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Abstract 
This study examines the gay liberation movement in Los Angeles County through the lens of 
housing rights. It illustrates how sexual justice activism evolved in tandem with the fates of the welfare 
state and urban politics. Like racial minorities, queers have been stymied by economic barriers. Beginning 
in the 1930s, federal housing agencies established “family” requirements to housing subsidies, which the 
state defined through biology or marriage. In L.A. County, activists worked to overcome this 
heteronormative barrier at the grassroots and within the political establishment. Binding gay liberation to 
economic and family justice, queers opened housing shelters and social service programs. This activism 
relied on public financing from the state. Moreover, like the Moral Majority, activists cast gay liberation in 
pro-family terms in order to win political support. This strategy encouraged the definition of family to 
change. By the end of the 1970s, housing policies at local and national levels recognized the pluralism of 
family life, revealing the covert success of gay liberation in public policy. While this was a remarkable 
achievement, gay liberation fell victim to urban austerity politics. Beginning with the 1978 California Tax 
Revolt, this movement encouraged privatization and public disinvestment in cities. Austerity degraded the 
welfare state and eliminated vital urban programs, worsening the urban crisis. In response to the crisis, the 
political geography of gay liberation in L.A. shifted to narrower contexts. Activists attempted to solve urban 
problems by incorporating a new city and relying on the private sector to solve public problems. By 1986, 
development and business interests had replaced the state as the chief benefactor of queer activism. While 
often examined in isolation, this project binds the histories of sexuality, the welfare state, and urban politics 
together to show their interconnectedness. 
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Introduction: Gay Liberation and Urban Crisis  
In the summer of 1975, organizers from the Gay Community Services Center (GCSC) submitted a 
grant for $75,000 to the Los Angeles County Community Development Commission. Lesbians and gays, 
they argued, suffered from high rates of “hospitalization, imprisonment, and suicide” because they lacked 
key social services. For example, they revealed that, “almost on a daily basis,” they were “contacted by 
human service workers searching for housing for gay clients.” Without homes, queers were less likely to 
attain decent employment or healthcare. Since many lesbians and gays had been abandoned by their 
biological families, moreover, they lacked emotional “stability.” Such marginalization created “high-risk 
communities” which cost “the taxpayer large sums of public funds” and exacerbated urban problems. Queer 
activists offered a way out: if funded by the county, they could develop “warm, supportive, homelike” 
housing shelters, employment training programs, and free healthcare initiatives. By reaching out to the 
region’s most marginalized populations, they would make “a direct impact on the general welfare of L.A. 
County.”1 Aiding the application was a letter from County Supervisor Edmund D. Edelman. The GCSC, he 
wrote, “provided badly needed human services” to a “vulnerable population.” Pledging his “full support,” 
he argued that queer activism was “worthy of County investment.”2 Within a month the grant was approved; 
it began a trend. Over the next few years, the GCSC received on average $350,000 in annual public funds.3 
Harnessing state resources for queer purposes, activists tied gay rights to the welfare state in order to launch 
their own war on poverty.  
This dissertation charts the evolving political geography of gay liberation in L.A. County over three 
decades. While I expected to write a grassroots narrative, research yielded a more complex story. In search 
of public financing, queer Angelenos gained access to political power and public funding with surprising 
speed. In the process, they tied gay liberation to larger movements for economic justice, destabilized 
                                                          
1 Gay Community Services Center general revenue sharing grant, 14 March 1975, GLCSC, box 11, folder 34. 
2 Ed Edelman To Whom It May Concern, March 1975. GLCSC, box 10, folder 24. 
3 Gay Community Services Center funding report, 6 October 1983. EDE, box 24, folder 4. 
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heteronormative understandings of family, and reshaped liberalism in multicultural ways. While they 
achieved meaningful results, activists won recognition at the exact moment when cities and welfare 
programs came under sustained attack. Thus, gay liberation was shaped by larger urban political boundaries. 
Amid urban privatization, the movement in L.A. County noticeably transformed. While activists utilized 
public resources to fund social services in the 1970s, urban austerity led them towards the private 
marketplace by the mid-1980s. In the final analysis, the fates of gay liberation and the American city were 
remarkably intertwined. 
 
Queer Metropolitan Power in Los Angeles  
 Unlike other queer urban histories, this study utilizes a metropolitan scale. Rather than focus on 
city advancements, I examine county breakthroughs in Los Angeles. In his study of Chicago, Timothy 
Stewart-Winter argued that “the path of gays and lesbians to political power led through city hall.” Thanks 
to pragmatic alliances with African Americans, queer Chicagoans gained “clout” with elected leaders and 
became active players in city politics.4 For decades, historians have situated lesbian and gay stories within 
such city boundaries, but L.A. encourages a different spatial narrative.5 Unlike activists in Chicago, New 
York, or San Francisco, queer Angelenos bypassed city hall for county power. In L.A., gay liberation won 
political recognition at the metropolitan level first. As a result, activists were provided unusual levels of 
political and financial power which differentiated queer acitivsm in L.A. from other cities and regions.   
 In the 1970s, queers found themselves geographically situated in the right place at the right time. 
Tom Sitton has rightly concluded that power in L.A. has historically resided with the county, not the city. 
Unlike the City Council, the five-person County Board of Supervisors controlled vast sums of funds and 
                                                          
4 Timothy Stewart-Winter, Queer Clout: Chicago and the Rise of Gay Politics (Philadelphia: The University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 1. 
5 Examples include: George Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male 
World, 1890-1940 (New York Basic Books, 1995); Nan Alamilla Boyd, Wide-Open Town: A History of Queer San 
Francisco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Marc Stein, City of Sisterly and Brotherly Loves: 
Lesbian and Gay Philadelphia, 1945-1972 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004); Daniel Hurewitz, 
Bohemian Los Angeles and the Making of Modern Politics (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2007); and 
Stewart-Winter, Queer Clout.  
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faced fewer bureaucratic entanglements. While major funding decisions required a three-person majority 
vote, individual supervisors were given enormous discretionary powers within their districts.6 Since the 
county was responsible for the bulk of social services, moreover, it controlled the majority of financial 
resources. The population of L.A. County (roughly the size of Ohio) insured it a steady stream of federal 
dollars through urban renewal and War on Poverty initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, county 
supervisors were given near carte blanche in neighborhoods lacking municipal governments. These 
unincorporated areas, it was understood, lacked the means to generate revenue and provide services. 
Accordingly, they received top priority within discretionary budgets. These contours of county government 
aided the development of gay liberation.  
Beginning in the 1960s, neighborhoods in present-day West Hollywood became identifiably queer. 
According to historian Martin Meeker, queers migrated to L.A. in search of “imagined communities” of 
acceptance.7 Once arrived, scores of lesbians and gays flocked to West Hollywood to escape the jurisdiction 
of the hostile Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).8 Many decided to stay, especially low-income 
renters, since “speculative developers” had constructed “hastily built ‘dingbat’ apartments” which were 
nonetheless affordable.9 Moreover, even for those who lived elsewhere in the metropolis, the Greater 
Hollywood area became a queer capitol: bars, political clubs, and social service agencies brought queers 
from throughout the county to this unincorporated area of the Third Supervisorial District. The growing 
queer presence offered political opportunities. The “sultanic [sic] power” of a single county supervisor, one 
man surmised, included “hundreds of appointments” and “appropriations totaling $2.6 billion.” Perhaps, he 
speculated, “gays of vision” could utilize county resources to “combat drug abuse, open halfway houses for 
                                                          
6 See Tom Sitton, The Courthouse Crowd: Los Angeles County Government, 1850-1950 (Los Angeles: The 
Historical Society of Southern California 2013). 
7 See Martin Meeker, Contacts Desired: Gay and Lesbian Communications and Community, 1940s-1970s (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
8 See Hurewitz, Bohemian Los Angeles and the Making of Modern Politics and Lillian Faderman & Stuart Timmons, 
Gay L.A.: A History of Sexual Outlaws, Power Politics, and Lipstick Lesbians (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 
9 Moira Rachel Kenney, Mapping Gay L.A.: The Intersection of Place and Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 2001), 46. 
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the homeless, and develop employment programs for the jobless.” 10 Upon the election of Ed Edelman in 
1974, this prophecy was fulfilled. For a brief but important moment, activists benefited from impressive 
levels of public financing from county programs. The future of gay liberation thus rested in the fate of the 
metropolitan welfare state. By framing gay rights within a metropolitan context, this study complicates 
existing narratives of gay liberation, American politics, and urban history. 
 
Housing, Liberalism, and the Politics of Family   
Housing concerns encouraged activists in Los Angeles to frame gay liberation as both an economic 
justice and pro-family movement, which facilitated breakthroughs within the liberal establishment. Like 
black power, “gay liberation” could be a plastic concept.11 Since its meanings shifted from place to place 
and person to person, providing a singular definition of the movement has proven difficult. Scholars have 
mainly focused on the cultural impact of gay liberation, which increased queer visibility and discourses in 
American society. Yet, they have often minimized connections between gay liberation and economic 
justice. According to Timothy Stewart-Winter, activists “focused in the 1970s on gaining civil liberties and 
rights based protections grounded in sexual identity” but “rarely raised explicit critiques of economic 
inequality.”12 Similarly, Phil Tiemeyer concluded that “gay liberation had divergent priorities, since certain 
members of the community…were often more concerned with liberating their libidos from homophobia 
than rectifying economic injustices.”13 In their quest for housing, queer Angelenos constantly connected 
sexuality with economic rights. Moreover, whether at the grassroots or within the political establishment, 
housing activism lured queers into a necessary confrontation with the state over the meaning of family. 
This confrontation was unavoidable. Unlike racial covenants, sexual housing discrimination was 
surreptitiously tied to family requirements. Beginning in the 1930s, both the Federal Housing 
                                                          
10 “L.A. Gays Win the EDE,” The Advocate, 4 December 1974. EES, folder 2. 
11 I am borrowing from Robert Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 218. 
12 Stewart-Winter, Queer Clout, 186. 
13 Phil Tiemeyer, Plane Queer: Labor, Sexuality, and AIDS in the History of Male Flight Attendants (Berkeley: The 
University of California Press, 2013), 116. 
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Administration (FHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) established marital 
and/or biological requirements which barred queers from housing subsidies. According to historian Gail 
Radford, “it was taken for granted that applicants live in what was then regarded as an optimal family unit 
consisting of mother, father, and children-no more and no less.”14 Housing subsidies, in other words, were 
reserved for heteronormative nuclear families. They composed but one ingredient to the development of 
what historian Margot Canaday has called the “straight state.”15 Amid the postwar suburban development 
boom, heteronormative housing policies continued to shape metropolitan landscapes. Historian Clay 
Howard concluded that, in the California Bay Area, developers divided the metropolis into “straight” 
suburbs and queer urban cores. This increased economic disparities between queer and straight 
communities.16 Thus, as they battled for access to housing, queers had no choice but to engage with the 
volatile politics of American family. 
Narratives of postwar family politics have typically focused on conservative perspectives. In 
reaction to feminism, abortion, and gay rights, conservatives cast themselves as family warriors and helped 
create the New Right. Business interests, evangelical leaders, and grassroots activists came together to 
defeat the Equal Rights Amendment, reshape the Republican Party, and advocate a “politics of morality.”17 
For many of these activists, gay liberation was especially alarming. Queers struck many as antithetical to 
family life. By the end of the 1970s, Miami resident Anita Bryant, a Christian singer from Oklahoma, came 
to symbolize the pro-family crusade against lesbians and gays. Bryant’s definition of family was based on 
“strict biblical doctrine” and emphasized biology and marriage.18 Jerry Falwell, a rising evangelical 
                                                          
14 Gail Radford, Modern Housing for America: Policy Struggles in the New Deal Era (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 166. 
15 Margot Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009). 
16 Clayton Howard, “Building a ‘Family Friendly’ Metropolis: Sexuality, the State, and Postwar Housing Policy,” 
Journal of Urban History (2013), and The Closet and the Cul de Sac: Sex, Politics, and Suburbanization in Postwar 
California (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming). 
17 See Daniel K. Williams, God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010); J. Brooks Flippen, Jimmy Carter, the Politics of Family, and the Rise of the Religious Right (Athens: 
The University of Georgia Press, 2011); and Robert Self, All in the Family: The Realignment of American 
Democracy since the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012). 
18 Williams, God’s Own Party, 148. 
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celebrity and political figure, was even more specific: “The family,” he wrote, “is the God-ordained 
institution of marriage of one man and one woman together for a lifetime with their biological or adopted 
children.”19 When they learned that officials in Miami had authorized an ordinance against sexual 
discrimination, activists like Bryant and Falwell devoted themselves against gay rights. Importantly, they 
saw their struggle as pro-family, not anti-queer. By the end of the decade, conservatives coalesced to form 
the Moral Majority, which lobbied public officials on behalf of biblical family principles. While these 
actions are well known, historians have paid less attention to the discourse of family among liberals and 
within gay liberation. 
By casting gay liberation as pro-family, queer Angelenos redefined familial definitions at both the 
grassroots and the within the liberal establishment. Ironically, when it came to family, most liberals agreed 
with Anita Bryant and Jerry Falwell. Hoping to make the “idealized nuclear family attainable for more 
Americans,” historian Robert Self argued, political leaders and policymakers developed “breadwinner 
liberalism.”20 As Great Society programs took form, historian Marisa Chappell elaborated, “the antipoverty 
coalition remained wedded to a particular model of family that was already unrealistic by the 1960s: the 
male-breadwinner, female-homemaker ideal.”21 Scholars have explored queer community-building in the 
1960s and 1970s, but these efforts also impacted a larger discourse on family.22 In fact, queer family 
legitimacy was a goal of gay liberation. In Out of the Closets: Voices of Gay Liberation, Karla Jay and 
Allen Young suggested that “gayness and gay liberation affects all people, whatever their primary sexual 
orientation.” As a struggle against homophobia and sexism, gay liberation would destabilize existing 
                                                          
19 Flippen, Jimmy Carter, the Politics of Family, and the Rise of the Religious Right, 56. 
20 Self, All in the Family, 4. 
21 Marisa Chappell, The War on Welfare: Family, Poverty, and Politics in Modern America (Philadelphia: The 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 2-3. 
22 See John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United 
States, 1940-1970 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983); Allan Bérubé, Coming Out Under Fire: The 
History of Gay Men and Women in World War II (New York: Free Press, 1990); Lillian Faderman, Odd Girls and 
Twilight Lovers: A History of Lesbian Life in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1991); and Elizabeth Kennedy & Madeline Davis, Boots of Leather, Slippers of Gold: The History of a Lesbian 
Community (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
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notions of sex, gender, and family.23 To this point, Carl Wittman predicted in his influential “Gay 
Manifesto” that gay liberation would create “new pluralistic, role-free social structures.” Rather than mimic 
heteronormative models of family, “liberation for gay people [required] defining for themselves how and 
with whom they live.”24 While this struck some as a radical idea in 1969, in fact it built upon a decades-
long quest for queer legitimacy which has been well-documented by Daniel Rivers and Heather Murray.25  
 Within queer housing shelters called “liberation houses,” lesbians and gays redefined family. 
Coming out, especially for young people, risked abandonment and rejection. Housing programs celebrated 
alternative family structures which, importantly, did not resemble heteronormative models. Families might 
consist of two partners, but maybe more; childrearing might be a priority in some, but not in others; in some 
cases, individuals might belong to multiple families simultaneously. Within grant applications to county 
officials, activists stressed queer family structures. According to one organizer, queers sometimes avoided 
“the term family” since it could often be “a coercive word.” Yet, houses were “somewhere where we took 
care of each other and assumed responsibility for each other.” After some reflection, another admitted “we 
ran [liberation houses] like a family…it was more than a homeless shelter.”26 Here was a grassroots pro-
family politics of the left. In claiming the right to organize their families as they saw fit, queers demonstrated 
that the 1970s did not belong to the Moral Majority. Moreover, in highlighting housing and family, activists 
secured breakthroughs within the liberal establishment.  
Economic and emotional needs framed gay rights in ways which encouraged liberals to expand 
their tents. During the 1970s, liberal urban policies offered surprising opportunities which shaped the 
political geography of gay liberation. The “long War on Poverty,” continued to evolve with the 
                                                          
23 Karla Jay & Allen Young (eds), Out of the Closet: Voices of Gay Liberation (New York: New York University 
Press, 1972, 1992), viii-ix. 
24 Carl Wittman, “A Gay Manifesto” in Jay & Young (eds), Out of the Closet: Voices of Gay Liberation, 331. 
25 Heather Murray, Not in This Family: Gays and the Meaning of Kinship in Postwar North America (Philadelphia: 
The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Daniel Rivers, Radical Relations: Lesbian Mothers, Gay Fathers, and 
Their Children (Chapel-Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 
26 Don Kilhefner oral history, interviewed by Ian M. Baldwin, West Hollywood, California, 2 February 2014 
(hereafter Kilhefner OH); Jon Platania oral history, interviewed by Ian M. Baldwin, Berkeley, California, 3 March 
2014 (Hereafter Platania OH). 
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Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) and the Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) program. Both products of the Nixon-Ford era, these empowered communities at the expense of 
“big government.” Local officials, it was reasoned, could better determine community needs than 
technocrats in Washington, D.C. In Watts and East L.A., African American and Chicano activists utilized 
CETA and CDBG programs to improve housing, secure employment, and offer healthcare services.27 
Likewise, queers used county funds to operate six housing shelters and the Gay Community Services Center 
(GCSC). Queer relationships with mainstream Democrats forced liberalism to change. Locally, liberals 
came to view sexual discrimination alongside racial discrimination. Avoiding moral pitfalls, liberals like 
Supervisor Edelman and Mayor Tom Bradley spoke a language of economic and pro-family gay rights. 
This strategy abetted national change in the Presidential Administration of Jimmy Carter. In 1977, HUD 
changed the definition of family to recognize any “stable” relationship and in 1980 Carter’s White House 
Conference on American Families announced no singular definition of family was possible. Far from 
“splintering” liberalism, gay liberation helped make the welfare state more responsive to the multicultural 
needs of its citizens.28 As activists adopted liberal tactics, liberalism adopted elements of gay liberation. 
 The political nature of queer activism in L.A. County complicates current historiography on gay 
liberation. Scholars have characterized gay politics in the 1970s in phases: by 1972 “gay liberation” was 
eclipsed by “gay liberalism,” they insist.29 Yet, in L.A., that transition was not so apparent. “We were anti-
establishment,” activist Don Kilhefner explained to me. “But, strategically, if we were going to make this 
revolution work, we were going to have to shift gears. The question became, how do we finance this radical 
movement?” In his mind, he never stopped promoting gay liberation.30 Much like other radicals and leftists, 
                                                          
27 See Robert Bauman, Race and the War on Poverty: From Watts to East L.A. (Norman: The University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2008) and See Donna Murch, Living for the City: Migration, Education, and the Rise of the Black 
Panther Party in Oakland, California (Chapel-Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
28 This supports Jonathan Bell’s notion of “mosaic liberalism” in Bell, California Crucible: The Forging of 
American Liberalism (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 9. 
29 On “gay liberalism,” Marc Stein, Rethinking the Gay and Lesbian Movement (New York: Routledge, 2012) and 
Christina B. Hanhardt, Safe Space: Gay Neighborhood History and the Politics of Violence (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2013), 84. 
30 Kilhefner OH. 
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queers utilized liberal tools pragmatically.31 Moreover, focusing on the thread of family reworks the 
temporal boundaries of the movement. In her examination of AIDS and politics, historian Jennifer Brier 
claimed that “gay liberation remained central to gay and lesbian life into the 1980s.”32 This study supports 
that conclusion. Long after the demise of gay liberation fronts, the project of queer family legitimization 
remained central to gay politics in L.A. 
 
Queers, Urban Policy, and Austerity  
 When queers tied themselves to county programs in Los Angeles, they intertwined gay liberation 
with metropolitan urban policy. Like activists in Chicago, lesbians and gays “claimed the right to the city.”33 
As long as those urban initiatives were publically funded, queers could count on stability. Yet, they gained 
access to programs which were soon to come under sustained attack. Urban historians have shown how 
industrial disinvestment and the privatization of social services contributed to an “urban crisis” in the 1940s 
and 1950s. The crisis disproportionately impacted racial minorities, whose fates relied on urban growth and 
services.34 A similar fate befell queer activists in the 1970s and 1980s. Like a tsunami, the urban crisis hit 
cities in multiple waves. Beginning with the 1978 Tax Revolt, a new and devastating wave of austerity 
                                                          
31 In fact, there has been a long history of “left-liberal” cooperation. See Doug Rossinow, Visions of Progress: The 
Left-Liberal Tradition in America (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) and Shana Bernstein, 
Bridges of Reform: Interracial Civil Rights Activism in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
32 Jennifer Brier, Infectious Ideas: U.S. Political Responses to the AIDS Crisis (Chapel-Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2009), 5. 
33 Stewart-Winter, Queer Clout, 72. 
34 See Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1983); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in 
Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Becky M. Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and 
Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2002); Josh Sides, L.A. City Limits: African American Los Angeles from the Great Depression to the Present 
(Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2003); Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern 
Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban 
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Press, 2008); Charlotte Brooks, Alien Neighbors, Foreign Friends: Asian Americans, Housing, and the 
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The University of Chicago Press, 2009); and N.D.B. Connolly, A World More Concrete: Real Estate and the 
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derailed the trajectory of gay liberation in L.A. County. In response, queers inadvertently embraced the 
same privatization impulses which threatened them.    
Beginning with Proposition 13, the “Tax Revolt” fundamentally altered municipal power in cities 
and counties in America. Seemingly a battle over property taxes, the Tax Revolt actually structurally 
thwarted municipal revenue generation in California. Soon other states, including Massachusetts, launched 
their own tax revolts modeled after Proposition 13.35 In L.A., the county entered a permanent budget crisis. 
Public disinvestment and the privatization of services led to increased unemployment and homelessness. 
Vital programs, such as CETA, were eliminated while others, like CDBG, were curtailed so drastically they 
became largely symbolic gestures.36 Despite claims to the contrary, the private marketplace proved ill-
equipped for metropolitan planning. For social justice activists, the austerity experiment caused a political 
crisis. In Oakland, black power advocates confronted a bittersweet paradox. They had entered the halls of 
power, Robert Self concluded, just as urban programs collapsed. As a result, “black power had no real 
chance of instantiation.”37 Gay liberation found itself equally altered by new fiscal and urban realities.   
In the face of austerity, queers turned towards the marketplace in search of private solutions to 
public problems. This shift altered the political geography of gay liberation in L.A., a transformation 
evidenced by the incorporation of West Hollywood in 1984. Whether labeled “suburban secession,” 
“metropolitan divergence,” or “sprawl,” municipal fragmentation hampered attempts to solve large urban 
crises. Metropolitan problems, Matthew Lassiter wisely pointed out, require metropolitan solutions.38 By 
retreating to the municipal boundaries of a new city, queers strengthened conservative assaults on county 
power. Moreover, they made gay rights compatible with the new urban marketplace. Scholars have shown 
how gentrification has arisen in politically surprising ways. In New York, Jane Jacobs and other “slow 
                                                          
35 See Lily Geismer, Don’t Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the Transformation of the Democratic Party 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
36 See David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Mark Blyth, 
Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
37 Self, American Babylon, 326-327. 
38 See Kruse, White Flight; Lassiter, The Silent Majority, 322-323; and Robert Fulton, The Reluctant Metropolis: 
The Politics of Urban Growth in Los Angeles (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
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growth activists” deployed New Left arguments against liberal urban programs, while queers in San 
Francisco and Washington, D.C. “reinforced the race and class stratification of postwar urban space” by 
“promoting and protecting gay neighborhoods.”39 Instead of blaming gentrification on insidious 
development interests, these scholars suggest it lay at the heart of modern liberation movements. West 
Hollywood strengthens these narratives.  
Without vital CETA and CDBG resources, activists sought private investment from development 
and corporate entities. In short order, business interests came to replace the state as the chief benefactor of 
queer activism. On the one hand, activists highlighted the sexual character of the new city: surely 
establishing a gay-friendly city spoke the pride elements within gay liberation. On the other, however, 
gentrified development eradicated the attention to economic justice within the movement. Boosters 
marketed the city as the capital of high-end retail, dining, and housing while progressive urban policies, 
namely rent control, slowly eroded. Reliant on private resources, queer activism evolved into a bipartisan 
attempt to make gay rights compatible with the marketplace. According to historian Lily Geismer, liberals 
relied upon “business interests to stimulate economic growth and shape tax policy” in the 1970s and 
1980s.40 The direction of West Hollywood mimicked and strengthened this trend. In the end, the city proved 
that queers could not run away from larger metropolitan problems. In connecting gay liberation to larger 
urban transformations, this study suggests that sexual and urban history be studied together in greater detail.  
 
Outline of the Dissertation  
 This dissertation relies on archival sources, oral histories, and theoretical tools from scholars of 
nationalism. I located queer voices in traditional and mainstream archival collections, which allowed me to 
present an outsider, and insider, narrative of L.A. politics. I utilized oral histories to present collective 
                                                          
39 Suleiman Osman, The Invention of Brownstown Brooklyn: Gentrification and the Search for Authenticity in 
Postwar New York (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 14-16; Christina B. Hanhardt, Safe Space: Gay 
Neighborhood History and the Politics of Violence (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 9; Kwame Holmes, 
“Chocolate to Rainbow City: The Dialects of Black and Gay Community Formation in Postwar Washington, D.C., 
1946-1978 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2011). 
40 Geismer, Don’t Blame Us, 252. 
12 
 
points-of-view and fill in critical archival gaps. Classical and recent nationalism studies provided theoretical 
frameworks for my research. In seeking place and politics, queers were not building nations. Still, they 
encountered similar dilemmas. Was gay liberation part of a larger movement? Was it exceptional, and thus 
incompatible with existing political structures? Like nationalists, queers answered these questions 
differently over time. “Traditions,” E.J. Hobsbawm reminded, might “appear to be old” but are in fact “quite 
recent…and often invented.” The most important aspect of creating a nation, Benedict Anderson elaborated, 
lay in the imagination. Groups of people first must believe that they are bound together before it can be so. 
Moreover, these processes were rarely static. Instead they constantly shifted.41 As the political geography 
of gay liberation shifted, spatial maps changed, and the notion of a “gay community” remained contested. 
Women and people of color influenced the direction of queer activism in L.A. County. However, 
within the establishment, political leaders were disproportionately white and male. While others have 
emphasized queer racial diversity at the grassroots, my research did not produce multicultural narratives.42 
Queer leaders supported racial justice and feminist movements, to be sure, but they sometimes struggled to 
adequately represent the marginalized. As much as they identified as radicals, gay leaders guarded keys to 
political power. Accordingly, my narrators are mostly white and male. I have attempted to balance this their 
perspectives by using archival records which offer more diverse voices. Letters to social service and 
political organizations, for instance, indicate that queer activism impacted men and women of diverse racial 
and ethnic backgrounds. Wherever possible, I emphasize these voices. Moreover, while gay liberation was 
not always welcoming to women, I highlight important exceptions. Lesbians like Jeanne Córdova (who 
shared Irish and Mexican heritage) and Valerie Terrigno (the first lesbian mayor in the nation) overcame 
considerable barriers to become political leaders in their own right. 
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Chapters explore the evolution of gay liberation thematically alongside urban change. While the 
first four chapters focus on queer breakthroughs within the liberal welfare state, the final three offer a 
declentionist narrative. In chapter one, I chart homophile alliances with liberal allies in the 1960s. 
Moreover, through grassroots initiatives, lesbians and gays emphasized economic forms of sexual 
discrimination which cast queers alongside racial minorities. Both strategies enabled breakthroughs in the 
era of gay liberation. Chapter two focuses on housing activism in the early 1970s. In liberation houses 
queers emphasized poverty and constructed family environments which celebrated queerness. For lesbians 
and gays who had been abandoned by their biological families, these shelters provided much more than 
physical shelter. Housing activism blossomed into a larger social service strategy at the GCSC, the subject 
of chapter three. Organizers launched employment, healthcare, counseling, and prisoner/parolee programs 
which provided “womb to tomb” services. How were activists able to achieve so much? The answer is the 
subject of chapter four. Beginning at the local level, activists established political and financial relationships 
which extended the welfare state to lesbians and gays. Through public grants, gay liberation was publically 
funded and supported by mainstream liberals. Yet, beginning with the Tax Revolt, activists struggled to 
maintain social services amid budget freefalls, the subject of chapter five. By the early 1980s, austerity 
politics encouraged the political geography of gay liberation to change. Chapter six examines the 1984 
incorporation of West Hollywood, which fractured liberal metropolitan strategies and remade gay politics 
in market-friendly ways. Despite progressive promises, the final chapter shows how the city cultivated pro-
development policies which encouraged gentrification.  
   
Note on Naming 
In the process of researching and writing this dissertation, I learned a valuable lesson in anonymity. Unless 
names appeared in publication, or I gained explicit consent of use, all names have been removed or altered 
to protect privacy.  
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Chapter One: “Like Any Other Family, We Need Many Friends”: Movement 
Building in Great Society Los Angeles
 
“The Southern California Chapter [of the ACLU], with 
the largest membership in the country, has adopted an 
official policy on sex and civil liberties…It is a gain for 
Civil Rights.” 
-ONE, 1966  
 
“Racial revolutions continue within our midst. Another 
minority, this time sexual, is standing up to assert its 
dignity and to demand full equality.” 
-Gay Religious Liberals, 1970 
 
 In 1967 New York Times writer Webster Schott wrote of an issue that had “no place on the Great 
Society’s list of priorities.” Indeed, it was “a subject most Americans [didn’t] want to think about, much 
less discuss.” The subject was “some 4-million homosexuals…demanding rights.” Schott believed 
homosexuality was “deviant,” yet he criticized sexual discrimination. Because they could not get married, 
he pointed out, queers “do not share household expenses, file joint income tax returns, or enjoy joint 
ownership of property.” These “public policies discriminate against and virtually disenfranchise them 
economically.” As with African Americans, he urged the nation to “make life more humane for our 4-
million confirmed male homosexuals.” Schott did not acknowledge the existence of lesbians. Connecting 
discrimination with urban crisis, he reasoned: “If Americans want integration instead of burning cities, 
Negroes must live next door. If we want heterosexuals instead of deviants, we must make life easier for 
them.” In Los Angeles, he reported, “the homosexual is moving above ground and organizing.” The 
homosexual magazine One [sic] claims a national circulation of 5,000” while “the Los Angeles Free Press 
[sic], an anti-establishment weekly edited by affluent hippies, carries homosexual advertising.” The city 
was also home to queer organizations, clubs, bars, and even religious institutions.1 A sexual movement 
could no longer be ignored.  
                                                          
1 Webster Schott, “Civil Rights and the Homosexual,” New York Times, 12 November, 1967, 271. 
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 By the 1960s, in fact, California was a very queer state. Scholars have focused mostly on San 
Francisco, where queers fought everyday struggles for space, established political and religious 
organizations, and developed networks of communication.2 Los Angeles has been included in homophile 
narratives, but to a lesser extent. Beginning in the 1950s, Angelenos established queer organizations which 
built upon the city’s leftist bohemian traditions.3 Throughout the 1960s, however, the city witnessed spatial 
and political developments which have not been fully appreciated. Often with the assistance of oppositional 
forces, Angelenos claimed space and forged political alliances which lasted decades. While others have 
revealed that queer ties with the left, this chapter highlights inroads within Great Society liberalism.4 These 
proved important to gay liberation in the 1970s. The diverse mosaic of L.A. proved an ideal setting for 
queer coalitional politics. According to Shana Bernstein, “Los Angeles’s cultural and political history made 
it a fertile place for civil rights activism” which was pragmatic.5 By the 1960s, Robert Bauman argued, 
“local neighborhoods and communities in Los Angeles implemented their own versions of the War on 
Poverty” which addressed specific local needs.6 While queers did not join the War on Poverty to the same 
degree, they did follow a similar trajectory which laid the groundwork for the expansion of the War on 
Poverty in the 1970s. 
 
Making Connections: Civil Rights and the Homophile Movement  
California was an important state to the developing homophile movement. Pioneering lesbian and 
gay organizations were founded in both Los Angeles and San Francisco which shaped the national 
                                                          
2 See Nan Alamilla Boyd, Wide-Open Town: A History of Queer San Francisco (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2003); Marcia M. Gallo, Different Daughters: A History of the Daughters of Bilitis and the Rise of the 
Lesbian Rights Movement (Emeryville: Seal Press, 2007); and Martin Meeker, Contacts Desired: Gay and Lesbian 
Communications and Community, 1940s-1970s (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
3 Two influential works on queer L.A. are Lillian Faderman & Stuart Timmons, Gay L.A.: A History of Sexual 
outlaws, Power Politics, and Lipstick Lesbians (New York: Basic Books, 2006) and Daniel Hurewitz, Bohemian Los 
Angeles and the Making of Modern Politics (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2007). 
4 See Emily Hobson, “Imagining Alliance: Queer Anti-Imperialism and Race in California, 1966-1990” (PhD 
Dissertation: University of Southern California, 2009). 
5 Shana Bernstein, Bridges of Reform: Interracial Civil Rights Activism in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 6-7. 
6 Robert Bauman, Race and the War on Poverty: From Watts to East L.A. (Norman: The University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2008), 5. 
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movement. Cities like Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York were important, but Golden State activists 
formed the vanguard. The overrepresentation of California activists led one lesbian observer to ask, “What 
is it in the air out there…which inspires such battle?”7 Southern California was especially important. “By 
the beginning of 1953,” John D’Emilio described, a “network of [homophile] groups stretched…from San 
Diego to the beach communities north of Santa Monica and inland to San Bernardino.”8 The heart of this 
network was Los Angeles. For gay men, the founding of the Mattachine Society and ONE, Incorporated 
expanded opportunities for communications and community-building. Lesbian women also benefited from 
ONE, as well as from the Daughters of Bilitis (DOB), a San Francisco organization which established a 
branch in L.A. So too, racial minorities could be found within each organization. Amid the backdrop of the 
civil rights, homophiles connected sexuality to a broad movement for social justice.9 
 Harry Hay proved most instrumental to the 1950 founding of Mattachine. After migrating with his 
parents from England to the U.S., he settled in L.A. as World War II erupted. By that time, he was married 
to Anita Platky and a devoted member of the American Communist Party (CPUSA). Daniel Hurewitz 
suggested that Hay’s spatial location contributed to his worldview. A “child of Edendale,” Hay 
“experienced the same conjunction of artistry and leftist politics that defined the neighborhood” of Silver 
Lake for decades.10 From radical artists to communists, Silver Lake proved to be a favorable environment 
for boundary-pushing. Hay’s politics have led historians to associate Mattachine with a radical political 
tradition. CPUSA exposure provided a “secret, cell-like structure that protected members from exposure.” 
At the same time, the CPUSA was often unhelpful. Sexual oppression, some communists reasoned, was 
inconsequential to larger economic revolution.11 This logic, combined with a dose of leadership 
                                                          
7 On homophile Philadelphia, see Marc Stein, City of Sisterly and Brotherly Loves: Lesbian and Gay Philadelphia, 
1945-1972 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004); Lorraine Hansberry Nemerov as quoted in Gallo, 
Different Daughters, 23. 
8 John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 
1940-1970 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 71. 
9 See Gallo, Different Daughters; Craig Loftin, Masked Voices: Gay Men and Lesbians in Cold War America 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012); Meeker, Contacts Desired; and Stein, City of Sisterly and 
Brotherly Loves. 
10 Hurewitz, Bohemian Los Angeles, 237. 
11 D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities, 58-59. 
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homophobia, led Hay to suppress his sexuality. But his move to Silver Lake was an opportunity to explore, 
and by 1950 he associated with a cadre of male friends and lovers, including Chuck Rowland, Dale 
Jennings, and Rudi Gernreich. These men comprised the core of Mattachine.  
 From the outset, organizers associated the group with other social movements. At the inaugural 
meeting, Hay expressed his belief that the organization was “historic in importance and magnitude,” but 
also noted a growing progressive atmosphere in Southern California. “Through forums and group 
discussions on social problems,” he explained, “the rehabilitation of social ethics have been increasing in 
quantity, in scope, and thus naturally in quality in the community in recent years.” Like other groups, 
Mattachine would “guarantee the basic and protected right to enter the front ranks of self-respecting 
citizenship” for sexual minorities.12 Hay spoke of both liberation and inclusion, strategies that could 
conflict. Mattachine was forged alongside other progressive groups which fused leftist and liberal political 
traditions. Shana Bernstein found pragmatic cooperation between Mexican, African, Jewish, and Japanese 
Americans of varying political persuasions. By the 1950s, these groups remained devoted to “earlier civil 
rights commitments despite their adoption of anticommunism.” While the language of the left had been 
muted, she suggested, a good portion of the Popular Front agenda from the 1930s and 1940s remained 
intact.13 Similarly, Doug Rossinow documented how “liberalism and the left…sprang from the same 
Enlightenment sources.” While historians have paid attention to divisions, “left-liberal” cooperation was 
commonplace.14 Queers fit within this tradition and emphasized layers discrimination, such as police 
harassment. 
While police brutality existed nationwide, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) exceled in 
the practice. By the 1950s, the LAPD earned a reputation for harsh crackdowns on minorities, leftists, and 
queers. Routine attacks on labor organizers, African and Mexican Americans, and gay bars exposed the 
                                                          
12 Harry Hay, opening remarks to the Mattachine Society. HHP, box 1, folder 4. 
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overzealous nature of the LAPD Vice Squad, which often made national news. The Sleepy Lagoon murder 
and the Zoot Suit Riots which followed in 1943 showcased the troubled relationship between law 
enforcement and Latinos, complicating wartime relations between the United States and Latin America. It 
also revealed coalitional activism in the city, as Latinos were supported by black, Filipino, and white 
activists.15 Whitney Strub argued that postwar obscenity ordinances were introduced in L.A. with the 
explicit purpose of limiting queer visibility and communications. While they hid under the guise of decency, 
these ordinances drove queers further underground and contributed to an “antigay moral panic.”16 
The “most pernicious method” of hunting gay men was entrapment. A small army of undercover 
officers patrolled gay bars in hopes of catching or inciting same-sex affections. These tactics became so 
common that “some undercover Vice Squad officers became known among gay men, who would caution 
one another about familiar faces.”17 Mattachine member Dale Jennings was entrapped in 1952, but fought 
the charges, claiming his rights had been violated. Harry Hay “saw the Jennings defense as another 
important opportunity to tie Mattachine to ‘fellow minorities’” and “even hired George Shibley, the lead 
attorney who had defended the youths in the Sleepy Lagoon case, to defend Jennings.”18 The surprising 
victory was a significant achievement for the two-year old Mattachine Society; membership in the 
organization grew quickly and leaders began lobbying local politicians. The pressures of Cold War 
anticommunism, however, prompted what some have called a “retreat to respectability.”19 Amid red and 
queer witch-hunts, Harry Hay was pressured out of Mattachine and new groups such as ONE, Incorporated 
and the Daughters of Bilitis (DOB) espoused liberal anticommunist politics. Yet, as Martin Meeker and 
Marcia Gallo argued, these organizations continued the important project of queer communications-
building. DOB’s The Ladder was “a means of sharing otherwise private thoughts and feelings, connecting 
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across miles, and breaking through isolation and fear” for scores of women.20 Such efforts reflected a 
strategy of “using respectability as a mask to hide a much more daring and creative approach.” Along with 
immigrant and racial groups, homophiles “sought to change American culture as much as they expected 
that the culture would change them.”21 “Wearing masks, Craig Loftin elaborated, signaled queer “adaptation 
and resilience” not “capitulation to the whims of a hostile society.”22 This strategy mirrored other activists 
who cloaked leftist politics in liberal language. In response to House Un-American Activities Committee 
(HUAC) red-baiting and LAPD crackdowns, homophiles adhered to the anticommunist landscape.  
 An offshoot of Mattachine, ONE was organized in 1952 and published a monthly newsletter of the 
same name. Politically, the organization was moderate. Founders included liberal Democrats like Jim 
Kepner as well as “avid Republicans” such as Don Slater, W. Dorr Legg, and Dale Jennings (of Mattachine 
fame).23 In other ways, however, ONE proved progressive. Unlike Mattachine, women played an active 
role within the organization. Lesbians such as Joan Corbin, Stella Rush, Helen Sandoz, and Betty Perdue 
helped shape the organization and wrote for the newsletter. A leader within the organization, Rush was a 
regular contributor to ONE for over seven years and proved “instrumental in the expansion southward of 
the DOB.” In the L.A. DOB chapter, Rush cosponsored “local homophile forums and meetings” which 
pushed the homophile movement to address sexism in addition to homophobia.24 Within ONE, a liberal 
civil rights discourse was presented to readers. The magazine promoted two objectives: exposure and social 
integration. It was crucial to “publish and disseminate a magazine dealing primarily with homosexuality” 
while also fostering “aid in the social integration and rehabilitation of the sexual variant.” The magazine 
was meant to be a first step, while a social services division would provide legal, employment, and housing 
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21 Meeker, Contacts Desired, 33. 
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counseling. To assist in this task, ONE worked with the Southern California Branch of the American Civil 
Liberties Union (SCACLU). Since “people ask ONE for legal advice repeatedly,” one article explained, the 
SCACLU would “refer fine and friendly attorneys” who could offer assistance. ONE editors explained that 
it was crucial to establish relationships with liberal allies. “Like any other family,” they reasoned, “we need 
many friends.”25 Friendships with liberal groups grew in importance throughout the 1960s, often with the 
unintended assistance of anti-queer activists.  
 
The “Homosexual Blot”: Backlash and Space-Claiming in 1960s Hollywood 
 Queer efforts to join a progressive mosaic were assisted by an unlikely source in the early 1960s. 
Throughout the decade conservatives mounted attacks on identifiably queer spaces in Los Angeles, 
including Pershing Square and Hollywood. The latter became a battle of morality and urban space. In their 
efforts to rid L.A. of “sexual deviates,” however, conservatives unintentionally drew liberals and 
homophiles closer together. Designating Hollywood as a “homosexual blot,” conservatives created a 
cognitive sexual map of L.A. that only partially represented reality. By the mid-1960s, Hollywood and its 
western unincorporated area were growing in queer population. In fact, it was the homophobic practices of 
the LAPD which encouraged many to move west outside of LAPD jurisdiction. But queers, like most 
Angelenos, lived in multiple neighborhoods. Downtown remained an important site for queers despite harsh 
policing. The growing presence of lesbians and gay men in Long Beach provided ample evidence of queer 
penetrations within suburban neighborhoods. In beach communities such as Venice and Santa Monica (and, 
further south, Laguna Beach), queer men and women could be located without much difficulty. Imagined 
communities and maps were nonetheless important. As Moira Rachel Kenney suggested, “place-claiming-
the appropriation of physical, social, and mental places by marginalized groups-…is the central strategic 
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mechanism of social movements.”26 The sexual map of L.A. was drawn by queers and homophobic 
opponents who imaginatively confined queers to the Hollywood area.  
Conservative activists found a powerful ally in a newspaper named Citizen-News. Beginning in 
1962, the paper alerted readers to the growing presence of “sex deviates” in the Hollywood area. Citizen-
News was one of many papers owned by Beverly Hills businessman and Republican Party patron David B. 
Heyler. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Heyler amassed a small media empire in L.A. worth 
approximately $4.5 million and with a circulation of approximately 450,000. In addition to promoting 
Richard Nixon (who more than once invited Heyler to private fundraisers), his papers also supported the 
local chapter of the John Birch Society.27 Unabashedly right-wing, Citizen-News “supported what it 
believed to be right, and opposed what it believed to be wrong, regardless of politics or pressure.”28 Writers 
dealt flippantly with journalistic standards, leading one historian to characterize its reports as 
“muckraking.”29 Still, it addressed genuine anxieties. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, conservative and 
religious leaders stoked fears of sexual perversion and child endangerment. The John Birch Society found 
Southern California to be fertile ground for a new and more “paranoid” conservative discourse.30 By the 
end of the 1950s, Michelle Nickerson found “a vast [conservative] subculture with its own literature, radio 
broadcasts, workshops, home-based study groups, speaking circuits, and, by 1961, bookstores” in Greater 
Los Angeles.31 A powerful evangelical movement led in part by Billy Graham supported this network.32 
Alongside communism, gender and sexual change motivated conservatives to action. Convinced that 
secular humanism was taking hold of public education, parents were encouraged to connect issues of 
homosexuality, violent crime, and child molestation. Public service shorts such as Boys Beware (a Southern 
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California production) warned parents against predatory gay men while local obscenity statutes and city 
ordinances conflated queers with child pornography.33 Citizen-News entered the fight early.  
In January of 1960, an editorial urged parents to support a resolution adopted by the National 
Religious Publicity Council, which decried gratuitous sex and violence in popular culture. “Sordid” film 
content relied “upon filth for sales,” one writer warned, and sought “to cater to those who like to wallow in 
filth for their own diversion.” This was dangerous for vulnerable youngsters.34 Two months later the paper 
called for a “parents’ crusade to combat repulsive indecency’” in the “den of filth” that was Hollywood.35 
Although “most young people have enough sense to be bored by [pornography] after the first few 
exposures,” the “explosion of open pornography” was dangerous.36 Solutions to the problem began with 
strict moral discipline and the moral public policies.37 It also required an appreciation for traditional gender 
roles. Despite feminist rumbles, Citizen-News assured that a “Woman’s place [was] still in the home.” 
Efforts to make the “gals really believe that they can hang onto all the sugar-and-spice and usurp the 
gentlemen,” one writer crowed, were “kind of pathetic.” Americans needed to embrace sex differences, not 
run away from them.38 Tucked neatly between stories of “How the Reds are Behind Anti-Semitism” and 
proclamations that the “Birchers are not Extremists,” readers were being prepped for a cultural war over 
the family.39 The campaign against queers was but one front. 
 The paper was direct and to the point: “Now is the time for Greater Hollywood to do something 
about [the] very ugly problem [concerning] the large concentration of homosexuals,” editors explained. 
These “sex deviates” had grown in population and caused neihgborhood deterioration. Residents and 
tourists could no longer avoid “the nauseating sights.” Pornography, prostitution, crime, and the loss of 
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property values plagued the area because it had become “a mecca for queers.” Writers acknowledged the 
work of LAPD Chief William Parker, whose “Hollywood Division’s vice squad steadily works to enforce 
the laws that curb homosexuals.”40 Indeed, it would have been difficult to overlook Parker’s escalating 
crackdown. At his urging, the city passed a harsh resolution giving the LAPD draconian discretion. “For 
Los Angeles’ gay men and lesbians,” Lillian Faderman and Stuart Timmons concluded, “life became much 
harder with the advent of Chief Parker.”41 One loyal reader celebrated Parker’s antics, concluding that 
Angelenos had “a police chief who is the tops!”42 Still, police repression was insufficient. The editorial staff 
reasoned that homosexuality was “a problem that citizens, schools, churches, the Hollywood Chamber of 
Commerce, [and] other groups and governmental officials other than police must assist in solving.” To 
safeguard the “interests of normal men, women and children,” the “entire community” needed to get 
involved. Editors promised that “several members of the staff” would work “in cooperation with community 
leaders, police and other governmental officials, [to] bring out the facts in a series of articles.” They would 
not rest “until Hollywood is freed of its homosexual blot.”43 
 Readers responded in a variety of ways. One identified as “DISGUSTED” lamented that 
Hollywood had been turned into a “gangland.” Queers had converted young people into “cursing, 
screaming, obnoxious teen-agers” who flouted sexual morality. DISGUSTED recommended that the LAPD 
enforce a permanent curfew, which would eliminate the street scene altogether.44 Mrs. Gloria Nelson 
enthusiastically endorsed the “fearless” campaign. She was overcome with “a burning desire to help make 
Hollywood clean again.” Although the police were on her side, the trouble came in legitimizing arrests. 
Several police officers had informed her that they were “not allowed to arrest sexual deviates unless they 
accost someone indecently, dress in female clothing, or are intoxicated and therefore disturbing the peace.” 
Since “deviates [were] reasonably careful not to beak any of these laws,” she pointed out, “they [were] free 
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to pollute our neighborhoods.” This strategy could be broken by systematic discrimination. “If the 
merchants of Hollywood, the entertainment industry, business, and the owners of income units,” she opined, 
“would cease selling [queers] products, serving them drinks or food, cease hiring them, in short, making it 
impossible for them to exist here,” the “cancer which grows in our midst” will be destroyed. If “other large 
cities in America” could solve their queer problems, she asked, “why not Los Angeles?”45 
 Not all readers agreed. J. Sutton believed Hollywood had become a cesspool, but offered a different 
reason. “An intelligent and thoughtful approach to what you call an ‘ugly problem,’” he suggested, “is not 
to assign more vice officers to ‘treat’ deviates…The ‘accosting and molesting’ you speak of is not done by 
the deviates, but by those red-blooded ‘normal’ teenagers whose parents fear will be harmed by perverts.” 
The problem was not queers, it was rambunctious teenagers. Editors maintained that the Hollywood 
“community will be served by first removing the concentration of sex deviates, young and old.”46 They also 
published a critique of Sutton from another reader. The wild teens in the area, he argued, “are obviously 
not the children of the good people.” Instead, they hailed “from many areas besides our own” in search of 
an “abundance of free entertainment supplied by the more extroverted homosexuals.” The root cause of 
Hollywood’s ugly problem remained the abundance of queers. “When ‘tolerance’ results in endangering 
our children,” he warned, “public examination and action is [sic] necessary.”47 The campaign in Hollywood 
dovetailed with simultaneous efforts to straighten Downtown. 
 Pershing Square was a central location for queer men since at least the 1930s. “Sailors and soldiers 
flocked” to the square, “known to be a pick-up area, and many more poured into the bar of the Biltmore, 
the elegant hotel facing the square.”48 Movement leaders Jim Kepner, Morris Kight, Don Slater, and Harry 
Hay all made contacts there. Kepner suggested the square “was known worldwide as a place where the gays 
went, the very center of what outlanders liked to call ‘the land of fruits and nuts.’”49 Much like Hollywood, 
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Pershing Square came under assault in the 1960s as a “beautification” campaign transformed public space. 
The Los Angeles Times boosted the effort. “No amount of sentimentalizing can change the fact that at 
present [Pershing Square] serves as a magnet for a criminal element, mostly homosexuals,” an article 
proclaimed. By “changing the planting, improving the lighting, and revising the sidewalks,” the space could 
be made open and “far easier to police.”50 Eradicating much of the vegetation in the area, Pershing Square 
was transformed into a panoptic space devoid of privacy. “The park is still there,” Kepner later bemoaned, 
“but it’s hardly Pershing Square anymore.” The transformation encouraged him, “along with most of the 
gay community, to move west.”51 Downtown success no doubt buoyed hopes for Hollywood. To the 
disappointment of anti-queer activists, however, the Hollywood campaign did not succeed. Instead, it 
strengthened relationships between queers and liberals.  
According to Judy Kutulas, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) branches were trailblazers for 
the national organization. Beginning in the 1930s, the Southern California branch (SCACLU) earned a 
reputation as “the most stable local branch” in the nation, and also as one of the most progressive. Founded 
with the help of socialist Upton Sinclair, the SCACLU was the “most radical of all the locals, and brought 
in the largest share of new members” in the 1950s and 1960s.52 ONE established a relationship with the 
branch in the 1950s and strengthened it amid the backdrop of the Hollywood harassment. The SCACLU 
was aware of Citizen-News, which routinely bashed the ACLU. One column suggested that “A.C.L.U. more 
appropriately stands for ‘All Communists Love Us’” and suggested giving the organization “so many 
Communists to defend that it gets sick of them.” Patriotic citizens ought to “make citizens arrests of 
Communists” and overwhelm the organization. Editors liked this plan, but warned that “citizen’s arrests 
are dangerous things to fool with.”53 The SCACLU monitored inflammatory rhetoric from the paper and 
gained an insider’s perspective when a Citizen-News employee contacted the local office. 
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“It seems to be the intention of my employer,” he reported, “to initiate a vicious and slanderous 
witch-hunt against the homosexual element of this community by using the language and semantic 
techniques of the John Birch Society.” He believed that owner David Heyler had “no motive for ‘queer-
hunting’” except “ruthless and coldblooded circulation-building.” The campaign was certain to bring 
deleterious effects. “I feel certain that the articles will be vicious, slanted, and directed toward a 
predetermined conclusion,” he concluded. In bringing the matter to the SCACLU, he suggested that 
homosexuals were in need of civil rights protection. “When an allegedly responsible newspaper misuses its 
freedom of the press to bring legal, social, and economic pressure against members of a minority group,” 
he underlined, “it abridges their civil rights as effectively as an act of unjust legislation. I need hardly point 
out the serious repercussions this could have in the form of police harassment and brutality, of which there 
has already been far too much.” He hoped the SCACLU could “bring this nonsense to a halt.”54 Noted 
columnist, Hollywood resident, and political chameleon Paul Coates also chastised anti-queer rhetoric as 
well. Coates disapproved of homosexuality, but the actions of Citizen-News were deplorable. “We’re all 
grownups,” he opined. Queers were “hardly a situation about which we should get hysterical.” He went 
further: “There is something very callous or, I would prefer to think, very ignorant, about putting a group 
label on these people as potential criminals and killers.”55 Coates had been one of the first to acknowledge 
the queers in Los Angeles.56 According to Whitney Strub, he utilized his columns and television program, 
Confidential File, to “repeatedly denounce homosexuality.”57 This makes his 1963 reprimanding of Citizen-
News significant. Queers, he argued, “are no more potential criminals and killers than any other sociological 
groups.” Echoing Webster Schott, he could not morally endorse queer behavior but did support civil rights 
protection.58 So did the SCACLU. 
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In the late 1950s, the organization drafted an open letter to congressional representatives in 
Washington, D.C. “More maligned in our society than even the Communist,” it read, “homosexuals stand 
alone as outcasts” and faced discrimination in housing, employment, and law enforcement. In “the 
American tradition,” the SCACLU urged protective legislation (this prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964).59 
The arrival of Vern and Bonnie Bullough pushed the organization further. An historian and sexologist, Vern 
held deep social justice convictions while Bonnie’s family confronted homophobic oppression and assisted 
lesbians in the 1940s.60 Both were active players in the SCACLU and Vern was elected its chairman. In 
1964 and 1965, as the nation’s attention focused on civil rights, SCACLU organizers wrote a policy 
statement concerning queers. Those “suspected, accused, or arrested on charges of sexual mis-conduct 
[sic],” Bullough charged, “find it difficult to gain employment and housing.”61 He concluded that “the right 
to privacy in sexual relations” was “a basic constitutional right.”62 While a branch proclamation, Bullough 
worked closely with national organizers, who adopted the SCACLU policy one year later.63 The Los 
Angeles Times reported that L.A. was the first to devise a “policy to protect the homosexual.”64 Amid civil 
rights advancements, ONE celebrated. “The largest ACLU branch in the country,” an article reported, has 
“adopted an official policy on Sex and Civil Liberties. It is a gain for Civil Rights.”65 The conservative 
assault on Hollywood aided this development. As late as 1984, writer and activist John Rechy recalled how 
“witch-hunts,” “police raids,” and the “inflammatory rhetoric of the Hollywood Citizen News [sic]” forced 
a “center of gay existence” to emerge in Hollywood.66 In imaginatively condemning Hollywood as a 
homosexual paradise, conservatives helped to make the area identifiably queer. 
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The ordeal also brought Homophiles into a larger discourse of civil liberties and human rights, 
which complicates existing legal narratives of sexuality in the 1960s. In examining the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Marc Stein concluded that “liberal and leftist advocates attempted to secure victories by appealing to 
conservative values,” resulting in “victories for marital and reproductive rights, but defeats of sexual 
freedom, equality, and citizenship.”67 That may have been the national case, but the SCACLU breakthrough 
was still important. It helped foster a liberal argument for change, of which California Assemblyman Willie 
Brown’s 1969 Consenting Adult Sex Bill was part. In other ways, queers were incorporated within the 
Great Society during the 1960s. 
 
Searching for the Great Society: Liberal and Religious Organizing 
 Los Angeles was a key city in the deployment of the War on Poverty. Social minorities bent liberal 
programs to serve their needs. Working alongside and within racial and gender movements, queers 
attempted to shape programs furthers. While San Franciscans led the way, Angelenos founded the United 
States Mission (USM) to house the homeless and connect queers with the War on Poverty. So too, the 
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) linked homophiles with liberalism and progressive Christianity. 
In the years preceding gay liberation, a new generation of activists worked towards inclusion.  
 In January of 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson declared an “unconditional war on poverty.” 
By August, he lobbied Congress to pass the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA), “which poured millions 
into job training” and provided “much-needed services to impoverished communities.” Coming some thirty 
years after the first New Deal reform initiatives, the War on Poverty was the heart of Johnson’s Great 
Society. Historians have since analyzed its impact, shortcomings, and legacy. Observers from both the right 
and left have not been kind. While “progressives argued that the proposed antipoverty programs were too 
stingy…conservatives countered that these efforts were subversive and costly.”68 Both overlooked local 
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success stories, where communities took control of federal initiatives and made them work. Although 
conservative critics such as Ronald Reagan ridiculed “big government,” the War on Poverty sparked local 
movements. A central component of the EOA was the creation of a Community Action Program (CAP), 
which funded community organizations to educate and train unemployed and homeless Americans. The 
War on Poverty was especially relevant to black activists. In the heart of Jim Crow, southerners took 
advantage of CAP resources to provide employment training, housing, and healthcare.69 In Las Vegas, black 
women developed programs for low-income mothers.70 Building upon legacies of cooperation, interracial 
efforts emerged in L.A. throughout 1960s and 1970s. This activism, Robert Bauman concluded, fostered 
alliances (and sometimes frustrations) between blacks and Latinos in Watts and East L.A.71 Within this 
larger narrative, queers pushed boundaries. 
 In both Los Angeles and San Francisco, activists took notice of the CAP program. Martin Meeker, 
Christina Hanhardt, and Jonathan Bell revealed how Bay Area organizers molded the War on Poverty in 
queer ways. As liberals moved to address poverty in the Tenderloin District of San Francisco, they extended 
arguments about poverty. “Although not disadvantaged because of the color of their skin,” they argued, 
“these social outcasts were nevertheless sequestered in urban slums where a lack of jobs, substandard 
housing, poor health indices, and isolation from family support and succor made them queerly 
disadvantaged.”72 Activists encouraged a queering of “poverty knowledge.”73 These efforts proved 
effective: in a 1965 policy report on the “Tenderloin Ghetto,” poverty experts espoused language towards 
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homosexuals that was closely “associated with the populations of other low-income” groups.74 This helped 
“shift the focus of debate away from questions of sex and relationships and onto the terrain of economic 
and civil rights.”75 This strengthens revisionist narratives of the homophile movement. Far from retreating, 
activists made impressive gains in the 1960s. Yet, scholars have suggested this was an aberration. “The fact 
that homophile advocates named their solidarity with the poor is significant,” one scholar argued. But “this 
approach would not last long in dominant gay politics.”76 L.A. tells a very different story. Activists worked 
long-term to expand the War on Poverty, which would only be realized in the 1970s. Seeds were also 
planted by the USM.  
 Sometimes referred to simply as the L.A. Mission, the USM was the brainchild of religious activist 
Robert Humphries. An Angeleno since the 1950s, he was alarmed by rising levels of unemployment and 
homelessness, and organized a crisis shelter. Although the USM would later be advertised as a gay 
organization, no mention of sexuality appeared at the outset. That changed as Humphries began to explore 
queer worlds. By the mid-1960s, he was a frequent traveler to Pershing Square and was deeply affected by 
law enforcement crackdowns. Around 1964, he met Morris Kight and started a conversation with him about 
police harassment and the USM. An energetic activist, Kight played a formidable role in the development 
of gay liberation in L.A. After he saw “Humphries rallying people in Pershing Square,” the two men 
“became working associates on the work of civil liberties and civil rights.” Kight guided Humphries to 
homophiles and both focused on social service activism. “I supported the Mission,” Kight explained, 
“because I believed in securing an income and housing for people at a disadvantage. That’s what the 
Mission did.”77 By 1965 the USM took on a queer focus. “The specific and primary purposes” would be 
“to maintain and enlarge the spirit of religious freedom for all people” by promoting “a greater area of 
understanding between non-conformist minorities, particularly those of homophile or homosexual 
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orientation, and the more conservative societies of Mankind.”78 Language tied the organization to the Great 
Society language, which led to a controversial revenue-generating strategy. Lyndon Johnson emphasized 
that the Great Society would offer a “hands up, not a hand out.” Likewise, the USM created a “self-help 
work program” that provided no free rides.79 Men and women were expected to work, often as door-to-door 
fundraisers. At the end of each week, funds were used to pay rent, food, and clothing bills. While this was 
certainly not a racket, it could be a trap. Years later, the strategy continued to bedevil organizers; some went 
so far as to characterize the organization as a “network of professional beggars.”80 Criticism rightly 
identified a central flaw: without stable funding, social service activism was vulnerable. Still, as one of the 
first social service organizations to champion low-income queers, the USM was significant. It appropriated 
liberal attention about poverty and applied it to queers, a strategy that was furthered in the years to come. 
The USM also strengthened progressive religious activism in L.A. Humphries argued that the USM 
was supported by Christian principles. For example, fliers quoted verses from the Bible to justify the 
organization’s existence. A favorite was Matthew 25, which read: “For I was hungry and ye gave me food; 
I was thirsty and ye gave me drink; I was a stranger and ye took me in.” According to organizers this was 
“what the U.S. Mission [was] all about.”81 In practice the USM was non-sectarian and did not mandate 
religious participation. Morris Kight characterized it as “somewhat Christian, a bit Buddhist, and a lot 
humanist.”82 Religious tolerance did not imply activists were spiritually disingenuous, however. Many fit 
well into the national evangelical movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and utilized faith to support social 
change. Histories of evangelicalism have often focused exclusively on the right.83 Yet, as Stephen Miller 
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suggested, evangelicalism was “an age, not a subculture.” Evangelicals of varying ideological stripes 
composed the movement, including queers.84  
Alongside Humphries, Troy Perry was influential. Born in Tallahassee, Florida, he developed a 
passion for evangelicalism and became a licensed Baptist preacher at the age of fifteen. Four years later he 
married the daughter of a fellow preacher, but found himself attracted to men. He consumed new books and 
articles on homosexuality and kept a copy of Donald Webster Cory’s (Edward Sagarin) The Homosexual 
in America hidden underneath his mattress.85 When the USM was founded, Perry was facing professional 
and personal crises. Church officials uncovered his sexuality and expelled him, prompting a move to Los 
Angeles. Upon arrival, his marriage disintegrated after a second church dismissal. Confused, Perry was 
prescribed “seclusion and prayer.” He found work in a department store before being drafted into military 
service in 1965. Upon his return, he fell in love with another man, whose rebuke left him suicidal and 
spiritually despondent. When police raided The Patch, a local gay bar, he realized he was not alone. The 
abuse convinced many that “God didn’t care about a bunch of dirty queers.”86 Hoping to overcome the 
spiritual depression, he founded the Metropolitan Community Church (MCC).  
In 1969 this “church for homosexuals” was established in Hollywood (just blocks from the 
headquarters of Citizen-News). “It is the first church in the nation,” the Los Angeles Times reported, “to be 
unabashedly for homosexuals.” According to Perry, the MCC would “give the homosexual a sense of 
belonging, a home.” It was also designed to make inroads with liberals. Some have claimed that Perry was 
“conservative in his politics,” seen especially in his resistance to antiwar activists during the Vietnam 
quagmire. More accurately, Perry tailored his message within a moderate framework in order to reach 
policymakers. He used his pulpit to combat harmful stereotypes, many of which had been repeated by 
Citizen-News. “The Church does not stand for adults having sexual affairs minors, in public, or forcing 
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themselves on others,” he reassured. He promoted pair-bonding among his flock and began performing 
non-binding marriage ceremonies for queer couples in 1969. He also molded himself into a homophile 
religious activist, and served as president of the Western Homophile Conference, chairman of the Los 
Angeles Committee for Homosexual Law Reform, and became a board member of the San Francisco-based 
Council on Religion and the Homosexual (CRH).87 The latter proved a “center for urban activism, racial 
and social justice organizing, and progressive politics” for decades.”88 
Within the church Perry worked against racial and gender divisions. He was “especially receptive 
to women and people of color” and “welcomed as ushers women in formal dress suits.” The MCC also 
hosted De Colores, a lesbian Latina group, and Perry encouraged the ordination of women. One fondly 
recalled how Perry once “chewed the guys out” when they suggested MCC women handle cooking and 
cleaning.89 He was active in both male and female homophile groups, especially the L.A. DOB. In 1970 he 
joined DOB president Carole Shepherd and other lesbians in an “indefinite fast in protest against restrictive 
laws” targeting queers.90 Like the USM, the MCC offered social services in addition to spiritual guidance. 
These included support and treatment for alcoholics, the deaf, those in emotional crisis, the unemployed, 
and the homeless. One community bulletin board posted advertisements from gay bars, magazines, and 
social clubs alongside job announcements.91 Sexual and economic interests were often packaged together. 
By 1969, the MCC worked alongside the USM and was branching outside of L.A. Churches opened in San 
Francisco, New York, and Minneapolis. Just as some were espousing a more radical form of “gay power,” 
Perry classified the MCC as liberal. The murder of Howard Efland, a queer male nurse, at the hands of the 
LAPD prompted a response which strongly resembled the tactics of Martin Luther King, Jr., not Malcolm 
X. Organizing a “Religious Freedom Memorial Service,” Humphries encouraged “a massive attendance to 
show the solidarity of the homophile community in our search for the religious freedom to follow an 
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alternative morality, and in our unrelenting protest against unjustifiable brutality by law enforcement 
officers.”92 Perry encouraged angry queers to resist violence. “The whole world has tried violence to solve 
its problems,” he counseled. “They only worsen. We are totally dedicated to non-violent techniques [which] 
have hardly been given a chance.”93 This dedication tied queers to mainstream civil rights struggles. So did 
the landmark Gay Religious Liberals Conference.  
Organized by the USM, MCC, and other Unitarian Church leaders, the 1970 conference invited 
“liberal religionists,” lesbians, and gays to a day of discussion, prayer, and strategizing. Organizers argued 
that the “time [was] ripe for people to come together” in order to advocate for a more “liberal church 
position” on homosexuality. Progressive Christians needed to “get their thing together” and “make their 
voices heard.”94 It was also important to recognize racial diversity and connect homophiles to civil rights 
activists. “Theological and racial revolutions continue within our midst,” a conference brochure read. 
“Another one is also developing. Another minority, this time sexual, is standing up to assert its dignity and 
to demand full equality.”95 Through panel sessions and workshops, participants sought common ground. 
This important alliance survived into the 1970s, when the Gay Community Services Center (GCSC) was 
covertly aided by members of the Christian Midnight Mission, who donated food, clothing, and other 
supplies in a “sub rosa” manner.96 While religion was often deployed against them, activists created places 
for themselves within progressive religious traditions.  
The impact of Great Society liberalism shaped queer leaders in important ways. Don Kilhefner and 
Jon Platania were two powerful examples. Born in 1938 to a working-class family in Ephrata, Pennsylvania, 
Kilhefner grew up in a community that stressed a “conservative biblical culture.” The New Deal policies 
of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, however, encouraged economic politicization. “There was a high regard for 
FDR and the New Deal,” Kilhefner explained, “because his politics included poor people.” Kilhefner’s 
                                                          
92 Robert Humphries to United States Mission, 28 February 1970. TCOF, box 16, folder 25. 
93 Troy Perry flier, July 1970. TCOF, box 16, folder 26. 
94 Gay Religious Liberals Conference flier, December 1970. TCOF, box 16, folder 26. 
95 Gay Religious Liberals Conference invitation, 29 October 1970. TCOF, box 16, folder 26.  
96 Don Kilhefner oral history, interviewed by Ian M. Baldwin, West Hollywood, California, 2 February 2014 
(hereafter Kilhefner OH). 
35 
 
father proudly displayed a picture of FDR in his bedroom. When his son inquired, he explained that “he 
was a good man.” As he came of age, Kilhefner realized that “Democrats were people who helped common 
people. Republicans tended not to help people, they tended to help businesses. I got the message that 
Democrats were different from Republicans.” In 1960 he cast his first ballot for John F. Kennedy and was 
particularly moved by the Peace Corps. “I really wanted to live in a foreign country,” he explained, “so I 
applied as one of the first groups to go abroad.” Prepping for a humanitarian mission to Ethiopia, Kilhefner 
received four months of training at Georgetown University, where his instructors included Margaret Mead. 
During his final week of training, Kilhefner and his colleagues were invited to the White House Rose 
Garden by the President. “He came out and talked to us for about an hour on why we were going,” he 
recalled. The mission would advance “the promise of America. You’re going there to be of service to 
people.” The words of the Democratic President deeply impacted Kilhefner, who departed for Ethiopia in 
September of 1962. When he arrived, he was startled by the severity of African poverty. Ethiopians were 
“poor beyond the imagination of what poor means.” He wanted to study the roots of what he had seen, and 
planned for a career in academia, which brought him to graduate school at UCLA.97 
 He found L.A. to be “one of the strangest places [he’d] ever been.” The city’s architecture, spatial 
layout, and cultural diversity fascinated him. So did its politics and he “quickly became involved with the 
radical community of Venice,” where he experienced the last days of the 1960s, enjoying “sunny days and 
Janis Joplin.” He also became involved with the Free Venice Committee, “which was trying to incorporate 
Venice as a separate city, much like West Hollywood did years later.” The motivation, as it would be in 
1984, was affordable housing. Venice was home to the local Peace and Freedom Party, and Kilhefner 
became a member. He was thrilled when Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver became the party’s official 
presidential candidate in 1968. Around the same time, Kilhefner embraced his queer identity. “I was aware 
of Mattachine and Los Angeles’ place in gay history,” he recalled, “but I could never find them.’” As his 
sexuality merged with his politics, Kilhefner fused past with his present. He remained a Kennedy admirer, 
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and even expressed respect for Democrats Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey, despite his own 
abhorrence to the Vietnam War, support of the Black Panthers, and attraction to the New Left. While he 
labeled himself a “political radical,” 1960s liberalism remained close to his heart.98 This political worldview 
impacted his understanding of gay liberation.  
 Jon Platania was also a child of the Great Society. After a stint in seminary school, he explored the 
benefits of secular education at the University of Nevada, Reno and Sacramento State University. The 
tumultuous events of the 1960s brought him into the Peace Movement, but he identified as a liberal. 
Transferring to San Francisco State University, he joined the urban studies program “on the way to a solid 
city planning career.” President Johnson’s initiatives appealed to him. “When the War on Poverty came and 
they started doing community organizing as a part of urban renewal,” he remembered, “I was ideally suited 
for that.” His interpretation of urban renewal was an exciting one of community participation, which he 
emphasized as the Personnel Director of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency. He soon “came to the 
attention of the regional director of [HUD], who happened to become the director of the Community 
Development Agency in Los Angeles.” He was invited to “come to Los Angeles and head their 
organizational development program,” an offer that made him feel like “a hot item.” At 28-years-old, the 
job offer also reinforced his political development. “I felt like my liberal, Leftist, progressive way I wanted 
to be in the world was being rewarded,” he recalled. Indeed, he dreamed that he “was on the way to being 
the cabinet minister for Housing Development in the president’s cabinet.” Excited about the opportunity, 
and also stuck in a rather unhappy relationship, Platania moved to L.A. in early 1969.99 By the time of the 
Stonewall Uprising, both Platania and Kilhefner were self-described leftists, yet they remained Great 
Society admirers. Years later, both fondly remembered their breakthroughs within the liberal establishment. 
Their narratives testify to the ways in which queers gained ground within the Great Society.  
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As the homophile movement was eclipsed by louder calls for gay liberation, much would change, 
but much would remain the same. A new emphasis on coming out and sexual expression impacted the 
nature of activism, but the foundations that were constructed in the 1960s were not fully transformed. The 
impact of Great Society liberalism proved powerful, as activists continued to focus on economic issues in 
a new political framework. For some, gay liberation was a bridge between liberalism and the New Left. 
 
From Homophiles to Liberationists 
 “Gay liberation” meant different things to different people. Across the political spectrum in L.A., 
groups claimed the movement, including the Los Angeles Gay Liberation Front (LAGLF), the Lavender 
and Red Union (LRU), older homophile organizations like ONE, and a range of women’s liberation 
organizations. Marc Stein argued that queer politics were marked by “three distinct orientations-gay 
liberation, lesbian feminism, and gay and lesbian liberalism,” yet activists in L.A. were more likely to use 
terms fluidly.100 In this way gay liberation had much in common with movements like Black Power, which 
Robert Self characterized as a “plastic concept.”101 There were other connections. According to Donna 
Murch, the Black Panther Party came to prioritize social service activism in the 1970s. While the media 
fixated on “men with guns,” attention shifted to free breakfast programs, education, and community 
outreach.102 This emphasis emerged within queer organizers as well.  
 Historians and activists have often described the 1969 Stonewall Uprising in New York City as the 
opening salvo of the gay liberation era. In fact, the impetus for the uprising-police brutality-had long been 
a queer concern.103 Los Angeles had certainly seen its fair share. From his appointment, LAPD Chief 
William Parker proved antagonistic to social minorities of all stripes, a practice tolerated by Mayor Sam 
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Yorty.104 By the late 1960s, violent confrontations between the LAPD and queers intensified. When he 
traveled to Sacramento to advocate against queers, Parker made news. The bombastic chief launched into 
a tirade, insisting that L.A. had been “flooded with homosexuals” who were a “menace to public safety.” 
When one lawmaker suggested his language was “rather rash,” Parker pulled out pornographic magazines 
which he claimed to have obtained in Hollywood. His theatrics proved too much for Democratic State 
Assemblyman Gordon Winton Jr., who angrily shouted him down. “You engage in histrionics!” he 
interjected. “One more remark from you and I’m going to ask the sergeant-at-arms to remove you from the 
room.”105 The spectacle revealed a tense relationship between queers and law enforcement. Shortly after 
Watts erupted, one man feared that “Poor Los Angeles” would witness more violence. “This past summer 
saw racial riots,” he warned. “Now there seems to be a rising tide of rebellious acts which will go down in 
history as the ‘Homosexual Riots of Los Angeles.’ The most recent rash of harassments and closings of gay 
bars and arrests will not help the situation.”106 Crackdowns at gay bars such as The Patch and the Black Cat 
Inn encouraged resistance and received coverage in leftist presses. 
Indeed, New Left reporters sympathetically monitored social movements in L.A. While the Los 
Angeles Times often proved indifferent or hostile, activists sustained an alternative source for news. 
Angelenos had a long history of doing so. Civil rights leaders Charlotta Bass and Loren Miller utilized the 
California Eagle to draw attention towards racial inequities in the 1940s and 1950s.107 By the 1960s and 
early 1970s, new outlets were established which strengthened leftist points of view. These included the L.A. 
Free Press, The Advocate, and The Lesbian Tide. Founded in 1964 by Marxist journalist Art Kunkin, the 
L.A. Free Press was a reliable booster. According to lesbian contributor Jeanne Córdova, the paper covered 
“every civil rights-oriented” movement “trying to build a counterculture based on peace, love, and brown 
rice.” During her hiring interview, she was impressed with the paper’s transparent willingness to “break all 
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the rules and fight the establishment.”108 Before he had “joined the revolution,” Kilhefner regularly combed 
the L.A. Free Press for information. “It was key,” he recalled. “We all read it every week; indeed sometimes 
we would wait at the newsstands on Thursday when it was delivered to get it. We were anxious to read.” 
He later credited the paper for introducing him to the ideas of gay liberation, after it released an “all-gay 
issue in honor of the Stonewall Rebellion.”109  
 In addition to her work at the L.A. Free Press, Córdova was a regular contributor to The Advocate 
and The Lesbian Tide. Her diverse Latina and Irish roots encouraged her reporting to recognize 
multicultural points of view. This was sorely needed in The Advocate, a paper established in 1967 by a 
white gay couple hoping to move away from “gentlemanly and stuffy” magazines like ONE. The inaugural 
issue celebrated “gay power” and proved popular with readers in and beyond L.A. By 1974, The Advocate 
reached a circulation of 44,000, making it the largest queer publication of the era.110 The Lesbian Tide 
emerged out of the Los Angeles DOB in 1971, of which Córdova had been president. As the branch fell 
into decline in the late 1960s, Córdova and “other younger lesbian-feminist activists provided a new 
infusion of energy” which revitalized it. In 1971, the DOB newsletter was renamed The Lesbian Tide and 
converted into a “national lesbian feminist magazine.” According to Marcia Gallo, it became “known for 
its news and analysis, high production values, and not least, for its always sensual, sometimes sexually 
suggestive photographs of lesbians.”111 These outlets spread messages of gay liberation which shaped 
grassroots activism.   
 Police harassment was a constant topic of concern. The murder of Howard Efland in 1969 
galvanized activists and sympathetic presses. Running into Efland near the Downton Dover Hotel, an 
undercover officer encouraged him to book a room at the hotel for the purpose of sex. He did so and, 
according to the officer, groped his new acquaintance. At this time, an additional officer emerged and 
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announced that Efland was under arrest. According to witnesses, Efland was unarmed but resisted. He was 
physically dragged out of the Dover lobby, taken into the street, and beaten for several minutes until he lost 
consciousness. He later died from the injuries. Although the beating had been witnessed by onlookers, the 
LAPD ruled the incident an excusable homicide and the Los Angeles Times neglected to inquire. Activists 
refused to let the matter drop. The Advocate accused the LAPD of an “outright lie” and demanded that a 
formal investigation be launched by the City Attorney.112 Bob Humphries and Troy Perry organized vigils 
and demonstrations, which leftist presses advertised. In one, they endorsed “unrelenting protest against 
unjustifiable brutality.”113 The L.A. Free Press covered these issues unremittingly. By May of 1970, writers 
warned of a coming queer Watts. By then another gay man had been killed by the LAPD. The death 
represented an “accelerated pace of arrests in Gay bars and private clubs” which could only be described 
as a “pogrom against homosexuals.” The editorial warned activists, law enforcement, and the general public 
about potential violence. There was “a super-militant minority who [wanted] vengeance…With half a 
million homosexuals concentrated in one vast ghetto, L.A. is sitting on a bomb,” they warned. Moreover, 
veteran activists seemed unable to control radical elements. One man accused Morris Kight and Troy Perry 
of being “Auntie Toms,” insisting that he was “sick of those old ladies and their Martin Luther King 
methods.” “We freed ourselves in New York with fire,” another argued, “and if they try to oppress us again, 
it will be the fire next time…Let me warn the straight community right now. If you step on my people 
anymore, it won’t be safe to step into the streets.”114 As Christina Hanhardt documented, police brutality 
motivated gays and lesbians to organize their own whistle brigades and community patrols, much like the 
Black Panthers.115 But like the Panthers, the image of militant queers rarely matched reality. 
Founded in 1970, the Los Angeles Gay Liberation Front (LAGLF) was one of numerous GLFs to 
emerge following Stonewall. John D’Emilio described these groups as “self-proclaimed revolutionary 
organizations in the style of the New Left.” Organized amidst the ongoing quagmire in Vietnam and 
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emerging freedom struggles in colonial Africa, activists “talked of liberation from oppression, resisting 
genocide, and making a revolution against ‘imperialist Amerika [sic].’”116 Many gained a reputation for 
radicalism, especially regarding religion and the state. Much as Homophiles had in the 1960s, LAGLF 
members prioritized multicultural alliances. The LAGLF manifesto, for instance, proclaimed “unity with 
and support for all oppressed minorities.”117 A female member saw the group as “just one of the many 
battles against the existing power structure. We were in solidarity under the greater umbrella of ‘revolution’ 
against the system.”118 Kilhefner recalled that queers were “anxious to join a revolution. The ruling culture 
didn’t define it as that, but we had the sense that something very important was happening, with the Civil 
Rights movement, with the anti-war movement, with feminism, with you name it. And now there was a 
possibility that the gay revolution could be a part of that. Just the fact that we were mentioned in the same 
context was important.”119 Philosophically, the group set out to destroy “societal antisexualism.” Activists 
labored for a new “free and loving Gay culture,” but also aimed “to bring all sexual beings into total 
acceptance of their sexuality.” In this way the movement established firm roots with the sexual 
counterculture of the 1960s. “All forms of oppression whether sexual, racial, economic, or cultural” were 
to be opposed.120 Just how the LAGLF aimed to effect change was unclear. “Gay-ins” proved a clever way 
to claim space. Inspired by civil rights sit-ins, same-sex public displays of affection were put on exhibition. 
In the summer of 1970, fliers for a Griffith Park gay-in encouraged people to “bring your boyfriend, 
girlfriend or both and have a good time. We want lots and lots of people having fun in their park. Whether 
you’re gay or straight, the cruising’s really great.”121 These efforts aided the goals of sexual openness and 
visibility, important components of gay liberation. Activists also targeted private businesses which 
discriminated against queers. When the Farm, a bar and dance hall, prohibited same-sex affection, activists 
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pounced. Picketing resulted in lost revenue and compelled the owner to change policy. Outside, activists 
nailed a broadside celebrating the “groovy freedom brought to you by the GAY LIBERATION FRONT.”122 
They also organized “funky dances” to raise funds and grow the LAGLF. Fliers often depicted 
religious and political figures as supportive of the LAGLF, creating a campy political discourse. One 
pictured Pope Paul VI, who confided that “between you and me, Gay is Good!”123 While they excelled at 
producing fliers, activists failed at community outreach. The very first LAGLF meeting Kilhefner attended 
was chaotic. “Every week there would be a different location for the meeting,” he remembered. “If you 
weren’t part of the chain, you didn’t know where the meetings were, or even if there was a meeting.” Venues 
varied considerably. One week the LAGLF borrowed space at the local War Resisters League; the following 
Sunday afternoon the group met at a “Satan bar” in Silver Lake. To Kilhefner, “this was death to any kind 
of organizing.”124 Stability arrived in late 1970 when the LAGLF was offered office space by the Peace and 
Freedom Party. Antiwar activism was an important part of LAGLF identity, and the very term “gay 
liberation front” was partially inspired by the North Vietnamese National Liberation Front. Antiwar 
marches and “Gay draft counseling” gave the LAGLF an antiwar identity.125 The new office gave the 
organization “a phone, a bank account, a mailbox, [and] all of the accoutrements which were necessary to 
foment a revolution.” Kilhefner’s energy earned him the role of office manager, and he took an indefinite 
leave of absence from UCLA to focus full-time on gay liberation.126 Within a few months, the LAGLF 
stabilized and even produced calling cards. Services, including “legal advice, draft counselling, V.D. 
screening, drug counseling, and a Job Co-op” were promised.127  
While the LAGLF was a main source of activism, other groups comprised gay liberation as well. 
Founded in 1971, a gay fellowship met sporadically near the University of Southern California to discuss 
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strategies of “achieving full human rights for gay people.” Meetings focused on emotional topics, such as 
coming out and relationship advice.128 Minutes from one reveal a variety of interests and needs amongst 
members. A representative from the Homophile Effort for Legal Protection spoke about police entrapment, 
and advised members “what to do, and not to do, if you are arrested.” After this presentation, members held 
a discussion on how to “develop a stronger feeling of gay community consciousness.” Like the LAGLF, 
the fellowship sponsored dances and mixers.129 The group does not appear to have survived past 1971, 
likely because it too-closely resembled the LAGLF. Queer socialists and communists could be found in 
both the fellowship and the LAGLF, but gravitated to the Lavender and Red Union (LRU), an organization 
formed in 1974. The LRU argued that “Gay Liberation [was] Impossible without Socialist Revolution” and 
that “Socialist Revolution [was] Incomplete without Gay Liberation.”130 An offshoot of the Revolutionary 
Union in Los Angeles, the LRU separated itself due to the “anti-Gay stand” within mainline socialism. 
Activists often moved back and forth between the LRU and the LAGLF.  
Lesbians were part of the LAGLF and proved influential in its early phase. Many more, however, 
found the organization male-focused and created alternative spaces and organizations. Descriptive was one 
female LAGLF member, who wrote in the L.A. Free Press that women needed to “find our own identity 
and our own causes as gay women.”131 Scholars have debated the meaning and feasibility of lesbian 
feminism and lesbian separatism. Certainly, many women sought distinctly female spaces apart from men. 
But, as Marc Stein found in his study of queer Philadelphia, even “Radicalesbians not only worked with 
gay men but saw their identities bound up with gay men’s.”132 That was true for many Angelenos also. The 
most assertive lesbian feminists, such as Jeanne Córdova, supported separate female activism while also 
maintaining connections with the male-centered LAGLF and later with the GCSC. The emergence of a 
vibrant lesbian feminist movement strengthened developing discourses of both gay and women’s liberation, 
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even though appearances suggested divisions. Similar to women in other locales, lesbians accessed the 
movement through dances, coffee clubs, and “herstory” reading groups. Women also embarked on parallel 
strategies with gay men and began to focus on social services. 
In his study of the “Califia community” in Southern California, Clark Pomerleau found that Califia 
women created their own discourses and institutions in order to build alliances between women of varying 
genders, sexualities, races, and class backgrounds.133 For lesbians hoping to dismantle racism or sexism as 
much as heteronormativity, such outlets were particularly needed. Throughout the metropolitan region, 
queer women established spaces and institutions. In 1973, three women founded the Los Angeles Woman’s 
Building near MacArthur Park where artists and educators created a “venue for women artists from all over 
the world who would work there to create a new women’s culture.”134 Until its closing in 1991, it remained 
an important location on queer and feminist maps of L.A. Lesbian feminist music also flourished in the 
region, and in 1973 the lesbian collective Olivia Records migrated to L.A. from Washington, D.C.135 In 
these ways, women “found the movement” along cultural avenues, supporting A. Finn Enke’s contention 
that lesbian feminism blossomed at the everyday level.136 But women achieved more than that in L.A. 
Beginning at the Los Angeles Women’s Center (LAWC), they influenced existing community centers and 
made lesbian concerns priorities.  
 Located on Crenshaw Boulevard in Mid-City, the LAWC operated a social services division and 
published a monthly newsletter focused on political and economic issues. Women from across the Southern 
California region were encouraged to “use the Women’s Center as a springboard from which to explore 
various women’s liberation groups.” While L.A. served as the central hub, leaders were “anxious to help 
women organize new women’s liberation groups in their own geographical area” and the newsletter 
extended south to Orange County and east to Riverside and San Bernardino. In 1970 several lesbians joined 
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the LAWC. Del Whan, who had recently left the LAGLF, convinced LAWC organizers to open a “Gay 
Women’s Liberation office” in order to establish “a coalition [with] Women’s Liberation in Los Angeles.” 
Soon a regular column entitled “Notes from the Gay Women’s Liberation” appeared. In one, women were 
urged organize a labor strike and reach out to “non-gay” feminists for support. Lesbians needed to “actively 
engage the public” and “bridge the gap of communication between the homosexual and the world.” They 
also needed to facilitate greater relationship-building amongst diverse women. “We certainly don’t have 
any sense of a Women’s Liberation MOVEMENT being built in L.A.,” one woman complained. Instead, 
“many feel a sense of isolation and frustration.” She regretted that leaders had not done a better job of 
“reaching out to black, brown, and oriental communities.” To help, the LAWC instituted a weekly “sexual 
politics workshop” devoted to sexuality and diversity. This had “nothing to do with [Kate] Millet’s book 
but everything to do with a dialogue between gay and straight women.” Workshops were well-received, 
averaging between 100-150 attendees.137 The impact of lesbian activism queered the trajectory of women’s 
liberation. Even after many lesbians broke away from the LAWC, for instance, the sexual workshops 
continued. 
By the end of 1970, queers had clearly entered a new phase of activism. Yet, the political work of 
the 1960s remained important. In the new decade, activists would build upon, not erase, the political gains 
they had made. Despite some successes, many leaders of gay liberation became frustrated. Street activism 
proved difficult to sustain and consumed time and energy. Leaders yearned for organizational structure and 
substantial results. Access to gay bars and rap groups, after all, did not impact every aspect of an 
individual’s life. How could those services benefit the homeless or unemployed? Emphasizing economic 
opportunity, some returned to the priorities of the War on Poverty. The most basic need was housing.  
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Chapter Two: Housing the Liberation: Providing Shelter and Building Families 
  
“At some deep and central level, we all carry a sense of 
dread that we will someday be abandoned. The existence 
of a home, an address, a place where someone we know 
can be found, where we belong, is the only solace for that 
universal fear.” 
-United States Mission flier, 1960s  
 
“These weren’t homeless shelters…These were liberation 
houses-something that we could be proud of. They were 
really run like families.” 
-Jon Platania, 2013 
 
 In 1972, a young man from upstate New York wrote an “emergency communication” to a friend in 
Los Angeles. He had recently come out as gay, which led to “unsolvable problems with [his] parents.” 
Rejected, he searched for a new place to start over. Southern California appealed to him and he hoped to 
join the “gay movement” there. “I would like to be out to L.A. within the month,” he wrote. “If I come to 
California it will be with the intent to stay.” There was one major impediment, however: he lacked financial 
resources and feared he would be homeless upon his arrival. “I’ll need a place to live,” he confessed, “and 
I’d appreciate it if you could help me. If Gay Youths don’t help each other, no one will.”1 His situation was 
a familiar one. For many queers, coming out might result in familial abandonment. Alongside other 
marginalized Americans, queers required economic assistance in order to stabilize their lives. Securing 
housing was the first, and most basic, challenge. If this young man did indeed head west in 1972, he might 
have found emotional and physical shelter in one of six liberation houses in L.A. These housed homeless 
queers in family environments for over a decade and nurtured a new generation of activists. 
Urban historians have painted bleak portraits of the 1970s. The era of urban renewal came to a 
tragic end, public housing construction all but ceased, and gentrification began to erode the affordability of 
cities.2 These assessments are not wrong, but overlook grassroots efforts to expand affordable housing 
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throughout the decade. Los Angeles witnessed many. In Watts, black activists pressured county agencies 
to reinvest in the neighborhood’s dilapidated housing stock, which many argued had been the root cause of 
the 1965 uprising. Organizers in East L.A. were even bolder. In 1971, they utilized grants to open Walter 
Reuther Villa, a multi-unit, low-rent housing complex named in honor of the legendary labor leader. 
“Designed, developed, constructed, and managed by Chicanos,” it was “public housing that worked.”3 
Likewise, queers created housing arrangements that were safe, affordable, and accepting. Beginning in 
1970, liberation houses addressed universal needs of shelter and family. Recognizing that many suffered 
from dual forms of poverty, activists developed spaces that provided economic refuge and emotional 
stability. Liberation houses were designed to be homes, not places to crash. They complicated declentionist 
narratives of housing activism in the postwar period. Far from wallowing in ruins, many sought 
neighborhood reinvestment at the grassroots.   
 
Dual Exclusion: Public and Private Housing Discrimination  
 Housing was a constant, pressing need. Like other Angelenos, low-income queers struggled amid 
housing shortages and rising costs, but they also faced additional burdens due to their sexualities. 
Discrimination was a two-armed beast that found queers in public and private markets. State-sanctioned 
family requirements prevented individuals from accessing public subsidies, while harassment and evictions 
awaited many in the rental market. 
Racial justice advocates and sympathetic policymakers emphasized that the lack of employment, 
housing, and educational opportunities created poverty and spatially confined people of color.4 Social 
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mobility required, among other things, access to good housing. Queers confronted more surreptitious forms 
of exclusion. Since the New Deal, the American welfare state was heteronormatively shaped in order to 
subsidize a patriarchal, male-breadwinner family ideal which rarely matched reality.5 During the Great 
Depression, millions of Americans lost homes and farms through bank foreclosures and evictions, 
prompting housing reform. The National Housing Act of 1934, the Wagner Act of 1936, and the Housing 
Act of 1937 established a long-term housing policy. Both the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) were designed to subsidize 
heterosexual family models. As Gail Radford explained, “It was taken for granted that applicants should 
live in what was then regarded as an optimal family unit consisting of mother, father, and children-no more 
and no less.” Housing policies thus prioritized and “actively shaped” heterosexual family constructions.6 
During the postwar housing boom, the trend accelerated. Suburban development in California’s Bay Area, 
Clayton Howard argued, encouraged married couples to migrate to the South Bay while “large numbers of 
unmarried people, including many gay men and lesbians, [became] concentrated in places like San 
Francisco.”7 Restrictive family requirements extended to a range of New Deal and Great Society welfare 
programs, including the G.I. Bill, immigration, and health care subsidies. By mid-century, public policies 
actively boosted the “straight state.”8 The City of Angels was an especially unforgiving place. Boosters laid 
groundwork for suburban expansion in the 1920s and 1930s, promoting growth that resisted core-periphery 
distinction and was attractive to industry.9 By the mid-1950s, these policies contributed to a growing 
housing crisis that disproportionally affected working-class and poor Angelenos. Ambitious developers 
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utilized federal resources to make Southern California a mecca for home-ownership, often at the expense 
of public housing development. A powerful development lobby emerged, led primarily by the California 
Real Estate Association (CREA) and the Apartment Owners Association (AOA), which stymied public 
housing construction. Relying upon red-baiting, CREA and AOA condemned such plans as “socialistic” 
and un-American. Don Parson and Dana Cuff revealed how such narratives derailed affordable housing in 
L.A.10 The result was a dramatic increase in housing costs across the region. For queers the housing crisis 
was acute, since the private market offered little solace.  
No law existed to protect queer tenants from discriminatory evictions in Los Angeles. As a result, 
few complaints made their way to housing authorities. Within letters to public officials, however, queers 
reported routine harassment. A woman living near MacArthur Park, reported that she was “being evicted 
from her apartment for no reason except that she was a lesbian.”11 Similarly, a man reported to his county 
supervisor that his landlord was “evicting him because he [was] GAY.” His elected representative suggested 
he “call the Housing Authority,” an unhelpful suggestion, since queers were not legally protected.12 As they 
moved to the Hollywood area, queers were often attacked by landlords who feared property depreciation. 
 An owner of one complex wrote to her political representative seeking advice on the best way to evict 
queers. She despised the “public nuisance created by gay persons in the area” and sought confirmation of 
her legal right to evict.13 Others promised to evict in retribution for the “gay takeover” of their 
neighborhoods. The owner of one complex on Sunset Boulevard insisted that “gay porno newsracks” had 
made it “hard to fill vacancies.” In retribution, he promised to “evict all trash” from his complex and make 
it “respectable again.”14 When “two gay night clubs” opened near his building, another landlord barred all 
queers.15 One man lamented his neighborhood’s “special favoritism towards gays.” The presence of 
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“cruisers” had driven away “good tenants” in exchange for “moral perverts.”16 A self-avowed “anti-gay” 
man was livid when queers rented a house near his complex. “Isn’t there a law against this?” he asked. If 
not, he urged legislation “banning gays from renting” in Hollywood.17 Harassment could often be 
vindictive, as one gay man learned. Throughout the 1970s, he became involved with gay liberation and 
helped organize a Hollywood gay pride parade. Unbeknownst to him, his landlord was watching. Since he 
was manager, and not owner, of the complex, he lacked authority to evict. Instead, he unscrupulously 
harassed the gay tenant, who discovered that he was being monitored. His landlord littered mailboxes with 
religious pamphlets, many of which claimed queers would “burn in Hell.” At one point, he called him a 
“faggot” and informed tenants that “anybody who is not a Christian will be evicted, because his was a solely 
Christian building.” The gay tenant reported the incident to housing authorities. When his landlord found 
out, he went berserk and turned off water and electricity to queer units. A second complaint was signed by 
thirty tenants, all of whom reported similar abuse.18 Some landlords may have been influenced by the anti-
gay campaigns of the 1960s. Whether they read Citizen-News or not, they responded in ways that supported 
its efforts. For queers, the private market was precarious. 
 Combating discrimination was extremely difficult, especially when some argued that heterosexuals 
were the ones facing obstacles. One editorial satirically told the story of “Osbert Wilde” (a reference to 
Oscar Wilde), who had “graduated from college and didn’t know what to be…so he decided to be gay.” 
Wilde determined that “being gay would enhance [his] opportunities and lifestyle.” Sure enough, he was 
offered a good job and a “fancy apartment” from frightened heterosexuals who went out of their way to 
“prove they [were] tolerant, anti-sexist, and equal-opportunity.” If anyone tried to discriminate against 
Osbert, he bragged, “they’ll have the whole Gay Lib movement at their throats.”19 One renter echoed this 
thinking, reporting that she and her boyfriend had “applied for an apartment only to be turned down by a 
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gay landlord.” According to her, “It was a clear case of reverse discrimination.” For queers, these arguments 
were infuriating. “How does it feel?” one queer replied. “We gays have known that feeling for not years, 
not decades, but perhaps centuries. Maybe next time you refer to gays as queers or faggots with so much 
hate, you’ll know why you weren’t accepted in the building.”20 Despite cries of “reverse discrimination,” 
queers were the vulnerable ones. One LAGLF flier pointed out that “In the overwhelmingly majority of 
communities (including, for example, Los Angeles) a homosexual can be evicted from his home simply 
because his or her landlord doesn’t like gays. The homosexual tenant has no legal protection.”21 It was a 
simple and true assessment. 
 The dire situation led many Homophiles to focus on housing. The Cloistered Order of Conclaved 
Knights of Sophisticracy [sic], or Knights of the Clock, emerged alongside Mattachine and ONE in the 
1960s. Established by W. Dorr Legg and his partner, Merton Bird, the group was a “social club” “known 
for sex parties.”22 They were also housing advocates. Both Legg and Bird moved to L.A. from Michigan in 
1949, where they encountered a bleak housing market. The two were unable to own a house together, 
because they were queer, and were unable to live in many parts of the city because Bird was black. Racially 
restrictive housing covenants remained successful methods of segregating the city.23 The Knights of the 
Clock sought to address these twin forms of discrimination and offered housing referrals to newly-arrived 
mixed-race couples. While records are few, the Knights assisted same-sex interracial couples through 
housing referrals.24 ONE also attempted to assist with housing through its “social service division.” While 
never fully developed, this wing of ONE offered housing referrals and counseling.25 The inspiration 
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emerged from readers, who wrote of their troubles finding housing. One woman wrote of “numerous cases” 
she had observed “from those who have had difficulty [securing] housing and employment.” She advised 
that organizations like ONE focus on providing these to queers “like any other minority group.”26 While 
the Knights of the Clock and ONE catered to middle-class queers, the USM focused on the low-income.  
 “At some deep and central level of our emotional lives,” USM organizers explained, “we all carry 
a sense of dread that we will someday be abandoned in the world. The existence of a ‘home,’ an address, a 
place where someone we know can be found, where we belong, is the only solace for that universal fear.”27 
Located on Western Avenue in eastern Hollywood, the USM was situated in the area of L.A. most closely 
identified with low-income queers. Homemade fliers were distributed at gay bars, social functions, and 
social service agencies and the organization printed fliers in Spanish for distribution in nearby Los Feliz 
and Central L.A.28 Fliers were simple and to the point: “Gay? Homeless?” asked one. “The United States 
Mission can offer you shelter, meals, clothes, and jobs.”  By the mid-1970s, Humphries was touting the 
USM as the “second oldest gay organization in the United States” and “the largest shelter program for 
homeless gay men and lesbians in the world.” Records indicate that thousands of men and women made 
use of the USM shelter in L.A. over the years.29 While housing was important, activists achieved only 
limited success. Homelessness remained a chronic problem for many. Indeed, many LAGLF organizers 
faced homelessness themselves, encouraging them to place heavy emphasis on housing. Their first 
experiment took place on Hoover Street.   
 
Movement Incubators: The Hoover Street Commune and the Gay Women’s Center 
Located between Silver Lake and Los Feliz at the corner of Sunset and North Hoover, the Hoover 
Street commune shaped queer politics in significant ways. Collective living was an important aspect of the 
LAGLF, especially since many activists came from low-income backgrounds. While the LAGLF 
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maintained an office, the commune became its de facto headquarters. In addition to Don Kilhefner, residents 
included Jon Platania, Rand Schrader, and Stanley Williams. Others such as Lee Heflin and Dexter Price 
lived nearby in an apartment complex and were often present at commune functions. So was Morris Kight, 
who was “in and out on a daily basis.”30 While lesbians did attend commune events, it was largely a male 
domain. Nevertheless, it was here that activists thought anew about the trajectory of gay liberation. Lesbians 
were doing the same in organizations such as the Gay Women’s Center. Collectively, queer men and women 
began to place greater emphasis on social service activism.  
Drugs were an important part of commune life. Residents engaged in ideological debate best after 
“Lucy came down from the sky with her diamonds.”31 We were “smoking a lot of dope, having a lot of sex, 
discovering the side of other consciousness with psychedelic drugs. It was a lot of fun,” Platania 
remembered. Communal highs helped him develop a deep love for yoga and meditation.32 At 4 p.m. each 
day “high tea” was served as activists gathered for discussions. Like clockwork, the commune transcended 
into “a hothouse of emerging gay-centered consciousness.” Traveling guests were welcomed, as L.A. was 
a favorite destination for traveling queer activists, intellectuals, and artists. “Virtually every evening there 
would be fifteen or more people sitting around our table for supper. Visiting gay liberationists, soon-to-be-
famous filmmakers, writers and poets, lovers de jour, mystics, [and] future judges [were] engaged in 
animated and liberating discussions,” one resident described. The Gay Law Students Association held 
parties at the commune, and participated in discussions. Although the primary residents were male, they 
prohibited aggressive expressions of masculinity and encouraged gender experimentation. Kilhefner 
enjoyed putting his “long hippie hair up into an elegant beehive” when he went shopping.33 Roommate 
Stanley Williams was “a delightfully creative gay man” who had a fondness for gender-bending. Prior to 
his arrival, he had been an ice-skater and performed with the traveling Ice Capades alongside famed 
Norwegian skater and Liberace-beard Sonja Henie. In 1971, an image of Williams, Lee Helfin, and Platania 
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was captured in Hollywood and submitted to Life Magazine. It appeared in the next issue, and showcased 
the men’s gender ambiguity, seemingly to showcase their radicalism.34 Over the course of several months, 
residents vented frustrations with the course of the LAGLF and began to move in a new direction.  
Many grew tired of the disorganization. Privately, Kight and Kilhefner were disillusioned with 
street activism which seemed devoid of a larger agenda. “As the summer went on, with all kinds of protest 
activities,” Kilhefner explained, “we saw that there was a limit to the work that the Gay Liberation Front 
could do. You could only keep up that level of protest for so long, and then it became yesterday’s news. 
We got tired; we burned people out.” As an organization, the LAGLF had “become much more 
unfocussed.”35 Around the same time, Kilhefner found himself in charge of a new phone line at the LAGLF. 
The number was widely circulated in queer newsletters, and he began to get calls. “For me it came into 
focus because of that hotline,” he explained. “I was there at night after the bars closed and a wave of 
telephone calls would come in from gay people. All of the issues of oppression you would expect to find 
were there. Losing apartments, losing jobs, alcohol, drugs, I mean you name it. They needed help.” He was 
deeply impacted by these multiple forms of oppression and organized the Gay Survival Committee within 
the LAGLF. “In addition to our overt political activity,” he described, “we had to start thinking about gay 
people themselves.” The committee was soon relocated to Hoover Street, where it expanded to ten or twelve 
members. “As far as we were concerned,” Kilhefner concluded, “the [LAGLF] phase was over. We needed 
to do something new.”36 Lesbians were of like mind.  
Operating within the Los Angeles Women’s Center (LAWC), lesbians worked alongside non-gay 
women to establish feminist housing services. By the end of 1970, the LAWC announced an emergency 
housing service for women in L.A. and Orange counties. No address was given, but interested women were 
advised to contact the LAWC for information. Bulletin boards posted listings for safe and friendly living 
situations and employment opportunities. One alerted women to openings for air traffic controllers, a 
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position ideal for women who were “unemployed, good at written tests, and willing to take a test for 
emotional stability.”37 Within the LAWC, lesbians embraced the focus on social services. Former LAGLF 
member Del Whan was motivated to do more, and decided to strike out on her own in the summer of 1971. 
Alongside likeminded women, she founded the Gay Women’s Center (GWC) that May in Echo Park.38  
Like the LAGLF, lesbians organized “Funky Dances” to raise funds for the GWC. They too mocked 
religious figures. One flier featured the Virgin Mary confiding that she “would come [to a Funky Dance] if 
[she] didn’t have to babysit.” Most events were held at the GWC office in Echo Park, although sometimes 
they moved to other venues such as Larchmont and Trouper’s Hall.39 Activists emphasized the need of 
housing and social services. The GWC would be “a community of gay women united in love and concern 
for each other’s mutual welfare.” In order to provide the latter, lesbians needed to offer “employment [and] 
housing referrals.” Housing opportunities were desperately sought-after; “we need listings!” activists 
confessed. The GWC was cast as a link in a chain of lesbian and feminist activism, which included the 
DOB in Downtown and an organization called “The Lesbian Feminists” in Mid-City.40 Many queer men 
and women agreed that social services were important: “If we were going to succeed,” explained one, “we 
could not just continue with radical political work per se. We needed, as Chairman Mao taught, to transform 
gay revolutionary consciousness into service to the people.”41 This proved difficult to categorize politically. 
While social service organizations were linked with the liberal establishment, many saw radical possibilities 
within them and considered the turn a pragmatic extension of gay liberation.  
As the 1960s faded from view, several New Left movements transformed in similar pragmatic 
ways. Dan Berger argued that the 1970s provided an opportunity for “movements to experiment and 
expand.” It was “a time when [social justice activists] felt they had to walk their talk.”42 That was true of 
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the Black Panthers. Focusing on “survival pending revolution,” Panthers invested time and energy into free 
breakfast programs, shelters, positive educational opportunities, and community watch patrols.43 In L.A., 
activists turned their attention towards urban poverty, employment discrimination, and community uplift. 
New organizations such as the Watts Labor Community Action Committee and the Sons of Watts 
Improvement Association focused on social services. Whether they were devoted leftists or liberals, they 
utilized the welfare state to fund their activism. So did Chicanos, who formed the East Los Angeles 
Community Union to assist Latinos and Latinas in East L.A.44 The transformation of queer activism should 
be seen alongside these examples. For activists of all stripes, housing was the first step in the deployment 
of a social service program. Liberation houses were queer solutions to the L.A.’s ongoing urban crisis. 
 
Grassroots Public Housing: L.A. Liberation Houses  
 Liberation houses relied heavily on the life experiences of activists, especially Jon Platania. He was 
an energetic booster for the program, thanks in large part to his personal and professional history. Platania 
came of age amid the collision of Great Society liberalism and New Left. While he completed a degree in 
urban studies, he devoted energies to the Peace Movement. Registering as a conscientious objector, he was 
assigned a term of service at a Nevada State hospital. During his stint at “the asylum,” he was exposed to 
sexual and economic injustice. One “gorgeous gay boy,” he recalled, was institutionalized for multiple 
violations of anti-sodomy statutes and was raped by inmates while incarcerated. The episode deeply 
impacted Platania. The “gorgeous gay boy…wasn’t free to get away with the things I got away with,” he 
concluded. “My parents had money. His didn’t.” This was a lesson Platania would not forget.45 
 After leaving Nevada State Hospital, he moved to the Bay Area and developed a strong connection 
to urban renewal initiatives. He rose through the ranks of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency before going 
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to work for HUD in L.A., a position which taught him lessons in governmental bureaucracy. Upon his 
arrival, Platania came to appreciate his new city. “I loved being in Los Angeles,” he remembered. It “was 
a very open, fun, big, challenging, exciting, thrilling, scary place.” He found it erotic as well, and quickly 
connected with men who became lovers, friends, and family. While he was “admittedly reluctant” to 
become associated with gay liberation, Platania found himself pushed into the movement in 1970 when he 
was entrapped and charged with “lewd and lascivious” conduct at Griffith Park. “I could hardly believe the 
terrifying reality that came crashing down upon my total existence,” he wrote. “Possibility had become fact; 
there really were vice officers who really did entrap innocent people.” The arrest brought employment 
concerns. As a state employee, the charge was dangerous. His HUD director came to the conclusion that, 
since the charge might be made public, “it would be better for him and the agency if [he] would resign.” 
The “blow to his public persona” left him “spiritually, psychologically, and emotionally devastated.”46 With 
nothing to lose, Platania fought the charges against him, an effort which received considerable attention in 
The Advocate and the L.A. Free Press and brought him in contact with Kilhefner and Kight.  In the end, he 
won and the LAPD were found to be “in violation of the very sections of the penal code which [Platania] 
had allegedly violated.”47 Reconstructing his devastated ego, Platania emerged rejuvenated, moved into the 
Hoover Street commune, and “turned [his] energy towards helping others.”48  
  Queer Angelenos faced new housing challenges in the 1970s. Activists estimated that hundreds of 
queers migrated to L.A. monthly.49 Martin Meeker argued these migrants descended upon “imagined 
communities” in search of gay utopias. New arrivals placed additional stress on critical resources.50 
Moreover, movement leaders themselves grappled with homelessness. Kilhefner became homeless when 
he dropped out of graduate school, and Platania lost his housing when he resigned from HUD. Both found 
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refuge on Hoover Street and began to envision additional “liberation houses.” The commune “became a 
model for what was possible. You get a house, you rent it, you make separate bedrooms, you have two or 
three people per bedroom, and you provide a meal once a day.” Each day, “people look for jobs, 
[accomplish] tasks, and come back in the evening [for] dinner. And then in the evening there’s discussion 
groups, and consciousness-raising groups.”51 This model provided the initial strategy.  
 The first house opened at 1168 N. Edgemont Street, midway between Silver Lake and Hollywood. 
Platania played financier since his reputation enabled him to “talk to the important people” who provided 
start-up funds. Activists also relied on him to sign leases because he had established credit history. Platania 
designed and managed the program and “felt a lot for the kinds of guys hanging out” in the houses.52 
Additional funds were raised through “gay funky dances.” Held most Friday nights, they became a source 
of steady revenue. Each week, activists could count on $100-150, which covered rents and house supplies. 
Private donations were also important. “Once people knew what we were doing,” Kilhefner explained, 
“they started making donations of beds, linens, clothing, you name it.” Most months, liberation houses 
operated on a $1,200 budget. Sometimes, activists could rely on clandestine alliances with other social 
service agencies. The Midnight Mission was “a Christian program on Skid Row” which happened to be 
“run by a [closeted] gay man.” When he had extra supplies, he “would share them…sub rosa.” Despite the 
assistance, the budget was still “very, very tight,” which meant most house staff and managers did not 
receive a salary.53 This was a serious flaw which hampered the initiative. 
At the height of the program, six houses served the communities of Greater Los Angeles. Locations 
were mostly concentrated in the Hollywood and Downtown areas, but served a geographically diverse 
group of people. At one house in 1973, individuals came from Watts, Downtown, and Northridge. Some 
came from elsewhere in Southern California: one man made the journey from Lake Elsinore, another from 
San Luis Obispo, and one woman came from Riverside. Outside California, new arrivals traveled from 
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Moss Point, Mississippi; Portland, Oregon; Cincinnati, Ohio; Hope, Indiana; and Honolulu, Hawaii.54 This 
wide geographical pull strengthens scholarly assertions that California was a queer magnet in the 1960s and 
1970s.55 House staff kept few organized records, so it is difficult to say with certainty how many people 
were housed at any given time. Kilhefner admitted that organizers “weren’t interested in documenting, 
because we didn’t even know if it was going to work.”56 By 1972, however, activists claimed to have housed 
“over 200 gay women and men” and confessed that “scores of gay people of all ages [were] turned away 
each week due to a lack of available space.”57 
What survives of house intake forms suggests sporadic lengths of stay. Individuals were housed 
“on a temporary basis until an alternative living environment” could be located.58 “Temporary” was a broad 
descriptor, however, as individuals might stay for a few days or for months at a time.59 It is equally difficult 
to ascertain the social backgrounds of residents. Houses were open to any individual who could demonstrate 
need, regardless of sexual preference. K. Norton was “straight” and stayed for six days until he could “get 
on his feet.”60 By and large, though, liberation houses attracted self-identified queers. Platania remembered 
that many were young males who “didn’t like working the streets.” Some were “political activists who 
didn’t have the money or resources to afford their own place” since “housing was so expensive” in L.A. 
The vast majority “were just young kids, not too prepared for anything.”61 A 1975 report revealed 
socioeconomic backgrounds. Residents were 69% white, 10% black, 10% Latino, 3% Asian, 1% American 
Indian, and 7% “other.” Houses thus appear to have been overrepresented by whites. Men comprised 62% 
of Liberation House residents in 1975; women accounted for just 38%. Most residents were under thirty. A 
unifying characteristic was poverty: “Virtually 100% of the persons being provided housing,” organizers 
                                                          
54 Gay Community Services Center Liberation House intake form, 1973. GLCSC, box 11, folder 37. 
55 See Meeker, Contacts Desired. 
56 Kilhenfer OH. 
57 Gay Community Services Center Liberation House proposal, January 1972. GLCSC, box 7, folder 53. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Gay Community Services Center Liberation House intake forms, 1972-1974. GLCSC. box 11, folder 38. 
60 Notes on Liberation House residents, K. Norton, undated. GLCSC, box 11, folder 40. 
61 Platania OH. 
60 
 
reported, are “poor or indigent.” Nearly 80% of all residents reported an annual incomes below the poverty 
line.62 
Liberation Houses connected a new generation of activists with homophile legacies. The Knights 
of the Clock and USM organizers certainly would have been impressed with the attention to housing. In 
other ways, however, liberation houses were products of the New Left and the sexual revolution. Economic 
shelter was important, but so was emotional security. Accordingly, houses were intended to be homes and 
fostered supportive, loving, and erotic family atmospheres.  
 
“Like a Family”: Providing Sexual and Emotional Support   
In an era of heated discourse surrounding the politics of “family,” liberation houses highlighted 
how queers could reconstruct the meaning of family at the grassroots.63 Scholarship on the 1970s has 
focused primarily on conservative family activism, such as the Moral Majority, which characterized queers 
as threats. Activists rejected these arguments and built familial atmospheres of their own, contributing to a 
decades-long project of queer family-building. In courtrooms and support groups, Daniel Rivers revealed, 
gays and lesbians lobbied for recognition and rights as parents from the late 1940s into the 1960s. “The 
right to be a ‘family,’” he argued, proved a powerful way to “enforce normative sexual ethics” in America. 
Recognition mandated a destabilization of heteronormative family definitions, and the promotion of 
pluralistic alternatives.64 This struggle often took place within “traditional households” as well. Heather 
Murray argued that “gays and their parents embodied a longing for eternal family life” which “endured into 
the postwar period and even into the late twentieth century.” Organizations such as the Parents and Friends 
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of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) emerged alongside Anita Bryant.65 Ideologically and practically, liberation 
houses promoted queer families in the 1970s.  
 By design, houses were meant to be alternatives to “flop houses” and “crash pads.” The concept of 
“crashing” lacked the overt political and emotional agenda of activists. In naming the houses, they conveyed 
this message. The program was “about affirmation,” Platania recalled. Residents wanted “to be in a place 
called a liberation house. That’s where [one] wants to be. It wasn’t a homeless shelter. I wouldn’t have 
managed a homeless shelter for love or money,” he insisted. “The minute you say homeless shelter, my 
mind goes to bedbugs, and drunks, and druggies, and washouts. But liberation house, that calls to me. I’m 
going to this place to be liberated.” Kilhefner agreed: “these were not flop-houses; these were liberation 
houses-something that we could be proud of.” As the first house manager, Platania instituted guidelines 
which dictated the program be “run like a family.”66  
Upon acceptance, residents chose new clothes and were guided to the nearest free clinic, where a 
medical examination was administered. This ascertained the health of the entering individual and protected 
from the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. Once through, residents signed a contract outlining the 
rules and guidelines of the house. These varied house to house, but shared a core set of principles. “As with 
all inter-personal relationships,” one form read, “there must be some guidelines. The Liberation Houses are 
multi-person households and it would follow that the first rule is that of common courtesy and consideration 
for your brother or sister.” These were “joint endeavors where-in each resident shares in responsibility and 
welfare.” The use of brother and sister was intentional. Far from regurgitating the groovy language of the 
seventies, these terms reflected the deliberate planning of a family atmosphere. Weapons and drugs were 
not allowed, yet “everybody smoked dope,” which house managers “did not think was a problem.” Of 
graver concern was heroin. Individuals with such drug problems were not to be admitted. Residents could 
invite guests, but were held “directly responsible for their actions while in the house.” Rules were framed 
in protective ways, safeguarding residents from potential trouble. The program was not free: rent was set at 
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$2.50 per day, $15.00 per week, or $50.00 per month, which covered a private bed and at least one meal a 
day, most always dinner. However, most house managers adjusted rents to reflect income and most 
residents paid “about a dollar a day.”67  
 Organizers made clear they were “only interested in people who are sincere and well-motivated as 
residents.” Those “not acting in good faith,” would “be asked to leave.” Sincerity could be demonstrated 
in multiple ways. Once the GCSC was established, residents were “encouraged to become active and devote 
at least two hours a week to volunteer work there.” This recommendation spoke to an emotional and 
political agenda. A majority of residents would “not have classified themselves as gay liberationists when 
they walked in,” Platania explained, but would “within a week” of staying there.” Most “didn’t have a 
[political] rubric…We were creating a context, and a language, and a rubric that didn’t exist before.” 
Liberation houses thus spread a political discourse to those who had not given their situation much political 
analysis. Residents were “bright, fun,” and believed “that the world was on the precipice of a great change. 
In their lifetime everyone would have medical care, everybody would have housing, everybody would have 
everything that we were trying to put into place.” In most houses, “there was a great enthusiasm, a great 
hope, a great optimism…This is what it could look like. This is how it could be done. This is what you 
could do, if you wanted to do it right.”68  
Daily tasks were designed to bind people together.69 Under house management, “either you helped 
with chores in the morning, or you weren’t there that night. Collective effort was really important.” 
Similarly, collective cooking and eating were mandated. “I insisted that we eat at six,” Platania recalled. 
“Eating together and cleaning up together” encouraged bonding.70 Kilhefner absolutely thought of the 
liberation houses as families, although sometimes he avoided “the term family” since it could often be “a 
coercive word and used against us.” To him the houses were “somewhere where we took care of each other 
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and assumed responsibility for each other.”71 In the coming years, as houses received public support, grant 
applications stressed the family atmosphere. These shelters provided “warm, supportive living 
environments in which” residents were “encouraged to develop positive self-images and to relate to other 
people.” Supportive environments “offset the high incidence of hospitalization, imprisonment and suicide 
among the members of the gay community,” thus lifting many out of poverty and also earning them an 
“accepting home environment.”72 As “pro-family” advocates such as Anita Bryant and Phyllis Schlafly 
emerged, liberation houses offered an important counter-narrative. 
 Activists developed rap groups and sessions focused around economic and emotional issues, such 
as employment and self-development counseling, alcohol and drug abuse treatment, and family crisis 
intervention.73 Residents were free to choose between sessions, except for employment training, which was 
mandatory. House leaders reached out to “progressive gay businesses” in search of job opportunities. 
“Eventually, we bought a couple of trucks and did moving, and gardens, and hauling,” Platania recalled. 
“A lot of kids got good jobs and moved out. Some integrated from out there into the Center as volunteer 
workers. Some went to work at the Gaywill Funky Shoppe.”74 This was indeed how many experiences 
ended. Final resident notes for one man read simply: “Found job. Moved. Paid rent. Good kid, no problem.” 
Another moved out after a month in the house when he became “involved in youth programs at [the 
GCSC],” which paid a small salary. Troy Perry’s MCC sometimes employed residents.75 For those who 
moved on, however, they were encouraged to return, meet new residents, maintain relationships, and mentor 
those in crisis. Like a family, these were children who left the nest, but did not sever emotional cords. 
 Importantly, houses offered sexual opportunities. Without a doubt, many entered hoping to explore 
the sexual aspects of gay liberation. Searching out sex, however, did not preclude a larger commitment. 
Historians have sometimes isolated political activism from sexuality, even within gay liberation. One 
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suggested that “gay liberation had divergent priorities, since certain members of the community were often 
more concerned with liberating their libidos…than rectifying economic injustices.”76 While some 
individuals might have been interested solely in sex, the majority of house residents had multiple priorities. 
House managers recognized this and worked to ensure sexual safety. Potential residents “had to get checked 
out for STDs before being involved with any of the other people in the house” and organizers began 
“passing out condoms [long] before AIDS.”77 The physical space of the houses provided an economic haven 
and an opportunity to experience the sex safely. Morris Kight argued that liberation houses provided space 
to “not make love in furtive and dangerous ways.” This was the “best way to avoid entrapment.”78 Several 
residents utilized houses for such encounters. One man “stayed for one night, had fun, paid in advance,” 
and caused “no problems.”79 House managers permitted this, since houses could offer “a cheap place to 
stay and have fun in L.A. for a few weeks.”80 This was not antithetical to gay liberation, which promoted 
sexual freedom. So long as they were respectful, managers welcomed the occasional sexual explorer. 
 House advertisements sometimes appeared in queer pornography. Pat Rocco’s Society of Pat Rocco 
Enlightened Enthusiasts, or SPREE, spread information about the program. SPREE seamlessly combined 
the political with the erotic. Images of nude men accompanied information for local bars and community 
programs, and editorials tackled the political and economic issues of the day. In the October 1971 edition 
of SPREE, readers were informed that liberation houses were “offering housing services for our community 
that have long been sorely needed. They operate on a shoestring budget, and with a lot of love. If you need 
help or housing, by all means go and see them.” This caption appeared directly underneath an image of two 
male house residents in a loving embrace. Other images depicted the environment as sexually-charged, as 
residents were photographed with little or no clothing.81 One of the purposes of the houses was to liberate 
                                                          
76 Phil Tiemeyer, Plane Queer: Labor, Sexuality, and AIDS in the History of Male Flight Attendants (Berkeley: The 
University of California Press, 2013), pg.  117. 
77 Platania OH. 
78 “Center Aids Gay Parolees,” Los Angeles Times, 19 October 1973, F1. 
79 Notes on Liberation House residents, undated. GLCSC, box 11, folder 40. 
80 Platania OH. 
81 SPREE News Pictorial, October 1971. Author’s personal collection. 
65 
 
economic barriers which prevented emotional and sexual desires. A potential resident could rightly hope to 
find sexual opportunities alongside economic ones. 
 The emphasis on family proved enduring. In the 1980s, Hudson House (founded by Pat Rocco) 
emphasized family needs to an even greater degree. Organizers found that many incoming residents had 
been “so alienated from family and community” that they suffered from “little to no self-esteem.”82 Family 
abandonment constituted something of a disability. For queer youths especially, “the sudden revelation of 
gayness” often led to the debilitating “break-up of a family.” Hudson House “provided an extended family 
environment” to those in crisis.83 Rocco argued that this was the most appealing aspect of the housing 
program. Upon arrival, residents did not “feel too good about themselves. They came from difficult 
situations. They had been thrown out by their parents, who say ‘we don’t want a gay person or a lesbian in 
our house.’” Queer housing programs offered a “precious refuge;” an island of hope.84  
 Advertisements and flyers emphasized emotional benefits. Residents were promised “a comfortable 
home” and “an instant gay family.”85 The Lesbian Tide lauded Hudson House as “a place where lesbians 
and gay men can feel relaxed and comfortable. They can feel ‘at home.’”86 Letters from interested 
individuals testified to family needs. A man from San Diego wrote that he needed “to get out of [his] current 
situation” quickly. “I still live with my parents,” he explained, “and because I’m gay I feel rejection from 
them and my friends. I really would like to get away.” He held high hopes for L.A. “I would not like to 
think I’m running away from something,” he wrote, “but running to something. I think L.A., because of its 
size and gay community, would be able to offer an opportunity.”87 Emotional needs were prioritized. “We 
would never overlook a resident’s birthday,” Rocco recalled. “So there was a birthday almost every day. It 
[provided] the feeling that you’re part of a family.” One man “literally walked from the state of Washington 
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to Los Angeles” to “find Hudson House.” When he arrived, his feet were swollen and he could walk no 
further. Residents gathered a “big basin, hot water, Epsom salts,” and “soaked his feet for hours.” Each 
month, residents organized a large party which made “people feel like part of a community, an enterprise, 
a family.”88 Communal cooking, cleaning, and discussions were continued. Social events were documented 
by Rocco, who maintained scrapbooks for each house. Several images suggested loving and sexual 
relationships between housemates.89  
 For many, family environments were rescuing. “When I came to Hudson House,” one woman 
revealed, “my father had thrown me out and I had lost some of my closest friends.” She had been left feeling 
“very depressed” and emotionally “exhausted.” Hudson House helped her to “pull myself back together 
emotionally and get my strength back. With so many people to hug and so many shoulders to cry on, I could 
no longer feel hopeless, worthless, and lonely.” Her new family saved her “from the hell [she] went 
through.” Another “knew no one” upon her arrival in L.A. “I have travelled around quite a bit,” she wrote, 
“but [L.A.] is the only place that has anything like Hudson House. It’s a place where Gay People are 
welcomed” and offered “a chance to get your head together in a family atmosphere.” Two men “met at 
Hudson House” and became lovers. Together for three months, they had “met some real friends” and were 
“glad to part of the family.” Many residents stayed long-term. “I started as a resident more than two years 
ago,” one woman explained. “I then became a house manager. I’ve grown as a person since coming here.”  
“The most important thing I gained at Hudson House [was] a family,” one man explained. “I have never 
had support like this before and it makes me feel great.”90 Testimonials illustrated how important family-
building could be. Halloween parties, Thanksgiving dinners, Christmas events, and house get-togethers 
marked the program as both an emotional and physical shelter.91 
 Queer family-building might appear less controversial today, but in the heated cultural environment 
of the 1970s and 1980s it was a radical project. As the Moral Majority gained power, queers demonstrated 
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that they could build stable and loving families. At the grassroots, they proved that Anita Bryant and Jerry 
Falwell were wrong. In 1982, USM founder Bob Humphries declared that “HUDSON HOUSE [WAS] A 
‘FAMILY’ BY DICTIONARY DEFINITION.” A “blood relationship,” he stressed, was “not essential to 
the concept and definition of ‘family.’” True families were formed when “people decide for themselves 
what constitutes a family.” Queer Angelenos “provided shelter, employment, food, and emotional security 
for over 4,000 people in hard times.”92 In queer housing programs, the definition of family was changed. 
 
Limits of the Grassroots: Flaws and Shortcomings 
 As a grassroots initiative, liberation houses encountered significant obstacles. Funding, interpersonal 
conflicts, mental health issues, and drug abuse impacted the effectiveness of the program. The lack of stable 
funding was perhaps the most structural flaw. Reliance on private fundraisers made house budgets 
insufficient and unpredictable. When donations failed to deliver, house managers scrambled to pay rents 
and utility bills. Moreover, meager budgets precluded salaries, leading to great turnover. “We got to live 
there,” Platania concluded, “and eat, and enjoy the benefits…but the staff didn’t get paid.”93 The model 
was unsustainable, and encouraged activists to pursue other forms of financing. 
 Among residents, personality conflicts were sometimes difficult to resolve. Several were asked to 
leave when they did not participate in house activities or clashed with others. One man only stayed at the 
house “to eat, bathe, and store luggage.” Using the house as a “crash pad,” he was asked to move on. 
Similarly, another “refused to make a commitment to [the] house” or “go through intake for re-admittance” 
and was evicted. Despite multiple efforts, a young woman was “unwilling to seek employment” and thus 
“unable to pay rent.” Staff asked her to leave and recommended counseling at the GCSC.“ For those who 
sought conflict or abused other residents, eviction was guaranteed. One man was unceremoniously sent 
packing after he was caught stealing, and two additional residents were evicted for “taking jobs from other 
people in the house.” House managers could mitigate these disturbances, but were inadequately prepared 
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to address the serious issues like mental health disorders and drug abuse. Early on, organizers improvised 
with little success. Internal notes on deeply-troubled residents highlighted unaddressed needs. For instance, 
one individual stayed three nights at a house, but was “psychotic.” Staff wrote that he was “not to be 
readmitted,” and encouraged others “to try and help [him] somehow.” Similar short notes abound of others. 
A woman’s “erratic mental state” resulted in “NO ADMITTANCE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES,” 
while a man’s “bizarre behavior” made him “persona non grata to all Liberation Houses.” Excessive drug 
or alcohol abuse could also constitute grounds for removal. After he “attacked the house manager with a 
chair,” a man was “removed because of heavy drug usage” which resulted in “a tendency towards violence.” 
A young resident was labeled a “drug runaway, not to be let in any liberation house,” while another was 
“very disruptive, often [had] four guests a night,” and was reportedly “dealing [drugs] in the house.”94 
Activists were sympathetic to their situations, but lacked resources to help them.  
 Houses could also face crises of authority and management. The decline of the Van Ness House in 
late 1972 was illustrative. When residents refused to obey rules and regulations, house managers lost 
control. Eventually, residents were sent a letter informing them of their evictions.  “It has become apparent,” 
it read, “that the Van Ness residence is not self-sustaining; nor has there been much indication that the 
experiment in collective living is working there.” Moreover, “none of the residents of the current Van Ness 
Liberation House have paid rents for the month of March.” Organizers suspected that alcohol and drugs 
explained the demise, and planned to “redevelop [Van Ness House into] a supportive living environment 
for gay sisters and brothers with drug and alcohol related problems.” Current residents could apply to the 
new program or vacate.95 Instead, they launched a rebellion. “You don’t live in the Collective and haven’t 
even deigned to visit,” they charged. “Therefore, the internal development or working of our Collective is, 
bluntly, none of your damned business.” They admitted that “some of us in the house have had sufficient 
alcohol and drug problems,” but rejected appeals for help. “We’ve pretty much resolved our own problems 
simply by living collectively-a collective you now want to shatter.” In the weeks that followed, they 
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promised to fight their evictions.96 In the end, however, they vacated under threats of forced expulsion. The 
nasty revolt was an example of how grassroots collectives could breed resentment and internal turf battles. 
Organization mattered.  
Despite such problems, liberation houses were an impressive grassroots solution to the housing 
crisis. Between 1971 and 1975, activists estimated that approximately 4,308 men and women has been 
housed in a queer shelter.97 This illustrated need and potential for queer housing initiatives. Platania 
concluded that liberation houses were “a living example of what gay people could do with little more than 
a steadfast belief in the strength of our gay energy.”98 They enabled activists to physically shelter the 
homeless and grow queer family environments. But housing was only the necessary first step in a larger 
development process that became the GCSC. 
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Chapter Three: “Womb to Tomb” Social Service Activism 
 
“The lack of housing and employment among adult gay 
men and women places them in positions of continuing 
economic insecurity. No small percentage finds 
themselves on an unending cycle between the streets, 
jails, clinics, hospitals and prisons. Los Angeles 
constitutes a nightmare of fear and self-depreciation for 
gay men and women.” 
-GCSC founding document, 1971 
 
“Thanks to the [GCSC], my self-esteem and confidence 
have improved because I am accepted for what I am and 
no longer have to build tissues of lies.” 
-H. McElroy, a lesbian parolee assisted by the GCSC, 
1974 
 
 
 Alexander: The Other Side of Dawn premiered on NBC in 1977. A sequel to Dawn: Portrait of a 
Teenage Runaway, the made-for-television film told the story of Alex, a young male hustler trying to 
survive in Los Angeles. In Dawn, Alex forged a relationship with a fellow female drifter, but now faced 
sexual confusion and lonesomeness. As a male prostitute, he wondered “whether he may be a homosexual 
(or at least bisexual).” Unremarkable in many ways, the film showcased an impressive organization in L.A. 
called the Gay Community Services Center (GCSC). Confronting sexual predators and economic hardships, 
Alex stumbled upon the GCSC, which offered housing, employment, and counseling programs. A Los 
Angeles Times review of the Alexander noted that GCSC organizers “took special interest in [Alex’s] 
welfare” and brought him in from the cold. Thanks to the GCSC, Alex turned his back on prostitution, 
sought gainful employment, and came to terms with his bisexuality.1 Three years later, famed novelist 
Edmund White set out in search of “gay America.” When he arrived in Southern California, he too took 
note of the GCSC. “In Los Angeles,” he observed, queers “are looking after their own.” The GCSC offered 
“facilities for handling employment, health, psychotherapy, alcoholism, prison probation and parole, and 
so on.” It was a “permanent place, an organization that owns its own.” L.A. must be “the most active and 
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civic-minded gay [city] in the country,” he concluded.2 Both observations highlighted queer social service 
activism in 1970s L.A. 
The GCSC developed a wide range of social programs in the areas of housing, employment, 
emotional counseling, healthcare, and parolee support. While it blazed new trails, it was one part of a larger 
mosaic of activism in L.A. The GCSC joined organizations such as the Sons of Watts Improvement 
Association, the East Los Angeles Community Union, the Los Angeles Women’s Center, and the Gay 
Women’s Center, all of which focused on the provision of social services. Although some worried about 
the consequences of this “institutional” approach, organizers argued that they were merely transforming 
radical politics. “Much like Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh,” one claimed, “providing services to the people 
fomented revolutions.”3 Through the GCSC, activists joined the War on Poverty on queer terms and 
constructed new, diverse poverty knowledge. This chapter examines the grassroots nature of the GCSC, 
while the following explores efforts to win it public financing and political support. The success of this 
organization demonstrated how gay liberation could impact both the grassroots and the establishment. 
 
Launching a Queer War on Poverty 
 The GCSC was a bold addition to social service activism in L.A. Organizers built upon past lessons 
and explained queer discrimination in structural terms. By the founding of the GCSC, activists explained 
queer poverty and homelessness in sophisticated ways. Framing the organization as one weapon in the 
larger War on Poverty, they asserted that queers had an integral part to play in the fight against metropolitan 
blight, homelessness, and inequality.  
 The GCSC was first conceived within liberation houses.4 The idea excited Jon Platania, Morris Kight, 
and Don Kilhefner, and the name of the organization became important. “By ‘community,’” Kilhefer 
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explained, “we meant somewhere where we took care of each other. The use of the word ‘Gay’” indicated 
that “we were going to be open and upfront.” The name also implied a political ideology, for “the word 
‘Services’ was clear from a political point of view. These were not social workers, these were 
revolutionaries. We saw there was something about the grassroots providing social services that was 
important and revolutionary.”5 Some scholars have suggested that activists “compromised” the “lofty 
ideals” of “the Gay Liberation Front [and] the New Left” by adopting an organizational strategy, but those 
involved saw the GCSC as a radical expansion of gay liberation.6 In order to obtain legitimacy as a 
community service center, the GCSC needed non-profit status. Organizers were assisted by attorney Alan 
Gross, who explained the requirements of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). At the state level, the GCSC 
faced little opposition. Elected alongside Governor Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State Jerry Brown 
“approved [the GCSC application] without blinking.”7 Organizers touted the endorsement within the 
national IRS application.8 Still, IRS officials “raised all kinds of questions.” Commissioners understandably 
insinuated that, by helping queers, the GCSC was discriminatory. In response, activists promised to “deal 
with anyone who comes to our door.”9 Some have argued that this was a “purposefully misleading ploy,” 
but the GCSC did welcome bisexual and questioning individuals who were “increasingly expressing the 
possibility of their gay natures.”10 Even with this promise, the IRS stonewalled organizers. At one point, 
Kilhefner was summoned to Washington, D.C. for questioning. Realizing that commissioners “were trying 
to find a reason not to grant the tax exemption,” he decided to regurgitate the written application “like some 
robotic parrot.” And still the IRS stalled. Some maintain that the “Nixon White House found out about [the 
application], and ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to keep it in his desk.” True or not, non-profit status 
was only granted after Nixon had been replaced by Gerald Ford.11   
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 The initial funding strategy was entirely private. Founders noted that “in spite of the legal, religious, 
medical, political, and social prejudice against gay men and women,” many queers had “become 
accomplished individuals at all levels of the professional, entertainment, and business communities.” Those 
with means (most of whom were white and male) were expected to support the GCSC. Although vastly 
removed from the day-to-day lives of low-income queers, wealthier gays were assumed to be “keenly 
sensitive to the needs of their own community.” This sensitivity would blossom into a stable funding 
relationship and be the organization’s “greatest single source of financial support,” or so it was thought.12 
Organizers quickly encountered the limits of this strategy. As outspoken leftists, Kight and Kilhefner 
proved ineffective fundraisers and developed “reputations for being difficult to work with.” Some wealthy 
queers accused them of being communists. Once he began soliciting funds, Kilhefner was shocked to learn 
that some queers were in fact conservative. “These were people,” he recalled, “who had made it. They 
owned some property [but] they were not a part of the antiwar movement, or civil rights movement…We 
got very little financial or brotherly support from them.” City Councilman Joel Wachs was a good example. 
A liberal Republican, Wachs was known as “a man in the closet.” Kilhefner believed he would offer 
clandestine support, but found that he “couldn’t count on him, because he was a conservative 
businessman.”13 The initial hesitancy among the donor class reflected deep political divisions among 
queers. For activists trying to build a community organization, this came as an unwelcome surprise.  
 Thankfully there were exceptions. Sheldon Andelson was a successful gay attorney and a staunch 
advocate of the GCSC.14 He agreed to serve on the GCSC Board of Directors and gave the young 
organization some badly needed credibility. Andelson was useful in raising funds from wealthy friends and 
remained committed to the organization. Still, he sometimes displayed a startling lack of understanding 
about the purpose of the GCSC. As late as 1976, Kilhefner remembered a call from Andelson: “He had to 
go to some fundraiser, and he said ‘Don, tell me again, why do we need a Gay and Lesbian Center?’ ‘Oh 
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Shelly, come on!’” Kilhefner replied. This testified to a lack of ideological cohesion between many activists 
and donors, even friendly ones. Yet the relationship was important from a financial perspective. Andelson 
convinced many to donate clandestinely. Since solicitations came from one of their own, members of the 
gay business community were more likely to donate. Additional resources were raised through the gay 
funky dances and all funds were compiled into “one big pot” from which the organization could pull 
depending on needs.15  
 Relying on Platania’s HUD background, activists wrote a sophisticated founding document which 
explained the need and purpose of the GCSC. This document highlighted structural economic impediments 
facing queers. Alice O’Conner argued that the discourse surrounding poverty in the United States 
transitioned into “an approach that, however expedient amidst the uncertainties of the 1970s, made it easier 
to think about poverty as a failure of individuals or of the welfare system, rather than of an economy in 
which Americans faced diminishing opportunities.”16 This was the trajectory of many poverty analysts, but 
not these queer activists. They instead stressed structural discrimination and associated the GCSC with the 
War on Poverty. According to organizers, many lesbians and gays arrived in Los Angeles hoping to partake 
in a “fantasy that never existed.” Arriving with “a lack of financing” and “few marketable job skills,” many 
became ensnarled in a downward spiral of “disappointment, drugs, a lack of funds,” and “prostitution.” The 
“lack of housing and employment among adult gay men and women,” moreover, placed “them in positions 
of continuing economic insecurity.” The “enforcement of repressive statutes compounded [poverty] still 
further.” Activists described an “unending cycle between the streets, the jails, the clinics, the hospitals, and 
prisons” which trapped Angelenos in “a nightmare of fear and self-depreciation.”17 This revealed how a 
lack of individual and public resources created queer poverty.  
 Access to housing was important. Organizers reported that many had been turned away from public 
housing projects and other community housing programs “because they [were] gay.” Marked as 
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“‘unacceptable’ in heterosexually oriented groups and homes,” there was not a single housing facility that 
“welcomed young or mature gay men or women in need of an accepting home environment.” Similarly, 
queers were locked out of employment programs and job opportunities, exacerbating the downward 
economic spiral. “The lack of social and human services available to gay men and women,” they reasoned, 
“can often be traced directly to the discriminatory practices of established employers.” Many businesses 
would not hire openly queer individuals because of “fear and ignorance.” Thus, opportunities for social 
mobility were blocked.18 Healthcare was a similar situation. It was “a well-established fact that the 
incidences of venereal disease [had] reached epidemic proportions throughout the Los Angeles area.” The 
“freedom of sexual expression which characterizes the gay community” made queer individuals more 
susceptible to disease, but so did poverty and exclusion from healthcare facilities. Many could not afford 
private healthcare and were reliant on free clinic programs. Even here, though, gay men and women were 
“reluctant to make use of free or public facilities for fear of exposure, ridicule, and embarrassment,” since 
most clinics were “heterosexually orientated.” This exacerbated the health crisis and increased risks for all 
Angelenos. After all, activists warned, accessible healthcare was “critical not only for the members of the 
exclusively gay community, but also for the members of the heterosexual community who are increasingly 
expressing the possibility of their gay natures.” This argument implied fluidity and crossover between 
supposed “gay” and “straight” communities.19  
 Once the structural problems had been established, organizers laid out a clear plan to tackle them. 
They pointed out that L.A. was exceptional. “The efforts of the Los Angeles homosexual community are 
particularly unique,” they argued, “in that its energies have been directed not only toward educating the 
majority of society…but also toward the immediate and critical needs of the individual homosexual.” 
Liberation houses demonstrated that queers could help their own. Safe and supportive shelter had “been 
provided to literally thousands of individuals of all ages” who came “from a broad range of socioeconomic 
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backgrounds.”20 While organizations existed elsewhere, the GCSC was uniquely qualified to assist in the 
War on Poverty. This argument also built upon the legacies of racial minorities in the city, who advocated 
for local control of antipoverty initiatives. The GCSC was a product of the community, for the community.  
 
Building a Multi-Layered Antipoverty Center 
 As the GCSC gained structure, housing programs remained integral. Liberation houses, while 
successful, had barely made a dent in the housing crisis. Organizers were reminded of this fact one “cold, 
misty morning.” Barricading the entrance of the GCSC, “young people huddled together seeking shelter. 
Unwanted, homeless, confused, they had nowhere else to turn.” After speaking with staff, leaders realized 
that “this [was] a common occurrence.” The spectacle reaffirmed that the GCSC needed to “make every 
effort possible at keeping a gay housing program in operation.” The problem was insurmountable, and 
organizers confessed that “we don’t know how we are going to meet the need; we simply know that we 
must. If we don’t take care of our own homeless and hungry, who will?” In addition to liberation houses, 
organizers offered other forms of housing assistance, such as emergency financial assistance to pay rents, 
which were often “desperately needed.” 21 By 1975 several residential properties housed the homeless. 
These included liberation houses, as well as the Van Ness House for alcoholics, the Sappho House which 
provided “temporary residential housing” just for women, a recovery house for women with “drug 
problems,” and a fourteen-bed house for newly released prisoners. “Almost on a daily basis,” organizers 
reported, “the Center is contacted by individuals searching for housing.” While they housed to maximum 
capacity, each day “at least one or two persons [were] denied” for lack of room.22 As the GCSC grew, 
staffing problems emerged. Suffering from an injury and a spiritual crisis, Jon Platania left L.A. for an 
indefinite rest in the Bay Area. Additionally, the interim housing director was forced to resign due to low 
wages. While “working at the Center was a privilege,” his salary had put him in “bad financial straits.”23 
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As the GCSC “tightened its belts in order to ensure the obligations of providing housing for our sisters and 
brothers,” it sometimes neglected to provide living wages to its employees.24 Lack of funds sometimes 
foreclosed on good ideas. Imagined as a “cool, groovy, non-oppressive atmosphere,” organizers 
unsuccessfully attempted to lease an apartment building.25 Such failures testified to queer ambitions, but 
also the inadequacies if private fundraising. This became clearer as the organization spread itself thin. In 
order to address the multifaceted beast of poverty, founders built a multi-layered approach. Sometimes, 
individuals mistakenly refer the GCSC as the Gay Community Service Center, missing the plural nature of 
services that the GCSC provided; today many simply refer to the organization as The Center, which one 
founder argued “inexcusably erases the significant words ‘community’ and ‘services.’”26  Organizers 
“decided [that] this was going to be a multilateral” effort which provided “womb to tomb services for gay 
and lesbian people” through housing, employment, counseling, and healthcare programs. 
 The diversity of programs surprised the Los Angeles Times. “The range of services is impressive,” a 
reporter concluded. “There’s a venereal disease clinic and a women’s gynecology clinic; programs to assist 
members in finding housing, jobs and fighting discrimination.” The GCSC had also instituted “rap groups 
and ‘gay awareness’ groups which stress the positive aspects of homosexuality.” One housing complex 
boasted “an alcohol and drug abuse project.” While “similar service centers are opening in other cities,” he 
wrote, “the GCSC is the first and has the widest scope.”27 The range of services was also emphasized in 
Outreach: The Extended Family, the self-published newsletter of the GCSC. Outreach guided individuals 
to individual and community services. These included “self-development, food and shelter, employment, 
legal, medical, senior citizens, prisoners, parole and probation.” A weekly schedule illustrated the range of 
options. Patrons could join a “Gay Awareness Rap for Men,” receive treatment at the free venereal disease 
clinic, attend an informational session on “The Blind and Sexuality,” receive guitar lessons, join a “Gay 
Awareness Rap for Women,” attend “Welfare Rights counseling,” visit the support group for gay parents, 
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utilize the “Free Women’s Clinic” for “complete gynecological services,” join the “Transsexual Counseling 
Group,” or take classes in Yoga and Tai Chi. Friday nights were devoted to gay funky dances.28 While the 
schedule fluctuated depending on turnout, it represented an impressive attempt to reach a diverse 
population. Organizers were most passionate for programs which reached the truly marginalized. This was 
most reflected in youth, healthcare, and parolee programs.  
 
Rescuing “the Forgotten”: Street Life, Prostitution, and Youth Outreach     
 The story of Alex: The Other Side of Dawn (which opened this chapter) revealed a dangerous world 
for queer teenage runaways. Scores of young gays and lesbians, many of whom faced rejection from their 
parents, arrived in Los Angeles with big dreams, but few resources. They confronted homelessness, drug 
abuse, and prostitution. Activists partnered with existing organizations and crafted their own solutions in 
order to assist them. Amid a hostile discourse which conflated queers with pedophiles, activists shined a 
spotlight on “forgotten” teens in their communities.  
 The GCSC partnered with existing youth organizations, such as Project Heavy-West (PHW) to 
reach troubled teens. Founded in 1976, PHW referred at-risk teens to existing social service agencies in 
L.A.29 Black, brown, and low-income teens were the prime targets. Activists suggested that young gay, 
bisexual, and questioning youths were in need of specialized attention and suggested that the GCSC could 
offer a “deterrent from juvenile crime.” Since queer youths of color were dually stigmatized, these services 
were desperately needed. As liberation houses could be sexually-charged environments, organizers 
suggested alternative housing arrangements for underage queers. Those in need of “emergency interim 
housing” could be placed “into private volunteer host situations,” or “low-cost roommate housing” instead. 
Once housed, teens could make use of the wide-range of GCSC services, including health and job 
development programs.30 Activists noted that the GCSC had experience in this area. Recently, one organizer 
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wrote, the GCSC assisted five gay juveniles with employment, eight with emergency food and welfare 
assistance, and sixteen with emergency housing.31 The proposal to join PHW was well-crafted and well-
argued, but ignited a firestorm of controversy. 
 The PHW Board of Directors divided over the issue. “The position of opponents,” one observer 
remarked, was “reflected in the memos of Howard Ekerling,” who represented the County. Appointed by 
Supervisor Ed Edelman, who was supportive of the GCSC, Ekerling opposed the GCSC and fought to keep 
it out of PHW. “The problem of ‘labeling’ youngsters as gay in a predominantly heterosexual society,” he 
explained, would do “more harm than good.” He believed that activists were “inadequately trained” and 
would “over-emphasize sexual orientation” in counseling programs. GCSC organizers considered those 
statements unfair. The presence of Ekerling at PHW meetings “caused significant concern among gay 
community leaders,” one noted, and queers demanded his removal. Strategically, Ekerling was “promoted” 
out of PHW. An aide to Supervisor Edelman explained that “the reasons for his removal need not be detailed 
to him,” and encouraged his reassignment to “a commission where gay-related issues would be minor.” 
GCSC supporters argued that PHW referrals would only involve “youth [who] indicate that they are gay or 
are determined to be gay by the Project HEAVY-West counselors.” Officials would verify which 
individuals suffered from “sexual identity problems” and to what extent they were “a substantial source of 
their delinquency.” Referrals would also need to be at least fifteen years of age or older.32 These measures 
addressed homophobic fears that youths might be sexually molested at the GCSC. There remained one 
significant obstacle: the Sheriff’s Department was steadfastly against the GCSC. On Halloween in 1978, a 
GCSC assistant director received a hostile memo from Sheriff’s authorities. They argued that there were 
“insignificant numbers of youthful offenders who are gay.” Thus, “special referrals for gay youths (i.e. 
GCSC) [was] unnecessary.” A GCSC director questioned the Sheriff’s Departments methods of “detecting 
gay juveniles” and accused them of harmful stereotyping. “I fear that the department ‘detects’ 
homosexuals,” she explained, “according to stereotype criteria and thus fails to identify [many] gay youths.” 
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This was a good point. How did the Sheriff’s Department measure queerness? The records of both the 
LAPD and the Sheriff’s Department made them particularly ill-suited for the task. “Given the homophobic 
attitudes already reflected in this report,” she ordered a countywide survey. Results contradicted law 
enforcement claims.33 
The local chapter of the Boys Club of America had “no special program for gay youth,” “no gay 
staff members” and “would NOT give any positive reinforcement for a person being gay.” Catholic Social 
Services “suggested that gay youths talk with their parish priest.” Since “many youths are just bored and so 
they have homosexual experiences,” the reasoning went, “a good priest would give him something to do” 
(as it turned out, this was a risky suggestion). A local fire station offered youth counseling, but a 
representative admitted that “there [was] no way firefighters would work with a homosexual kid.” The 
Hollywood YMCA “was officially neutral on the subject,” but a representative boasted that “about 50% of 
his gay clients became straight.” The United Way was the only agency which had a policy on queers, and 
this was “referral to the GCSC” where queers could “be with their own.” The Sheriff’s Department insisted 
that the GCSC was dangerously located only “two blocks from the chickenhawk capital of the City” and 
that staff lacked “professional qualifications.” GCSC organizers tore this argument to shreds. “Where there 
are high crime areas in a city,” they asked, “are service agencies or police departments discouraged from 
establishing? Why is it that our Center isn’t viewed as being situated in the best of all locations as opposed 
to the worst?” The “baffling” list of complaints revealed a “discriminatory nature.”34 The new county 
representative, Barry Cohn, was supportive of the GCSC. Law enforcement officials “threatened the 
Board,” Cohn reported, “by implying that if funds are made available to the [GCSC] then they shall not 
participate.” Referrals were essential to the operations of PHW, so this was a serious threat.35 Supervisor 
Edelman spoke with Sheriff Herman Block privately in an effort to smooth things over.36 Edelman had a 
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decent relationship with law enforcement, many of whom “personally liked him.”37 In this instance, though, 
Block was intransigent. Behind the scenes, he pressured PHW board members to reject the GCSC proposal, 
which they did. Director Laurence Rubin explained that approval would have “deleterious effects on the 
flow of referrals” and worried that “the welfare of young people” might be placed in jeopardy, since a 
“young person’s sexual orientation [was] not absolute.”38 Another board member felt it “inappropriate to 
send ‘teenagers with sex identities problems’ to the [GCSC].” It would be better, he suggested, if the GCSC 
hired “independent consultants to serve gay oriented youth (i.e. straight counselors for gay kids).”39 Queers 
lobbied for another vote. After a lengthy period of “intelligent discussion and debate” with GCSC 
organizers, PHW reversed course and approved the application.40 In an impressive about-face, Rubin 
commended the “courageous vote” and congratulated the GCSC for “bringing bureaucracy to [queer] 
people.”41 
PHW awarded the GCSC $6,000 (measly in comparison to other agencies) in order to counsel a 
minimum of twenty clients. The partnership would “divert gay youths from entering, re-entering, or further 
penetrating the Juvenile Justice System.” Officials encouraged activists to be “gay role models” and foster 
“understanding of the special problems of gay youth.” GCSC activists could better tackle the “‘street 
culture’ of Hollywood,” they admitted. There remained, however, a referral hang-up. PHW mandated that 
“only overtly gay presenting youth” could be referred.42 What did overtly presenting mean? This provision 
was added to appease the Sheriff’s Department, but failed to reassure them. Both the LAPD and the 
Sheriff’s Department blasted the decision. Some crowed that there were “only a minimal number of 
documented homosexual juveniles in need of counseling,” and accused PHW of pandering.43 Herman Block 
made good on his threat and withdrew from PHW.44 Panicked organizers reached out to county leaders 
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fearing that “the entire viability of the operation [was] in jeopardy.” If the Sheriff’s Department refused to 
offer referrals, many queers would be steered away.45 In hopes of a compromise, PHW offered another 
concession. Block argued that “volunteer host situations” were “an open invitation to the solicitation of 
minors.”46 Susan Kuhner of the GCSC found this homophobic. Only trained professionals, she insisted, 
would be eligible as “volunteer hosts.”47 Block was stoking fears that “young individuals would be sent 
home with gay couples over the weekend for sex.”48 County leaders agreed the fear was “overblown.”49 
Edelman brought GCSC organizers together with Block to “clean the whole thing up.”50 No record of the 
meeting remains, but afterwards Block announced he would “re-evaluate the decision to leave [PHW].” 
Law enforcement officers would have “no intention of sending any individuals to the GCSC,” he confessed, 
but he was willing “to tour the Gay Community Services Center facilities” himself before he made his 
decision.51 Sure enough, the Sheriff’s Department remained within PHW; several queer youths were even 
referred from the West Hollywood sub-station. The struggle highlighted delicate issues of sexuality, 
queerness, and youth. The GCSC worked against decades-old stereotypes to prove that queers were not 
predators. The issue of prostitution proved even more contentious. 
 Organizers explained that queer teens found themselves trapped in a cycle of poverty and 
prostitution. In the Greater Hollywood area, queer prostitution was an epidemic, and much of it was 
underage. Neighborhood constituents confirmed the problem, and sent angry letters to elected officials. One 
man demanded that “police remove all male hookers along Santa Monica Boulevard” and “send them to 
San Francisco.”52 Business owners worried that prostitution blighted the neighborhood and drove customers 
away. One wanted to know why “responsible gay organizations” weren’t addressing the issue.53 Queers 
                                                          
45 Letter, 16 March 1979. EDE, box 24, folder 5. 
46 Letter to Ed Edelman, 23 April 1979. EDE, box 24, folder 5. 
47 Aide to Ed Edelman, 27 April 1979. EDE, box 24, folder 5. 
48 Aide to Ed Edelman, 13 April 1979. EDE, box 24, folder 5. 
49 Aide to Ed Edelman, 6 April 1979. EDE, box 24, folder 5. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Aide to Ed Edelman, 13 April 1979. EDE, box 24, folder 5. 
52 Letter to Ed Edelman, 30 November 1981. EDE, box 822. 
53 Letter to Ed Edelman, 12 October 1979. EDE, box 822. 
83 
 
worried about prostitution as well, but many distrusted law enforcement. A “campaign to clean up gay 
prostitution,” wrote one man, would end in a pogrom. Police officers harassed residents “not for the alleged 
charges of prostitution, but because they are GAY.” A “campaign of intimidation” would do more harm 
than good.54 The problem was “not really a matter of gay prostitution,” some observed, “so much as a matter 
of prostitution in general (both gay and straight).” If the queer side of the issue was to be addressed, it would 
need to come from within the queer community. The GCSC made “an effort to deal with the problem of 
gay prostitution indirectly through Project HEAVY-West,” but more direct action was required.55 Affiliated 
with the GCSC, Boyle Home was established to fill the gap. 
Boyle Home was modeled after liberation houses but adjusted to serve underage youths. It consisted 
of two rented houses on Cloverdale Avenue and Olympic Boulevard. Named after its founder, Ed Boyle, it 
was founded in 1976 and helped queer youths in crisis, especially prostitutes. Boyle Home relied on the 
GCSC for referrals and received political support from the County (Edelman’s office offered funding and 
Dodger tickets for house residents).56 Boyle’s private life was mysterious, but he was referred to as a “non-
gay person” by organizers.57 Whether he was straight, bisexual, or otherwise non-identifying, this label 
shielded him from predatory stereotypes. Organizers argued that gay prostitutes required special care and 
attention. The Hollywood Human Services Project labeled them “forgotten young men.” Largely a 
“runaway population,” male prostitutes came from “predominantly lower class and ethnic backgrounds.” 
Many suffered from “symptomatic family disorders” including neglect and abandonment. It came as little 
surprise, then, that Hollywood was “one of the greatest meccas for runaways” and “one of the most 
dangerous street scenes” in America. For gay youths, there was little chance of escape, since many facilities 
did not serve them. Queer teens were more likely to become “forgotten throwaways.”58 The Los Angeles 
Times celebrated the boldness of Boyle Home. Residents were “self-identified gays” who found themselves 
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lost in prostitution. The Times described a non-threatening environment: Boyle managed the program with 
two female social workers, and permission from parents or legal guardians was required. Sadly, Boyle 
reported that this was not difficult to obtain. “Many parents and siblings may intellectually accept a gay 
brother or son,” he explained “but are unwilling to open their home to him.” Residents could “not have sex 
within the house,” “leave without clearance,” or “cruise Santa Monica Boulevard.” House counseling 
sessions offered “a place to examine what being gay means.” A sixteen-year-old runaway from Redlands, 
California revealed that his “attraction to street life” emerged after he was “abandoned” by parents. Thanks 
to Boyle Home, he longed for “more emotional and loving relationships.” Ed Boyle found this story typical. 
Young gays wanted “some guy who will make it OK forever and ever,” he explained. Instead, many found 
“weekends of drugs and sex” which caused “emotional damage.” Los Angeles was an exceptionally cruel 
place. The city had become a “ghetto for gays,” he opined. “Gays will say they’re happy they’ve got 
Hollywood; that’s like a Jew saying he’s happy he’s got the Warsaw ghetto. It’s all based on, ‘Am I young 
enough?’ ‘Am I pretty enough?’”59 The streets of Hollywood could be mean and superficial.  
When it came to gender, Boyle Home sometimes offered harmful advice. One staff member 
remarked that, “without role models,” many “gay boys tend to become flamboyant” and “effeminate.” 
Young gay males might “even try cross-dressing, or dressing like women” in order to “completely deny 
their masculinity.” Gender confusion, some charged, stemmed from a lack of exposure to “successful 
human beings who are gay.” What did that mean? Did “successful” queerness require “masculinity”? She 
implied as much. This could have troubling effects on teens. One young man “painted his eyebrows and 
polished his nails” before a weekly meeting. Counselors asked him how he would feel if “a woman handed 
him some lesbian literature” The worried teen asked, “would they think I was a girl?” After discussion, “the 
consensus was: If [he] didn’t like the assumption and if he doesn’t like kids at school calling him names, 
then he’d better remove the paint and polish.”60 This was a troubling lesson in conformity, and spoke to a 
historical problem of gender within queer communities. “Swish,” Craig Loftin contended, was an 
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“unacceptable mannerism” in mainstream gay life.61 In Philadelphia, Marc Stein found that “while lesbians 
and gay men were engaging in important struggles, they were not furthering the goal of abolishing the 
sexes.” Instead, activists “subverted the hegemony of heterosexuality” while simultaneously “strengthening 
the hegemony of sex.”62 It is difficult to know how committed Boyle Home organizers were to gender 
conformity. This example might have been deliberately conservative to fend off anti-gay attackers. 
Regardless, some residents seem to have gone without needed sexual and gender counseling.  
Theoretically the program was open to females, but it privileged males. Boyle admitted that “10 
boys were referred for every girl,” which encouraged the belief that male prostitution was more of a 
problem. Boyle was hardly alone in this assumption. Adolescent runaways were often depicted as male 
teens, which limited options for women. A women’s crisis counselor at the GCSC complained that “on any 
evening, there are usually a few lesbian runaways looking for a place to stay.” Many used the GCSC itself 
as shelter until it closed at midnight. When staff locked the doors, she said, young lesbians “often walk out 
in tears, saying ‘I guess I’ll have to find a straight man to spend the night with.’” Street life was not a male 
problem, yet there were “no licensed lesbian homes in Los Angeles.” Some women concluded that “men 
care about men, gay or straight.” Boyle Home was symptomatic of this exclusion. Even within the 
organization, some complained that “bed space was reserved to accommodate boys.” One county leader 
was warned that “this issue might get very hot. It has elements of women’s rights and justice, mixed with 
realities, fixed budgets and limited resources.”63 Faults notwithstanding, Boyle Home was an important 
initiative. It contributed to a rethinking of adoption, foster care, and adolescent social welfare. Susan 
McGreivy, a GCSC lawyer and President of the SCACLU Gay Rights Chapter, used the program’s success 
to pressure the Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) to “certify Gay foster homes” in L.A. County. 
If the county wanted to curb the “continuous stream of youngsters who often end up hustling on Santa 
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Monica,” they needed to support programs like Boyle Home.64 The DPSS actually had no official policy 
on the matter, but an internal memo declared that “homosexuality [was] a valid consideration in foster 
parent placement.” In other words, there was neither a pro- nor anti-gay position; DPSS staff had 
discretion.65 The conservative nature of Boyle Home earned it approval. County representatives described 
it as “an experimental project” which “does not take the position of condoning or condemning sexual 
identity.” If organizers strategically sterilized the program to win approval, it worked. The DPSS even 
offered financial assistance, since “it would be unfortunate if a program as crucial as this folds because of 
lack of funds.”66 The DPSS had previously “refused to process application forms from gays” but now 
signaled a new attitude. When a Palos Verdes queer couple applied to foster a seventeen-year-old runaway, 
the “DPSS could find no reason to deny the application. [The couple] had been together for 10 years. They 
had excellent references” and “excellent jobs.”67 This application was processed shortly after Boyle Home 
obtained DPSS approval and funding.  
Like liberation houses, queer youth programs impacted understandings of family and stability and 
remained an important aspect of the GCSC into the 1980s. By the end of that decade, activists founded the 
Gay and Lesbian Adolescent Social Services (GLASS) program, which experienced great success until it 
filed for bankruptcy in 2009. While the organization often assisted covertly to avoid controversy, the GCSC 
reached scores of queer teens. These efforts revealed a strong concern for sexual and economic justice, as 
did healthcare activism.  
 
Providing Healthcare: Free Clinics and Substance Abuse Programs  
 Jenna M. Loyd documented an energetic free healthcare movement in 1960s and 1970s L.A. Within 
“Black freedom, women’s, and antiwar movements,” activists “situated questions of bodily harms and 
healing within the multiply scaled geographies of everyday life. Their ideas of bodily well-being included 
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access to dignified healthcare, and went beyond clinic walls to include bodily self-determination and 
healthy living conditions.”68 Historical revelations of medical abuses (most notably the Tuskegee 
experiments), led Black Panthers to establish community-controlled healthcare facilities, which tended both 
“body and soul.”69 Queers contributed to this grassroots healthcare movement. Liberation houses mandated 
free clinic screenings, but the GCSC also developed comprehensive health programs. From routine 
healthcare needs, to venereal disease and gynecological treatment, to alcohol and drug abuse programs, 
activists expanded healthcare options for low-income lesbians and gays. 
 In fact, healthcare concerned motivated activists before the founding of the GCSC. As a young Peace 
and Freedom Party member, Kilhefner worked on behalf of the free-clinic movement. These “community-
based free clinics,” he recalled, “were coming alive at the grassroots and questioning the establishment.” 
Neighborhoods molded clinics to address particular needs of residents and activists worked to establish 
clinics “in communities that were poor” and “many times non-English-speaking.”70 Nationwide, the Brown 
Berets and Black Panthers opened clinics that were independent from complete state control. In Los 
Angeles, clinics emerged in diverse neighborhoods such as Long Beach, Watts, and East L.A. which were 
“unique because they saw themselves as not simply meeting an unmet health need, but [also] as part of a 
broader movement for liberation, justice, and peace.”71 Supported by volunteer staffs of sympathetic 
medical professionals, academics, and activists, free clinics offered healthcare to the marginalized. While 
controlled by community activists, local clinics relied on grants from the National Free Clinic Council to 
operate. When the GCSC sought funds to open a clinic of its own, a representative “called Morris [Kight] 
and [Kilhefner] and said ‘Look, I’d like to grant you the $25,000, but I can’t.” He suggested that “the gay 
issue” would be too controversial. Activists argued that, like racial minorities, sexual minorities deserved 
access to healthcare grants. “Look,” they reasoned, “there’s a civil rights movement going on in this 
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country, and it involves not only blacks, but it involves Latinos, and gay people, and women and we’re part 
of that.” Activists also appealed to the Los Angeles Free Clinic Council, whose members endorsed the 
GCSC proposal and sent an “avalanche” of letters to the National Council. It worked, and helped secure 
the grant.72 Once operational, the GCSC clinic provided free venereal disease testing, gynecological exams, 
and routine physicals. For queers who worried about public exposure, the clinic was a lifesaver. A decade 
later it played an important role in the fight against AIDS. The experience encouraged activists to stress 
commonality with other minorities. They did so again in 1974 when the newly formed Echo Park-Silver 
Lake Regional Drug Coalition circulated fliers about drug abuse in Echo Park and Silver Lake. Reaching 
out to the “total community,” coalition organizers encouraged activists to attend a meeting “to find out what 
we’ve been doing, to present helpful ideas of your own, and to find out how you can help.”73 Sensing 
opportunity, GCSC activists attended the meeting and noted that the only way to solve the drug problem in 
the area was to “represent ALL segments of the community,” which included queers.74 Submitting a 
proposal for over $100,000, organizers argued that low-income queers, especially those of color, would 
respond best to fellow queers.75 Substance abuse, in fact, was a top GCSC priority. 
 When the Van Ness liberation house underwent an organizational crisis in late 1972, it was 
transformed into a treatment facility for queer alcoholics. The Van Ness program was partnered with 
Alcoholics Together, an L.A.-based substance abuse program. By the summer of 1973, Van Ness became 
“a model for what will be houses springing up all over the country.”76 For those with means, it cost forty 
dollars a week; if no financial resources were available, clients were asked to volunteer in lieu of payment.77 
Treatment plans varied depending “on the individualized needs of the person.” Most residents lived at the 
house for three months, but were encouraged to make a long-term commitment. After organizers assessed 
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suitability, clients entered detoxification, then stabilization. At this point, individuals were assigned a 
sponsor and guided towards county welfare programs.78 For many, this was a crash-course in “government 
and private sources for counseling, legal and probation matters, job and vocational counseling, medical and 
psychological counseling, and financial assistance.”79 They were expected to make use of GCSC programs 
for personal and professional development. By the end of treatment, residents would “secure permanent 
employment or involvement in a vocational training program,” and become involved in “activities of gay 
and non-gay communities.” Active involvement might include “attending services at the Metropolitan 
Community Church,” or volunteering at the GCSC. Once graduated Van Ness residents were asked to 
“participate in Household Rap Groups” and volunteer in “staffing the telephone help-line at the house.”80 
Like most treatment programs, Van Ness stressed a lifelong commitment to sobriety. 
 Van Ness House replicated the liberation house project of family-building. A brochure pointed out 
that “the gay alcoholic faces two socially stigmatizing problems: alcoholism and homosexuality.” Genuine 
recovery required “a facility geared towards recognition, understanding, and acceptance of both.” As one 
was treated for their alcoholism, they also received emotional support and encouragement for their 
queerness. Residents developed a “family-style living pattern” and formed emotional relationships. On 
average, Van Ness housed ten to twelve individuals at a time, making it an intimate environment. Together, 
they “maintained the house, prepared meals, participated in” counseling sessions, and “learned to live 
comfortably without alcohol or drugs.”81 The popularity of the program was revealed in long waiting lists 
and grateful letters. One man wrote that the program was “fantastic.” He was a member of “Alcoholics 
Anonymous for over four years,” but felt rejected for being gay. At Van Ness he found dual acceptance and 
encouraged organizers “to open more houses quickly.” Out and sober, he was “currently sponsoring four 
people, one of which has been through Van Ness and one who is there now. Both are sober, functioning 
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very well, have jobs, and are becoming responsible citizens.”82 Unlike liberation houses, lesbians were well-
represented in Van Ness. 
 One “very grateful homosexual alcoholic” wrote that she had never witnessed such a “wonderful 
program.” Van Ness guided the “confused and helpless” towards “a steadying hand and true purpose.” She 
lamented that there were not “enough of these facilities at the present time” and hoped “to see the program 
enlarged.”83 Another woman acknowledged “how much it meant [for] other gay alcoholics to have meetings 
of their own. There are some of us who might not have made it if it were not for the gay meetings.” 
Counseling brought her sobriety and lesbian validation. “Now I have four years of sobriety and I’m living 
a fuller and happier life,” she reported.84 Some women, however longed for lesbian-only spaces. One was 
“very fortunate” but believed that “a Women’s (Gay) only house would be substantial for other women.” 
There was “a need for communication [between] other alcoholic homosexual women,” and she admitted 
that, while she could “get along with the men,” she could not “relate to their problems.” Still, her experience 
was a success. She was now “functioning without alcohol and drugs, which I couldn’t do before.”85 The 
GCSC did establish a female-only treatment facility while Van Ness continued to treat men and women. 
The program received commendations and support from elected officials. Mayor Tom Bradley and County 
Supervisor Ed Edelman were both fans, and Councilwoman Peggy Stevenson admitted that it was “a most 
valuable social service asset” which “enhanced the overall neighborhood.”86 Long before AIDS, queers 
labored to provide affordable healthcare in L.A. As with housing, healthcare activism connected gay 
liberation with other social movements and strengthened the region’s mosaic. In similar ways, prisoner and 
parolee advocacy earned the GCSC respect. 
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“I Can’t Begin to Thank You”: Reaching Out to Prisoners and Parolees   
 One of the most progressive programs of the GCSC was the Prison, Probation, and Parole (PPP) 
Program, which provided housing, employment, and emotional services for incarcerated and newly released 
queers. This program fused the most important aspects of social service activism and came at a critical time. 
The arrival of the GCSC coincided with a dramatic escalation of mass incarceration in America. “Between 
1970 and 2010,” Heather Ann Thompson argued, “more people were incarcerated in the United States than 
were imprisoned in any other country.” The reasons for the spike included a bipartisan “war on crime,” the 
corporatization of the prison industry, and a crackdown on social minorities, especially African 
Americans.87 In California, the prison industry expanded rapidly, creating a network of profitable “golden 
gulags.”88 Social justice activists did not sit idly by as individuals became ensnarled. Dan Berger found that 
mass incarceration shaped the trajectory of racial justice movements and forced the nation to confront 
injustice and the confinement of black bodies.89 Queers also found themselves imprisoned. Targeted with 
anti-sodomy laws, gay men were particularly vulnerable to arrest and incarceration. Queers of color were 
more susceptible, and faced a double threat of sexual and racial profiling. While mass incarceration 
constrained social justice movements, Regina Kunzel argued that “political connections between lesbian 
and gay activists and prison inmates persisted” throughout the era.90 In Los Angeles, GCSC organizers 
developed the PPP Program to fight back. 
 Activists were familiar with issues facing queer inmates. Many, including Platania and Kilhefner, 
encountered incarceration first hand. Aside from his entrapment and arrest, Platania confronted injustice 
while working at Nevada State Hospital, where he witnessed abuse and discrimination. While a student at 
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Sacramento State University, he also witnessed a friend “busted for selling a lid of Marijuana.” Although 
he was a stellar student, he was “sentenced to five years to life in a maximum security prison.” Platania 
remembered the experience sourly, noting “it was really awful.” These examples illustrated that the criminal 
justice system was not always just and he worked for reform. Years after his involvement with the GCSC, 
he worked at San Quentin Penitentiary counseling inmates.91 Don Kilhefner also had encounters with 
incarceration. While with the LAGLF, the director of the Nelles School for Boys in Whittier informed him 
that he had “a group of gay boys” who “suffered a lot.” After a long conversation, he confessed, “I just 
don’t know what to do with them.” Kilhefner offered to visit the teenagers, “three quarters” of which “were 
youth of color.” Once there, he counseled them “about gay liberation and what it was trying to do.” The 
inmates revealed abuse: authority figures and fellow inmates “humiliated and shamed them” through 
physical and mental degradation. Some “would go around cell to cell to serve meals, and before they would 
serve the gay [inmates] they would masturbate into the food.” Authorities appeared to sanction the abuse. 
As they learned about gay liberation, however, the inmates became “more uppity, more politically aware, 
and more demanding.” This was good news for Kilhefner, but bad news for the director of Nelles, who 
terminated the counseling program. The ordeal provided Kilhefner “direct experience with the prison 
population” and informed his work in the PPP Program.92 These experiences, along with phone calls and 
letters from inmates, enabled organizers to address the unique needs of queers behind the wall.   
 Incarceration, much like poverty and homelessness, was a structural problem. PPP Program directors 
estimated that in California, “approximately 20% of those incarcerated are gay women and men,” and noted 
that no “public or private agency in Los Angeles County provided services specifically to meet the needs” 
of such individuals.93 Interviewed by the Los Angeles Times about the program, Kilhefner and Morris Kight 
argued that “nine times out of ten, re-entry centers will automatically exclude people if they are gay because 
they see gay people as a problem.” This posed a burden on openly-gay inmates, for “enrollment in a re-
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entry program” was “often a stipulation for parole.”94 Indeed, many parole boards required that applicants 
be accepted into some kind of supportive program, have adequate housing lined up, and employment 
prospects secured. Securing these things behind bars was nearly impossible. If one was open about their 
sexuality, they could encounter hostility. “Our clients report negative experiences in dealing with public 
and private agencies,” organizers reported. Queers were subject to “moralistic lectures based on sin or 
sickness myths, ridicule, direct verbal and physical abuse, insensitivity, and negative reinforcement.” This 
led “most prisoners [to] feel isolated, cut off and forgotten.” The feeling of isolation was “even more 
pronounced and cruel for the gay prisoner who is rejected and abandoned by family, relatives, and 
friends.”95 Organizers referenced the story of “a 16 year old, black youth who was openly gay.” Eligible 
for release, “his family refused to deal with him” and “no suitable placement could be found for him 
anywhere in the County because of his ‘sexual identity problems.’” Aside from the GCSC, the only 
alternative was sending the young man to an asylum.96 
 Queer prisoners were ideal candidates for social rehabilitation. Since “very few gay persons [were] 
incarcerated for crimes of violence,” activists reasoned that most were not “hardened criminals.” Kilhefner 
knew “a friend who was in prison [for] seven years on a simple sodomy charge.” While “he should have 
been out in one year, there was no program willing to take him, so he stayed in year after year, a forgotten 
person.” These individuals “would be excellent candidates for release by the courts to a community based 
rehabilitation and re-entry program” that was accepting of their sexuality. Framing incarceration as costly, 
they argued that the “lack of housing facilities for gay prisoners [in L.A. was] a major factor contributing 
to the continued incarceration, at public expense, of gay prisoners.” Queer prisoners struggled to find 
adequate and affordable housing as well as employment; they faced the debilitating stigma of having been 
                                                          
94 “Center Aids Gay Parolees,” Los Angeles Times, 19 October 1973, F1. 
95 Gay Community Services Center Prison, Probation, and Parole Program general revenue sharing proposal, 14 
March 1975. GLCSC, box 14, folder 10. 
96 Don Kilhefner to Friends to the Center, 7 December 1976. GLCSC, box 14, folder 8. 
94 
 
branded a felon and gay. These structural impediments created “a critical need for positive, supportive re-
entry housing in Los Angeles County.”97 The PPP Program addressed this need. 
 Stability required a safe place to call home. Housing brought emotional security and also allowed 
individuals to make “better judgments.” In a liberation house, inmates would “learn they need not hide out, 
need not make love in furtive and dangerous ways,” organizers argued. A safe and loving environment 
would allow queers to “seek tenderness, caring, and sharing in open and honest ways. That’s the best way 
to avoid entrapment.”98 Once housed, individuals were assisted with employment. This proved “most 
difficult, since many employers did not offer jobs to known felons or homosexuals.” Discrimination 
resulted in “a tremendous unemployment rate in the gay community” turning it “into a poverty community” 
where “crimes of survival” abounded.99 By 1975, however, the GCSC established relationships with 
companies such as Campbell Construction Company, Bio-Feedback Technology, and queer-owned 
businesses in the hopes of locating jobs. The United States Mission (USM) and Metropolitan Community 
Church (MCC) also provided employment, and by 1977, jobs were secured with the County through the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) program.100 Outside of housing and employment 
assistance, queer parolees were offered counseling.  
 The PPP Program was framed as an arm of a larger social services movement. It reached “low 
income, handicapped and disadvantaged persons” who were often ignored.101 In 1976 the Prisoners Yellow 
Pages, a national resource guide, included the GCSC. Listed in the California section, the GCSC program 
was one of only two listings which accepted open queers (the other being Troy Perry’s MCC, which offered 
referrals to the GCSC). The editor of Prisoners Yellow Pages noted that it was his “hope that prisoners who 
turn to the Yellow Pages will find the assistance they need regardless of their race, creed, color, sex, sexual 
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preference, or national origin.”102 Once word spread about the program, inmates from across the nation 
sought assistance. In March of 1976, 172 individuals contacted the GCSC. Twelve were accepted into 
Liberation Houses and 106 were provided employment referrals. Overall, 1,093 letters were received that 
year.103 One man wrote that his “plans are set up to be paroled to the Los Angeles area soon,” but he required 
housing to finalize his release. Onto this letter, Morris Kight scribbled “OK-Housed-Job,” seemingly 
indicating that he was housed and assisted with employment.104 In many instances, the promise of assistance 
helped secure parole. “The Gay Community Services Center has been requested to supply employment and 
housing for the above named person,” one letter to a parole board read. “We will provide the prisoner with 
housing in one of our Liberation Houses. Emphasis in the house is placed upon accepting responsibilities, 
working with house members, and participating in the programs offered at the Center. We will also provide 
employment, full-time, through our Job Placement Office.”105 Securing these elements gave a parole 
application hope. 
Such was the case with a black lesbian incarcerated at the California Institution for Women. She 
began her correspondence with the GCSC while still behind bars. At that time, her future “looked quite 
bleak.” Her parole had been delayed because she had been unable to secure employment, a necessary 
requirement. “One of the biggest problems any person has who leaves prison is obtaining a good job,” she 
wrote. Because she was queer, however, she labored “under a double problem” since she was “both a lesbian 
and an offender” (she might have added a third, being that she was black). She had almost given up hope, 
but then stumbled across the GCSC in the Prisoner Yellow Pages. Since she planned to live with friends 
upon her release, the most pressing matter was employment. GCSC organizers informed her that “there was 
a definite possibility of a job with Campbell Construction Company.” One week later, she learned that “the 
job offer was definite,” which enabled her to finalize her parole application. Employment secured, she was 
granted parole three months earlier than expected. Upon her release, she relied on the GCSC for 
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transportation and “some initial financial assistance” in acquiring food and clothing.106 Back in Los Angeles 
and enjoying her freedom, she expressed her gratitude. “All the facilities of the [GCSC] were put at my 
disposal,” she wrote. “Both my self-esteem and confidence have increased because I am accepted for what 
I am and do not have to build tissues of lies.” Her experience demonstrated the need of the PPP Program. 
As a queer woman, it was important that she secure assistance as a lesbian. The “tissues of lies” that she 
lamented spoke to past experiences of hiding. Dual affirmation was “needed by so many people,” she wrote, 
“many of whom might be successful citizens rather than failures if given just a little help.” She hoped that 
the GCSC would expand the PPP Program in order to “reach every gay person who is now incarcerated.”107 
Her story demonstrated that some queer inmates could overcome the system. 
 GCSC staff sometimes became personally involved in cases. After a young gay man was arrested 
for breaking and entering, his friend wrote for help. He hoped that the GCSC would be able to sway the 
Ohio Adult Parole Authority in granting parole. “Only 22 and just a kid,” his friend had “no family and no 
friends except me.”108 Taking up the case, a GCSC organizer wrote back and explained the various 
requirements that would need to be met, including housing and employment. The friend assured that he 
would “offer [him] permanent housing for as long as he wishes” as well as “employment in my place of 
business located in Glendale, California.”109 Officials then sought a direct relationship with the inmate. “We 
can and will provide you with ongoing counseling services,” a GCSC representative wrote, “to help 
facilitate your successful reentry into the community. Of course, when you come to Los Angeles, you will 
have access to the entire range of services at G.C.S.C.-the free Men’s Clinic, supportive rap groups with 
peers, etc.”110 Organizers then wrote directly to the Ohio parole board. “[The inmate] is scheduled for 
release in December of 1977,” they wrote, “but since housing, employment and post-release counseling are 
presently available to him, we are hoping he will be released earlier. When he comes to Los Angeles he 
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will have access to the full range of services offered by our [PPP Program].”111 The young man was released 
early and arrived in L.A. by November. He sent along the briefest of notes to appreciation: “I can’t begin 
to thank you for your understanding.”112 What became of him is unclear, but his case testified to the ways 
that the GCSC could make a difference. 
Not all cases were so successful. Sometimes GCSC involvement could do more harm than good. 
This was the case with a San Luis Obispo inmate, who reached out for help in 1974. Organizers offered up 
a range of services to expedite his release, but during an appearance before the parole board “a 
representative told [him] that [the] G.C.S.C. was against the law, and would not be accepted as a place to 
parole men coming from prison.” He pleaded with the parole board, promising that “if granted parole, [he] 
would have the help of [the] G.C.S.C. to find a job, and a place to live.” Instead of compassion, the board 
“talked to me as if I were shit. I was made fun of because I am homosexual.” In letters supporting his 
application, the GCSC stressed that the organization would assist him with “common emotional problems 
[that people faced] because of their gayness.” This backfired and hurt his chances of parole because 
members of the board did not approve of homosexuality. “I know that I have been denied parole mainly 
because of my being gay,” the inmate confessed. He warned PPP Program staff that they should “make it 
known to other gay prisoners what they should expect when they go before the parole board.” In his case, 
housing and employment plans with a queer organization were evidence of his continued illegality. This 
decision left him “feeling quite alone.” Out of options, he vented: “I understand that [the] G.C.S.C. has a 
Prisoner Parole and Probation program, but is it working?”113 One of the weaknesses of the GCSC was that 
recognition was not guaranteed. In this case, there was little the GCSC could do. It hit a homophobic wall.  
 Within the PPP Program, activists continued the project of family-building as well. Queer prisoners 
suffered from both the loneliness of incarceration and familial neglect or abandonment. Regina Kunzel 
noted that many prisoners sought kinship from gay activists. Seeking “a sense of belonging,” they were 
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attracted to alternative models of family that were possible within gay liberation.114 After receiving a note 
of encouragement in 1975, one inmate wrote in gratitude: “Thank you very much for your letter. It makes 
me feel very good to know that there are people who care and are willing to help persons like myself.” The 
support encouraged him to be hopeful about his parole, and look forward to “returning to Los Angeles.”115 
A man incarcerated at a San Luis Obispo penitentiary sought “warm assistance in helping me locate 
someone who is able and willing to write me.” Including a picture, he described himself as “a 27 year old 
black journalist” who liked “the outdoors, reading, writing, good music, pleasing the one I am with, and 
having loads of SEX.” He had “no family or friends” who could “assist in my moments of need,” making 
him desperate for human contact. “I would like to correspond with someone whether Gay or not, single, 
married, or divorced,” he wrote, adding “I do not discriminate, I love all people, no matter what color they 
may be.” If possible, he hoped to establish a “lasting relationship.”116 Emotional isolation hit many hard. 
One inmate longed for “someone to correspond with” but was blunt about his deteriorating situation. “I am 
losing contact with the outside world,” he wrote. “I have been in prison five years now and will be in a lot 
longer I am afraid. I have no one on the outside to write.” After providing a physical description of himself, 
he implored the GCSC to “help a lonely convict. It really would be appreciated, believe me.”117 He was 
delighted to get a reply from a GCSC organizer, who asked him to “write and tell me a little about yourself. 
What are your likes and dislikes?” He added, “I hear you clearly when you say that you are losing contact 
with the outside world. That is a real fear when you are locked up for any length of time.” He encouraged 
the inmate to write back, so as the GCSC could develop “something positive for you.” He closed his letter 
offering “much gay love,” something likely not offered to this inmate in some time.118  
These experiences revealed important emotional and economic needs. The GCSC addressed both 
through the PPP Program. If possible, inmates would be welcomed into a liberation house and given 
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employment assistance. If parole seemed unlikely, however, activists still sought to spread “gay love” 
across the miles. In 1975 the GCSC initiated a volunteer pen pal program to reach more inmates. “You 
probably take your relative freedom for granted,” activists wrote to the community. “At the [GCSC] there 
are dozens of files about Gay prisoners who don’t take their freedom for granted. They don’t have any.” 
Activists asked others to “Put yourself in their place-locked in a cage, subjected to regimentation, harassed 
for being Gay, day in and day out, year after year, perhaps never hearing from old friends, family, lovers.” 
If this image was upsetting, individuals should “write as a friend to a friend, on a regular basis, to one, two, 
perhaps three Gay prisoners. Your letters can help a brother or sister keep up spirits. Share your love and 
pride.”119 These letters spread precious emotional support and extended gay liberation to the most 
vulnerable and excluded segments of society. 
 
“Fostering Dignity” and Building Bridges 
In 1973, the Los Angeles Times published an article on the GCSC written by columnist Art 
Seidenbaum. Expecting a short visit, Seidenbaum spent hours interviewing organizers and clients. “My 
visit to the Gay Community Services Center,” he concluded, “persuades me that dignity is being fostered 
there.” The GCSC was helping “the gay membership which has needs that have not been met heretofore in 
this city.” Of equal importance, the GCSC had earned “respect from the larger community because it has 
helped spread human understanding rather than antagonism.”120 Rather than incite controversy and division, 
the GCSC built political bridges to other social minorities. In this way it advanced a long project of queer 
coalitional politics in L.A. 
Within a few years of opening its doors, the organization received numerous letters of support from 
fellow social service agencies. The PPP Program was signaled out by a representative of the Sons of Watts 
Assistance and Rehabilitation Project. He commended the “untiring efforts” of the GCSC in “providing the 
most vital services to persons in need, such as counseling, job referrals, [parole] applications, and 
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emergency housing.” Noting that many black queer residents of Watts were in need of those services, he 
thanked the GCSC for spreading understanding and implored organizers to “hang in there!”121 The Southern 
California Prison Coalition enthusiastically supported the GCSC. “There are all too few organizations 
operating in our society today to help ex-convicts adjust to living again in the community,” a representative 
wrote. For queer parolees, “the transition is sometimes so severe that their return to prison is precipitated.” 
By addressing sexuality directly, the GCSC had instituted “constructive efforts to help our most 
disadvantaged citizens who need so much support…You can be assured that you have our support in any 
way that is possible.”122 Prominent liberals in L.A. lauded the PPP Program. “It is only through the 
participation of concerned citizen groups such as yours,” City Attorney Burt Pines wrote, “that arrestees 
and ex-offenders feel that they have a continued stake in society.” The GCSC offered a “chance” for those 
who “otherwise had none,” making it “vitally important to the city.”123 One constituent wrote to Los 
Angeles County Supervisor Ed Edelman to express his “full support” for the “housing of gay prisoners and 
parolees.” He believed that the program showcased the “best aspects of our humanity” and encouraged 
Edelman to “fully support and fund these efforts.”124 Edelman concurred. 
The multi-layered approach of the GCSC was impressive to other community agencies. A 
representatives of the East-Los Chicano Education Training and Research Organization admired the 
“refreshing and innovative” approach of GCSC programs. They were a “step in the right direction.”125 A 
black activist and employee at Martin Luther King Jr. General Hospital in Watts wrote that he was “very 
much encouraged to see the progress [the GCSC] has made in providing services to a previously neglected 
segments of our population, specifically gays and females.” Commenting on housing and drug abuse 
programs, he added that “homelessness and alcoholism” were “critical problems” in Watts and thanked the 
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GCSC for “outstanding achievement in this area.”126 The Asian Women’s Center was impressed by 
attention to women’s issues and the “diversity of [GCSC] programs.”127 These letters admired queer 
activism and also acknowledged that queers within their communities were clients. The GCSC was a rising 
tide that lifted all boats.  
Other relationships were also strengthened via the GCSC. The Southern California Branch of the 
American Civil Liberties Union (SCACLU) became a booster. “On behalf of our members,” a 
representative wrote, “thanks for the job you’ve done.” He expressed his “best wishes for your continued 
growth.”128 Some businesses also linked themselves with the GCSC. A representative of Campbell 
Construction Company, which hired gay parolees, commended “the excellent employment program [the 
GCSC had]. As you are well aware,” he wrote, “I have hired a number of people through your program 
and, to date, these employees have evolved into hard working, loyal and honest individuals. No employer 
could ask for more.”129 After a tour of the GCSC, a UCLA professor of sociology wrote that he was 
“impressed with the program.” A researcher in sexuality, he “knew it would be difficult to establish a place 
for poor gay people,” but believed that the GCSC had proven successful because “it is run by the members 
of the community it serves.”130 Local control bred trust and respect.  
Within a few years, the GCSC became the largest queer social service agency in the nation. 
Providing a wide-range of services, including housing, employment, healthcare, counseling, and parole 
support, it offered a “womb to tomb” solution to the problem of queer poverty. This achievement is well-
known. The reasons for its success are not. How did activists fund their efforts? Where did resources come 
from? This was an equally remarkable story. Throughout the 1970s, queers made political breakthroughs 
with the establishment which assured public financing for grassroots activism. Remarkably, they brought 
gay liberation into the halls of power and the welfare state. 
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Chapter Four: A “Ray of Sunshine”: Gay Liberation, Establishment Politics, and 
the Welfare State 
 
“Several [GCSC] programs are now closely connected 
with County government. We are deeply appreciative for 
the ray of sunshine which you have become for our 
community and the entire Third District.” 
-Don Kilhefner to County Supervisor Ed Edelman, 1976  
 
“This change was not made in response to pressure. We 
are simply trying to expand low-income housing for all 
families.” 
-HUD spokesman Tom Bacon, 1977  
 
 In 1970 Los Angeles Gay Liberation Front (LAGLF) activist Don Kilhefner made a trip to the 
County Hall of Administration. Concerned with rising rates of sexually transmitted diseases, he asked to 
speak to a county supervisor. “Looking like Alan Ginsburg” and “naïve as hell,” he introduced himself as 
a “gay man with the Gay Liberation Front.” The clerk asked him to wait in the lobby, at which time she 
called security. Confronted by two deputies, he was escorted out and told not to come back. “You don’t 
belong here,” they explained. Just a few years later, however, he returned under very different 
circumstances. Now an employee of the Gay Community Services Center (GCSC), Kilhefner came by 
invitation of County Supervisor Ed Edelman. A GCSC grant had recently been rejected by the Health 
Department and Edelman brought representatives together in his conference room to find out why. Health 
Department officials were put on the spot and grilled. Soon enough, Edelman ended debate. “Just give them 
the money,” he instructed. “At that point,” Kilhefner remembered, “it was all over; they caved; they gave 
us the money.”1 These two experiences could not have been more different and testified to the remarkable 
degree by which queers gained ground within the political establishment in the 1970s. 
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Queer activism has often been celebrated as a grassroots success story.2 While this narrative is 
important, it minimizes the role of the state within the story. In L.A., activists were successful because they 
transcended the grassroots and utilized tools of the establishment. This chapter reveals how political and 
economic relationships with the liberal establishment, a strategy begun in the 1960s, yielded considerable 
rewards in the 1970s. Like others, queers molded themselves in liberal ways but retained leftist worldviews. 
Doug Rossinow has characterized such movements as “left-liberal.”3 Historians who view the 1970s as a 
prologue to the 1980s miss the dynamic success of left-liberal movements, including gay liberation.4 For 
much of the decade, it was difficult to see the decline of liberalism. Instead, as Robert Bauman found, many 
progressives were expanding the War on Poverty and carrying it forward.5 Queers were important players 
in this story. While the 1970s have been characterized as an “era of limits,” activists successfully located 
social welfare programs to fund their activism.6 At county and city levels, they harnessed the potential of 
the Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) and the Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) program. As they won funds, they also carved space within liberalism. Through the Stonewall 
Democratic Club (SDC) they encouraged Democrats to incorporate queers in political coalitions. Far from 
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“splintering” liberalism, gay liberation strengthened the Democratic Party.7 Nor were political gains 
confined to the local level. While this chapter begins in L.A., it ends with breakthroughs at the national 
level. Within the Presidential Administration of Jimmy Carter, in fact, the definition of family changed and 
housing subsidies were opened to queers.  
 
County Breakthrough: Ed Edelman and the New Democrats   
 The relationship between activists and Los Angeles County Supervisor Ed Edelman was most 
influential. The alliance developed due to shared geography and ideology. Since many queers lived in the 
unincorporated area of West Hollywood, the County was their immediate governing body. West Hollywood 
had greater access to funds via grants that were reserved for unincorporated areas. The fact that L.A. County 
was one of the most populous in the nation meant that these opportunities were considerable. Moreover, 
decisions regarding the allocation of funds were left to the discretion of county supervisors. Unlike cities, 
there were fewer bureaucratic entanglements, which made L.A. County incredibly powerful.8 With the 
election of Edelman in 1974, queers gained an ally in control of discretionary spending. They also gained 
a political bedfellow who brought queers to the political table. 
 Close aides considered Edelman “a new type of Democrat” from a “new political generation.”9 He 
bridged the Great Society with the New Left. Prior to announcing his 1974 supervisorial bid, he served as 
L.A. City Councilman. Elected in 1965, he touted his involvement in the John F. Kennedy administration 
as well as his support of minority civil rights movements of all stripes.10 He espoused a decidedly leftist 
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populism, promised “a philosophy of inclusion,” and championed “underdogs, outsiders, [and] 
neighborhoods [which] were not politically represented.” More than once he railed against “downtown 
interests and developers,” who exacerbated urban inequities.11 One aide remembered that Edelman 
“believed people could be lifted up” and that “government was going be part of the solution.” First elected 
in his early thirties, he “was one of those people who was going somewhere…He was part of the next 
generation that was going to make a difference within the system.”12 His cohort included Jerry Brown, Alan 
Cranston, and Tom Bradley. Jonathan Bell argued that modern liberalism was “forged in the crucible” of 
California’s “diverse mosaic,” and Edelman was one of its products.13 As a supervisorial candidate Edelman 
promised new affordable housing and labor protection, spoke out against the Vietnam War, and supported 
personal privacy rights. He assured that “equal rights in housing, education, and employment” extended “to 
all persons, regardless of age, sex, religion, race, or sexual orientation.” Alongside a picture of Robert F. 
Kennedy, one ad chided “business as usual” on the County Board of Supervisors. For too long, “land 
owners, developers, oil companies,” and “big business” controlled precious resources. Edelman promised 
Third District voters he would “open up government to the people.”14 Queers were listening. 
 Indeed, lesbians and gays were already flexing political muscle. In 1969, City Councilman Paul 
Lamport sponsored “an anti-loitering ordinance aimed primarily at chasing male homosexuals from the 
streets of Hollywood.” Activists mobilized against him and contributed to his defeat, which emboldened 
them. Unlike some Democrats, Edelman seemed to genuinely support queers. Running for a supervisorial 
district encompassing West Hollywood made attentiveness to queers necessary, and rumors have also 
persisted that Edelman had a queer brother or daughter.15 These no doubt contributed to his support, but did 
not define it. An advocate of personal privacy, he “was incredibly supportive of the personal and political 
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empowerment of gays.”16 He viewed queers as a marginalized minority in need of protection. On the City 
Council, he supported California Assemblyman Willie Brown’s Consenting Adult Sex Bill, which repealed 
sodomy laws in the state.17  Moreover, he supported the economic activism of organizations like the GCSC. 
Affordable housing, employment opportunities, universal healthcare, and criminal justice reform were 
fundamental to his political worldview. When he began his campaign, it made sense to court queer voters.  
 His impressive win among lesbian and gay voters (he received 80% of the vote in West Hollywood) 
led The Advocate to muse over the possibilities of his election. Edelman had been “the only major candidate 
in California who made a public bid for the gay vote,” the paper reported. Shortly before the election he 
even introduced “an unprecedented gay rights plank in his general campaign brochure” which called for 
“an end to discrimination in housing and employment on the basis of sexual preference.” Most impressively, 
Edelman fought back against queer-baiting. When his opponent sought to “create a voter backlash by 
calling attention to [Edelman’s] gay support,” Edelman called it an “unfortunate” case of “gay-baiting.” On 
election night, he admitted that the “election indicates the strength of the gay community and the 
significance of having people in public office who are going to be sensitive to its needs and to the 
discrimination it has suffered for too long.” An ally on the County Board of Supervisors meant much more 
than friends on the City Council. “The County’s five supervisors wield sultanic [sic] power,” The Advocate 
noted. Supervisors decided “hundreds of appointments” and controlled “appropriations totaling $2.6 billion. 
How such funds are spent sets policy.” Through, Edelman activists could change the “concrete mentality 
of widening streets and putting up buildings” into one of concern for human needs.” There were “Gays of 
vision with the skill to combat drug abuse…to open halfway houses for the homeless, and to develop 
employment programs for the jobless.” 18 The County offered tremendous power.  
 In 1975, Edelman declared a countywide gay pride week, predating L.A. His most important decision, 
however, was to hire a gay liaison. From Edelman’s perspective, a liaison would help “open County 
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Government to people of all lifestyles” and “raise the level of consciousness in County Government to the 
needs of gay people.”19 The selection moved queer activism into the halls of political power. While Edelman 
received letters of interest from many (including Don Slater of the conservative Homosexual Information 
Center (HIC) he settled on GCSC insider David Glascock.20 His politics mixed well with Edelman’s. A 
veteran of the LAGLF and the GCSC, he also worked on behalf of the Community Relations Conference 
of Southern California, a well-established organization that promoted “better human relations through 
intergroup cooperation.” Founded in 1947, it nurtured many young liberals, including Kenneth Hahn, Tom 
Bradley, and Maxine Waters.21 Glascock was a loyal Democrat, but his selection was controversial. The 
Los Angeles Times questioned his moral character and revealed “offenses involving minors in Wisconsin 
and New Jersey.”22 One article speculated as to why his ex-wife “had custody of their 5-year-old daughter.” 
Glascock defended himself against “certain individuals [who] cannot deal with homosexuals on an even 
level” and promised “never [to] ask a constituent what he does in bed.”23 Edelman stood by his choice. 
“Those incidents were 12 and 14 years ago,” he told reporters. “I knew about both…We hired [Glascock] 
because, if we’re going to solve our problems in the gay community, we want someone who understands 
those problems.”24 At another event, Edelman revealed why Glascock was a good choice: through him, “the 
County [would] provide for [gay] needs through the Gay Community Service [sic] Center.”25  
 Paid a monthly salary of just over one thousand dollars, Glascock provided weekly briefings, 
monitored funding of GCSC programs, made appearances on Edelman’s behalf, and fielded constituent 
requests and complaints.26 In these areas he boosted the GCSC and defended it from external threats. In 
1978, for example, Edelman received a cantankerous note from a Homosexual Information Center 
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representative. This group emerged from a conflict among activists at ONE in the late 1960s, and stood 
opposed to gay liberation.27 The man warned that “the Gay Community Services Center [was] not the 
exclusive spokesman for the homosexual community. In fact, the center may not even be the representative 
of a majority.” He suggested Edelman “look into the Homosexual Information Center to determine where 
the power really is in this community.”28 Instead, he turned to Glascock for a political appraisal. “The 
Homosexual Information Center,” the aide reported, “consists of two men who are both extremely 
conservative and guilt ridden because of their homosexuality. They have attacked every part of the 
organized Gay Movement from Troy Perry on down.” Pointing out that the writer had endorsed a 
conservative over Edelman in 1974, he reasoned that these folks were “very troubled persons.”29 The 
conservative charges were indeed correct: in 1980 members marched in a gay parade under a banner reading 
“Homosexuals for Ronald Reagan.”30 Glascock helped isolate these groups. Shortly after Harvey Milk’s 
election to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors in 1977, Edelman queried his liaison about his politics. 
“Harvey Milk,” Glascock reported, was “the first upfront gay man to be elected to any office in California’s 
history.” 31 He was also a good Democrat (Glascock ignored or overlooked Milk’s conservative past, in 
which he had supported Barry Goldwater).32 He suggested Edelman send a welcoming note, which the 
Supervisor did.33 When he was invited to speak before the Municipal Elections Committee of Los Angeles 
(MECLA), Glascock explained that “the membership is made up of the wealthier, more conservative 
members of the gay community” but was “one of the most politically powerful groups because of the 
amount of money they are able to pour into campaigns.”34 These briefings allowed Edelman to tailor his 
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remarks to different political tastes. In addition to briefings, Glascock fielded constituent requests and 
brought queer concerns to county government. 
 Queers found community in a multitude of ways in postwar America. In coffee shops, bars, social 
clubs, sporting leagues, and other venues, queers found their movements.35 In L.A., many also discovered 
gay liberation through Edelman’s office as Glascock guided individuals to the services and agenda of the 
GCSC. When one man moved to the area in 1975, he paid a visit to Edelman’s office seeking information 
on the GCSC and the Homosexual Information Center. Staff directed him to Don Kilhefner, and provided 
no information for the HIC.36 When a lesbian wrote seeking “a place for gays,” Edelman’s office sent her 
a map with the GCSC address.37 These referrals steered people towards the organization. Letters also bore 
witness to rampant and multifaceted sexual discrimination. A former hospital controller had returned to 
California after “a bad case of depression” and hospitalization in Iowa only to find harassment. On his way 
to visit a friend in Riverside County, he explained, he was stopped by police officers who had been 
following him since he left a gay bar. “They asked me about my marital status. When I told them I had 
never been married, one had the audacity to ask if I was Gay. I told them I was and that I wasn’t ashamed 
of it. After that, they arrested me and hauled me to jail.” In “what was obviously a case of Gay 
Discrimination,” he sought advice from Edelman. “I just don’t know where to turn. What does a person do 
when he is so unsure of his rights, his attorney, the judge, etc.?”38 In his reply (drafted by Glascock), 
Edelman informed him that “the Los Angeles Gay Community Services Center provides a legal services 
referral program” and gave him necessary contact information.39  
 His office also kept notes on police brutality. In San Francisco and New York, queers mobilized at 
the grassroots to combat police violence throughout the 1960s and 1970s.40 Activists did so in L.A. as well, 
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but also advocated within the establishment. Edelman was made aware that the “LAPD harassed and 
arrested 40 gay persons” during a weekend raid in Hollywood.41 When he was stopped for the “crime” of 
“being black and gay,” one man headed straight to Edelman’s office to report it.42 Another detailed how his 
“roommate was arrested in the West Hollywood Park’s men’s room while on his way home from a job 
interview.” Edelman advised him to notify the “ACLU-Gay Rights Chapter” and report the incident.43 An 
elderly man believed that “FBI agents followed him to restaurants in downtown” and instructed “waiters 
not to let him eat.” Queer and a former communist, he was sure he was on an “enemies list.” Edelman’s 
office forwarded the complaint to local law enforcement and requested that he be taken off any list.44 In a 
lengthy call, one man told of “a vicious attack on a friend” who was beaten and “called a ‘faggot’” by 
police. He warned that, if things didn’t change “gays who live in this area will form vigilante groups to do 
their own surveillance.”45 “It is not criminal to be Gay,” another constituent wrote, “and as a citizen and 
taxpayer I resent ‘gestapo’ exercises of intimidation and resentment.”46 His letter received a supportive and 
apologetic note from Edelman, who promised to fight on his behalf. Dozens of others found themselves in 
similar situations, as queers battled against the tactics of Police Chief Edward M. Davis. While it took years 
to achieve meaningful reform, each letter increased the arsenal by which progressives could fight.  
 By the close of the 1970s, Edelman’s office received scores of letters and calls from queer 
constituents. Whether it was to report an eviction, an act of violence, or to solicit information about how to 
contact queer organizations, his office helped many find gay liberation in Los Angeles. As queer boosters, 
Edelman and Glascock helped to open the county to lesbians and gays. The partnership benefited both men 
and represented a genuine alliance. Two years after he was hired, Glascock was offered a job with the 
Department of Social Services. He “decided not to accept the job offer,” which “was a difficult decision 
because of the money and security involved.” But, he explained, “I have a strong commitment to my gay 
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brothers and sisters and an even stronger loyalty to Ed Edelman.” He could be more effective within 
Edelman’s office than outside of it.47 When he did leave in 1980 (for a job at the GCSC), Edelman thanked 
him for his “yeoman work” which “insured social betterment” in L.A.48 “I want you to know,” Glascock 
replied, “that my years on your staff was truly the most rewarding period of my life. I learned more and 
accomplished more during that time than ever before.” He held a deep respect for Edelman’s “integrity” 
and “concern for people,” a “true political rarity. When it is time for you to campaign, I want to help.”49 As 
Edelman’s liaison Glasock was an effective lobbyist for the GCSC, a fact not lost on activists. In one note 
to Glascock, Kilhefner wrote, “As always, ‘Praise the Lord’ that you are where you are and doing what you 
do. We love you.”50 That love was well-deserved. 
 
Financing Gay Liberation through CETA and CDBG Programs  
 Ed Edelman was elected to the County Board of Supervisors in a very fortuitous year. The County 
was already powerful, but two new federal programs made it more so. The presidential administrations of 
Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford created the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) and the 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program in order to trim the War on Poverty, but ended up 
expanding it. These programs were boons to social activists. By the end of the 1970s, hundreds of thousands 
of dollars were flowing annually to the GCSC from CETA and CDBG grants. Public financing literally 
paid activists to be activists and allowed gay liberation to thrive at the grassroots.  
 The CETA program was a game-changer. Signed into law by Richard Nixon in 1973, it offered 
employment grants to community service organizations. Although largely ignored or diminished by 
scholars, it provided thousands of employment opportunities to low-income men and women. Part of a 
larger stimulus package, CETA funds were congressionally allocated to job training programs in the public 
sector. The program was an effort to “consolidate the many manpower programs that had been started 
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during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,” but resulted in a broadening of public opportunities 
beyond what Nixon intended.51 Indeed, CETA was the “most significant federal jobs program in the 1970s” 
and was expanded greatly in the presidential administrations of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.52 Eligibility 
was determined broadly and relied on the discretion of local county or city officials, giving county 
supervisors discretionary power. “Once we got wind of where it seemed like [CETA] was going,” Kilhefner 
recalled, “we said, ‘Let’s start spreading the word that the County is funding organizations that are helping 
poor people.’ And we just spread the word.”53 Other organizations were mobilizing low-income people in 
Hollywood, including the Greater Los Angeles Community Action Agency (GLACAA). Metropolitan in 
scale, GLACAA emerged from the ashes of the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency, which 
empowered racial minorities. Comprised of a workforce that was eighty percent nonwhite, the agency 
divided L.A. into ten target zones and funded social service programs for minorities, including African, 
Mexican, Jewish, and poor Angelenos.54 In 1974 activists requested that “all [GLACAA] meetings be open 
to the public” so they could present a queer face to poverty.55 While they lobbied GLACAA officials, 
Edelman and Glascock helped open doors. In May of 1975 a GLACAA organizer came to Edelman for 
help “coordinating unemployed persons in West Hollywood.” He wished to recruit “people who are looking 
to hire job trainees” and “wanted to know if [the Edelman office] knew of any employees who would 
participate” or were “looking for work.”56 Glascock recommended the GCSC. In 1976, the GCSC submitted 
a $400,000 CETA proposal, the bulk of which funded “housing for poverty persons” and the GCSC 
“Employment Project.”57 Endorsed by Edelman, CETA funds were awarded that spring.  
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 Glascock was particularly thrilled. Attending the award ceremony, he reported that the victory was 
“an important issue for gays” since “CETA funds will allow the [GCSC] to hire 75 persons for training and 
will help their programs.”58 Indeed, the allocation of funds provided the first salaried positions at the GCSC. 
There were good political reasons to celebrate as well, for activists had overcome homophobic opposition. 
One City Councilman had crowed that “providing funds to an organization to further the aims of 
homosexuals should not be condoned or supported. [Homosexuality] perverts the use of this nation and can 
only add to the further destruction of American family life.” The idea of utilizing federal funds to nurture 
alternative lifestyles was enough to garner “four hours of heated debate” during which some tried to “divert 
[funds] to other programs.” In the end, the effort failed. The portion awarded to the GCSC was, after all, 
rather small in comparison to other allotments. The Los Angeles Unified School District received $4.9 
million; the Watts Labor Action Committee $1 million; and the Chicana Service Action $949,000.59 Within 
the mosaic, queers were not funded equally, but it was significant that they now enjoyed a piece of the pie. 
It is difficult to overestimate CETA grants. For activists, they provided the “highest return to the 
community” and allowed the GCSC to embark on an “exciting period of growth and high quality social 
services.”60 To Kilhefner, CETA symbolized queer power. “They thought they could divide up the pie 
anyway they wanted to,” he explained, “but were forced to allocate some of this money to us.”61 CETA 
funded a number of political positions, including Mayor Tom Bradley’s gay liaison. Until the termination 
of the program in the 1980s, it allowed activists to commit themselves to full-time activism.  
 CDBG programs were also helpful. Signed into law by President Ford in 1974, the Housing and 
Community Development Act contained substantial urban policy reforms, including Section 8 housing and 
the sometimes overlooked CDBG program. The concept was bipartisan: liberals applauded additional urban 
investment and conservatives celebrated that local communities would control funds, not the Federal 
Government. Developers were pleased with the initiative as well, since private investors could apply for 
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funds alongside social service agencies. Like CETA, the program was designed with great flexibility. Funds 
could be allocated for public infrastructure, housing, administrative planning, public services, economic 
development, and property acquisitions. Those categories were deliberately vague to allow local authorities 
maximum discretion. Funds were awarded by county, based on need and population. Again, in L.A. county 
supervisors controlled most of the money. Beginning in 1975, organizers submitted proposals to Edelman 
on a regular basis. “Whenever we got requests for proposals we applied,” Kilhefner remembered. “Nobody 
else [in the country] was doing that, but our government was supporting gays.” Grant-writing could be 
unpredictable and tedious. Many “didn’t know anything about writing proposals.”62 In fact, Kilhefner had 
experience writing grants in graduate school and Jon Platania’s background in HUD proved useful. 
Although he had since left L.A., he had left behind a sophisticated explanation of the GCSC in the 
organization’s founding document. Stressing poverty knowledge and the language of liberal social uplift, 
this became the backbone for many grants which others wrote.  
 Activists secured funds for a range of services. One 1975 grant won $71,000 for “services to low 
income, handicapped, and disadvantaged persons.” Arguing that “no other public or private agency in Los 
Angeles County [was] providing,” such services, the GCSC positioned itself as a metropolitan remedy. 
“Almost on a daily basis,” activists explained, “the Center is contacted by human service workers searching 
for housing for gay clients.” This was a burden for the county, as it greatly contributed to the homeless 
population. Moreover, “by offsetting the high incidence of hospitalization, imprisonment, and suicide 
among the members of the gay community in Los Angeles County,” the GCSC saved “the general public 
large sums of public funds.” Activists argued that queer investments were in the interests of taxpayers. 
GCSC service programs had “broad application” and did not “just serve gay people.” They were models 
that could “easily be adapted for numerous other problem areas” and made “a direct impact on the general 
welfare of the area.”63 This framed queer activism within a larger context of metropolitan renewal.  
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 Tying GCSC programs to CDBG funds carried risks. In the summer of 1976 a county budget error 
placed GCSC programs in jeopardy. Activists reached out to Glascock for help. Since both the Interim 
Housing and the Prisoner, Probation, and Parole (PPP) programs were reliant on county funds, organizers 
needed to “process [the] renewal right away” and “put people in the machinery on notice.”64 Morris Kight 
wrote directly to county agencies. “Two of the Center’s vital programs [Housing and PPP] have been funded 
through General Revenue Sharing Funding,” he explained. The announcement of funding cutbacks caused 
“great concern for both of these programs” which provided “housing for those who would otherwise be 
homeless.” Kight admitted reliance: “One of the crucial lessons we learned is that we cannot operate a 
housing program without external funding. Thus our resort to [the] County.”65 In an internal memo, 
Kilhefner warned that “until we have a definite agreement with the County” liberation houses would not be 
“accepting residents.”66 If additional funds were not secured, programs would be “badly crippled.”67 Here 
is where it helped to have friends in high places. In addition to submitting letters of recommendation, 
Edelman could bestow discretionary funds himself. On this occasion, he awarded $40,000.68 While funding 
could be stressful, activists could usually rely on such intervention. In one letter to Edelman, activists 
admitted that “the continuing support which we have received from you has played a critical role in our 
development. Several important programs are now closely connected with that of County government. We 
are deeply appreciative for the ray of sunshine which you have become for our community and the entire 
Third District.”69 In other ways Edelman’s office helped fund queer activism. 
 Friendly staff helped to perfect grants. In 1976 the GCSC submitted a $25,000 grant for a “Lesbian 
Resource Program.” The purpose of the program was to “provide direct internal and external linkages to 
social services for lesbian women.” Individuals would be “integrated into the community at large” and 
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given “a sense of self-esteem and a constructive self-image.” The GCSC estimated that “approximately 250 
low-income women per month, ages 16-60, will receive program services,” including “employment, 
housing, welfare rights, and legal services.”70 While it was a decent application, Glascock worried that it 
might be denied, and reached out to county employees for help. One man enclosed a model winning 
proposal, and recommended that the GCSC focus on employment and housing programs in its application. 
He advised deleting sections detailing “lesbian art, literature, and music” and “a Resource Center relating 
to the Herstory, Sexuality, life-style, and concerns of lesbian women.”71 The GCSC took the advice, which 
“assisted immeasurably in the approval procedure.”72 Sure enough, the revised application was a winner. 
In these cases, Edelman’s office held impromptu grant writing workshops. Once they received funds, 
organizers could utilize money as they saw fit (a lesbian resource center was established), but organizers 
needed to learn the language of bureaucracy. Edelman’s office helped them play things safe. 
 Personal vouchers and letters of endorsements also helped. Edelman was often called upon to assist 
with other politicians. Councilwoman Peggy Stevenson and Mayor Tom Bradley were GCSC supporters, 
but far more cautious. Van Ness House, a GCSC program, was located in Stevenson’s district and activists 
needed her assistance in obtaining a zoning permit to allow fourteen residents in the house. Her office 
reached out to queer attorney Sheldon Andelson with reservations. She worried that “some might object” 
and encouraged residents to “solicit support from neighbors” through “an open house.”73 Activists were 
displeased by this response and went to Edelman, who endorsed the zoning request and submitted a letter 
to Stevenson. “It is my hope,” he wrote, “that the City will grant this variance so that the Van Ness Recovery 
House can continue with its important work.”74 Attached to the letter, activists asked “Would it now be 
appropriate for Councilwoman Stevenson to forward a letter of support?”75 This time she did.76 Did 
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Edelman’s pushing help Stevenson along? It is impossible to say for certain, but it likely helped. When the 
Blue Ribbon Revitalize Hollywood campaign was announced, queers applied. “Mindful of our civic 
responsibility to the total community,” they promised to “do our part in making this City a better place to 
live for all of its citizens.” The Blue Ribbon campaign promised to “deal with the problems of poverty, 
crime, employment, housing, and the general deterioration of the Hollywood area,” of which the GCSC 
was an expert. The proposal requested $300,000 for improvements on the GCSC’s deteriorating 
headquarters and liberation houses. This would improve “blight” and contribute to the “beautification of 
the neighborhood.”77 While the proposal was “classified as acceptable,” it was “assigned a low priority.” 78 
When appeals to Mayor Bradley went unanswered, Glascock asked Edelman to “call [Mayor] Bradley and 
indicate how important it is to respond to the needs of gay citizens. He needs a gentle push.”79 If Edelman 
made such a push, it is unrecorded. However, the application soon received approval. An aide recalled that 
Edelman was often responsible for “bringing Mayor Tom Bradley to a place of support,” since Bradley was 
“not as identified with the gay community.”80 As a respected political leader, Edelman could encourage 
others.  
 In relatively short order, the GCSC became a publically-funded social services agency in Los 
Angeles County. Funds were secured at city and Federal levels, but the county remained the most consistent 
benefactor.81 By 1976 Glascock calculated that over $600,000 had found its way to the GCSC, with more 
grants outstanding.”82 During one funding cycle, Edelman dipped into his discretionary budget three times: 
once to secure $75,000 for the GCSC Venereal Disease Treatment and Education Program, again to provide 
$10,000 for the PPP Program, and a third to award $25,000 for emergency housing programs.83 Activists 
learned the craft of grant-writing and enjoyed its rewards. Kilhefner estimated that the GCSC took in “four 
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million dollars [in county funds] over the whole period.”84 As is often the case, local success enabled greater 
rewards. The largest was a three-year National Institute for Alcohol and Alcohol Abuse grant for $1 
million.85 While activists were just as dedicated in other cities, queers accessed state resources in 
unprecedented ways in L.A. This financial development nurtured a political one as gay liberation became 
embedded within local Democratic politics.  
 
“Now we’re Establishment”: The Stonewall Democratic Club 
 The Stonewall Democratic Club (SDC) emerged as one of the most influential queer political 
organizations in L.A. The name of the organization implied a left-liberal orientation. While “Stonewall” 
identified it with gay liberation and the New Left, “Democratic” signaled its willingness to work within the 
liberal establishment. Could the SDC do both? In 1976, The Advocate published a revealing cartoon. At an 
SDC meeting a young demonstrator interrupted with sign readings “2-4-6-8, Register as Democrate [sic].” 
An embarrassed Morris Kight replied, “Now that we’re establishment, dear brother, we’re just not sure 
we’ll be picketing with signs anymore.”86 The cartoon revealed a shift in strategy which mirrored the GCSC. 
Both organizations adopted mainstream tactics while they pushed liberalism in queer directions. 
 The prospect of the “gay vote” emerged in 1953 when Paul Coates described Mattachine as a “strange 
new pressure group.”87 By the end of the 1960s, The Advocate endorsed candidates in local and national 
elections. The SDC was a continuation of these efforts. Founded in 1975, it was organized by Morris Kight 
and David Glascock. Many members were previous LAGLF activists and many also worked at the GCSC. 
Future leaders, like Valerie Terrigno, cut their political teeth within the organization. As a tax-exempt social 
service agency, the GCSC could not play politics in the open. The SDC could, and did. It resembled other 
grassroots Democratic clubs in California. Membership fees were nominal and varied depending on income. 
The organization was formed “in recognition of a new awareness within the Democratic Party that Gay 
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People should be fully and equally represented in the Community and the National Body Politic.” The SDC 
agenda was simple and sought to “make the Democratic Party and its elected officials responsive to and 
responsible for the needs of all people and to promote a sane and humanist society.” Much like homophiles, 
SDC organizers framed their struggle as part of a broad “general human and civil rights movement” and 
made economic issues paramount. The SDC promoted “welfare rights” and primarily represented “single 
and lower income persons.”88 Unlike earlier organizations, the SDC provided detailed prescriptions for 
discrimination through a sophisticated “gay rights plank” which connected queers to the Democratic Party.  
 Released in late 1975, the gay rights plank urged “passage of civil rights legislation to prohibit 
discrimination against gay people in the areas of housing, employment, public accommodations, and public 
services.” Discriminatory policies in the military, in government employment, and within immigration 
policy had to be eliminated. Representing gay men and lesbians, the SDC championed sex and gender 
equality and called for the immediate passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (indeed, this was point one 
in the plank). Of fifteen points, at least ten addressed economic discrimiantion. The tax system needed to 
be rewritten so as to not “victimize single persons and same-gender couples.” Queers deserved access to 
welfare, and Congress needed to draft “legislation to enable persons covered by Social Security and all 
federal pension programs to designate whomever they so choose to receive benefits in the event.” This 
language was decidedly queer, not gay. Rather than call for civil unions or marriage, activists encouraged 
individuals choose “whomever” they wanted as beneficiaries. Several points pulled directly from the GCSC. 
For example, point ten called for “the establishment of an Office on Gay Awareness,” which would “recruit 
qualified gay women and men to conduct Gay Awareness Workshops within federal government agencies, 
and commence the eradication of homophobia.” The GCSC founding document had called for the exact 
same thing. The SDC also supported increased “funding for qualified gay social service agencies,” clearly 
with the GCSC in mind.89 When it came to housing, the plank was more than specific. It targeted 
heteronormative HUD and FHA policies with zeal. Activists demanded “a policy change” which would 
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encourage “all persons to choose housing and living arrangements in accordance with their own 
preferences.” HUD needed to end “discrimination against gay people in public housing projects, federally 
guaranteed housing loans, and in all other areas under HUD’s jurisdiction.” Targeting the actual method of 
discrimination, the SDC promised to lobby HUD until the “families only” policy had been eliminated. 
While they did not explicitly state that HUD needed to redefine family, implicitly they did. How else could 
it be revised? The plank looked and read very much like a civil rights document. Gay men and women, for 
instance “needed to be immediately added to the Federal Civil Rights Commission."90 Liberation, however, 
was in the details. 
 Perhaps to the surprise of activists, the California Democratic Council (CDC) adopted the gay rights 
plank in the same year of its publication. Jonathan Bell found that the CDC moved Democratic politics 
leftwards in the 1950s and 1960s.91 By the 1970s the CDC was a dominant authority and influenced clubs 
throughout the state. Democrats such as Alan Cranston, Phil Burton, and Jerry Brown succeeded thanks to 
CDC endorsements and support. At the 1975 CDC Convention in San Jose, Kight and Glascock served as 
delegates.92 Along the way they gained allies and a few foes. In an unpleasant encounter with L.A. District 
Attorney Candidate Vincent Bugliosi, Glascock recalled that he had been accosted. Bugliosi threatened to 
“destroy me and my credibility in the Gay community because of my support for [another D.A. candidate].” 
Glascock “told him that if he wished to attempt to destroy me, there was nothing I could do to stop him,” 
but advised Bugliosi that he was “the chairman of the Candidate Evaluation Committee of the Stonewall 
Democratic Club and that our Club would be looking for someone to endorse in the near future.”93 Queers, 
he warned, were now political players. On November 17 the gay rights plank was approved without debate 
by voice vote.94 At the start of a presidential election year, planks were sent to Democratic frontrunners, 
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including Hubert Humphrey, Jesse Jackson, Sargent Shriver, Birch Bayh, Fred Harris, and Jimmy Carter.95 
In less than a year, the SDC had become a statewide political player.       
 At county and state levels, organizers flexed muscle through endorsements. To win SDC backing 
candidates had to support the gay rights plank in its entirety. When Sabrina Schiller ran for a State Senate 
seat in 1976, she vowed to “support legislation which will take the ambiguity out of the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act and specifically list sexual orientation as a prohibited basis of discrimination,” which would “prohibit 
landlords from refusing to rent to gays or single persons.”96 Her strong stance won her an endorsement in 
the competitive Democratic primary. When Tom Hayden announced his candidacy for the United States 
Senate, he promised to “go beyond just legislating.” If elected, he would “ensure affirmative action 
programs are carried out in federal agencies and among federal contractors” to “promote the full integration 
of gays with the social and economic life of America.”97 Hayden and Schiller won their primaries, but 
narrowly lost their elections. The SDC took special aim at anti-gay Democrats. When Supervisor Edelman 
endorsed Democrat Joe Montoya for a State Senate seat, the SDC protested. “We are very disturbed at the 
news that you have endorsed Assemblyman Joe Montoya,” leaders wrote. “You have every right to endorse 
whomever you like, but we wish you had compared the voting records” of the two candidates “with special 
regard to GAY RIGHTS. Mr. Montoya has not, to use the word loosely, been favorable to our cause.”98 
Edelman met privately with Montoya, who suddenly reversed course on gay rights. 
 At the city level activists opened doors with Mayor Bradley and Councilwoman Stevenson. First 
elected in 1973, Bradley built a “biracial political coalition” which was reliant on African American, Latino, 
and “established white liberal” support.99 Thanks to SDC pressure, he was the second politician in L.A. to 
appoint a gay liaison (a position funded through CETA), hiring Bill Carey in 1976.100 Bradley also declared 
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a gay rights week and visited the GCSC personally. Supporting gay rights was “brave,” one constituent 
wrote, and evidenced his “prestige as a man of character.”101 As an African American, Bradley’s support 
of the GCSC was important. One black Angeleno thanked him for recognizing queers, which would ensure 
“hate and bigotry can be diminished and better relations between people of all kinds established.”102 Bradley 
replied that “receiving such a letter” was “one of the greatest rewards a public official” could receive.103 
Councilwoman Stevenson was a harder sell. In 1973, The Advocate endorsed her husband for the City 
Council but did so apprehensively. Activists bemoaned politicians like Stevenson, “who support gay rights 
[but] have not been aggressive enough in pushing for city legislation which would insure those rights.” 
Queers demanded “more than lip service.”104 When Stevenson died in 1975, his wife ran to replace him. 
The idea of a gay pride parade unnerved with her. “I agree with many others,” she explained “who feel that 
the Parade is not in the best interests of the Gay Community and that it is totally counterproductive to the 
cause of Gay Rights.”105 One activist found her lack of support disturbing. “How could a parade be counter-
productive?” he asked. Who were the “many others” that Stevenson alluded to? Stevenson must be “talking 
about the non-gay people in your district who complain about the faggots on Hollywood Blvd. Make no 
mistake,” he warned “we have the right to be here. The parade has brought many closeted gays out and 
made them aware of their responsibility to the city as responsible citizens.”106 Stevenson did not reply. On 
one occasion, Christopher Street West demanded “an open community meeting with [Stevenson]” in order 
“to clarify positions and other matters relevant to the Gay Community.” If she “refused to meet with the 
community” she would “be declared antagonistic to the goals of Gay Pride.”107 In her refusal to endorse 
issues of “Gay Pride,” Stevenson resembled other Democrats of the era, such as Jimmy Carter. But like 
Carter, she was receptive to issues of economic discrimination. She endorsed the SDC gay rights plank and 
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supported GCSC housing programs. She especially approved of housing programs like Van Ness and 
Hudson House, a program established in the 1980s. To different degrees, Bradley and Stevenson 
demonstrated that when gay rights were tethered to economic liberalism breakthroughs were possible.  
By the summer of 1980, the SDC was courted by numerous Democratic hopefuls. The group’s 
leanings were displayed when they feted icons of the left, including George McGovern and Ted Kennedy.108 
In local and national venues, the SDC had “taken gay and lesbian issues from the streets to the halls of 
government.”109 “The Gay rights movement in Los Angeles,” the Los Angeles Times reported, “has more 
momentum than ever before.” In reference to an SDC reception of George McGovern, the Times marveled 
at “the growing respectability of the gay rights movement in Democratic political circles, particularly in 
Los Angeles.”110 The SDC helped to change Democratic politics in L.A. and California. Earlier than in 
most states, liberals began including queers. In a few short years, the SDC had become a major political 
player, but not all supported the project. Believing that gay liberation was being sold to “the establishment,” 
some queers attacked.   
 
The Perils of Success: The Queer Left and the GCSC Strike 
 As the SDC and GCSC gained power and resources, alternative discourses emerged from queer 
socialists, communists, and lesbian feminists, many of whom felt underrepresented within left-liberal gay 
politics. Emily Hobson found that queers built strong ties to leftist liberation movements in California.111 
Los Angeles, Laura Pulido demonstrated, was a major source for multiracial radicalism and fostered a 
flowering of the queer left.112 Many who built beds of support within radical groups found the SDC and 
GCSC counterproductive and antithetical to social revolution (of which gay liberation, they argued, was an 
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integral part). In some ways, they were quite correct. Gay liberation manifestos espoused language of 
revolution, not integration. Social norms and economic structures needed to be built anew, not remodeled.113 
In utilizing Democratic politics and the liberal welfare state, the SDC and the GCSC appeared supportive 
of mainstream structures and institutions. In other ways, however, queer leftists viewed politics in simplistic 
ways. Since the GCSC received grants, and the SDC garnered Democratic endorsements, many reasoned 
that successes masked straight, capitalist takeover. For them the ends did not justify the means.  
The success of the SDC earned it enemies. On one occasion, the president of Christopher Street 
West felt he had been “deeply insulted” by SDC leaders. He was “astonished by [the] behavior” of the 
organization, which was “supposed to have expertise in politics.” At a recent community gathering, he 
explained, he had been snubbed. “It is a shame when any organization thinks it is so big and so powerful 
that common courtesy and understanding is lacking,” he crowed. Then he went political. The SDC was 
morphing into a “money hungry, capitalist, S.O.B.” he fumed.114 Did the SDC deserve criticism? Probably. 
It is easy to see how the success of the organization might go to the heads of its leaders. Not since MECLA 
had a queer organization been so powerful. But were the political characterizations of the SDC fair? Hardly. 
Far from being “money hungry capitalists,” many leaders worked at the GCSC and collected CETA salaries. 
The Revolutionary Socialist League applauded the gay rights plank for its economic message, but 
bemoaned the missing “S word.” “The fight for a better society, for socialism,” they maintained, “includes 
gay people as valuable and militant allies.” Both groups battled economic discrimination, but from different 
ideological vantage points. Socialists believed that “attacks on gays” were “only one part of an attack on 
all working people by the rulers of this country.” What was needed was a “fight against gay oppression” 
that was also a “fight against capitalism.”115 The most influential queer socialists could be found in the 
Lavender and Red Union (LRU). The LRU suggested that heterosexuality was a device “to enslave workers 
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in sexual repression and monogamy,” and printed fliers in Spanish.116 Leaders believed that “the liberation 
of all oppressed peoples can only be accomplished through class struggle.”117 On Halloween in 1975, 
members protested President Ford, who travelled to Los Angeles for a fundraiser. “Ford is another trick of 
the ruling class,” they declared. His economic policies included a “soak the rich tax for single 
people…which hit gay people unfairly.”118 This overlooked queer use of state resources. The real trick was 
that Ford had inadvertently funded gay liberation. 
 The LRU sometimes struggled to remain pure to socialist principles. Leaders devoted “energy to 
public demonstrations,” including “against L.A. Police Chief Ed Davis” and “Barney’s Beanery-a large 
non-Gay bar in West Hollywood [that] had a sign, t-shirts and matchbooks that said, ‘Fagots [sic] Stay 
Out.’”119 These “super-structural” issues were diversions from the revolution, one might have argued. How 
would picketing a bar advance class revolution? When the SDC released a gay rights plank, the LRU 
countered with its own. The organization defended “the rights of Lesbians and Gay men to equal 
opportunity in employment, to custody of our children and to decent medical care,” and promised to fight 
to “abolish all anti-gay laws.”120 Aside from supporting socialist revolution, the platforms were identical. 
The Los Angeles Socialist Workers Party “stood in solidarity with the aims of the gay liberation movement 
to eliminate legislation restricting the rights of gays in housing, jobs and social services” and supported 
“passage of the Equal Rights Amendment.” It endorsed the gay rights plank, but not the SDC. When Mayor 
Bradley announced a visit to the SDC, socialists congratulated “the fact that the mayor of the nation’s 
second largest city feels it important to address your organization.” It surely implied strength, but they 
warned against cozying up to the establishment. “Sam Manual is running against Bradley,” they advised, 
and “presents a real alternative to the working people of this city.” Running as a socialist, Manual had few 
chances of breaking through. Still, socialists urged the SDC to “organize independently of the Democratic 
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and Republican parties, which are responsible for perpetuating discriminatory laws.”121 No good could 
come from working within the system. 
 Most communists were intransigent. The Los Angeles Research Group, an organization of 
“approximately ten communists who are gay women” claimed that the SDC and GCSC were not advancing 
gay liberation. To them, “liberation” implied “the coming of revolution,” which the SDC did not support. 
These women, however, also felt isolated from the CPUSA. They were “disturbed with the consolidation 
of an anti-gay line” within the CPUSA, and outraged that queers had been refused communist 
memberships.122 Others shared that concern. One man had been “politically active on the left for many 
years” and felt “emotionally and ideologically drawn to the traditions and policies of the Communist Party.” 
But the policies of the Daily World, a communist newspaper, turned him off. He warned that the CPUSA 
was “losing support [and] growing old and stale.”123 A Daily World representative chastised him in 
response. “You should know,” he wrote, “that the Communists want to ‘change the world’ by changing its 
mode of production. Then we will tackle the superstructure, which largely takes care of itself.”124 That reply 
was insulting. “Postponing an active struggle against a very real and often violent oppression until ‘after 
the revolution,’” the man fired back, “is an affront to the mind.” While “straight” Party leaders could 
comfortably wait for the revolution, he could not and canceled his membership.125 On the far-left, sexuality 
and ideology did not always mix well. Within the GCSC, activists learned this lesson painfully. 
 In 1975 activists were rocked by a protracted and intense strike at the GCSC. It came at a vulnerable 
moment in the organization’s history, as organizers began relationships with county funding agencies. The 
GCSC was entering a new phase of power and professionalism. Narratives of the strike differ, yet at its core 
it reflected ideological tensions. Successful breakthroughs with the establishment bred fear, anxiety, and 
resentment. The strike did not purge leftists from the GCSC, but did expel those unwilling to work with the 
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state. The discord began when six women and five men were fired from the GCSC (they named themselves 
the “Gay Feminist Eleven”). The motivation for the firings stemmed from a published newsletter entitled 
It’s About Time. This exposé claimed that the GCSC suffered from a history of exclusion. Men and women 
of color claimed that they GCSC was too white; lesbians charged that the organization catered primarily to 
men; and leftists accused leaders of exploiting workers with measly salaries.126 Historical memory has 
focused almost exclusively on the complaints from lesbians. Longtime activist and GCSC employee Jeanne 
Córdova suggested that the strike emerged in response to the eradication of feminism at the GCSC.127 Some 
historians have agreed, arguing that the strike pitted “radical lesbian feminists against gay men.”128 These 
tensions were real and did contribute to the strike, yet its cause was more firmly rooted in ideological 
anxiety concerning state strategies and public financing.  
 The LRU was the chief instigator. In an irony that seems to have been lost, the organization utilized 
space at the GCSC to hold meetings (where members condemned “establishment” strategies of both the 
SDC and the GCSC).129 LRU organizers turned the conflict into a traditional struggle between workers and 
owners and highlighted the conflict between women and men. The LRU claimed that the SDC and GCSC 
“created an ideology in which the world is divided between Gay and non-gay people and ignores class 
contradictions.” This resulted in “boss rule at the GCSC.” They targeted recent breakthroughs with county 
funding agencies as evidence. “The Gay community must be educated,” organizers wrote, “as to the nature 
of the [GCSC] and the government’s role in it.” Establishment strategies transformed activists into “bosses 
and enemies to other workers.”130 On the one hand, the LRU rightly noted that class divisions were 
important. On the other, it inaccurately painted a black-and-white depiction of the GCSC. What “boss rule” 
did the LRU refer to? Leaders were mostly poor. It was true that managers offered little pay for excessive 
work, but they did so because of few resources (recall that many leaders had themselves been homeless). 
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Ironically, the breakthroughs with CETA and CDBG programs (the very things the LRU condemned) 
allowed staff to receive better wages. Don Kilhefner found the accusations outrageous. We were “hardly 
joining the establishment,” he argued. “We were anti-establishment. But, strategically, if we were going to 
make this revolution work, we were going to have to shift gears.” To him, “the question became, how do 
we finance this radical movement?”131 Could the intent of the movement be maintained if “strategy 
shifted”? The LRU and the Gay Feminist Eleven answered no. 
 In fighting for their beliefs, queer leftists tried to sabotage GCSC funding. It is unclear who sent It’s 
About Time to Supervisor Edelman’s office, but it triggered the firings of the eleven agitators. When David 
Glascock read it he was mortified. He swiftly contacted Kilhefner and Morris Kight and demanded that 
“internal squabbling” come to an immediate end. If it did not, he suggested that the GCSC might “lose its 
public charter as well as the federal revenue-sharing funds” which he had just secured.132 The result was 
the abrupt firing of those most associated with the publication. Context is key in explaining the harsh 
response. GCSC proposals were then working through bureaucratic channels and activists were nearing 
CETA approval. It was an exciting but stressful moment. The crackdown on dissent was a severe, but 
understandable purge of ideological intransigence. Once fired the Gay Feminist Eleven picketed. Banners 
assailed the GCSC’s “patriarchal management” and accused it of “racism, sexism, and classism.” One of 
the eleven who was fired, Jeanne Córdova was angry, but even she had difficulty with the harshness of 
language. The GCSC was a “place my baby gay brother might go ask for a bed when my Catholic parents 
throw him out,” she recalled. The firings were wrong, but histrionic condemnation of the GCSC was equally 
injurious. In the end, she supported the LRU-backed strike, but did so on feminist grounds. “This is not a 
labor issue,” she declared. “Our fight is about lesbian feminism versus male-dominated hierarchy.” Yet 
even this was somewhat misleading. Prior to her firing, Córdova had been a GCSC director; after the purge, 
women remained in leadership positions. While they might not have been genuine lesbian feminists 
according to some, the struggle was not male versus female as some portrayed it. If there was hope for 
                                                          
131 Kilhefner OH. 
132 Faderman & Timmons, Gay L.A., 204-205. 
129 
 
reconciliation, it ended when protestors condemned GCSC leaders as “capitalist pigs.”133 In response 
activists parted ways and GCSC leaders wrote a detailed defense of their actions. 
 A special edition newsletter aimed to quell negative publicity and reassure allies (especially Edelman) 
that the GCSC was stable. Organizers admitted that the young social service agency was in the midst of an 
“organizational crisis” which had arisen from “a period of rapid growth.” In short order it had transformed 
“from a volunteer-run, non-traditional agency to an organization with a large incumbency.” New “personnel 
and fiscal requirements that come with grants, contracts, and complex programmatic growth” had caused 
tensions. “Some [staff] positions were filled by people whose goals and objectives conflicted with the goals 
and objectives of the GCSC.” These “political dissidents” did not support government involvement and 
refused to play by the rules. As activism shifted from streets to grants it was time to bid adieu to 
“professional agitators.” Justifying the political and financial alliances they had forged, activists asked 
supporters to rally behind the GCSC. “If you have ever benefited from a Gay Community Services Center 
Program or service,” they pleaded, “this is the time to come forward with your support, your love, your 
gifts, and your presence. You may have needed the Center in the past. You may need it in the future. It 
needs you know.” This campaign was necessary: behind the scenes, members of the Gay Feminist Eleven 
sent letters to Edelman suggesting he cancel contracts with the GCSC.134 
 While the strike subsided, it did so at great political costs. Córdova had been an influential lesbian 
organizer, but was now gone. The ordeal left her angry and she carried a grudge against Kight and the 
GCSC for nearly thirty years. Even in her memoir, she had difficulty letting go. “With its businesslike 
louvered windows,” she wrote, “L.A.’s best known gay organization had morphed into a ‘gay 
institution’…It became ‘the man.’”135 That was not quite fair. Other members of the Gay Feminist Eleven 
came to regret their actions. Some felt duped by the LRU. One even believed that the FBI instigated the 
strike as a way to “destroy the first and largest gay center in America” from within.136 In looking for 
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scapegoats, some downplayed their own ideological intransigence. In the final analysis the strike was 
unavoidable. Organizers forged new political strategies which harnessed the tools of liberalism and the 
welfare state. To them this was not a Faustian Bargain, but pragmatic progress. Protecting that progress 
required them to to disconnect from hardliners opposed to the establishment. The 1975 strike was not a 
purge of lesbians. Women continued to influence the GCSC, including future West Hollywood Mayor 
Valerie Terrigno. Nor was it a purge of leftists: Kight maintained he was of the “Communist tradition,” 
while Kilhefer declared himself a “Maoist.”137 Instead it purged those unwilling to work with the state.  
 
Going National: Gays for Carter  
 As they secured local gains queers also influenced national politics. For liberals the 1970s was a 
curious time, especially since the Democratic standard-bearer proved to be a sphinx. Jimmy Carter 
disappointed the left on many fronts. According to some, his conservative economic policies unintentionally 
exacerbated an “age of inequality.”138 However, Carter expanded CETA and placed avowed leftists 
(including many feminists) in key positions of power. The former Governor of Georgia was an evangelical 
Christian who was proudly “born-again.” Yet, as Randall Balmer suggested, he was cut from decidedly 
progressive religious cloth.139 Carter frankly admitted his moral anxieties regarding non-marital, 
heteronormative sex, but he supported an end to economic discrimination. Through Carter’s 
Administration, queers demonstrated how local activism could shape the nation. 
 Carter’s political relationship with queers began in Los Angeles in March of 1976. Relying on 
primaries, Carter won a series of upset victories against Democratic frontrunners and hoped to do well in 
California’s June primary contest. He was dealt a significant challenge when Governor Jerry Brown jumped 
into the race. Brown represented a serious challenge from the left and was well-liked by queers. After 
winning election in 1974 the young governor secured “landmark legislation” which “extended the reach of 
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Democratic liberalism,” including “collective bargaining rights for public school employees and farm 
workers.”140 He also supported and signed the Consenting Adult Sex Bill, which repealed sodomy laws in 
the state. Within the GCSC, Kilhefner recalled, Brown’s consistent support led many to wonder if he “might 
be gay himself.”141 Even so, Carter built important relationships with queers. While he insinuated that 
abortion and homosexuality were sins, he “did not believe it was his role to mandate personal morality” to 
others.142 Supervisor Edelman’s support of Carter encouraged activists to give him a look. At one fundraiser 
in March of 1976, SDC member and MCC founder Troy Perry grilled Carter on discrimination in housing, 
immigration, military policy, and civilian contract employment. To Perry’s surprise, Carter pledged support 
to all areas except military policy.143 While many remained loyal to Brown, others founded Gays for Carter 
(GFC) to support the Georgian. “We can, for the first time,” organizers proclaimed, “help elect a President 
who has openly declared himself a supporter of the Gay movement.”144 Yet, to what degree was Carter 
supportive of the “gay movement”? He was not comfortable with the message of gay pride, and he criticized 
sex outside of marriage (making sex for lesbians and gays impossible). Hope rested in policy change. One 
month before the primary, the SDC held an endorsement meeting. When Morris Kight announced his 
support of Carter, it swayed others to endorse him. Kight then took an active role in GFC, which quickly 
became a carbon copy of the SDC. When Carter condemned racist housing practices in a California speech, 
Kight verified that this protest “also extended to sexual minorities.” A Carter aide replied that the candidate 
was “opposed to discrimination in all forms, including sexual preference.”145 Although Brown bested Carter 
by nearly 40 points, an important relationship had been established.  
Once the nomination was secured, queers worked to galvanize the “national gay community.” They 
confessed that Carter’s religion made them nervous but declared that “all gay persons throughout the 
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country” ought to labor on behalf of Carter because he had “openly declared [his] support for gay rights.” 
They also highlighted the ticket’s strong support for labor rights.146 Yet, when activists sent along the gay 
rights plank, they received a tepid response from Carter aides. “As you know,” they wrote, “Governor 
Carter is not entirely comfortable with the issue of homosexuality for personal reasons, but he strongly 
stresses his belief that gay people should not be singled out for harassment, abuse, or discrimination” and 
“has repeatedly expressed his opposition to all forms of discrimination.”147 Carter could endorse the plank, 
but could not be a vocal supporter of homosexuality per se. That reply irritated as much as it revealed. 
Carter would not be a loud supporter, but instead a clandestine ally. Major advancements would occur under 
the table. Although effective, this strategy angered some. When the election was called for Carter, GFC 
organizers celebrated that his “administration will be one which insures an end to discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.” They anxiously awaited Carter’s fulfillment of his “promise to issue an Executive Order 
outlawing discrimination against Gay people within the first two years of his administration helped get out 
this vote.”148 But here activists made an assumption. Carter had never promised an executive order, and one 
would not be forthcoming. His administration would advance surreptitious, but consequential progress. 
This was best revealed in two major achievements: a 1977 HUD policy change and the White House 
Conference on American Families, both of which recognized the pluralism of family life in America. 
 
HUD and the Rewriting of Family  
 In May of 1977 HUD officials rewrote the definition of family. Since the establishment of housing 
subsidies in the 1930s, eligibility required marital or biological attachments. This locked many queers out 
of crucial social welfare programs. While overlooked by historians, the decision by HUD represented a 
weakening of heteronormative hegemony within the “straight state.”149 The political strategies of queer 
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Angelenos helped craft national change. Activists within the SDC sent copies of the gay rights plank to all 
cabinet heads and secretaries in the Presidential Administration of Jimmy Carter. Emphasizing economic 
discrimination the plank outlined how family definitions could be changed to expand subsidies for low-
income queers. On the surface this breakthrough might seem surprising. A born-again President, Jimmy 
Carter has not been remembered as a queer or feminist champion. Yet, as Susan Hartmann and Marisa 
Chappell documented, Carter appointed leftist feminists within his administration. These women (some of 
whom were lesbians) pushed his policies away from patriarchal, male-breadwinner ideals and towards 
plural, feminist alternatives.150 Queers were also actors, and beneficiaries, in this story. The HUD 
development revealed how they covertly gained ground in the 1970s. 
Officials in HUD actually began to question family policies during the Ford Administration. Some 
administrators worried that exclusionary policies discriminated against single people. Queers were not 
apparently included in this concern, nevertheless HUD moved to open a loophole in the 1974 Housing and 
Community Development Act. Officials announced that individuals could declare themselves a “single-
household” in order to gain eligibility. Reporters with The Advocate believed that “gay people [were] now 
benefited by President Ford,” since many “have been discriminated against, not because someone suspected 
they’re gay, but merely because they aren’t married.” The “we take married people only stance” had been 
shaken. Now “persons who are discriminated against because of their marital status…may take their 
complaints to the local discrimination office” of HUD.151 Others guided queers towards the “HUD ‘hot 
line’ telephone system” in order to “report housing discrimination” under the new law.152 The policy change 
offered an outlet, but a marginal one. Complainants had to demonstrate their singleness in order file a 
grievance. What if they wanted to live with a partner of the same sex? If these relationships were to be 
recognized the definition of family would have to be expanded. The 1977 policy change did just that. 
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 Before that announcement, activists in Los Angeles and San Francisco unsuccessfully attempted to 
mount a housing discrimination test case. In July of 1976 Glenn Schmoll filed a case with the Superior 
Court of California. Schmoll had been an Angeleno since the 1950s, and worked for Troy Perry as his “first 
secretary” as well as a “receptionist for The Advocate.”153 In 1976 he moved to San Francisco to work at 
NewsWest, a queer publication. Upon his arrival he attempted to rent a vacant apartment. After a tour, the 
unit was “offered for rent at $175 per month.” When the owner inquired discovered Schmoll was gay, 
however, “the offer to rent was withdrawn” and “the owner made clear that he would not rent to gay 
persons.” Schmoll reached out to Donald Knutson, a professor of law at the University of Southern 
California, to represent him in court. Knutson predicted it would be a “precedent-setting case” and 
incorrectly believed he could argue damages under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act of 1959. This 
measure prohibited racial discrimination in housing, and was followed in 1963 by the Rumford Fair 
Housing Act. Neither Unruh nor Rumford mentioned sexuality. However, some believed that the language 
was broad enough to include queers. Knutson cited California Attorney General Evelle J. Younger, a liberal 
Republican, who mused “that homosexuals [were likely] protected under the Unruh Act.” He was mistaken. 
Without legal merit, the case was dismissed.154 Legal scholars suggested that the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
was utilized by queers to battle homophobia in the 1970s and 1980s, but it provided no security for Schmoll 
(the Unruh act was revised in 2005 to specifically protect sexual minorities).155 The case might have had 
better luck had Schmoll been denied housing as a single man, something the 1974 Housing Act prohibited. 
Just a year later, officials announced the HUD policy change. 
Within the gay rights plank activists argued for a change to “family policy.” HUD needed to permit 
“all persons to choose housing and living arrangements in accordance with their own preferences.”156 While 
they might not have intended to do so, activists called for a radical solution to housing discrimination in 
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making this argument. Unlike mainstream civil rights efforts, protective legislation was not the goal. Rather, 
the entire qualification of family was condemned. This transcended gay rights and suggested multiple 
familial possibilities. In their critique of HUD queers joined feminists, especially women of color, who 
were also applying pressure to HUD. They argued that single mothers who cohabitated (including lesbians) 
ought to be eligible for the same subsidies as married couples.157 Queers strengthened this argument further. 
By 1977 the SDC gay rights plank had been endorsed by Supervisor Edelman, Mayor Bradley, and Jerry 
Brown.158 It was also considered by national heavyweights, including Hubert Humphrey, Jesse Jackson, 
Sargent Shriver, and President Carter.159 Once elected Carter’s office sent it along to all department heads, 
including HUD Secretary Patricia Roberts Harris. 
Since its creation, HUD has been a powerful weapon in ensuring fair housing, but it matters who 
administers the department. Appointed by the President, HUD secretaries have bent the organization to 
represent their own politics. In the Nixon and Ford eras, HUD was led by less-than enthusiastic 
conservatives, including George Romney. The appointment of Patricia Roberts Harris in January of 1977 
was a welcome change. A graduate of Howard University, she gained stature in the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations as a Civil Rights and Democratic Party organizer. In 1963 she was appointed co-chair to 
the National Women’s Committee for Civil Rights by President Kennedy, and was selected as the 
Ambassador to Luxemburg by President Johnson in 1964 (the selection made her the first black female 
ambassador in U.S. history).160 She was an enthusiastic supporter of public housing and “attempted to use 
financial incentives” to “encourage suburbs to accept a fair share of [new] public housing” construction.161 
A liberal, Harris was also a vocal supporter of the New Left, especially women’s liberation and black power. 
Under her leadership, HUD moved in a decidedly feminist direction.162 Indeed, televangelist Pat Robertson 
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considered her an “avowed enemy” after she labeled the Moral Majority “dangerous, intolerant, and 
polarizing.”163 She was one of numerous feminists appointed to key administrative posts in the Carter 
Administration, including outspoken gay rights activist Margaret “Midge” Costanza.  
 It is unclear if Harris studied the gay rights plank, but her actions aided its agenda. The summer of 
1977 was volatile. In Dade County, Florida former Miss Oklahoma and orange juice saleswoman Anita 
Bryant fought to repeal a gay rights ordinance. In the heat of the drama, the HUD policy change was 
subjectively ingenuous. “Any stable family relationship,” HUD spokesman Tom Bacon explained, was now 
eligible to apply for housing subsidies. He did not mention queers, nor did he define “stability.” When 
reporters asked if queers influenced the decision, he deflected. “The change was not made in response to 
pressure from any group,” he insisted. HUD was not “trying to get a particular group in. We were simply 
trying to expand the eligibility of low-income housing for all families.”164 What HUD administrators 
decided to do was radical: the “stability” policy destabilized any definition of family. The policy change 
did not prohibit discrimination, but opened the door to queer recognition. Theoretically a stable queer 
family might be eligible for subsidies while an unstable heterosexual one might not be. Stability was in the 
eye of the beholder. According to HUD, family was no longer beholden to marital and biological 
constraints. Historians have argued that the New Right and Moral Majority coalesced around “attacks on 
the family” in the 1970s.165 The 1977 HUD decision allows us to better understand the context. 
Press reports immediately connected the policy change with queers. A New York Times editorial 
declared that “the government [was] opening public housing to homosexual couples.”166 At a press 
conference, reporters grilled Carter on the decision. Asked if homosexuals could be families, he gave a 
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confused answer. Homosexuals did not form “normal interrelationships,” but he didn’t “see homosexuals 
as a threat to the family either.” Puzzled reporters pushed further, at which point an annoyed Carter 
complained that it was “a subject I don’t particularly want to involve myself in. I’ve got enough problems.” 
This was classic Carter. His appointments nurtured breakthroughs that he rarely took credit for.167  Across 
the nation queers noted the policy change, which was met with excitement and confusion. One woman 
celebrated that HUD would now “permit low-income homosexual couples to live in public housing,” but 
the language of the policy confused her. “What does a ‘stable family relationship’ mean?” she asked. “The 
new regulations do not define it.” If “each public-housing authority and private owner who receives Federal 
assistance” could “determine whether a couple fits the new description” then the law could be “endlessly 
vague.”168 The Advocate mostly celebrated. “Public housing will now be open to gay couples in a ‘stable 
family relationship,’” reporters announced. The decision asserted that, in addition to “married, heterosexual 
families…gay people need roofs over their heads, too.”169 Anti-queer conservatives took note of HUD’s 
actions and resisted them. 
 Lawmakers fiercely debate queer inclusion within HUD. In the House Edward Boland (D-MA) 
joined forces with Tom Hagedorn (R-MN) to propose an amendment to HUD’s appropriations bill which 
barred queers from all subsidies. “The issue of homosexual rights,” Boland claimed, “is too sensitive to 
thrust on local housing authorities.” The House passed the bill by voice vote, “nullifying federal housing 
assistance for unmarried persons living together.”170 This placed discrimination within the public record, 
which caused headaches and a Democratic rumble in the Senate. As Senators reviewed the House 
amendment, “the usually stolid Appropriations Committee room became a forum on gay rights.” Supporting 
the amendment, William Proxmire (D-WI) and Lawton Chiles (D-FL) pointed out that since “there is a 
waiting list for public housing,” Americans “with traditional wife-husband stable family relationships 
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should have preference.” It would be a mistake, they asserted, to “say that homosexuals have equal access 
with families.” HUD had forced a decision on whether “public policy should assist homosexuals with 
subsidized housing.” They answered no, but two Democrats fought back. Lowell Weicker (D-CT) of and 
Warren Magnusson (D-MA) opposed the amendment on constitutional grounds. “Such language would put 
Congress on record favoring discrimination,” Weicker warned. “We don’t want to get caught up in some 
temporary hysteria and start mashing people’s constitutional rights all over the place.” This argument 
carried the day. Lawmakers removed the anti-queer provision and emphasized that subsidy “eligibility 
would be determined” by authorities on a case-by-case basis.171 This allowed Congress to approve the 
appropriations bill “without a whisper of gay rights,” but did nothing to alter the nature of HUD’s policy 
change. 
Urban historians have not been terribly kind to the Carter Presidency.172 His Administration 
certainly failed American cities on multiple fronts, but the 1977 HUD policy change opened housing to 
previously excluded people. It demonstrated how queers could infiltrate the state clandestinely. For 
Angelenos, it fit nicely within a decades-long project of queer family legitimization. One activist celebrated 
the victory as an “advancement in gay rights” and an “extension of…family” life in America.173 The victory 
did not belong to Angelenos alone, but was certainly assisted by their activism. So too they helped queer 
Carter’s White House Conference on American Families in 1980. 
 
“The Pluralism of Family Life” and the White House Conference on Families 
Many evangelicals supported Jimmy Carter in 1976 because he ran on a message of moral 
redemption and family values. “The American family is in trouble,” he told one campaign crowd. What 
was needed was a “pro-family government policy,” he told another.174 But what did that mean? Shortly 
                                                          
171 “Senate Bill on Housing Skips the Gay Issue,” San Francisco Chronicle, 25 June 1977. PHOSF, folder 1. 
172 See Thomas Sugrue, “Carter’s Urban Policy Crisis,” in Gary M. Fink & Hugh Davis Graham (eds.), The Carter 
Presidency: Policy Choices (Lawrence, KS: The University of Kansas Press, 1998). 
173 OUT!, 12 August, 1977. PHOSF, folder 1. 
174 Flippen, Jimmy Carter, 89. 
139 
 
before the election, he commissioned a report on the status of the family in the nation. It did not highlight 
“militant homosexuality” as a problem. Instead “unemployment and lack of adequate income” were the 
culprits. Carter promised to host “a national conference on families” to solve the crisis in the home. Marisa 
Chappell and J. Brooks Flippen argued that he “selected his words carefully, deciding on ‘families,’ not 
‘family,’ to reflect diversity.” By 1980, Carter assured the conference would “recognize the pluralism of 
family life in America.”175 His insistence on pluralism, like HUD’s insistence on stability, fostered change. 
Over the course of the 1970s, conservatives politicized and narrowed the idea of family. Jerry 
Falwell, a Virginia businessman and host of the Old Time Gospel Hour, argued that “family” was defined 
as a “God-ordained institution of the marriage of one man and one woman together for a lifetime with their 
biological or adopted children.” He echoed a definition that had been codified in federal welfare policies 
since the 1930s. Many did not want it to change. Falwell explained that “militant homosexuals” were a 
group of “influential people who hate families” and warned that queer men “sought out young boys” for 
sex and recruitment.176177 Anita Bryant strengthened that charge. “The recruitment of our children is 
absolutely necessary for the survival and growth of homosexuality,” she explained. In L.A. alone, police 
“reported that 25,000 boys 17 years or younger have been recruited into a homosexual ring.”178 What did 
this “ring” look like? Did it include liberation houses and the GCSC? Bryant did not explain. Subtitling her 
passionate tome The Survival of Our Nation’s Families and the Threat of Militant Homosexuality, she 
refocused the issue of gay rights around the protection of children. This played a central role in the 1978 
fight over the Briggs Amendment in California (discussed in the next chapter). Any conference on 
American families would have to navigate tricky and increasingly dangerous political waters.   
In his announcement of the conference, Carter called for “a national discussion of the state of 
American families.” He was “encouraged by the increasing interest in the state of families by people from 
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all walks of life” and assured that the “conference will recognize pluralism.”179 The chief organizer, Patricia 
Fleming, represented this. “An African American divorced mother of three teenage sons,” Fleming was an 
unpopular choice with conservatives. Some even threatened to boycott, leading Carter to replace her with 
John Carr, a “white, male, married Catholic.”180 Even so, the conference prioritized diversity. Three 
regional meetings were planned in Baltimore, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles. As the first neared, the 
politics of family became volatile when U.S. Senator Paul Laxalt (R-NV) introduced the Family Protection 
Act which “proposed denying federal funds for sex education, school desegregation, legal services in cases 
involving abortion and divorce, and the banning of federal support for any form of gay rights.”181 While it 
failed, it reflected growing conservative militancy. Falwell insisted that conservatives needed to “counteract 
disruptive federal intervention into family life.”182 In all three conference meetings, conservative and 
progressive activists sought to define family on their terms. 
At the opening salvo in Baltimore, they went to war. Conservatives accused Carter of having “the 
worst record for family issues for any president in history.”183 Progressives, however, outnumbered them 
and voted to endorse the Equal Rights Amendment and gay rights.184 Anti-feminist Phyllis Schlafly decried 
the meeting as a “media event” designed to “promote an alternative lifestyle” and stormed out. 
Conservatives regrouped, reloaded, and headed to Minneapolis. In the second round, they won control and 
voted to oppose “the imposition of a secular, humanist philosophy on public institutions.” Significantly for 
queers, they also voted to “exclude homosexuals in the definition of family.”185 Ideologically confused, the 
conference moved to Los Angeles for its final meeting. Unsurprisingly feminists and queers stole the show. 
Attendees voted to “approve government-funded abortions” and “outlaw housing laws that would 
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discriminate based on sexual preference.” The latter passed by an overwhelming 64%.186 “The emphasis” 
of the conference, a Los Angeles Times article remarked, “remained on ensuring equal opportunity in 
employment, transportation, healthcare, housing, [and] education.” Unlike in Baltimore and Minneapolis, 
the L.A. event revolved around economics. To the horror of conservatives, queers won inclusion in Carter’s 
plurality. Often a quiet supporter, after the L.A. gathering Carter was more forceful. As his showdown with 
Ronald Reagan neared, he revealed how his definition of family had changed since he became President. 
Families, he now believed, were “networks of relationships, rooted not in blood but on shared experiences, 
shared joys and sorrows, and most of all, a shared love that crosses vast distances.” He warned against 
conservative definitions. “Americans often feel nostalgic about a past that seems to be simpler and 
sometimes seems to be better,” he explained. “We can learn from the past, but we must not limit our vision 
of what a good family is just to what a family was.”187 This view extended to other Democrats, including 
Vice President Walter Mondale, who explained that, since America was “a diverse and pluralistic nation,” 
there could be “no single, ideal model for family.”188 Queers had long made the same argument. 
While historians have adequately documented the rise of the “straight state,” less attention has been 
placed on its demise. Queers have not often been included in War on Poverty narratives, but they should 
be. As the War on Poverty extended into the 1970s they won public financing and established political 
inroads within the establishment. The combined effect was an impressive queering of the American welfare 
state. The timing of these breakthroughs was unfortunate. As queers joined liberal efforts to curb poverty 
and homelessness, a conservative counterrevolution was brewing in Southern California. In 1978, 
Proposition 13, or the Tax Revolt, systematically weakened the welfare state in L.A. County. Combined 
with federal budget cuts in the Reagan Administration, it devastated social activists. Queers had 
inadvertently jumped onto a sinking ship. As they encountered new and insurmountable obstacles, many 
questioned the durability of their politics.      
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Chapter Five: Austerity Activism in the Era of the Tax Revolt 
 
“The challenge of the 1980s will be more complex and 
difficult to overcome in light of the public mandate issued 
with Proposition 13, [which may] polarize the 
government from the very people it attempts to serve.” 
-Mayor Tom Bradley, 1979  
 
“Did you ever wonder how a national political 
organization for homosexuals came into being? Why are 
millions of dollars of public funds being channeled to 
Gays? Why does the California Tax Payer have to pay?” 
-Billie and Virgie Bynum, 1978 
 
 In October of 1982 two activists wrote the “The Cold, the Broke, and the Hungry,” a short pamphlet 
which described a program called Hudson House. An average day began at 6 a.m. When the alarm clock 
rang, a house manager “slowly crawled out of bed, reached for his robe and stumbled into the kitchen.” His 
first task was to make coffee and prepare “enough bacon and eggs, juice and bread to feed sixteen people.” 
As “the house began to fill with the smell of frying bacon and hot coffee,” it began to come alive. By 7 a.m. 
“the whole house bustled with activity, laughter, small talk, and a few groans.” Blocks away, “the same 
scene was taking place at another house.” This routine went on “day in and day out, rain or shine, seven 
days a week” and was “just another day at Hudson House.”1 In many ways this housing program resembled 
earlier queer efforts. Like Gay Community Services Center (GCSC) programs, it provided shelter and 
fostered supportive family environments for low-income queers. Yet something was also different. Unlike 
the programs of the 1970s, Hudson House was never adequately funded. Without stable financing, 
organizers faced periods of insolvency and resorted to selling food stamps to stay afloat. In short order the 
program disintegrated. Instead of public financing, queers struggled to overcome the effects of austerity in 
the 1980s. 
 When he ran for President in 1976, California Governor Jerry Brown warned that Americans were 
entering an “era of limits,” but that statement was premature. As Brown spoke, queers made impressive 
local and national political inroads within the welfare state. Two years later, however, the Governor seemed 
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clairvoyant. Clear trouble emerged in 1978 with the passage of Proposition 13, commonly known as the 
Tax Revolt. This measure appeared on the ballot in the same year as Proposition 6, or the Briggs Initiative, 
which threatened to bar lesbian, gay, bisexual, questioning, and transgender teachers from classrooms in 
California. Historians have focused on the successful effort against Briggs, but Proposition 13 was equally 
consequential to queers.2 Its passage forced California cities and counties to broadly cut social service 
programs. Alongside others, queers faced devastating cuts which negatively impacted their activism. Upon 
the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, things got worse. He fulfilled campaign promises to reduce 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funding and eliminate the Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act (CETA). These actions contributed to the rise of austerity, or “neoliberal,” politics which 
privileged privatization at the expense of the welfare state.3 This chapter explores the effects of austerity 
politics upon gay liberation. While scholars have explored this transition in economic and ideological 
contexts, less attention has been given to the grassroots. The fate of queer programs in L.A. helps to provide 
a fuller cost accounting of the war on welfare. Social programs serving low-income queers were truncated 
or eliminated. Those devoted to the most marginalized, including homeless, young, and incarcerated queers, 
were disproportionally wounded. Austerity measures disrupted attempts to solve metropolitan problems; 
indeed, they exacerbated these problems. Moreover, this worsening urban crisis encouraged the political 
geography of gay liberation to shift as frustrated activists rethought the utility of state solutions to poverty. 
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Fomenting Backlash    
 The queer political gains of the 1970s did not go unnoticed by opponents. They watched in horror 
as lesbians and gays received political credibility and public financing. Historians have labeled these 
restless forces the nascent Moral Majority.4 In L.A. conservative grumblers were not irrational. Queers had 
gained power and public funds were flowing their way. Conservatives reacted to a factual political 
landscape which threatened hegemonic heterosexuality. Anti-queer backlash dovetailed with growing anti-
state sentiment. Both were ingredients to Propositions 6 and 13.     
 County Supervisor Edelman’s strong support of queers made him a marked man. Compared to 
others, he received a heavy share of hate mail. His endorsement of gay pride parades outraged more than a 
few voters in the Third District. One woman was “disappointed to hear the news” and chastised the 
supervisor. Since he commanded “a position of responsibility and influence,” his “actions [might] affect 
others [especially] young, impressionable persons.”5 Another woman expressed “indignation about 
Edelman’s lack of ‘good taste’” while a man promised to “tell his friends not to vote” for Edelman again.6 
An angry constituent felt a “deep, burning indignation” towards him. “The vast majority of your 
constituents do not for one minute condone, approve or accept homosexual behavior as acceptable.” It was 
“loathsome for a supervisor to…flout, legitimitize [sic], glorify and adulate homosexuality.” Edelman’s 
actions were “one of the reasons politicians are held in such low repute (almost as low as homosexuals).” 
If elected officials were willing to “wade and wallow in shit in order to get votes from sodomists [sic],” he 
promised that “come next election they [will be] kicked off the public payroll.”7 Edelman flagged the letter 
as homophobic and “the type which should not be acknowledged.”8 Some letters sought mutual 
understanding, but still displayed anger. A woman complained against the queer “monopoly of West 
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Hollywood streets” which was “offensive to all decent and normal residents.” When a gay parade congested 
streets and prevented her from attending church services, she asked Edelman if he “would permit such a 
wrong-doing parade to pass by your Temple, hampering free and usual passage to worshippers on your 
Sabbath?” Regrettably, she believed Edelman’s support of queers was “a very shooty [sic] way of seeking 
votes” and warned that “gay votes are miniscule when compared to all others.”9 Edelman replied that he 
was sorry for the inconvenience, but stood by his decision to “represent all members of the Third District.”10 
She wrote again the following year, still angry. “Property owners and…tax-paying residents” would no 
longer “allow the Gay Parade to ‘hog’ the streets,” she wrote.11 This time she got no reply. 
 As queers assumed greater visibility in West Hollywood, constituents lobbied against their presence. 
A physician hoped Edelman would use his “sympathy [for the gay community] to effect a constructive 
change.” He and his neighbors endured “a seemingly endless parade of cars” and “street-walking hustlers.” 
Sadly, “individual residents [were] powerless to do anything, for if we complain we are branded as 
bigots.”12 Similarly, a woman worried that “the homo-sexual situation in our area is getting out of hand. 
They are expressing their homo-sexuality on the streets where children can see,” a “problem which is 
getting worse every day.”13 Edelman explained that there was “no simple way to deter ‘cruising,’” but 
promised to “use more indirect and approaches to address the problem.” He also urged compassion and 
understanding, since “all people are granted certain fundamental rights such as peaceful assembly and 
freedom of speech” regardless of whether one “agreed with their lifestyle.”14 Queers were often associated 
with urban blight and decay. One businessman was convinced that “the gays [were] responsible for the 
deterioration of Hollywood” and demanded “a news conference to enforce the law in the area.”15 Others 
believed that “gay cruisers [had] invaded the community.” How could it be, a woman asked, that elected 
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officials would “condone such illegal activity”?16 One man spent several hours in Edelman’s office 
demanding an appointment after his “8yr old nephew” was supposedly “harassed by gays hanging out at a 
park restroom in West Hollywood.”17 One women wanted “all the homosexuals out of Hollywood”; “Send 
them to San Francisco” suggested another.18 For many, religion dictated their views.  
 Typical was one letter. “God [had] made it clear that homosexuality [was a] sin,” it read. “God does 
not change His mind. God sets guidelines for our lives because as our creator, He knows what is best for 
us.” This woman was hopeful, but worried that “the day will come when He will judge what we have done 
with our lives, and encouraged Edelman to “change course quickly”.19 Particularly venomous was the 
Printed-Page Ministry, led by Billie and Virgie Bynum. The Bynums began to distribute homophobic 
leaflets and letters in 1976. In October of that year, they infiltrated several public buses and replaced stacks 
of bus schedules with a pamphlet entitled “WAKE UP CHRISTIANS.” It encouraged moral revolution. 
“Gays may be Sex Perverts,” it read, but they “have many friends in local, State, and Federal Government.” 
In Los Angeles, “politicians friendly to Gay causes are: MAYOR TOM BRADLEY, City Council Members 
Peggy Stevenson…Not to mention UNCLE EDELMAN.” These politicians, as well as the ACLU, would 
soon “be faced with the wrath of God’s Judgment.” Distributed in time for November elections, it urged 
Christians “to take note of the politicians who advocate sex perversion” so “that you may vote against these 
people. There is estimated to be about eight million Christians here in the State of California. We as a group 
have the potential of having the most powerful voting group in the State, so let’s begin to use it.”20 
Edelman’s office learned of the mass distribution and assigned David Glascock to investigate.21 A few years 
later, the Bynums struck again. “Did you ever wonder how a national political organization for homosexuals 
came into being,” the dynamic duo asked. “Who erected the infra-structure? Who trained the inner circle? 
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Who taught them the art of using dis-information, political contacts?” Most importantly, “who bankrolled 
the group??” How had “the Gay Community” become “so deeply entrenched in local politics.” Why were 
“millions of dollars of public funds being channeled into the local Gay Community? Why does the average 
California Tax Payer have to pay for Gay’s? [sic].”22 The answer was Edelman. Far from a crank accusation, 
the Bynums followed the money. Organizations like the GCSC accessed public funds via County coffers. 
In a nasty letter to Edelman, this time in the midst of the AIDS crisis, one woman asked, “shouldn’t the 
liberal politicians be blamed for the tragic situation [of AIDS]??” After all, wasn’t “it only fair to blame the 
liberal pro-Gay politician whose promotion and support for sex perversion” had “directly resulted in these 
horrible diseases?” If voters wanted to exact retribution in the next election, they ought to target “politicians 
who have helped extol and advance the cause of homosexuality in California” including Edelman.23 These 
writers responded to an altered political landscape. For queers it was a blessing; for them it was a curse.  
For the most part, Edelman could challenge or ignore these complaints. Most county supervisors 
were impervious to election challengers. One aide recalled how “seldom” it was “that a member of the 
[County] Board of Supervisors” would be “voted out of office.” Edelman was “an example of that. His 
deciding to run made [others] not want to run. The consolidation of money and endorsements made a 
challenge untenable.24 City leaders were less secure. When Mayor Bradley endorsed the GCSC, constituents 
ridiculed him. “I vigorously protest your publicly coming out in favor of the ‘Gay Community’s’ so-called 
rights at the expense of the majority and its welfare,” a La Crescenta woman wrote. Queer were entitled to 
“the rights of all mentally ill people: medical, psychological and spiritual care in order that they might 
become whole people. No more except for the right to life and to vote.” If Bradley condoned homosexuality, 
he “was either hopelessly ignorant or a very unworthy public servant.” She promised to “remember at 
election time.”25 Some writers claimed to be disaffected Democrats. In the 1970s religious and “moral” 
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issue voters had yet to coalesce around the Republican Party. Queers helped facilitate the transition for 
some. “I was completely shocked when you opened your doors to the ‘gays’,” wrote one man. “Now we 
have a haven for all the perverted sub-humans congregating in the southern California area.” This “loyal 
Democrat” expected “laws to protect the family,” not harm them. “Where do you stand Mayor Bradley?” 
he asked. “For God’s laws or against?”26 One man chastised the Mayor for “convoluted thinking.” He had 
seen two article in his newspaper. One showed the Mayor “working to clean up the stink in Hollywood” 
while the other announced “plans to name [an] aide as [a] link to the gays.” This made no sense. “It appears 
obvious that much of the mess now being tackled in Hollywood arises from homosexuals” who spread “the 
rot which leads to growth of the criminal element.” The inconsistency smacked of political pandering. “The 
homosexual population is but 10% of the whole,” he reasoned. “I suggest that you reverse course for the 
good of the City of Los Angeles, and for the good of Tom Bradley.” Was this the “new Democrats [sic] 
strategy,” he wondered.27 Others agreed. “Homosexual people are sick,” a woman wrote Bradley. “They do 
not need a ‘sounding board’ through your office…I have an idea it will be your last term unless you stand 
with the majority.”28 The Mayor sometimes responded to these angry letters.  
When one resident “drew the line when it comes to paying the salary of a known homosexual,” 
Bradley defended himself. “In a city of 2.8 million,” he explained, “it is to be expected that people with 
varied lifestyles and points of view will be living alongside one another.” However, “When I was re-elected 
to my second term in office, it was not in order that I might be Mayor of some of the people, but rather, to 
be Mayor of all the people.”29 Considering the political atmosphere, this response was bold and resembled 
Bradley’s attitudes towards racial animosity. When he hesitated announcing Gay Pride Week in Los 
Angeles, one constituent urged him forward. “As an elected official you are answerable to the electorate.” 
In light of the “bigoted religious views of Anita Bryant,” how could, Bradley, “a Black person align himself 
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with forces of hatred and discrimination?”30 Racial and sexual struggles were linked. When he ran for 
Governor, Bradley made the connection himself. “In Los Angeles,” he wrote, “the gay and lesbian 
community has worked hard for public recognition of basic human rights.” He “recognized the special 
needs of the gay and lesbian community,” but also cast it alongside “minority efforts to improve human 
relations” and extend “Civil Rights.” He took credit for supporting the GCSC in this endeavor and 
celebrated queer endorsements.31 
 When Edelman or Bradley defended their support of queers, they demonstrated transformed liberal 
thinking, not just politicking. It would have been easy to ignore letters or, in these private correspondences, 
attempt to play both sides. But they defended queer inclusion in local politics, testifying to the degree by 
which queers had changed the Democratic Party. Still, backlash was significant. In 1978, Propositions 6 
and 13 fused anti-queer and anti-state discourses in transformative ways. 
 
Briggs and the Tax Revolt  
 The Briggs Initiative was a significant test for queers. To many observers the defeat of Proposition 
6 was a consequential victory. While it was important, so was Proposition 13, which succeeded that same 
year. Both concerned queers and the state, and should be analyzed together.32 As Daniel K. Williams and 
J. Brooks Flippen argued, by the late 1970s the cultural and economic aims of the Moral Majority and 
Christian Right had fused.33 While the Briggs Initiative failed, the main conservative assault triumphed. 
This crippled the welfare state in California and altered queer activism. 
 Proposition 13 proved central to the conservative counterrevolution. At its core, however, it 
emerged from populist rage that defied easy political categorization. “It was,” Jonathan Bell suggested, “in 
some senses a product of the failure of liberals to grapple with the problem of taxes as much as the success 
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of the right in making government the problem.”34 Molly Michelmore convincingly argued that the Tax 
Revolt stemmed from a structural deficiency within liberalism. While Democrats expanded the welfare 
state, they concealed the costs. Indeed, “stealth [welfare] programs…in combination with a bipartisan 
defense of low tax rates” served to “undermine support for the activist state.”35 Few Angelenos realized 
their dependency on state subsidies or county programs. As conservatives gained traction, taxation and 
welfare fueled a populist revolt that cast middle-class homeowners as victims of wasteful minority social 
service programs. As the economy suffered amid stagflation these trends created a perfect environment for 
tax rebellion. Proposition 13 was spearheaded by Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann. While Gann gained the 
spotlight after the election, Jarvis became the official face in 1978. The Republican was also an apartment 
owner and lobbyist for the Los Angeles Apartment Owners Association (AOA). Although the campaign 
revolved around homeowners, it was from the beginning supported by business interests. Jarvis was a 
staunch opponent of rent control and hoped that Proposition 13 would liberate landlords and owners from 
burdensome regulations. He concealed these aims and “cast himself in the mold of the American populist,” 
not an AOA lobbyist.36 Isaac William Martin argued that many supporters did not share Jarvis’ ultra-
conservative politics, but were mobilized by a belief that the government needed to protect them from the 
market.37 The tax crunch that hit middle-class property owners in the 1970s caused the average price of a 
single-family home in L.A. (and thus property taxes) to jump 120 percent, making the “prospect of losing 
one’s home, particularly for the elderly and others on fixed incomes…very real.” The “allure of Proposition 
13 lay in its simplicity” and was easily misunderstood. It promised to revert property assessments to 1975 
levels and freeze them. Increases would be limited to two-percent per year. Most importantly, Proposition 
13 “prohibited any government body-local or state-from raising any new taxes without a two-thirds vote of 
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the governing body.”38 This threatened municipal revenue-generating capacity and conflated “tax reform 
with antiliberalism” in an all-out attack on the welfare state. Throughout the campaign, Jarvis and his allies 
decried “welfare bums” and labeled social programs wasteful.39 Some conservatives criticized public 
officials for wasting money on useless programs, like the GCSC. Why, some asked, were “millions of 
dollars of public funds being channeled into the Gay Community?”40 It was easy to exploit the notion that 
social minorities were gaining ground “at the expense of the majority and its welfare.”41 Since county 
operations received scant attention, voters indulged in fantastical understandings of waste and fraud. 
 Liberals saw the strategy and mounted a late, unsuccessful challenge. Supervisor Edelman came 
out strongly against Proposition 13 and declared it “a $5 billion giveaway to commercial, industrial and 
multiple-unit property owners.” Since “only $2 billion of the total property tax reduction [was] targeted for 
homeowners,” he argued, “property owners [were] the secret beneficiaries.” He was right. It was 
“commercial, industrial and apartment interests” which would be the main beneficiaries.42 This message 
was difficult to disseminate to voters, however. One Edelman aide recalled frustration in trying to reveal 
“what [Jarvis’] actual job was. Forget what his political position; this was his job.”43 Explaining the 
crippling effects of Proposition 13 on county resources was equally difficult. The loss of $7 billion would 
result in “the destruction of vital local services which people depend on daily for their well-being,” Edelman 
argued.44 Public libraries would lose $12 million; the Health Department $123 million; the CDC $2 million; 
and County staffing $1 million. Thousands of jobs would be eliminated overnight.45 At the GCSC, nearly 
every program was tied to the county and would be cut. These statistics proved accurate, but conservatives 
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had a more attractive argument. Jarvis promised to deliver “something for nothing” while liberals struggled 
to justify taxation.46 
 When voters went to the polls in June, they overwhelmingly passed Proposition 13. In the 
immediate aftermath, “local governments saw more than $6 billion in funding evaporate.”47 The success 
signaled an end of an “epochal bargain with the federal state, industrial capital, and local officials.” Middle-
class Californians would no longer “hold corporate capital responsible” for their plight. Instead they 
endorsed “a counterrevolution against the liberal state” and “poor and low-income people.”48 In L.A. a 
profound transformation occurred. One Edelman aide viewed “Proposition 13 as a sea change, particularly 
for the county because it was the county that set the tax rate” and “decided how taxes would be spent.” For 
decades supervisors relied on generous budgets. Now they faced a loss of authority and control.49 Angelenos 
were “going down this road where life would be so much more difficult,” an observer lamented. “Even the 
people who got it intellectually, they didn't really get it. We were moving to this anti-tax, anti-government 
era.” On the Board of Supervisors, “that certainly became clearer every day, and it became incumbent on 
smart people to figure out how to work within constraints.” Edelman found this difficult. He remained in 
“a ‘we're-still-building-things’” mentality despite the new climate and “never totally gave in to the new 
reality.” Moreover, the costs of Proposition 13 remained hidden from voters. An Edelman aide ironically 
noted that “we went overboard in our campaign [against Proposition 13], saying things like, ‘Proposition 
13 will mean all children die,’ and in fact, they didn't. We kind of cobbled it together…Yes, the streets in 
Los Angeles [began to] suck, but people still got to work. We did just a good enough job. We actually did 
too good a job.”50 The effects would be protracted and harmful, but not immediately apparent. Queers had 
little time to digest, for they immediately shifted gears to combat Proposition 6. 
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 The Briggs Initiative emerged from the Anita Bryant movement. In the twilight of Carter’s 
presidency, the politics of family became tense. An evangelical and conservative activist, Bryant was 
convinced that “militant homosexuals” were destroying the American family and worked to roll back gay 
rights ordinances. Her first victory came in the summer of 1977 (just days after the HUD decision). In Dade 
County, Florida, voters decisively repealed an anti-discrimination ordinance. The campaign earned national 
attention and was supported by Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson. Bryant also received support from 
California State Senator John Briggs, who travelled to Miami in support. He viewed gay rights not as “a 
civil rights issue,” but as a crusade against families. Victory in Florida emboldened Briggs, who returned 
to California to launch Proposition 6 (which he hoped might propel him to the Governor’s Mansion).51 His 
California Defend Our Children Committee “trafficked in parental front porch rhetoric” and soon focused 
on teachers in public schools.52 His efforts tapped into a strong undercurrent of homegrown homophobia. 
The forces which propelled anti-queer campaigns in the 1960s had not dissipated and Southern California 
proved to be Briggs’ bastion of support. In Pasadena, Stop Gay Power, an offshoot of Robert G. Grant’s 
Christian Voice, advocated for Proposition 6 and “on behalf of America’s children and families.” Briggs 
believed that conservatives could “make an historic difference in the perilous days we face” through the 
classroom. Prominent supporters included LAPD Chief Edward M. Davis, who “commended” Stop Gay 
Power and “prayed for victory” in November. “An aroused community,” he crowed, “can do much toward 
protecting itself from predators in its midst.” Stop Gay Power also touted national supporters, including 
singer Pat Boone who called “upon all Christian citizens to join together in love and concerned action.”53 
In the Los Angeles Times, a supporter argued that queers were a grave “interference with liberty.” From his 
perspective, “When a measure interferes with the rights of the majority, it interferes with freedom.”54  
Proposition 6 would protect heterosexuals from militants. 
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 National religious leaders also chimed in. In a newsletter for his Old-Time Gospel Hour, Jerry 
Falwell declared “war against the evils threatening America.” This would not be “a war with guns and 
bullets,” he surmised (although he did promote gun ownership). Instead it would be “fought with the Bible, 
prayer and Christian involvement.”55 Queer rights were “special rights,” he insisted, and the Briggs 
Initiative would “restore the will of the majority.” Of course, Falwell sought “financial support” in this 
effort. Alongside his endorsement, he asked followers to send “at least $25, but hopefully $50 or more” to 
his own organization.56 In a Christian Voice newsletter, Robert G. Grant emphasized the importance of the 
Briggs Initiative. “The truth about militant gays, liberal educators, cruel atheists, and godless politicians,” 
he wrote, would make “God-loving Americans angry.” Activists ought to ask their neighbors how they 
would “feel if tomorrow your child was taught by a practicing homosexual?” Queer teachers would “openly 
advocate their ‘lifestyle’” and “recruit” many children. A vote for Proposition 6 was a vote to rescue 
children. If activists lost, then “godless militant gays, liberal educators and vicious atheists will tell you 
how your children will be educated.”57 On the heels of Proposition 13, liberals mobilized. 
   The anti-Briggs effort has been mostly told from a Bay-Area perspective. After all, San Francisco 
Supervisor Harvey Milk spearheaded the “No on 6” effort and forcefully debated John Briggs. In popular 
accounts, such as the documentary The Times of Harvey Milk, the battle of Proposition 6 occurred in San 
Francisco.58 In fact the effort was statewide and Milk relied upon Southern California activists for financial 
assistance. David Goodstein, a wealthy queer Angeleno, financed the campaign and political consultant 
Don Bradley designed a publicity onslaught. Additionally, Milk reached out to David Glascock and Don 
Amador.59 Together they built political support against Briggs. One result was the New Alliance for Gay 
                                                          
55 Old-Time Gospel Hour newsletter, 1980. BBP, box 1, folder 1. 
56 Moral Majority newsletter, 1980. BBP, box 1, folder 1. 
57 Christian Voice newsletter, 1978. MKC, box 21, folder “Homosexuals.” 
58 Randy Shilts, The Mayor of Castro Street: The Life and Times of Harvey Milk (New York: St. Martin’s, 1982); 
Robert Epstein (dir.) The Times of Harvey Milk (New Yorker Films, 1984); John D’Emilio, “Gay Politics, Gay 
Community: San Francisco’s Experience” in D’Emilio, Making Trouble: Essays on Gay History, Politics, and the 
University (New York: Routledge, 1992); Armstrong, Forging Gay Identities, 129-132; and Foley, Front Porch 
Politics, 88-89. 
59 Shilts, The Mayor of Castro Street, 250. 
155 
 
Equality, which “excelled at fundraising” and anchored efforts around “the right to privacy.”60 Fundraisers 
featured national figures, like George McGovern, who blistered Proposition 6 as “un-American” and 
“unconstitutional.” The Municipal Elections Committee of Los Angeles (MECLA), the Stonewall 
Democratic Club (SDC), the National Organization for Women (NOW), and the National Gay Rights 
Lobby all worked against Proposition 6.61  
Behind the scenes, Glascock convinced Edelman to take a leading role in the campaign.62 This was 
not a difficult sell, for Edelman supported queers and personally disliked John Briggs. The SDC encouraged 
the supervisor to chastise any Democrat who supported Proposition 6. At a San Gabriel forum, Democratic 
State Assemblyman Joe Montoya shocked the audience when he “came out in favor of the Briggs 
Initiative.” Montoya went further and stated that “he did not consider gays a minority” and insisted that 
they “should not be included in any ‘human rights’ category.” The SDC argued that “if Montoya wins, the 
Gay Community has lost a friend and gained an enemy.”63 Glascock felt Montoya’s answer was “stupid 
and inconsistent” and advised Edelman to intervene. “Discuss this matter with Montoya,” he recommended, 
“because it is going to continue to be an issue and could come back to haunt us.”64 After a closed-door 
meeting with the Supervisor, Montoya announced that he had changed his mind. He was now in the “No 
on 6” camp. Endorsements mattered and the SDC “mapped out an intensive, and successful, strategy to 
secure resolutions against Proposition 6 from the Democratic State Central Committee, the California 
Democratic Council (CDC), and Democratic Committees from all over the state.”65 By November a 
majority of California politicians had come out against Briggs, including Edelman, Tom Bradley, Peggy 
Stevenson, Jerry Brown, and Ronald Reagan. President Jimmy Carter also voiced his opposition. Voters 
agreed and decisively voted no. 
                                                          
60 Foley, Front Porch Politics, 91. 
61 New Alliance for Gay Equality letter, 3 February 1978. TCOF, box 28, folder 6. 
62 David Glascock to Ed Edelman, 26 January 1978. EDE, box 909, folder 1. 
63 Letter to Ed Edelman, 12 May 1978. EDE, box 248, folder 1. 
64 David Glascock to Ed Edelman, 16 May 1978. EDE, box 248, folder 1. 
65 Faderman & Timmons, Gay L.A., 226-227. 
156 
 
The victory was a stunning achievement. Randy Shilts revealed that, during the election night 
festivities, Supervisor Milk made a celebratory phone call to Don Amador in L.A. The Mayor’s liaison was 
“celebrating the victory with a gay teen” who “a year before, was ready to kill himself.” After his parents 
threatened to institutionalize him, he “boarded a bus for Los Angeles, registered to vote, and that day cast 
his first ballot against Proposition 6.”66 How ironic that Milk called Amador. He had been a passionate 
fighter in two ballot initiatives in 1978. On this night, he was celebrating a grand victory. But five months 
earlier he had been dealt a hefty blow. The defeat of Proposition 6 empowered Amador as an activist; but 
the passage of Proposition 13 would cost him his job. As a CETA employee, the loss of city and county 
revenue would phase out his position. That was not readily apparent in 1978 as activists worked to expand 
their political reach in L.A.   
 
Fighting Back: City Politics after Briggs  
 Before his untimely departure, Don Amador utilized his role as liaison to advance queer rights 
within the Mayor’s office, efforts which complemented the work of David Glascock. Amador’s mission 
was more complicated as Bradley was more cautious than Edelman. The recent experience of Proposition 
6, however, created an unexpected moment for progress. As had happened in the 1960s, conservative 
attacks earned queers political support.  
 Shortly after his appointment, Amador reported that the most important “gay issues” were a lack 
of affordable housing, outreach with racial minorities, and law enforcement harassment. He “found over 15 
[non-GCSC] Gay people working on housing [issues],” but few “working with each other.” Amador hoped 
that Bradley’s office could “organize all 15 as one board, so as a group they can work on grant proposals 
and other projects together.” Alongside Galscock, Amador lobbied Bradley to support the GCSC within the 
Hollywood Revitalization Committee, which was established to combat homelessness.67 Since these funds 
were controlled by the city, Amador’s lobbying was important. In 1979, the GCSC submitted a grant and 
                                                          
66 Shilts, The Mayor of Castro Street, 250. 
67 Don Amador to Tom Bradley, 27 April 1978. TBP, box 1212, folder 1. 
157 
 
noted that the Hollywood Human Services Project had found “376 people during a two-week period in need 
of emergency shelter.” The “largest groups in need of temporary housing,” the GCSC maintained, “are 
young, single men and women (many of whom are gay).” A grant would allow the GCSC to “feed and 
house up to 40 persons per night.”68 The proposal was endorsed by Edelman and Helene Cohen, who 
administered the Hollywood Human Services Project. She stressed that “emergency shelter is perhaps 
Hollywood’s most visible human need,” and lauded the GCSC’s “long-standing and respected reputation 
for providing quality services to gays and non-gays alike.”69 Funds also allowed activists to open a new 
GCSC location on Wilshire Boulevard. Upon its opening Amador arranged for Bradley to take a tour and 
be photographed alongside Morris Kight.70 This illustrated the benefits of having a pro-GCSC advocate in 
the Mayor’s office. Like Glascock, Amador could identify funding opportunities and Bradley’s appearance 
signaled newfound poltical support.71  
Amador worked to insure queer racial diversity. He established ties with other mayoral liaisons to 
illustrate the point and began “working closely with A. Lee, the Mayor’s Native American Liaison.” This 
gave him a “greater knowledge, understanding and action of government programs to help our respective 
minority communities.” There was significant common ground, Amador explained, as “Native American 
peoples were once the most accepting toward their own Gay individuals.” When he arranged meetings 
between Bradley and activists, he included “Gay Blacks, senior citizens, Latinos, youth and women.”72 This 
strategy reflected the diversity of queer life and stressed political alliances. It also reflected Amador’s 
political worldview. In an interview with the Hollywood Independent, he bemoaned “white, wealthy, upper 
middle class homosexuals” who were too often the face of the movement. “If I sponsor some event,” he 
explained, “I will see that invitations are given out to every type of gay from every part of the community.” 
This was an important way to fight “discrimination within the gay community towards the elderly and 
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blacks.” The latter were “almost separated with their own bars and own areas. Black gays come to me,” 
Amador confessed, “and say, ‘Yes, we’ll become involved, when we are included.’” This response 
encouraged him to work towards “cleaning up discrimination within our own community.”73  
Establishing political and financial bridges with Los Angeles’ first African American Mayor 
helped. It was important to have Bradley’s support go public. Before it was clear that the CETA program 
would be eliminated, the Mayor’s office arranged for a small grant to be awarded to the Women’s Resources 
Unit of the GCSC. It funded “on-site sensitivity training for staff members of City and County agencies 
who serve the public, including members of the gay community.” It also called for racial, ethnic, and gender 
sensitivity training. Some GCSC organizers encountered “difficulty ‘getting in the door’ at some agencies,” 
so the new training program would “familiarize” racial minorities and city administrators “with [GCSC] 
programs.” All members of the Mayor’s staff were required to attend, either at City Hall or the GCSC.74 
Just a year after the Briggs Initiative, the City of Los Angeles was sponsoring a queer educational program 
to build bridges among social minorities. Advancements did not readily trickle down to law enforcement. 
While Edelman could intervene with the Sheriff’s Department, the LAPD answered to the Mayor. 
Homophobia had been stitched into the LAPD by Chief Edward M. Davis, an outspoken conservative with 
sights on higher office. At a Christian Business Men’s Committee meeting in 1976, Davis accused the 
powerful “homosexual lobby” of “getting away with murder.” Making no distinction between his public 
service and private faith, he pledged to rely on the Bible and “old fashioned morality laws” to clean up the 
city.75 The Southern California Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union (SCACLU) relied on Davis’ 
controversial statements for recruitment and fundraising. Fliers depicted outrageous statements and asked 
“With crazy Ed in charge, how can you afford NOT to join the ACLU?”76 Through Bradley, Amador battled 
for change. 
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He reported that “problems with police [were] pouring in from numerous Gay people” who detailed 
“harassment in bars and public spaces.”77 Davis’ venom could sometimes be especially unkind. When 
Christopher Street West President Sharon Cornelison invited him to participate in a parade, he declined, 
adding that he would happily participate in a “‘GAY CONVERSION’” parade.78 When his insensitive 
response went public, activists hanged him in effigy as Mayor Bradley looked on.79 Luckily for queers, 
Davis held political ambitions. In the midst of Proposition 6, he resigned to run for Governor. In the primary 
for the Republican nomination, he ran against John Briggs. In fact, he cast himself as more conservative 
and condemned the Los Angeles Times “strong editorial support of homosexuality” by cancelling his 
subscription.80 His primary campaign speeches became regular spectacles. At a meeting in Costa Mesa, 
Davis declared that he “always felt the government really was out to force me to hire 4-foot-11 transvestite 
morons.” Describing himself as an “average Californian,” he was proud to have also been “the lightning 
rod for Gay Liberation” in Los Angeles. He represented the vast majority of residents in the state who 
“don’t want to be pushed around by homosexuals.”81 His candidacy revealed a strong homophobic 
conservative discourse in 1978. Although he won the endorsement of several organizations and individuals 
(including John Briggs, who dropped out early after his campaign gained zero traction), he came in a close 
second in the June Republican primary.82 Years later he won a seat in the California State Senate. For 
activists his departure was welcomed. 
The new Chief of Police, Daryl F. Gates, was no ally, but was an improvement. Upon 
announcement of his selection activists demanded an audience. Gates agreed and attended a meeting at the 
home of Sheldon Andelson. Amador appeared on behalf of Bradley. The “three hour reception included 
questions” pertaining to “inaccurate child molestation statistics,” harassment of queer LAPD officers, the 
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establishment of a “Gay Studies” program within the LAPD, tactics of vice officers, and the legitimacy of 
the GCSC. This last issue was important. Activists asked Gates if he “would help policy personnel 
understand the Center’s purpose” and “a meeting at the Center was suggested.” Gates agreed, something 
that Davis would never have done. Since the meeting had been organized by Bradley’s office, Amador was 
angry that he did not receive recognition. Instead “Councilwoman Peggy Stevenson took most of the 
credit.” Amador surmised that she did so in order to appease “gays living in her district” who had “accused 
her of doing very little for Gay neighborhoods.”83 Such was the nature of Bradley, who often preferred to 
remain in the background. Less than a month later Gates admitted that figures which showed that “most 
child molesters are homosexuals were misleading.” Admonishing those responsible, he offered an apology 
and promised transparency.84 That he made this admission two months prior to the vote on Briggs was 
terribly significant. After all, Proposition 6 rested on such bogus assumptions.  
In other ways, Gates remained disconnected and uninterested in gay community concerns. When 
Amador urged Gates to address “the recent killing of two Gay men” in Silver Lake, the LAPD did nothing. 
“The majority of Gay constituents,” Amador informed Mayor Bradley, “call this office asking for help and 
direction. Some have information that may give the police clues” but “there is a lack of response from [the 
LAPD].”85 Amid the assassination of San Francisco Supervisor Harvey Milk and the paltry sentence handed 
to Dan White, his murderer, Amador warned that violence could escalate. When the White Night Riots 
rocked San Francisco, he pleaded for the Mayor Bradley to “offer support, help and guidance to prevent 
greater violence.”86 Bradley publicly condemned the Dan White verdict.87 While Gates proved insensitive 
to the needs of many social minorities (and was compelled to resign after the 1992 Rodney King Riots after 
his use of paramilitary force was widely criticized), still, he worked with the GCSC on many of its youth 
programs in the 1980s. Through Don Amador, Bradley helped to secure this limited but important reform. 
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“I honestly get the feeling,” Amador wrote, “that Chief Gates is willing to communicate and to learn.” Most 
importantly, “it is refreshing to be viewed as a minority ‘with problems’ rather than a minority that IS a 
problem.”88 This limited breakthrough paled in comparison to the 1979 citywide gay rights ordinance. 
San Francisco activists secured passage of an ordinance prohibiting sexual discrimination in 1978. 
Similar ordinances appeared in Eugene, Oregon; Wichita, Kansas; and Miami, Florida. But, with the 
exception of San Francisco, all of these efforts had been rolled back. Los Angeles became the first major 
city to approve a gay rights ordinance after the Anita Bryant backlash. Once again conservative activism 
strengthened queer rights. Activists were supported by the SCACLU, which had “several attorneys working 
on the Ordinance with the help of the City Attorney.”89 The ordinance also presented a political opportunity 
for Councilwoman Peggy Stevenson, whose relationship with queers was in need of assistance. Along with 
Councilman Joel Wachs, she agreed to sponsor the measure and presented it to the City Council in May of 
1979. Largely modeled after San Francisco’s measure, the ordinance forbade discrimination in both public 
and private housing and employment. During the preliminary hearing, only one council member, John S. 
Gibson, Jr., cast a dissenting vote.90 One week later, the matter was opened for public debate. In the 
“sometimes emotional” deliberations, the City Council found themselves outnumbered by an oppositional 
audience, many of whom traveled from the San Fernando Valley. A man from Northridge condemned the 
“attack on Judeo-Christian traditions.” The legislative chairwoman of the Women’s City Club brought her 
Bible, quoted verses, and labeled homosexuality an “abomination.” The ordinance would protect 
“immorality, degeneracy, and depravity,” she charged. Another feared that the “gay movement was eroding 
the family unit.” These views were supported by councilmen Gibson and Robert M. Wilkinson, both of 
whom voted against the ordinance. In rebuttal, Joel Wachs argued that “discrimination against gays is 
harmful to the city. When we deny one group of people rights to be productive citizens, we deny the very 
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root of our democratic principle.” As a compromise, the ordinance included a religious exceptions policy.91 
Approved thirteen to two, the measure was sent to Mayor Bradley, who signed it quietly.92  
Like Carter, Bradley avoided loud embraces of gay rights. Asked if the Mayor thought his life 
“immoral,” Don Amador hesitated. “Well, I think it’s not whether he considers it moral or immoral. The 
mayor wouldn’t have me here if he was not concerned about gay people.”93 Whether or not he approved, 
Bradley was convinced that queers represented a legitimate minority. In the years to come, he became more 
visible. Like Edelman, he visited the GCSC regularly, attended SDC meetings, and spoke at MECLA 
events. At one speech in 1984, Bradley was proud to have “improved the quality of gay life in Los Angeles.” 
In addition to signing the gay rights ordinance, he supported GCSC programs and later became strong ally 
in the fight against AIDS.94 When he ran for governor, Bradley praised the quest for “gay public recognition 
of basic human rights, personal integrity, and dignity for everyone.” He was proud to earn endorsements 
from the SDC and The Advocate.95 In the immediate aftermath of Propositions 6 and 13, activists continued 
to make important political inroads, but below the surface austerity measures limited their impact.  
 
Social Service Activism in Hard Times 
In his study of race in postwar Oakland, Robert Self argued that the fiscal impact of Proposition 13 
was devastating for African Americans. The structural limitations of the Tax Revolt meant that “black 
power had no real chance of instantiation at the city level.” Instead, power could only be demonstrated 
through boycotts and the election of African Americans to city council seats. While these were “epochal in 
importance,” they did little to alter economic inequalities.96 Scholars have not yet connected gay liberation 
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with the Tax Revolt, but in L.A. Proposition 13 had a deleterious effect on queer activism. As CDBG and 
CETA programs were curtailed, activists struggled to provide social services. 
During the summer of 1978 queers fought alongside others against Proposition 13.97 Much of the 
gay rights plank required a strong and inclusive welfare state. So did the GCSC. One month before 
Californians went to the polls, David Glascock estimated potential effects of the measure. His findings were 
foreboding. Proposition 13 would “drastically affect the Gay Community Services Center,” he concluded. 
Since the County funded several programs with CDBG monies, these would be eliminated. These included 
the Prisoner, Probation, and Parole (PPP), housing, drug counseling, and lesbian resources programs. The 
GCSC staff would face certain catastrophe. There are “80 positions in the GCSC funded through the CETA 
Program,” Glascock noted. These “will be eliminated with the passage of Proposition 13.”98 While 
Proposition 13 did not apparently target CETA, it slit the program’s throat by forcing a shuffling of county 
resources. CETA programs provided jobs and security from the marketplace which nurtured a professional 
class of activists. At the GCSC most program directors were partially or fully CETA-funded. In the Mayor’s 
office Don Amador was hired through a CETA grant. Realizing that the county now faced tough budget 
calls, supervisors were informed that CETA would be suspended in 1980. By that point, the program was 
under heavy assault. Some alleged that it was corrupt, since politicians used funds for “overt political 
purposes” (Bradley was a clear example).99 While this was true, social services agencies could also be 
classified as “political.” It was impossible to expect objectivity. Moreover, CETA mandated funds serve 
low-income individuals and neighborhoods. “Political” jobs could accomplish both. Bradley made this 
argument as he tried to save CETA. “I see nothing wrong with employing someone who meets the 
guidelines. Whether that person worked in a campaign, or [not]…they must be unemployed, live in the city, 
and meet the qualifications,” he told reporters.100 His was a losing battle, as the termination of his own gay 
liaison demonstrated. 
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 Unlike David Glascock, Amador’s position was fully-funded through CETA. As his fate became 
clear he came under great stress. Although he usually got along with Edelman’s staff, he suddenly proved 
“quite hostile.” One aide found his behavior quixotic until she grasped Amador’s predicament. “After Don 
and I spoke for a while,” she concluded, “his hostility seemed to disappear.” The root of “the problem is 
that his job with the Mayor is being phased out since he is a CETA employee.”101 The SDC lobbied for 
Amador, but it was impossible. “We share your concern,” the Mayor wrote. “The entire City is faced with 
some difficult decisions both as a result of CETA and the drastic loss of revenue following the passage of 
Proposition 13.” Amador was one among 50 members of the Mayor’s staff who would be terminated. The 
“severe budget cuts” were unavoidable, but Bradley promised to work against “the possible breakdown of 
communication between government and various segments of the community.”102 Towards the end Amador 
made appeals to Edelman’s office. “As a representative within the Gay Community,” he explained, “my 
concerns are those of the late Supervisor Harvey Milk: to build bridges everywhere.” He hoped to help 
Edelman on “a number of issues” in “any way possible.”103 Unfortunately, the supervisor wasn’t hiring. 
Proposition 13 had frozen his budget. These terminations isolated queer activists from their government.  
While Edelman and Bradley remained allies, the Tax Revolt crippled their power. The final death 
of CETA dragged out for four years. Even with the termination of eighty staff members in 1979, the GCSC 
was collecting close to $400,000 in CETA funds in 1981. This provided salaries for nearly half of the 
remaining staff. But the election of Ronald Reagan assured that CETA would end. Even before he assumed 
the presidency, Reagan promised to eliminate the program. His urban task force, led by future California 
Governor Pete Wilson, considered CETA a “failure” which had “squandered precious resources” on 
“useless programs” and the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 eliminated it.104 This was 
transformational. The first CETA grant in 1976 for $96,000 swelled to over $500,000 by 1980. This budget 
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was cut to $52,000 in 1982, and to $0 in 1983 as CETA collapsed.105 As had been predicted, the 
marginalized suffered the most. The PPP Program was the first to close. Activists encouraged members of 
the community to write to queer prisoners and parolees, but could no longer assist with housing, 
employment, or emotional counseling. Housing programs were also hard hit. Of the six liberation houses, 
only one survived the initial round of cuts, but it too would be forced to close in 1979.  
When the CETA budget was cut, some organizers charged sexual discrimination. A rumor was 
circling through the GCSC that the County was reserving all funds for “so-called ‘intact families’ only.” 
Activists demanded that funding “opportunities be available to all residents of the County, regardless of 
their family living arrangements.”106 But they were wrong. Edelman replied that no such policy existed. 
Instead, the Reagan Administration had terminated the program; queer and straight social service agencies 
were equally sharing in the pain.107 In light of new limits, some activists felt betrayed. Instead of fighting 
against Reagan, they cursed CETA. In the weeks that followed the program’s end, some GCSC employees 
sported “Declare our Independence from Bureaucracy!” buttons.108 Don Kilhefner was disillusioned. When 
“the County got strapped for money,” he recalled, “everything just got cut.” As this happened, it seemed 
like “the political consciousness of the community began to change.”109 Relocated in the Bay Area, Jon 
Platania viewed the “drying up of social services” as ominous. We had been “sustained through general 
assistance grants, food stamps and other social welfare programs,” he explained. Without those funds, what 
would become of the GCSC? “Turning off social resources,” he reasoned, ensured that “promising social 
experiments” would face “periods of decline.”110  
Activists fought bitterly to protect their programs. The youth-centered Boyle Home collapsed under 
the weight of the Tax Revolt, but only after a protracted struggle. Ed Boyle “doubted whether [he] could 
keep the homes going” without financial assistance and appealed to Edelman for help. Some constituents 
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blamed the Edelman for the bleak cuts. One woman demanded he “reconsider the order to close the Boyle 
Home” pointing out that “this is the only place a gay child has to go to! In the Year of the Child,” she wrote, 
“our priority should be the wellbeing of all our children.” Another urged Edelman to “use [his] influence” 
to prevent the closure. “As a parent, I’ve seen the desperate need in this city for a place like this,” another 
opined. “Please don’t close it.” “The future of our productive citizens is at stake,” one man pleaded. A 
school counselor explained that “most of these young people are rejected by their families and have no 
place to go.” Without Boyle Home, they faced “degradation” and “hopelessness.” How could the county 
“spend billions of dollars on vagrants, abortions, drug and alcohol addicts, and wards of the courts,” one 
woman asked, “yet turn a deaf, dumb, and blind eye to homosexual issues”? Powerful appeals also came 
from queer youths. “Nothing is worse than being made unwelcome in your own home by parents who do 
not approve,” one young man explained. Since “gays also pay for the funding of public schools through 
taxes,” he wrote, they were entitled to public assistance. “During my teen years and early twenties,” another 
confessed, “I was forced into prostitution…It is just as ugly and devastating to young men as it is to 
women.” Boyle Home offered him a “refuge.” Its closure “condemns young men to the street where they 
are not only easy prey, but also victims of very limited economic opportunity.” He understood that Edelman 
was “under pressure to spend less,” but warned that he would “only save short term cash. The long term 
loss of manpower and welfare is going to be staggering.”111 The rage was justified but not the target. 
Edelman could not control the fate of Boyle Home. “I am afraid you are incorrect about my 
position,” he wrote to one constituent. “I have always given strong support to the Ed Boyle Home.”112 She 
wrote back appreciating Edelman’s “humanistic view,” but was frustrated.113 In several exchanges with 
constituents Edelman unsuccessfully attempted to explain. In the end the sharp cuts imposed by Proposition 
13 aided the conservative counterrevolution. At his inauguration in 1980, Ronald Reagan famously told 
Americans that “government is not the solution to our problems, government is the problem.” A self-
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fulfilling prophecy, Proposition 13 strengthened that argument. Elected officials like Edelman were now 
blamed for their failure to prevent the mandates that the Tax Revolt imposed. To his credit, Edelman did 
attempt to save Boyle Home. He was angry that Ed Boyle did not ask for his assistance earlier, since the 
“program is very popular in the gay community and doing some good.”114 He managed to locate funds from 
his shrinking discretionary budget for Boyle. In announcing these, he took a swipe at Proposition 13. “One 
of the critical problems with Proposition 13,” he explained, “was the freeze on foster care and children’s 
institutions.” Boyle Home was a “very special program” that was now in danger. Was this the intent of the 
Tax Revolt? His assistance increased the Boyle Home budget from $916 to $1,239 per resident and kept it 
open, temporarily.115 Boyle publically lauded Edelman, a “a very special supervisor” who proved “very 
sensitive to the needs of these kids”116 Ironically, when the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner reported the 
story, Boyle Home came under fire. 
Because the Herald article was supportive, it solicited anger from conservatives. The writer 
received “many angry calls resenting the fact that [he] wrote an article on the subject.” Several found the 
“toleration” of homosexuality “distasteful.” There was even pushback from Herald editors, who 
reprimanded the story.117 Edelman wrote a letter of support and praised the “well-presented piece” which 
“offered a realistic yet sensitive look at a difficult contemporary problem.” He chastised those who would 
“prefer to believe the problem [of queer homelessness and prostitution] does not exist” and personally 
responded to angry constituents.118 But even he could not prevent the closure of the program in late 1980. 
The immediate cause was Ed Boyle’s total exhaustion. Earlier in the year, he hoped to expand the program 
through additional funding.119 That was unlikely, since the county instituted stern cuts that year and Boyle 
ran out of steam. “Although people continue to be interested in the program,” he wrote, it was too costly 
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and stressful to remain open. He thanked Edelman for his “tremendous support” which had “earned the 
necessary increases and operating costs” that kept the doors open for nearly four years.120 But the fiscal 
landscape was too unpredictable. Could Boyle count on a dip into Edelman’s discretionary budget every 
year in order to remain open? The writing was on the wall. Five years earlier, Boyle Home might have had 
a better chance. Its closure showed how deeply the Tax Revolt cut.  
In late 1981 GCSC organizers fought back and located “an extremely suitable building” for a new 
youth home. The L.A. City Council pledged $60,000 to assist in property acquisition, and organizers hoped 
Edelman could cover the remaining balance.121 He wrote in full support of the proposal. “There is a critical 
shortage of facilities for gay and lesbian adolescents,” he stressed.122 In another letter he assured that he had 
“personally toured the [GCSC]” which had “a proud record of serving the Los Angeles community for 
many years.”123 The GCSC won funds, but not nearly enough.124 By the fall of 1983 activists were still 
$20,000 short. As had been the case with Boyle Home, they relied on Edelman’s discretionary spending. 
He followed through, terming the allocation a “worthy investment.”125 Now called Project Confrontation 
Youth, the program managed to survive the Tax Revolt, but its multiple near-death encounters did not bode 
well for the future. In the 1970s, the GCSC won contractual grants, which guaranteed annual incomes. Now 
activists were reliant on the goodwill of Edelman, who shared money when he had it. In 1983 the supervisor 
funded the GCSC almost exclusively through discretionary spending.126 Organizer Rand Schrader praised 
his support, which made “the [GCSC] literally look different” and purchased a full-page advertisement in 
a MECLA newsletter to thank him.127 The overreliance on Edelman revealed a new weakness. Without a 
stable budget the GCSC could not engage in the same type of activism as it had in the 1970s. The 
organization was living month-to-month, award-to-award. While the ambitions of activists remained 
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unchanged, new austerity policies prevented them from being fully realized. This was clearest with Hudson 
House, an ill-fated housing program of the 1980s. 
 
“Gratuitous Destruction”: The Demise of Hudson House 
Queers remained committed to economic justice after the Tax Revolt. Ironically, one of the 
strongest efforts to house the homeless emerged at the same time as Proposition 13. Separate from the 
GCSC, Hudson House built upon the liberation house model. It housed low-income and homeless men and 
women, provided employment counseling, and offered family atmospheres. Unlike earlier programs 
however, Hudson House was hobbled by the attack on the welfare state. It did not share similar levels of 
public financing, which resulted in the program’s downfall. It demonstrated how the curtailment of public 
spending in L.A. County exacerbated social problems such as homelessness rather than solve them. 
 Hudson House was the vision of Pat Rocco who had used SPREE, his own erotic publication, to 
advertise for liberation houses and the GCSC. As the latter came under attack, Rocco developed his own 
autonomous housing program. Born in Brooklyn, New York in 1934, he moved to California with his large 
Italian family in the mid-1940s and discovered a love for photography and filmmaking. He insisted his 
films were “gay love stories,” not pornography. Indeed they did possess political meaning. “The films made 
me a gay liberationist,” he explained. “The fact they were up front, that they were really overt…and that 
they had something to say that was positive” supported cored aims of gay liberation. Soon he was publishing 
SPREE, which consisted of nude pictures and political editorials. Involved with most gay organization in 
the 1970s, Rocco used his camera to document the movement in L.A.128  He was particularly concerned 
with homelessness. As liberation houses began to close, he reached out to Robert Humphries of the United 
States Mission (USM) and they decided to raise funds for a new housing program. Initial funds were raised 
through the “Greasy Guy Contest,” a 1950s-themed party.129 The strategy mirrored early liberation house 
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fundraising. Startup funds allowed activists to rent a large house on Hudson Avenue in Hollywood (hence 
the name, Hudson House). Rocco advertised it as a direct descendent of liberation houses and established 
a link with the GCSC. “DO YOU NEED LOW-COST HOUSING WITH MEALS? CLOTHING? 
SHOWERS?” one flier queried. “INQUIRE ABOUT HUDSON HOUSE AT THE GAY AND LESBIAN 
COMMUNITY SERVICES CENTER, ROOM 105.”130 Technically, there was no official relationship 
between Hudson House and the GCSC, but the latter provided necessary referrals. 
 Like earlier programs, residents had to be at least eighteen and demonstrate financial need to enter 
Hudson House. Managers were not to accept “residents who have been evicted from, owe back rent to, or 
have caused problems or disturbances in” former liberation houses.131 This policy stemmed from Rocco’s 
belief that houses closed because “they had problems with management, with rules, or lack of them, with 
liquor, with sex, and with dope.”132 In fact, a lack of funds and staff had spelled their demise. Like its 
predecessor, Hudson House was not free: residents could pay by the day but were recommended to pay the 
weekly rate of $65. Rents were negotiated at lower rates for those without necessary funds.133 Organizers 
insisted that every resident “pay something,” but also that money not be “a barrier to admission.”134 At its 
height, the program consisted of four homes in Greater Hollywood which could house between sixty and 
seventy residents. Three locations were within walking distance to the GCSC and most residents were 
“homeless men and women from the Hollywood, Silverlake, [and] Echo Park areas.”135 Each house held 
mandatory weekly meetings where residents could raise issues and complaints.136 A van was acquired and 
shared between locations for transportation needs.137 Records and photographs indicate that Hudson House 
was more diverse than liberation houses. Overall, the resident population broke down as 55% white, 25% 
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black, and 20% Asian, Latino, or “other” and photographs depicted diverse and integrated settings. The 
program shared a gender disparity with its predecessor, however. Men outnumbered woman by a whopping 
seventy to twenty percent (ten percent were listed as “transsexuals” who did not identify as exclusively 
“male” or “female”). Around 80% or residents were under the age of thirty.138 Organizers sought strong 
relationships with racial minorities in the area. “We do not overlook other groups,” Rocco explained. “We 
are in communication with them, and they with us.” Together they declared that “all minorities and all 
people [were] entitled to equal access to jobs, housing, dignity, and equality.” The program was designed 
for queers, but also housed “non-gays in some numbers.”139 Associating with social service agencies in East 
L.A. and Watts helped Hudson House earn support from liberals who publicly commended Rocco and his 
efforts at a gay parade in 1983.140 Like the GCSC, the program was multi-layered. 
Residents were given “food, bed space, clothing and a supportive, non-threatening environment” 
in order to undergo “re-socialization.” Substance abuse and emotional counseling were provided via the 
GCSC.141 There was a glaring difference, however, when it came to employment counseling. Without 
CETA funds, organizers developed a controversial employment program to stay afloat. Most residents were 
sent to the USM, where they went door-to-door soliciting donations. USM employees were “required to 
maintain a quota of $25.01 average collection per day” during their first month of employment and “$35.01 
thereafter.” House managers informed residents that, “if you are unwilling to help yourselves, we are unable 
to help you, and we are unable to keep you.”142 For those with no other options, USM jobs were mandatory. 
Moreover, house managers intrusively kept track of salaries. “It is your responsibility to meet minimum 
payments through your work,” residents were told. Therefore, “we will request a computer readout from 
the Mission every Wednesday in order to determine what wages Hudson House residents have earned for 
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their minimum payments.”143 This information was used to calculate rents, but was gathered in draconian 
fashion. USM jobs were highly undesirable, and many sought alternative opportunities. One avenue was a 
gay thrift shop opened by Rocco in 1983. “In these days of Reaganomics,” he explained, “with prices so 
high and money so tight, a THRIFT SHOP is just what is needed in our community.” Reliant on private 
donations, the store sold products “at ‘yard-sale’ prices” and created a handful of jobs for residents.144 
Sometimes local politicians would seek staff through Hudson House. When Wallace Albertson ran for the 
California State Assembly, he sought dedicate staff members. Those interested were reminded to “dress 
neatly and comfortably” for the interview and to “tell them you were recommended by Pat Rocco.”145 These 
opportunities appeared infrequently. Most residents became door-to-door USM fundraisers. 
As GCSC programs closed, Hudson House attempted to fill gaps. The defunct PPP Program was 
partially reconstituted by Rocco and many incarcerated queers began writing for help. One man hoped to 
“return to California upon release,” but lacked resources. Incarcerated since 1972, he knew of “no one on 
the outside to turn to” and “had no contact with family in over five years,” yet word had reached him about 
Hudson House. “From what I have heard,” he wrote, it “seems to be the place where I can find the help and 
understanding I will need when I’m first released. I hope you can aid me with housing, and help me get 
back on my feet.” He also expected sexual opportunities, and described himself as “40 years old, Gay, 
mainly butch,” and “very straight appearing.”146 Avowed bisexual, straight, and questioning inmates also 
wrote Rocco. A man from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania heard about Hudson House from a friend. “I am very 
interested in your facility,” he wrote, “because I am due for parole and I do not have a place to stay.” He 
had “no relatives in California or any surrounding states,” which caused him great anxiety. “I’m not ‘Gay,’” 
he admitted, but qualified that “I have no hang ups. I’m a 25 year old black divorcey [sic]; I am a body 
builder and student of average intelligence. Please consider my request. I need help.”147 This may have 
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relayed sexual curiosity. Either way, he had no qualms about moving into a queer space. For some, Hudson 
House promised to satisfy economic and emotional desires. 
 A twenty-two year-old inmate from Carson City, Nevada was delighted to hear of his acceptance 
into Hudson House. He hoped to find work “through the CETA program” upon his release (likely unaware 
of the program’s demise), and had been advised by “a black friend named Henry” that Hudson House 
provided decent housing. He experienced “a lot of problems in prison” and was anxious to get out. “There 
is a great mistreatment of gays here,” he revealed. “As a result, I’ve been through much abuse.” Including 
a picture of himself, he requested a brochure and further information. A few months later, the inmate sent 
another letter to Rocco. His parole had been delayed and he feared he was deteriorating behind bars. He 
revealed “something very private” to Rocco: “All of my family, except my grandpa, have disavowed me 
due to my homosexuality, so I don’t have anywhere but the streets I can turn to. I am really on my own.” 
This “lonely experience” caused him much distress and he attempted suicide. “Gay, lonely, and emotional,” 
he was “a misfit in prison.” The only thing that kept him going was the promise of Hudson House. While 
he waited to hear from the parole board, he asked Rocco to have residents “write me letters of friendship to 
help combat my loneliness” and offered to send stamps if needed. A month later he secured release. “I 
cannot tell you how grateful I am,” he wrote. “When I arrive at Hudson House, I will do everything to 
express my appreciation.” While he had recently been suicidal, now he was “very excited about arriving in 
Hollywood, meeting new gay friends, and becoming involved in [Hudson House].”148 Family-building and 
emotional needs connected Hudson House with earlier efforts. Residents were given both economic and 
emotional assistance. When it came to funding Hudson House, however, the similarities ended.  
Hudson House was never able to obtain significant public financing, which impacted its 
effectiveness. Morris Kight worked alongside Rocco for funds and attempted to qualify Hudson House in 
city programs. Including Hudson House within the Hollywood Neighborhood Strategy Area program, they 
argued that Hudson House would be “part of the solution” to the crisis of “rising rents, scarcity of housing, 
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rising enforcement standards, the decline of older housing, and the constant influx on new residents seeking 
a better life.” Within the program, “housing, jobs, and the search for dignity” were core goals. While “no 
community in Los Angeles County” was without queers, “distinct pockets of gays” had emerged in West 
Hollywood. Low-income migrants lacked “complete educations,” were “alienated from their home 
communities,” hailed from “racial minority communities,” and often emerged from “poverty families.” 
This left many new arrivals with the “serious disadvantage of not being able to compete in the job 
market.”149 The LAGLF had “taken the responsibility of finding housing in the homes of friendly members 
of the community.” Unfortunately, this turned into a “Dance of Death,” as “close quarters, inadequate 
washroom facilities, and overcrowding caused stress and strains.” The arrival of the GCSC ushered in more 
sophisticated social services approach. Hudson House would complement these efforts and provide a 
“residential facility for gay and non-gay women and men” which was “light, airy, and homelike.” Activists 
were awarded a measly $65,000, the only grant they would receive.150  
To safeguard it from attacks, Hudson House was framed in conservative ways. Over and over 
activists assured that it would not create welfare reliance. “We have as a stated policy to not create 
dependency,” one activist maintained. Residents were “urged to put their lives in order, to seek and hold 
jobs, to open bank accounts, learn to manage their monies, and then move on.”151 They would need to 
“quickly develop survival skills.”152 Notions of sex and pleasure were downplayed. “We have striven to 
live so quietly that our neighbors have total respect for our activities,” organizers explained. While certain 
activities, such as library trips, beach parties, and community service were necessary to produce 
“socialization skills,” residents would prioritize their finances. “All incoming residents are commenced on 
a systematic program the very first day of their residency to put their financial affairs in order. They must 
commence a search immediately for a job.”153 On paper, Hudson House prioritized responsibility over fun. 
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To emphasize the point, Rocco developed draconian house rules. Residents were expected to “leave the 
premises and seek employment between 8:00 A.M. and 5:00 P.M. on weekdays, and 9:30 A.M. to 4:00 
P.M. on Saturdays.” Drugs and alcohol were forbidden. Meals would be served at specific times only and 
nightly curfews enforced. Most alarmingly, sexuality would be patrolled. “No resident will be allowed 
guests at any time unless special arrangements have been made,” one rule read. “Approved guests will be 
allowed only in the living and dining room areas.” These rules gave Hudson House a monastic appearance, 
but it was largely a façade. Most “rules” were not followed in practice. Reflecting both Propositions 6 and 
13, Rocco promised no “free rides” to deflect attacks on social welfare, and desexualized the program to 
safeguard it from homophobia. This was a pragmatic and keen strategy which activists sometimes revealed. 
For instance, one rule teasingly promised that “no one will be pressured into sexual activities,” adding in 
an amendment that “bisexual and non-gay proclivities will be overlooked unless they are excessive.”154  
The mastery of bureaucratic language would have helped Hudson House a few years earlier, but 
after Proposition 13 securing public financing became untenable. In 1980 activists hoped to win funds 
through the Los Angeles Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which bestowed grants to local 
programs to fight crime. Hudson House had “reached the point [in which] the level of present services 
cannot be operated without external funding.”155 The director lauded the initiative and welcomed the 
proposal, but had no funds to spare. Hudson House was “meritorious,” she wrote. However “as you may 
be aware, LEAA monies have been drastically reduced; therefore, it is highly unlikely that this office will 
be entertaining any new program areas. If I become aware of monies, I will certainly advise you of same.”156 
Activists submitted a winning proposal, but there were no funds to award. This became a trend. When 
organizers sought funds to purchase a house in 1980 they appeared disconnected from reality. Requesting 
an additional $300,000 (to the $65,000 already issued), they reported that the house was “an important piece 
of real estate located in a unique area” and was “in the spirit of the HUD Plan of private ownership.”157 
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That might be so, officials wrote back, but with continuing budget constraints, such strategies were “no 
longer germane to project development.” For the foreseeable future, no grants would be forthcoming to any 
social service agency.158 Activists were not the only ones who were frustrated. An exasperated Supervisor 
Edelman condemned city and county budget cuts. “The supply of affordable housing,” he reminded, “can 
only be described as too little for too many.” Austerity measures exacerbated ongoing problems.159  
In such a climate frustrations mounted between activists and state representatives. When they 
secured their $65,000 grant, activists were in technical violation of an important guideline. Unlike the 
GCSC, Hudson House had not achieved non-profit status. Activists argued that this was unnecessary, since 
Hudson House was associated with the USM. The idea of incorporating outside of their parent organization, 
they argued, “offended friends at the Mission who felt that their assistance had been total and loving and 
more than honorable.”160 Funds had not been awarded to the USM, however, and Hudson House was 
skirting regulations. Unless it incorporated, the funding contract would be delayed, perhaps even 
canceled..161 The matter was resolved when activists created Crossroads Employment and Job Services, a 
non-profit entity, to collect the funds. But their bureaucratic patience was running thin. When the target 
area was revised in late 1980, Kight hit a breaking point. In a letter to a count agency, he rejected the new 
boundaries. “The Hudson Houses are just a bit out of the actual geographic lines,” he argued. “Frankly we 
do not think anything should be required of us” since the program reached clients from throughout the 
county. How could officials rationalize any delay in helping people over arbitrary boundary? “The 
government,” Kight crowed, needed to “show the kind of imagination and compassion in this matter which 
should be the hallmark of a creative social service delivery mechanism.”162 Activists were attempting to 
play by the rules for few rewards.   
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Additionally, Hudson House was beset by urban transformations and hostile neighbors. By 1982 
West Hollywood was showing signs of gentrification. “The bulldozers are claiming two of our houses to 
make way for a new apartment complex!” Rocco informed supporters. Centrally located, Hudson House 
occupied desirable real estate. As developers began to eradicate “blight” and raise property values in the 
neighborhood, the program felt the effects. Rising rental costs in the area portended structural problems for 
any grassroots housing program.163At some locations, neighbors were also hostile. One man registered 
several complaints with Councilwoman Peggy Stevenson. He charged that there had been “a stabbing at 
Hudson House,” that residents were “vandals,” and that “dope was being sold.” When Stevenson followed 
up, Rocco categorically denied the charges. “Does [he] mean those who are in need of services are 
‘undesirable’?” he queried.164 False charges masked homophobic hostility. An apartment manager tried to 
remove one house from his neighborhood in March of 1981 and showed up at Supervisor Edelman’s office. 
Aides noted that he was “anti-gay and upset about halfway houses for gays.” Edelman elected not to follow 
up with him.165 A few months later, he went to Stevenson. Rocco explained the nature of his hostility. 
“From the day we moved in,” he revealed, “we’ve been having considerable difficulty.” The apartment 
manager indicated that “he didn’t want a ‘fag halfway house’ on his block, and that he would do everything 
possible to ‘get us out of there.’” He had also “accosted residents on numerous occasions” and “called the 
fire department” to disrupt a house barbeque. Stevenson contacted the owner of the apartment complex to 
inform him that his manager was “causing undue distress” in the neighborhood.166   
Compared to the program’s funding dilemma, homophobic neighbors were a minor concern. The 
majority of Rocco’s time and energy went into fundraising. The hemorrhaging of county programs 
necessitated that Hudson House be reliant on private donors. This was the initial, and unsuccessful, strategy 
of the GCSC. Through fliers and publications, Rocco sought money continuously. The program was 
                                                          
163 Hudson House flier, 1982. HHR, box 1, folder 1. 
164 Letter, 13 November 1980. HHR, box 1, folder 6. 
165 Letter to Ed Edelman, 25 March 1971. EDE, box 825. 
166 Letter, 29 October 1981. HHR, box 1, folder 3. 
178 
 
“working well,” one read, but in “need of a refrigerator, beds, silverware, chairs, and large cans of food.”167 
When a new house opened in 1982, it was “up to the gay community” to “help furnish it!” Reliance on 
private donations was unpredictable and unsustainable. The task of fundraising also exhausted Rocco, who 
sometimes was compelled to grovel. “THANK YOU for your help in making [Hudson House] possible,” 
one appeal read. “Now comes the task of furnishing to make it ready for the gay men and lesbians who will 
move in as soon as it’s ready. CAN YOU HELP US AGAIN?” In this case, the most important items needed 
included a refrigerator, dressers, a coffee table, linens, towels, pillows, and an air conditioner. Rocco 
appealed to wealthy queers, and argued that “your own gay and lesbian brothers and sisters need you.”168 
While private donations allowed the program to function, they did not offer a viable long-term solution. 
Under enormous financial stress, Rocco relied on creatively destructive solutions. As a result the program 
was engulfed in a welfare scandal that involved the FBI.  
The first report of illegality came from an “anonymous former resident” who wrote a blistering 
expose to Mayor Bradley. Entitled “Lazy Man’s Way to Riches,” the informant claimed to have entered 
Hudson House after a GCSC referral. Upon his arrival, he found “hustlers, transvestites, jailbirds, impaired 
sanies [sic], racial bigots, adamant heterosexuals, thieves, sexual lunatics, insecure psychopaths, selfish 
introverts and others.” Residents were “not allowed to cook for themselves and padlocks [were] placed on 
the refrigerators and the cupboards.” The letter attacked Rocco in deeply personal ways and sometimes 
appeared homophobic. Towards the end, a damning allegation was made. “Pat Rocco,” he claimed, “has 
fully encouraged all vulnerable newcomers with little or no cash or jobs to actively seek obtaining food 
stamps to pay their rents at Hudson House…[Rents] are payable either in food stamps or cash.” Anonymous 
wanted to know how “the Office of the Mayor could commend such an institution…Truly the wool has 
been pulled over someone’s eyes. Whose is it?” At certain places, theh writer clearly lied. He claimed to 
have witnessed the “horrors of Hudson House” while “a resident for more than three years.” This would 
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have been impossible since the program had barely been open a year.169 He also appeared homophobic 
(calling Rocco and others “sexual lunatics”), making his residency in the program odd. Some arguments 
were contradictory. If Rocco ran the house like a “dictator,” it seems unlikely “chaos [would] reign 
supreme.” The most suspicious charge, however, held validity. Rocco had indeed allowed residents to pay 
rent with food stamps, a violation of the law. Although Bradley does not appear to have paid much attention 
to the letter, a copy made its way to the FBI.  
The details of the ensuing controversy remain murky. Pat Rocco has been understandably hesitant 
to discuss the details. Although the food stamp violation was a strategic move to keep Hudson House afloat, 
it was illegal. By 1982 the FBI was monitoring the program. According to his lawyer, late in the year an 
“undercover agent approached [Rocco]” and offered “to purchase [food] stamps” from him in a sting 
operation. Agents “approached him several more times” covertly to exchange food stamps for dollars. 
Hudson House officials believed that the timing of the sting was deliberate. When agents moved to entrap 
Rocco, they argued, “Hudson House was in an extremely precarious position” and was operating “on a 
hand to mouth basis.” The financial stress “put Pat Rocco under great pressure” leading him to make “an 
error, even though Hudson House would have been closed down had he not” done so. Rocco’s lawyer 
argued that his client “has always been associated with activities tending to relieve the suffering of his 
fellow citizens, in particular gay people.” His crime stemmed from a big heart.170 He avoided charges, but 
still faced punishment. In order to maintain operations for Crossroads (the employment wing of Hudson 
House), authorities insisted upon the abrupt “termination of Pat Rocco.”171 
That sad duty fell to Valerie Terrigno, an up-and-coming community activist and political leader 
(in a cruel irony, her involvement with Crossroads would come back to haunt her). After the dust settled, 
Rocco left Los Angeles and moved to Hawaii. Shortly before his departure, he sat down with Morris Kight 
for an interview. He avoided the controversy, but his voice revealed sadness. “I’m going to Hawaii with 
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my other half,” he insisted. “I’m leaving my directorship of Hudson House. We’re making a very big change 
in both of our lives.” When asked for the reason, Rocco hesitated, then answered “it just seems time for a 
change, I guess.” He and his partner hoped to “kind of start brand-new with everything; with our entire 
lives, really.” Despite the forced exile, he remained proud and emotional about Hudson House. “I feel very 
good about the past,” he confessed. “We’re here for a purpose. [Hudson House fills] a great need in the 
community, and I’m really proud of the growth that it’s had and the number of people-up to now it’s more 
than four thousand-that Hudson House has helped. I’m proud of that.” When Kight asked if Rocco was 
“taking a vacation from the gay movement for a little while?” he responded, “I guess you could put it that 
way.”172 Frontiers announced that Rocco was “retiring…in favor of a business opportunity.”173 In his 
absence Hudson House fell apart. In order to protect the original $65,000 grant, USM organizers separated 
the housing program from Crossroads. To remain funded, however, they kept the namesake of Hudson 
House to avoid “the technical effect of placing Crossroads in the hazardous position of a new applicant for 
the grant, instead of an ongoing agency.” When Rocco protested, the USM threatened to resolve the matter 
in court, an avenue Rocco wisely avoided. One organizer lamented the “gratuitous destruction of a poor 
gay people’s program.”174  
What happened to Hudson House was not unprecedented. Donna Murch found that the Black 
Panthers were penetrated “through special FBI directives and the Counter Intelligence Program 
(COUNTELPRO).” These efforts “sought to cripple the Party through mass incarcerations, harassment, and 
infiltration.”175 Queers often worried that FBI informants and saboteurs infiltrated their groups. Back in the 
early 1970s, Don Kilhefner believed that the LAGLF was penetrated by the LAPD and FBI.176 In 1985, 
Valerie Terrigno believed that the FBI plotted her downfall as West Hollywood Mayor. In this instance, 
FBI entrapment facilitated the undoing of Hudson House and shrouded the program in controversy. Far 
                                                          
172 Pat Rocco OH.  
173 “Hudson House Sees Five Years,” Frontiers, May 1983. HHR, box 1, folder 1. 
174 United States Mission internal memo, undated. USM, box 1, folder 5. 
175 Murch, Living for the City, 168. 
176 Don Kilhefer OH.  
181 
 
removed from the action, Jon Platania regretted the course of events. Perhaps Rocco did allow “semi-illegal 
behavior,” Platania reasoned. “So what?” Rocco “participated in charitable efforts” which needed to be 
celebrated, not condemned. “Any man who contributes as he has must be good. I wasn’t close enough to 
Hudson House to know what happened or what didn’t happen,” he went on. “I do know that when you have 
a bunch of people living together, you’re going to have the potential for scandal if you’re looking for it.” 
In his final analysis, Platania couldn’t “imagine anything that horrible” which “blots out the good. It’s 
always good when you have some place to stay and rest your head. Shelter is good.”177 Hudson House was 
a progressive program that helped many Angelenos. Rocco considered it a “real success story,” and claimed 
that “over 4,000 gay men and lesbians” had passed through the program. “Some stayed for days, others for 
years.” Most entered “without housing, food, jobs, and in [with] emotional trouble.”178  
In the end, the demise of Hudson House rested in its era: urban austerity politics doomed the 
program from the start. Like the GCSC, Hudson House earned political support from Edelman, 
Councilwoman Stevenson, and Mayor Bradley.179 Even State Senator David Roberti applauded Rocco for 
his efforts.180 “Everybody had nice things to say about [Hudson House],” Rocco remarked. “It was a love-
in.”181 But it wasn’t enough. What the program needed was financing, not commendations. The example of 
Hudson House was illustrative. Activists gained access to the welfare state at a perilous historical moment 
and enjoyed a very brief moment in the sun. In a 1979 speech Mayor Bradley spoke of a “Post-Proposition 
13 Era.” The “problems of unemployment, housing, and urban blight,” had not been resolved, he told a 
crowd. But “the challenge of the 1980s will be more complex and difficult to overcome,” since urban 
activism would need to “be accomplished in light of the public mandate issued with Proposition 13.” This 
threatened to “polarize the government itself from the very people it attempts to serve.” The next generation 
would need to find ways to work within or subvert new limits. He encouraged progressives to use their 
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“spirit, creativity and intelligence to cope with [the] rapid changes.” We must “make sure that a city like 
Los Angeles maintains service to the public.”182 How would gay activists respond to Bradley’s call? As 
austerity tested the utility of state activism, queers plotted a new course in West Hollywood which 
compelled the political geography of gay liberation to change. 
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Chapter Six: Incorporation and a New Political Geography in West Hollywood 
 
“I am of two minds on Incorporation. On the one hand, I 
am supposed to advocate good government…On the 
other, I have always advocated self-determination, and it 
would be wonderful to have a government of gay and 
lesbian folks.” 
-Morris Kight, 1984  
 
“To be a city or not to be a city is one question, but 
perhaps the most important question is what kind of city 
would West Hollywood be?” 
-Allen Chivens and Joyce Hundal,  
West Hollywood Study Committee, 1984 
 
Towards the end of November 1984, Supervisor Edelman sought advice from three aides. Two 
weeks earlier, voters overwhelmingly incorporated West Hollywood as an independent city. Now Edelman 
was asked to officiate the inauguration of the new government. This was a heavy favor considering his deep 
opposition to cityhood. One aide warned against bitterness: “Your only choice,” she explained, “is to be as 
positive and upbeat as possible. You can say that you did your best to [ensure] working harmony in West 
Hollywood.” Recognizing its importance, “stress that you fought to maintain [rent control] in spite of the 
conservative Board majority,” she urged. An openly-gay aide agreed. “Your central theme might be that 
you enjoyed representing West Hollywood,” he suggested. “You are proud of your role in molding [the] 
dynamic community.” While “it may seem out of place, you should point to your accomplishments…it is 
a positive story to tell.” But Edelman’s senior aide disagreed. “Keep your remarks brief,” he warned. “Do 
not remind everyone of your position in the election. Do not list your accomplishments. Do not dwell on 
the difficulties ahead. Do not respond to funding issues-the audience won’t like it.” Instead, he urged the 
supervisor to “focus on the ‘gay city’ aspect.” Edelman might describe the transition as “a father who is 
seeing a child growing strong enough to strike out on its own.” This was “somewhat patronizing” but also 
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“positive, human, and frank.” As soon as possible, “remove yourself from the celebration.”1 Edelman 
heeded this advice. The political geography of gay liberation, he realized, had changed. 
While Edelman sulked, others celebrated. The incorporation of West Hollywood marked a 
milestone and, in some ways, built upon the rich legacy of gay activism in L.A. Queers forged an “unlikely 
coalition” with seniors, immigrants, and racial minorities over the shared economic concern of rent control.2 
At the same time, however, queers dominated media narratives of incorporation. The real issue, the Los 
Angeles Times opined, was not housing but the creation of “America’s first gay city.” Incorporators 
encouraged this view, noting that, “for the first time, an openly gay City Council” would control queer 
destinies.3 In the fog of merriment a few dissenters could be heard. In the L.A. Free Press, one man was 
suspicious of the “strange bedfellows” and “bitter factions” which had emerged. Why had organizers “made 
overtures to business people and landlords”? By “playing the game of big city politics,” he mused, “the 
urban village of West Hollywood” might “never be the same.”4 Dana Cuff reminded urban historians that, 
for everything built, something is destroyed.5 Like most good stories, there was more to the creation of 
West Hollywood than met the eye. Scholars have mostly promulgated celebratory narratives. Queers needed 
this “city of their own,” a “sort of gay Israel,” some argued.6 Urban independence was arguably a natural 
outgrowth of gay liberation. Moreover, there were clear economic incentives to incorporate. Proposition 13 
weakened the county and curtailed opportunities for activists. Worse yet, conservatives wrestled control of 
the Board from liberals in 1980. Metropolitan planning was now controlled by a less-than-friendly political 
body. Queers understandably sought to resist these transformations, but how they did so mattered. Placed 
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alongside the long history of queer activism, cityhood was a bold reimaging. In the 1970s queers gained 
metropolitan political power through the county. They joined existing social movements and carried the 
War on Poverty forward in queer directions. This strategy became unhinged as the political geography of 
gay liberation shifted to narrower boundaries.  
 
The Conservative Takeover of L.A. County   
 The relationship between queers and the county was unique. Elsewhere in the nation, activists 
established ties to city councils, which resulted in protective ordinances and political alliances.7 In L.A., 
queers broke through first at the county level. Many rightly viewed it as the most stable and supportive 
political outlet, but that changed dramatically in 1980. While Edelman remained a staunch ally, an 
unexpected political restructuring imposed new limits. When conservatives won control of the Board, 
liberal gains were threatened. The fates of a countywide gay rights ordinance, the West Hollywood 
Community Plan (WHCP), rent control, and AIDS activism became controlled by the New Right. This 
encouraged many to doubt metropolitan political frameworks. 
 Some were already questioning their liberal allegiance. The 1980 Presidential Election was 
especially divisive. In a lengthy letter to Carter, one man reminded the President that supporting him in the 
1976 primary was difficult. Although Governor Brown was popular, Angelenos had “led the fight for 
securing gay votes for Carter.” They did so, he assured, because of “your promise that you would issue an 
Executive Order extending the Civil Rights act to cover Gay men and women.” While “it is now politically 
difficult for you,” he implored Carter to “present a Profile in Courage, and issue it as you promised!”8 This 
anger was misguided. In the first place, the President lacked the authority to amend the Civil Rights Act; 
only Congress could do that. Secondly, Carter had never promised to issue an executive order. Lesbians 
associated with the the Los Angeles Wages for Housework Committee assailed Carter from another front. 
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Welfare provided the “power to leave marriages and jobs,” which were “silent nightmares” for many 
lesbians, and the “independence [to] get out from under the man to start getting what we want for a change.” 
Rather than cut, Carter ought to increase welfare spending. “Use federal funds for gay rights!” they 
implored.9 By the time he ran for reelection, many feminists had indeed broken with Carter.10 As the 
economy worsened amid stagflation, moreover, Carter cast himself as a fiscal conservative and recklessly 
searched for balanced budgets.11 But, in actuality, Carter’s first term saw welfare gains. He authorized an 
expansion of CETA and HUD permitted queers access to housing subsidies. The White House Conference 
on American Families endorsed a majority of the issues these lesbians demanded. Still, they were 
unsatisfied by quiet progress. When Senator Edward Kennedy challenged Carter for the nomination, many 
jumped ship.12 When Kennedy failed to overtake Carter, however, most returned to the President. But not 
all. One SDC leader resigned, admitting that he was “not a suitable person to be doing heavy Club work at 
this time because my own feelings about the direction of our Party are not good.”13 To the surprise of many 
Angelenos, national events were overshadowed in 1980 by a local political earthquake.   
The unexpected conservative takeover of the County Board of Supervisors occurred as activists 
and Edelman worked to secure a countywide gay rights ordinance. While the city passed an ordinance in 
1979, activists placed greater importance on county action since “the population of L.A. County comprises 
over 7 million people (one third of the total population in California).”14 Most importantly, a county 
ordinance would include unincorporated areas like West Hollywood, which were untouched by city 
ordinances. One Gay Community Services Center (GCSC) representative reported that “gay women and 
men [were] routinely and systematically discriminated against in the County” and lobbied for protection. 
                                                          
9 “Coming Out Against Carter,” The Welfare Penny Press, October 1977. EDE, box 909. Folder 10. 
10 Susan Hartmann, “Feminism, Public Policy, and the Carter Administration,” in Gary Fink & Hugh Graham (eds.) 
The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 
225. 
11 Timothy Stanley, “Going Beyond the New Deal: Socialists and the Democratic Party in the 1970s” in Stanley and 
Jonathan Bell (eds.), Making Sense of American Liberalism (University Of Illinois Press, Urbana: 2012), 72. 
12 Stonewall Democratic Club announcement, 9 May 1980. SDC, box 2, folder 3. 
13 Letter, 10 July 1980. SDC, box 2, folder 3. 
14 Letter to Ed Edelman, 19 July 1979. EDE, box 249, folder 10. 
187 
 
Believing it “now an appropriate time,” queers encouraged Edelman to introduce an ordinance banning 
discrimination “on the basis of ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘marital status.’” This “policy would have a 
beneficial effect on all single persons, separated or divorced individuals, widows, and co-habitors.”15 The 
slow process, however, frustrated activists. One man implored Edelman to move fast. The passage of the 
city ordinance, combined with the “overwhelming defeat of the anti-gay Proposition 6,” indicated that the 
majority favored “basic human rights to all gay and lesbian citizens of Los Angeles County.”16 But Edelman 
struggled to secure the three needed votes. “The best way of ensuring passage,” he advised, would be “to 
have the votes lined up in advance.” Once introduced, the ordinance would “become an attractive target for 
the Gay-baiters.”17 The source of the delay was Supervisor Kenneth Hahn, “a mainstream Democrat” who 
was weary of gay rights.18 Newly-appointed Supervisor Yvonne Burke was a different story.  
Her arrival was unexpected. When moderate Republican James Hayes announced his abrupt 
resignation, Governor Jerry Brown appointed Burke, a rising political star who had been elected to Congress 
and served as a University of California Regent. “I grew up poor in the ghettoes of Los Angeles,” Burke 
told reporters. “I wear it as a badge of great pride.” An outspoken liberal, she celebrated her female and 
black identities and believed the county should do more to promote diversity and social welfare. She 
believed the limits of Proposition 13 could be overcome, but Burke was selected to represent a district that 
clashed with her priorities. The Fourth District included Malibu and was, according to the Los Angeles 
Times, “predominantly white” and “politically conservative.” 19  Her presence offered a unique opportunity, 
and gay activists swiftly won her support.20 Still, Hahn worried about “possible negative fallout” from a 
countywide ordinance.21 Activists hoped “a call from [Edelman] would be ‘very effective’” in changing his 
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mind.22 As lobbying continued, popular support for the ordinance grew. Lawyers for Human Rights, a well-
respected non-profit organization, offered a strong endorsement. “I doubt if there is one attorney in our 
organization,” a representative wrote, “who has not seen cases of discrimination in housing, immigration, 
employment-the list is endless.”23 Constituents also encouraged action. “Support a County Gay Rights 
Ordinance NOW, not later,” one man wrote.24 Another charged that “total support of gay rights” was 
impossible without “a COUNTY ordinance.”25 “It’s long overdue for us,” a woman from West Hollywood 
opined.26 After several meetings, Edelman believed Hahn was ready and drafted the ordinance.27 At the last 
moment, however, Hahn sent mixed signals, resulting in “a strategy night session with some 10 MECLA 
and ACLU representatives.” All pressured Hahn while Edelman reached out to conservative Supervisor 
Pete Schabarum. An unlikely supporter, Edelman was willing to play all cards.28 In the midst of their efforts, 
Edelman and activists were not blindsided by conservative victories that November. 
Coinciding with the Presidential Election, supervisorial races became unusually competitive in 
1980. Schabarum, long the sole conservative on the Board, correctly believed a takeover possible and 
targeted Burke and Baxter Ward. Republican Michael Antonovich was recruited to take on the latter. He 
ran in opposition to Détente and demanded the nation’s withdrawal from the United Nations. No fans of 
Ward, Edelman and Hahn focused on protecting Burke. Initially she seemed safe: in December of 1979 she 
had “no opposition in sight” and had “impressed groups with her grasp of local concerns.” As a token of 
moderation, she even permitted a Hayes-appointed regional coast commissioner to remain on the job despite 
his “pro-developer” views.29 Her luck changed when Schabarum convinced Deane Dana, a George 
Deukmejian staffer, to enter the race. Schabarum openly longed to “take the Board in a more conservative 
direction” and motivated development interests to rally behind Republican challengers. Dana also relied on 
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race-baiting. In the predominantly white Fourth District, he “blasted [Burke] as a supporter of forced 
busing,” a charge that lacked accuracy and relevancy. On Election Day, Ward was declared a loser as soon 
the polls closed. While he “blamed Schabarum,” the Los Angeles Times noted he had “made enemies among 
his colleagues.” Burke’s race was much closer. At her campaign headquarters aboard the Queen Mary in 
Long Beach, she worried that President Carter’s early concession speech “discouraged many Democrats 
from going to the polls.” In the end she fell short by less than 8,000 votes. Schabarum celebrated the 
“smashing conservative triumph.” Antonovich believed the returns signaled a “rejection of liberalism.”30 
For Edelman, the strategy of “finding one vote” suddenly became a quest for “two or three votes.”31 In the 
immediate aftermath the countywide ordinance was doomed. 
 As that became clear, homophobic attitudes of the new Board were also revealed. Antonivich had 
supported Proposition 6 while Dana voiced a clear distaste for “special gay rights.” They were both lost 
causes. Schabarum ironically became the moderate Republican. Edelman tried to lobby him through a 
“Republican ‘Log Cabin’ Club” and considered “rewriting the ordinance so as not to emphasize sexual 
preference but rather human rights.”32 Assuming Hahn voted yes, Schabarum’s conversion might be the 
“key vote.”33 While Edelman gave “it a good shot,” Schabarum was “a ‘NO.’”34 Worse yet, after months 
of waffling, Hahn stunned all when he indicated that was “a definite NO” as well.35 To activists, the county 
suddenly appeared hostile. At one gathering, an aide reported to Edelman, “there [were] elements of the 
gay community who question not only your judgment but also credibility in supporting you.”36 
Disillusionment continued as activists faced setbacks in urban planning, rent control, and the battle against 
AIDS.   
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Ungovernable Space: The Demise of the West Hollywood Community Plan  
 Planning decisions contributed greatly to the cityhood campaign. As an unincorporated area, West 
Hollywood lacked a clear development plan. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, it became a haven for renters 
(who sought cheap housing) and developers (who sought refuge from regulations). As a result, its urban 
identity was decidedly mixed. Edelman sought clarity and called for a coherent plan. Tenants, developers, 
and urban planners established a blueprint in the West Hollywood Community Plan (WHCP). While it 
sought urban identity, the WHCP revealed neighborhood divisions between renters, landlords, and 
developers. While Edelman portrayed himself as a mediator, behind-the-scenes he frustrated developers. If 
supported, the WHCP might have solved many planning issues which plagued West Hollywood. Instead, 
its failure exacerbated conflicts between renters and developers and stoked talks of separation.  
The WHCP stressed inclusivity and included diverse segments of the community.37 Renters and 
small-property owners worked alongside developers. The first public meeting was held at Plummer Park in 
1976, where Edelman bemoaned that West Hollywood had “been allowed to grow for so many years 
unguided.” The WHCP would monitor the future.38 To developers, his language seemed antagonistic. 
“Monitoring” surely implied regulations, the lack of which made West Hollywood appealing. Indeed, they 
took advantage of lax codes and zoning regulations which allowed “speculative developers” to construct 
“hastily built ‘dingbat’ apartments.”39 As the housing crisis worsened, developers exploited the situation. 
Proposition 13 provided relief to developers (including Howard Jarvis) by radically lowering tax burdens. 
As “more and more people competed for rental units,” moreover, owners “pushed rents to new heights.”40 
Low-income queers, seniors, immigrants, racial minorities, and others flocked to West Hollywood for 
relief. As it was, West Hollywood consisted of an unwieldy mixture of commercial and residential zones. 
The latter were fiercely contested by renters, homeowners, and developers. R-1 and R-2 zones limited 
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development to “one-family” and “two-family” residences and comprised 13% of West Hollywood space. 
R-3 zones, which permitted “moderately-sized apartments” and public housing projects, comprised 16%. 
“Great density” housing, or R-4 zones, outweighed both, and accounted for 71% of overall West Hollywood 
space.41 Their abundance made the area a development paradise.42 Furthermore, the R-4 category 
unnaturally collapsed homeless shelters, like the GCSC, with large-scale condominiums and hotels. 
The WHCP committee consisted of developers, but was outweighed by small-property owners, 
renters, and community activists. Its composition accurately represented the community, which was 
predominantly renter-based and low-income. Architects Margaret and Bud Siegel were recruited by 
Edelman for their “community activism” and “advocacy of affordable housing.” Norma Grody, the 
President of the Beverly Hills Young Democrats, was appointed because she was a “feminist” and “very 
sharp…in community outreach.” Betty Berzon, a West Hollywood “property owner,” was also a GCSC 
Board member and “very knowledgeable on gay sociological problems.” Troy Perry, founder of the 
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) and a West Hollywood renter, was appointed, as was Chris Cox, 
a 27-year-old gay renter who was “well informed on young gay persons’ problems” and an Edelman 
campaign supporter. Attorney, businessman, and developer Sheldon Andelson rounded out the committee.43 
While they worked alongside developers, progressive members heavily influenced the WHCP. The director 
of the Whip Poverty Program encouraged the committee to tackle “widespread condominium conversion 
projects.” These caused “displacement of renters and decreased housing opportunities for senior citizens, 
the handicapped, and low-income families.”44 By the late 1970s, in fact, condominium development was 
epidemic in L.A. County. From 1970 through 1979, over 366,000 units of housing were converted.45 The 
Los Angeles Times believed this “wave of the future” was “irreversible” and predicted that “within the next 
10 years, condominiums will dominate the Southland’s residential tracts just as the compact car has taken 
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over the region’s freeways.”46 In one two-month span, over forty applications for conversions were filed in 
West Hollywood, totaling over one thousand housing units.47 Neighborhood fliers demanded officials “Stop 
the Evictions!!!” which stemmed from these projects.48 Renters were not the only ones upset.  
Middle-class homeowners also resented conversion projects and some warned that the “suburban 
lifestyle” would be wiped out by condominiums.49 In their critiques, homeowners called upon privileged 
suburban fantasies, many of which never existed.50 Nonetheless, middle-class unhappiness abetted renter 
resistance. When the Norma Triangle area of West Hollywood was targeted for conversion, homeowners 
revolted. “Ours is a community of unique qualities!” one homeowner charged. “In many ways, it is like a 
small town-it simply does not lend itself well to expansion. Multiple dwellings, with their greatly increased 
density of population, could only be a detriment.”51 Another desperately wanted to “preserve the uniqueness 
of [West Hollywood].” He was “not interested in selling property” but “only in having [his] HOME remain 
in a nice area.” Multi-family units brought “concrete slab condominiums, increased crime, traffic, and 
congested living.”52 In October of 1979, renters and homeowners descended upon a Board of Supervisors 
demanding a conversion moratorium and “chased board members from the hearing room.” Edelman 
explained he was seeking votes for an ordinance, but renters insisted they could not wait. “Thousands of us 
will be evicted before the board acts,” an elderly man explained. One week later, Edelman introduced the 
ordinance.53 Protestors returned to assure its passage. When Schabarum moved to postpone the matter, they 
began shouting. “It is readily apparent,” he crowed, “that we have some professional agitators. I’m not 
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going to sit here and listen to outcries and disorderly conduct.” An elderly man shot back that Schabarum 
served “the most powerful lobby in California, the real estate and developers’ lobby.” Another decried that 
“supervisors should be put in jail” for inaction.54 At the next meeting, Edelman and Burke introduced a 
compromise halting evictions. Renters celebrated with shouts of “People Power!” but Edelman warned that 
it was only a temporary fix. “We stopped evictions,” he explained, “but we didn’t stop conversions.”55 To 
accomplish the latter, he borrowed a trick from the city. Earlier that year, officials mandated developers 
contribute $500 per each converted unit to assist displaced renters.56 Since “conversions create significant 
problems,” Edelman charged, developers owed renters something.57 This did not halt conversions, but 
curbed their speed. It also made conversion projects reliant on support of individual supervisors.  
By 1981 the WHCP was finalized. It offered protections to renters and incentives to developers. 
“West Hollywood was originally developed as a single family community,” the committee explained. 
However, “during the past thirty years it has been redeveloped [into] mixed neighborhoods.” Neighborhood 
expansion required affordability. Developers were required to “minimize displacement, ensure that units 
meet minimum standards, and promote the retention of rental units.” Financial incentives would be 
provided to “encourage an increased supply of affordable rental units.” Proposed “density bonuses” would 
be awarded to developers who constructed large-scale, affordable housing complexes which “provided for 
the needs of special groups, such as senior citizens, handicapped, and other socially marginalized 
individuals.”58 Historically significant buildings and neighborhoods would be protected, appeasing 
homeowners. Incentives were even offered to large-scale entities, including Playboy Enterprises, which 
relocated from Chicago to West Hollywood.59 Edelman and allies celebrated the “‘blueprint for 
development’” and it was praised as a community-based approach to planning.60 A County Regional 
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Planning employee argued that business and tenant interests were well-balanced. To an evenhanded 
observer, there was “nothing controversial” about the WHCP.61 Or was there?  
On the left, some felt that the plan did not do enough for renters. One disappointed activist argued 
that the WHCP offered “no proposals for concrete programs to insure housing; in fact, the plan merely 
urges the development and acquisition of housing, without providing specific plans.” He feared this would 
force “residents to become subject to bureaucratic entanglement.”62 The WHCP committee retorted that 
renters would receive subsidies, but could not fight the charge of bureaucratic entanglement. That would 
certainly be the case. Criticism from the left was overshadowed by louder grumbles on the right. Developers 
went along with the WHCP under the assumption that large-scale hotels would be permitted in R-4 zones, 
but planners classified these projects as commercial, and excluded them. This spoiled plans for the 
L’Ermitage North, a sister hotel of the Beverly Hills L’Ermitage. The company purchased land for the 
expansion and demanded that the definition of R-4 zones be changed. Edelman’s office refused. 
“Throughout the planning process,” he explained, “it has been the consistent position that hotels belong in 
commercial areas, not residential. Hotels attract strangers into a community. Other than those who stand to 
profit, not one person supports this.”63 If an exception were granted, the WHCP would seem to favor 
developers. On the other hand, if developers abandoned the plan, it might collapse. One committee member 
urged L’Ermitage to “join civic-minded citizens” and “learn to accept the sometimes discouraging realities 
of County-wide politics.”64 No exception was given. Stymied, the hotel requested that land be rezoned and 
took their case to conservative supervisors. When the WHCP came up for final approval, they attacked. 
After “two hours of intense discussion,” Edelman called for a vote, but no one seconded the motion. After 
speaking to Antonivich in recess, Edelman was assured a vote. When it came, Schabarum was the first 
called upon. He abstained, at which point an angry Edelman “chided him, reminding him of his criticism 
of former supervisor Yvonne Burke’s abstentions.” The testy Schabarum sniped back, “All right. Then I’ll 
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vote no.” Of the remaining votes, Dana abstained and Antonivich supported, leaving the measure one vote 
short. Observers noted that Edelman was “obviously angry,” but “vowed not to give up.” Asked to justify 
their votes, Schabarum and Dana “criticized the plan because of the restrictions it placed on the L’Ermitage 
hotel project and similar proposed developments.” WHCP committee member Joyce Hundal called the 
defeat “outrageous” and criticized the “excessive testimony” from developers.65  
The defeat was another embarrassing setback. Once again the County failed to satisfy community 
demands, disillusioning supporters. After all, the WHCP was a moderate plan to curb dangerous growth. 
Larry Gross, leader of the Coalition for Economic Survival (CES) warned that “if the [housing] crisis is not 
dealt with properly, people will have to sleep in tents. Our elected officials have to stop looking at housing 
as a business and start regarding it as a necessity.”66 Implicit in his warning was a lack of confidence in 
county government. Loyalty eroded further when conservatives eliminated countywide rent control in 1983. 
 
The Rise and Fall of Rent Control in L.A. County 
 In addition to condominium conversions, low-income renters fought against unscrupulous gouging 
in West Hollywood. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s they mobilized for relief. As in the past, queers joined 
a mosaic. Racial minorities, senior citizens, single women, the disabled, and immigrants all advocated for 
rent control. This coalition successfully lobbied for countywide rent control, an important but fragile prize. 
Subject to reauthorizations, it fell victim to the new conservative majority. Its loss strengthened distrust in 
the county and triggered incorporation.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, renters were a growing political constituency and organized to protect their 
homes amidst a discourse of property rights that disparaged them.67 Tenants’ rights movements emerged 
throughout the United States, especially in Southern California, where affordable housing was fast 
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becoming an oxymoron. As Michael Stewart Foley observed, “by the 1970s, the independent ‘mom and 
pop’ landlord had given way to absentee professional landlords who bought apartment buildings as tax 
shelters.” Rent struggles in L.A. and Santa Monica produced dedicated activists.68 Like many 
neighborhoods, rents rose steadily in West Hollywood after Proposition 13. This came as a shock to those 
who believed that tax savings would enable landlords to lower rents. This trickle-down promise never came 
to pass. Mayor Bradley’s office was flooded with “calls regarding rent increases” after Proposition 13.69 
Despite conservative promises, the Tax Revolt further eroded housing affordability. The problem was so 
severe that Howard Jarvis joined Governor Jerry Brown at a press conference to “implore landlords to pass 
on some of the Prop 13 windfall.”70 Located between Santa Monica and West Hollywood, the Westside 
Fair Housing Council mobilized renters for action.71 So did Santa Monicans for Renters’ Rights and the 
Jane Fonda- and Tom Hayden-backed CES.  
Activists attempted to secure rent control in 1978 through Proposition P, which appeared on the 
same ballot as Proposition 13. The rent control measure drew widespread criticism from landlords, who 
claimed it would “disrupt the free market, pit tenants against landlords, and [reduce] available housing.”72 
The results of the Tax Revolt, however, weakened this argument. In 1979 renters lobbied for Proposition 
A, which would “establish a rent control board elected by voters and ban the demolition of rental units for 
[condominium] conversions.” Activists registered renters and held public forums for the measure. 
Consumer-activist Ralph Nader offered his support, and urged the predominantly renter-based community 
of Santa Monica to “vote its interests.” A victory, he hoped, would “remove the stigmas applied to rent 
control by landlord propaganda.”73 Opponents, including the Apartment Owners Association (AOA), 
worked feverishly against Proposition A and outspent tenant groups “$217,257 to $38,443.” They warned 
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that rent control would result in “abandoned buildings” full of “rapists, muggers, robbers, and murderers.”74 
These tactics failed and the measure carried by eight points.75 It was a first round victory in a metropolitan 
struggle. That same year L.A. authorized moderate rent control. West Hollywood was the next target.  
Many migrated to West Hollywood in search of low-cost housing and fiercely resisted rent gouging. 
One man complained that he was “being ‘RIPPED OFF’ again and again by the Apartment house Owners 
Association [sic].” Some were “being forced to live in unfit hovels-often three or four in one very small 
apartment” which was “not a pleasant or healthy thing.” He pointed out that, since “the Apartmenthouse 
Owners have a very strong, well paid lobby,” renters “depend on our elected representatives to see that we 
are protected.”76 By the end of 1978, Edelman’s office received an avalanche of complaints about gouging. 
In one month alone, over 900 cases were reported.77 The egregious assault prompted action. In addressing 
his fellow supervisors, Edelman warned that the situation was “a threat to the general public…In my own 
District, West Hollywood has reached a crisis.”78 The situation was serious enough to convince moderate 
Republican James Hayes to support the measure, so long as it was limited to unincorporated areas.79 The 
measure authorized a short-term rollback to be reassessed every six months and limited future increases to 
7.5%.80 Additionally, it included a clause prohibiting “evictions except for good cause,” which provided 
tenant protections.81 The breakthrough identified Edelman with rent control and he became a regular guest 
on Newt Dieter’s Southern California Issues radio show, where he discussed the subject.82 Rent control 
often overlapped with gay rights. In 1981, the National Gay Archives hosted a forum on rent control that 
                                                          
74 Foley, Front Porch Politics, 249. 
75 “Pro-Tenant Group Sweeps Santa Monica Rent Election,” Los Angeles Times, 28 June 1979, 2.  
76 Letter Ed Edelman, 12 December 1975. EDE, box 331, folder 6. 
77 Constituent complaints regarding rent increases, June-July, 1978. EDE, Box 821-826. 
78 Rent Control motion by Ed Edelman, 1978. EDE, box 331, folder 2. 
79 “Rent Rollback Proposed for West Hollywood,” Los Angeles Times, 18 October 1978, D1. 
80 Rent Control motion by Ed Edelman, 1978. EDE, box 331, folder 2. 
81 “County Rent-Freeze Plan Turned Down,” Los Angeles Times, 7 March 1979, 28; “Board Votes 3-1 for Rent 
Control,” Los Angeles Times, 6 June 1979, 12. 
82 Aide to Ed Edelman, 20 November 1979. EDE, box 250, folder 5. 
198 
 
was opened by Edelman.83 “Keep up the good work!” one renter wrote to him. “There are old people eating 
cat and dog food in West Hollywood to pay these gouging landlords.”84  
Even some landlords welcomed rent control. One apartment owner congratulated Edelman for 
“rising to the occasion.” He suspected his views came from “the Jewish drive to aid the unfortunate.” As 
he explained, Proposition 13 had made him a very rich man. The tax rate on his four-bedroom unit decreased 
from $3,800 to $1,600 and was falling still. “Sure, I can raise hell on the rentals,” he mused, “but in good 
conscience how can I?” After all, “Jarvis had to appeal to the tenant so as to secure the passage of 
[Proposition] 13…The minute 13 passed, the landlords [declared] ‘We must have rent raises.’” Rent control 
forced landlords to locate their consciences. “The trouble is with the landlords [who] are not satisfied with 
the windfall [and] want more and more,” he complained.85 This was a minority opinion. Southern California 
had a long history of development lobbyism. In the 1950s the Californian Real Estate Association (CREA) 
united with anticommunists in a successful campaign against public housing.86 In 1978 CREA boosted 
Proposition 13 alongside the AOA. Both came out in force against rent control, especially in unincorporated 
areas. A real estate broker and landlord was “absolutely opposed to the project of rent restriction” and 
argued that “Los Angeles [was] loosing [sic] population” because of it. With “several apartments vacant,” 
she did not “see a dangerous ‘crunch’ in the near futur [sic].” While it was “true that rents have been rising,” 
she claimed that they had not risen in “proportion [with] property tax, insurance premiums, and labor 
costs.”87 Some landlords punished tenants for rent control. “Due to supervisor Ed Edelman,” one 
announced, “I am raising all rent to fair market value.” He admitted that this was a calculated act of political 
revenge. “I am sorry Edelman and the other members of the county board don’t think property owners are 
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capable of managing their own business.” While the increase would “mean a hardship,” he could not “sit 
still and alowe [sic] myself to be backed into a corner.” He sent a copy of this notice to Edelman.88  
While the supervisor often strove for balance, he held no love for large developers, who harmed 
the “physical evolution of the city.”89 When he failed to support landlords, CREA and AOA activists took 
their case to voters. Conservatives had long utilized propositions to secure inequitable housing patterns.90 
Relying on a language of “privacy,” “freedom of choice,” and “property rights,” they rolled back 
progressive gains at the ballot box. In 1964, Proposition 14 nullified the Rumford Fair Housing Act, which 
outlawed racial discrimination in housing. Similarly, Proposition 13 masked itself in populist language to 
appeal to middle-class homeowners. This strategy stalled when conservatives badly miscalculated with 
Proposition 10, a measure which would have restricted the county’s authority to impose rent control. The 
AOA-backed Californians for Fair Rents (CFR) aimed to intentionally deceive, but renters were not so 
gullible. They had, after all, been dealt a bad hand with Proposition 13. In an editorial, KNX radio station 
admitted that it was “no fan of rent control” but was “even less fond of deceit.” In actuality, CFR was “a 
group of landlords who oppose rent control. Californians for Higher Rents is more like it.”91 Others piled 
on, including the Los Angeles Times, which attacked a CFR ad featuring a low-income, disabled, elderly 
renter in favor of Proposition 10.92 “Have you heard both sides of the Proposition 10 issue?” one renter 
asked in the Times. “Who do you believe? The landlords, real estate interests, mortgage bankers, and 
developers? Or the coalition of citizens for renters rights?” He blasted the “manipulation of the public in a 
slick and expensive media campaign” and urged “people to look past the media blitz.”93 Actors Jack 
Lemmon and Peter Fonda came out strongly against CFR. In one ad, Lemmon argued that “Yes on 10 ads 
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are being paid for by big landlords and real estate speculators. They want yes votes so they can make more 
money.” In another, Fonda told voters: “You know what, it’s a big fraud.”94   
In West Hollywood the SDC registered voters and held public forums on the measure. As the vote 
neared, progressives earned a plethora of endorsements against Proposition 10. Governors Edmond (Pat) 
and Jerry Brown, Mayor Tom Bradley, State Senator David Roberti, and organizers Cezar Chavez and 
Dolores Huerta condemned the measure. Media outlets, including the Los Angeles Times, Herald Examiner, 
KABC, KNX, KFWB, and the Santa Ana Register opposed it as well. One activist bragged that “a variety 
of Minority, Women’s, [and] Gay community organizations are with us. Our labor support is also very 
strong.”95 In a letter to the Los Angeles Times, one woman wrote that she had “finally gotten mad.” The 
“so-called ‘Fair Rent Initiative,’ which Howard Jarvis and the landlords are attempting to pass off as a ‘rent 
control’” had ground her gears. “I don’t like being lied to,” she wrote. To her delight, she discovered that 
she “could fight back, influence others, and make an impact on the electoral process. No longer will I fume 
in silence.” Channeling the populist rage behind Proposition 13, she sent “a message [to] Howard Jarvis 
and Co.: I’m mad as hell, and I’m not going to take it anymore!”96 Voters routed Proposition 10 at the polls. 
Despite a “huge war chest,” developers could not deceive.97 A celebratory renter declared the victory “an 
indication of the growing political clout of the tenant’s movement.”98 The fate of Proposition 10 supports 
scholarly reassessments of the late 1970s: far from dead, progressives fought and sometimes won.99 
Unfortunately for renters in L.A. County, CREA and AOA activists were not done fighting.  
 Five months after Proposition 10 failed, the County Board of Supervisors shifted sharply to the 
right. While they could not fight rent control effectively in Santa Monica or Los Angeles, CREA and AOA 
sensed opportunity at the county levell. As they had with public housing, landlords characterized rent 
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control as un-American and socialistic. Apartment Industry Digest newsletter President and landlord Daniel 
C. Faller urged property owners to “join the revolution against an economic system of redistributing 
wealth.” The “activists behind the rent control movement are nothing but Socialists parading under the 
fancy title of ‘Economic Democracy.’” He advised transforming rent control into an issue of free market 
democracy, an old but reliable trick. Organizers encouraged landlords to support “only those who believe 
in our current form of government” and back “AMERICAN officials” with “our money and time.” They 
took aim at “the liberal ‘welfare-crazy’ politicians who like to vote away the rights and money of others.” 
Along with California Attorney General George Deukmejian, Supervisors Antonivich, Dana, and 
Schabarum lambasted the “government poking its nose into areas it does not belong.”100 At private 
meetings, landlords assaulted renters in ghastly ways. “Once upon a time,” a pamphlet explained, “there 
were three happy and independent hogs.” They slowly became “conditioned” to “only eat in certain fields” 
and were eventually trapped as they gorged. Lest the point be missed, this was “a story of SOCIALISM, 
COMMUNISM, and RENT CONTROL.” Renters were “FAT, LAZY, [and] DEPENDENT”; they went 
“around trying to extract as many freebies as possible.” The AOA took special aim at Edelman, who “feels 
it is his duty to make these people as comfortable as possible. Go right ahead, Mr. Edelman!” they wailed,” 
but do it with your own paycheck and get your cotton picken [sic] hands out of the pockets of HARD 
WORKING AMERICANS.” Even elderly renters felt the assault. “Good parents,” the AOA suggested, 
“worked and contributed until they [were] into their eighties.” In truth, “many of these fixed income seniors 
who beg for more welfare, could, instead, go back to work.”101 The AOA recast rent control as an issue of 
“makers” versus “takers,” which overlooked both the working-class background of rent control and the use 
of state subsidies by developers.  
Religious arguments were also deployed. At one AOA meeting, a landlord declared that “the Bible 
states ‘IF ANY WOULD NOT WORK, NEITHER SHALL HE EAT’!” Why, he wondered, “should 
Housing Providers be coerced into giving these free loaders a $400.00 apartment for only $200.00?” Rent 
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control (like public housing) “justified a socialistic economic system,” and abetted godless communism. Or 
was it fascism? The AOA predicted a return to “the Nazi economic philosophy: ‘THE 
COMMONWEALTH RANKS ABOVE PRIVATE PROPERTY’” and exploited Jane Fonda’s 
involvement in the rent control movement. Steve Ross argued that she was a special target for 
conservatives.102 Sure enough, the AOA blasted “Hanoi Jane” and proclaimed that “The [Tom] Hayden-
Fonda-Santa Monica brand of ‘Socialism’ did not work for Hitler, is not working in Poland, and will never 
work in the U.S.A.!” Landlords often portrayed themselves as working-class heroes. Apartment ownership 
in L.A. was “a ‘Mom and Pop’ business that supplied housing” for the majority. Rent control would 
“destroy the heart of the American dream-the right to truly own property.” The histrionics were too much 
for some. One landlord sent AOA literature (including the “hog fairytale”) to Edelman. “This is being 
passed out to landlords in West Hollywood,” he warned.103 Dissent was the exception, not the rule. Red-
baiting, antistatism, and religion, concocted a bitter anti-rent control stew.  
As renewal of the ordinance neared, one landlord accused queers of abusing rent control. “As an 
owner” he was “most strongly opposed to any form of rent control,” but was “sensitive to the needs of the 
elderly and poor.” The “younger working people-some of whom are degenerates,” however, demanded 
“free rides.”104 Queers fought these accusations. One man implored Edelman to “do everything [could]” to 
save his home.105 Others organized a forum at the National Gay Archives on Hudson Avenue featuring 
speeches and testimonials from renters.106 An elderly woman from another unincorporated area asked 
Edelman to sway her supervisor “to go along” with rent control.107 After the 1980 takeover, Schabarum 
became Edelman’s targeted third vote. “He figured he had Kenny Hahn's vote,” an aide remembered, “but 
he had to find a third. He tried to be strategic about it.”108 Edelman played tennis regularly with Schabarum, 
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and got to know him on a personal level. In 1981, he convinced him to reauthorize rent control and hoped 
to do so again. In May of 1983, however, Schabarum switched sides. Instead of rent control, the county 
ought to fund an AOA study on rental housing he suggested. “That’s not worth a hill of beans,” Edelman 
shot back. Larry Gross promised to “fight on the ballot, in the courts, wherever we need to.”109 Another 
man warned that, without rent control, West Hollywood might be annexed to L.A.110 One lesbian expressed 
her “gratitude and thanks” for Edelman’s efforts, but warned that “the DISASTER OF MAY 3, 1983 could 
not have come at a worse time.”111 Another constituent was “appalled and dismayed by [Edelman’s] feeble 
and defeatist approach.” As a supervisor, “you should have been better armed. You should know where the 
‘skeletons are hidden.’ You are the politician-you should know how to ‘wheel and deal’-that’s why you 
were elected.”112 Edelman did his best to explain: “Organized opposition” to rent control was “large and 
influential,” he wrote back. “As a result, ‘behind-the-scenes’ negotiations are not always successful.”113  
Renters were not in a patient mood, and rallied behind a badly miscalculated CES ballot initiative 
called Proposition M, which would have restored rent control by voter fiat. Unlike Proposition 10, which 
was put to a statewide vote, Proposition M was a county initiative. Moreover, only residents of 
unincorporated areas were eligible to vote. While West Hollywood was large, it was outweighed by 
predominantly middle-class unincorporated neighborhoods like Calabassas, El Monte, Hacienda Heights, 
Inglewood, Montebello and Newhall. The CES thus inadvertently constructed a voting constituency 
unsympathetic to rent control. They were also badly outmaneuvered by the AOA. At one meeting, 
developers and landlords displayed “an almost evangelical” fervor against Proposition M. One woman 
pledged $10,000 to defeat it and hoped to “dance on the grave of rent control.” Many slammed West 
Hollywood’s “heavy populations of the elderly and gays” who drove the “radical agenda.” Some viewed 
Proposition M as the most radical rent control initiative yet. Limiting annual increases to 4%, the measure 
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improved on the city’s 7% cap, and Santa Monica’s 4.5% limit.114 The AOA devoted significant resources 
to defeat it while supporters of Proposition M relied on donations averaging $10.  
As the campaign unfolded, conservatives framed apartment owners as working-class families and 
victims. An owner of several properties in West Hollywood and Beverly Hills complained that “since the 
invention of rent control, real estate capital has left [West Hollywood]” resulting in less choice for tenants. 
“Why should property owners be singled out and punished?” he asked. “Who will be the next victim of 
government control?”115 Some resorted to race-baiting and targeted minorities in an effort to siphon away 
votes. In the heavily African American areas of Florence and Willowbrook, the AOA flooded residents 
with mailers. Predicting “neighborhood deterioration” and a rise in crime if the measure passed, activists 
encouraged black voters to “avoid another Watts.” The AOA recruited an African American landlord to 
make the pitch. He framed Proposition M as a threat to the black middle-class. “Don’t pass this thing,” he 
warned, “it will kill me!” In East L.A., leaflets warned that Latino families would face evictions since 
Proposition M would “make it difficult to allow extended family members” to live in the same unit. These 
were effective appeals. Predominantly black Willowbrook voted 70-30% against Proposition M; East L.A. 
voters turned down the measure 65-35%.116 In predominantly suburban areas, Proposition M didn’t have a 
chance. The AOA warned that “rent control creates slums, stops new construction, and costs too much 
money.” It was a “giveaway” that homeowners would pay for. The AOA was not “educating the electorate,” 
one renter charged. It was “buying an election.”117  
For many the collapse of rent control was disastrous. Gouging threatened low-income renters in 
West Hollywood. The vast majority of GCSC and SDC activists were renters who faced the possibility of 
being squeezed out of their neighborhoods. Some landlords could be especially cruel. When one man found 
himself in a heated battle with his landlord, he was informed that his “attitude will determine [his] rent. 
That’s one good thing about being a property owner, I set the price.” Apparently he didn’t like the tenant’s 
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attitude: his rent was raised 40%, from $372 to $515. Believing that the increase was “excessive, especially 
in view of the fact that I am furnishing my own stove and refrigerator, living with a single kitchen sink 
without a garbage disposal, and have an investment in the carpeting which is depreciating annually,” he 
appealed for relief. But his landlord would have none of it. “After reading the tone of your letter,” he wrote, 
“I’ve decided to take my apartment to market price. The rent will be increased by one hundred dollars a 
month, which means $515 to $615…To show you that I mean business,” he threatened, “if I do not see 
cooperation you will force me to have you look for another apartment.” The powerless tenant appealed to 
Edelman and California State Senator David Roberti. His experience was “a prime example of the rent 
gouging going on by greedy landlords.” He had “contacted innumerable agencies regarding this matter,” 
but “the general consensus is that I, as a tenant, have no rights…Is there no equitable treatment for apartment 
dwellers?” he asked.118 His experience spoke to the desperation of many.  
The demise of rent control was a powerful trigger for incorporation. Like with the WHCP, the 
county attempted to intervene in the urban transformations which were making West Hollywood 
unaffordable. Yet again, the county proved incapable of coming to the rescue. Things could hardly get 
worse, but then they did. The AIDS crisis, and the county’s perceived responses to it, was the final straw.  
 
“We Used to Be Friends”: AIDS and Queer Antistatism  
 Some narratives of West Hollywood incorporation overlook the importance of AIDS. Activist 
Steve Martin remembered that “AIDS hit with full force” only after incorporation. It “cut a swath of death 
through the community,” he explained, which caused “the euphoria of cityhood…to be fleeting.”119 Lillian 
Faderman and Stuart Timmons similarly separate AIDS from the story. Once queers founded a “city of 
[their] own,” AIDS “hit like a bomb” and devastated the community.120 In fact, the politics of AIDS 
impacted incorporation considerably. Activists and scholars have perpetuated antistatist AIDS narratives. 
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Randy Shilts’ powerful tome, And the Band Played On, established an enduring example. Writing as he 
suffered from AIDS-related complications, Shilts blasted the state for silence and inaction.121 Phil Tiemeyer 
found that Shilts twisted facts and in the process supported conservative attempts to blame queers for the 
disease.122 Moreover, Jennifer Brier found his antistatist narrative inaccurate. At the highest levels of 
government, the crisis was not ignored. On the contrary, it produced “fissures within the conservative 
movement” as Reagan Republicans debated sexuality.123 In L.A. County the state was certainly not silent 
on AIDS either. Queer activists worked alongside liberal allies to fight the disease. Despite fiscal 
constraints, the county poured millions into these efforts. Still, an antistatist narrative emerged which 
encouraged queers to reject the county and seek urban independence.   
One aide recalled that Edelman moved quickly on AIDS, a response was almost “natural.” He “felt 
comfortable with the gay community” and was known as the “healthcare for the poor guy.” AIDS fused the 
issues. “He became a leader whether he wanted to or not, [but] I think he took that job without any 
hesitation.” He secured grants for USC and UCLA medical centers and became “the face of the county” 
during the fight.124 Indeed, it was UCLA medical researchers who “discovered” the disease.125 Edelman 
also established an AIDS outreach commission in 1983 which raised revenue and political support. Grants 
and discretionary spending allowed queers to fight AIDS at the grassroots. In addition to the GCSC, the 
AIDS Project of Los Angeles (APLA) held the front line. Announcing a $50,000 grant to APLA, Edelman 
commended activists for “facing the growing challenge” and pointed out that “many persons with AIDS 
need support” outside of healthcare.126 Funds were also secured through Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) grants. Despite the County’s weakened fiscal position, Edelman could allocate FEMA 
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funds with discretion. With one $75,000 grant, organizers were able to “establish an emergency shelter to 
house persons with AIDS” and provide “emergency lodging in a hotel,” “emergency rent assistance for 40 
persons,” and “emergency mortgage assistance for 15 persons.”127 The battle against AIDS, activists 
stressed, required “government relief [in order] to survive.”128 In the L. A. Free Press, APLA Director Bill 
Misenhimer “credited Supervisor Edelman for keeping the AIDS Project afloat. In the past year he has 
channeled funds, getting it ‘wherever he can.’”129 
The GCSC also fought against AIDS. In fact, the disease allowed Edelman to restore some funds 
which had been lost to Proposition 13. Although CETA and CDBG funds evaporated, emergency health 
and disaster monies became available. These were often “unrestricted” and could be used as activists saw 
fit to “assist persons with AIDS.” Funds were routed into healthcare, housing, employment, and social 
programs.130 When activists encountered bureaucratic obstacles, Edelman often intervened. On one 
occasion, Don Kilhefner applied for an emergency grant to open an “AIDS prevention clinic.” County 
officials rejected the request, arguing that “there [was] no such thing as AIDS prevention.” When Edelman 
became involved, that position was altered and the grant issued.131 In speeches before MECLA and the 
SDC, Edelman maintained that a “special relationship” existed between queers and county government. 
“Clearly, the tremendous cost of AIDS research is beyond the County’s means alone,” he explained. 
“However, the County can be heavily involved in education and provision of social services.” He 
highlighted the impressive sums of money which had flowed from his office to grassroots organizations. 
“Virtually all funds,” he boasted, “have been secured thorough Third District block grants.”132 He promised 
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that “if the rest of the Board of Supervisors can be influenced,” even “more County money will be 
awarded.”133 “Influencing” them to join the fight, however, was not easy. 
Supervisors Antonovich, Dana, and Schabarum often opposed intervention. Instead, they supported 
reactionary responses to AIDS, which were not hard to find. An editor for the Los Angeles Daily News 
supported a national plan (which was championed by conservative William F. Buckley) to quarantine 
queers and “curtail the spread of contamination.” The “national obsession with minority rights,” he wrote, 
needed to end.134 A writer in the Hollywood Independent concluded that “AIDS and tolerance” could not 
“exist together.” Like nothing else AIDS was “killing the possibility of tolerance…the freedom to be friends 
is gone.”135 This article appeared alongside a cartoon depicting a child boasting to his teacher “It wouldn’t 
be so bad having AIDS in school. At least you wouldn’t have to worry about being molested!”136 On the 
Board, Antonivich and Schabarum were strongly opposed to sex education, the same issue that engulfed 
the Reagan Administration.137 They took aim at L.A. Cares, an initiative launched by the APLA, the GCSC, 
and the local chapter of Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG). With the celebrity 
endorsement of Poltergeist actress Zelda Rubinsein, L.A. Cares encouraged queers to “play safely” and use 
condoms.138 Advertisements recast safe sex in clever and erotic ways. Conservatives charged that taxpayers 
were funding “pornography” and Antonovich demanded that money be returned. Edelman’s office shot 
back, accusing Antonovich of “focusing on a potential embarrassment rather than saving lives. Surely,” 
aides argued, “he can’t believe that anyone will actually become gay because of these brochures.”139 
Schabarum came to Antonovich’s defense and called for a “review of all county contracts with gay 
organizations.”140 Edelman pointed out that L.A. Cares “targeted a very narrow audience-promiscuous gay 
                                                          
133 Aide to Ed Edelman, 17 August 1984. EDE, box 250, folder 3. 
134 D.B. Wilson, “Health, Not Rights, is the AIDS Issue,” Los Angeles Daily News, 9 October 1985. EDE, box 248, 
folder 5. 
135 C. Marshner, “AIDS and Tolerance Together Can’t Exist,” Hollywood Independent, 2 October 1985. EDE, box 
248, folder 5. 
136 Hollywood Independent, 2 October 1985. EDE, box 248, folder 5. 
137 See Brier, Infectious Ideas.  
138 Heather Murray, Not in This Family: Gays and the Meaning of Kinship in Postwar North America (Philadelphia: 
The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 173-177. 
139 Aide to Ed Edelman, 22 August 1985. EDE, box 992, folder 4. 
140 “Anti-AIDS Forces Fire at Supervisors,” Los Angeles Times, 9 September 1985, B1. 
209 
 
men who are at high risk.” Since “County funds were not directly involved in its publication,” a review was 
unnecessary. This was slightly disingenuous. Since the GCSC and the APLA received “unrestricted” funds, 
they could utilize resources for L.A. Cares. But Edelman also fought back substantively. The 
advertisements were “not pornography,” he maintained, but were “intended to educate [by] depicting gay 
men having safe sex in an appealing way. There is redeeming social value here.”141 His argument won the 
day but the specter of homophobia haunted the Board.   
The Los Angeles Times reported that even “veteran Republican” and AIDS activist Bruce Decker 
could not abide conservative Supervisors. “I’ve worked hard privately to try and avoid this battle,” he 
confided, but Schabarum’s actions “bordered on criminal neglect.”142 In refusing to assist in the battle 
against AIDS, conservatives gave the Board a bad name. “The L.A. Supervisors are appalling, just 
appalling,” one woman observed. “They know nothing about health education. Nothing. It’s an 
embarrassment. You’ve got four bigots on the board.” The exception was Edelman, who represented “an 
oasis of liberal thinking.”143 Schabarum attacked this characterization. The Board of Supervisors did care 
about AIDS, he shot back, but it objected to wasteful spending and partisanship. “I am concerned,” he 
explained, “that AIDS is being moved into politics.” Unbecomingly, he attacked Mayor Bradley. “I will 
say on Tom Bradley’s behalf, he has done an outstanding job of running around town and having his picture 
taken with gay leaders. I also know that he has a City checkbook, but he isn’t spending money on AIDS.” 
The Mayor shouldn’t “call upon the County to spend more.”144 That was a cheap shot for two reasons. In 
the first place, the structure of government called upon the county to fund most health services. Moreover, 
the Mayor had provided economic resources. Joining forces with Edelman, he secured $600,000 for 
activists around the same time that Schabarum threw his tantrum.145 Conservatives despised spending in 
principle, and the crisis of AIDS required a commitment of resources that they resented.  
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When they were lampooned as bigots, conservatives pushed back. In 1985, Antonovich was 
mocked in the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner when an activist submitted an “open letter” purportedly 
written by the supervisor. It offered “a solution to the problem of AIDS” that required “homosexual men to 
start having sex with women, and homosexual women to have sex with men.” Queers ought to alter their 
behavior “in their own best interests, and in the interests of public health.” Once they realized “the extent 
of pain and suffering [and] precious tax dollars it can help save,” the solution was a no-brainer. The letter 
even offered dating advice. “For homosexual men, a good beginning would be smiling at a woman in a 
friendly, engaging way. One smile elicits another. Two smiles can lead to a conversation. A conversation 
can provoke a caress, even a kiss, and then in no time you could be experiencing the myriad delights that 
you’ve been missing.” The “vaccine [for AIDS],” he declared, “is heterosexuality.”146 County offices were 
swamped with letters and calls. Even an Edelman aide was duped. These “ignorant statements about gay 
men,” he charged, “fuel homophobia…Taking Antonovich’s position to its extreme, won’t it follow that 
high-risk gay men will pursue sexual relations with heterosexual women, a heretofore safe population? 
How absurd!”147 Antonovich was not amused. But in demanding an apology he announced his support for 
conversion therapy. “I think they can become straight or they can restrict themselves to a single partner,” 
he clarified. When this was published, the anonymous writer of the letter retorted, “What I wrote was a 
parody…Now that seems to be his actual belief!”148 Public conflicts cast dispersions on the Board which 
encouraged queer mistrust. 
As a result, the relationship between Edelman and activists was weakened. While many 
acknowledged his support (he was named Frontiers “Man of the Year” in 1985 and received a “Heart of 
Gold Award” from the AIDS Hospice Foundation in 1988), others took aim.149 At an AIDS Coalition to 
Unleash Power (ACT-UP) demonstration at USC, Edelman was apoplectic. “He was the only one who 
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went,” one aide recalled, “so they yelled at him. Instead of saying, ‘thank you for coming, we know you're 
on our side,’ he represented ‘The Man.’ He was on the County Board of Supervisors, and they weren’t 
doing enough.” The rage of activists was justified, but misdirected. After the event, Edelman expressed 
“frustration with the gay community.” Queers “were yelling at him, when they used to be his friends. He 
mostly understood them [but] wished they would be a little more appreciative and recognize his 
limitations.” A queer charge against Edelman during the AIDS crisis was his pragmatism. “Could he have 
been more effective, or more radical, or more something, to get more than he did being a quiet insider?” 
some asked.150 That’s a difficult hypothetical, but it is highly unlikely that conservatives would have 
responded to that approach.  
Throughout the AIDS crisis, county government was not idle. The state responded in meaningful, 
but insufficient ways. In the end AIDS proved to be a final breaking point for many queers, however. Their 
anger was understandable. AIDS stole friends, lovers, and families. The generation that was out to “change 
the world,” Jon Platania explained, were now “dead from AIDS.”151 The epidemic was a communal trauma 
and altered gay political strategies. “As a result of AIDS,” one observed, “a generation of leaders was wiped 
out.”152 Low-income queers, who held core leadership posts in queer organizations, were hit hardest.153 The 
loss of so many resulted in “a natural maturation process” that heightened desires of sovereignty. Alongside 
the other traumas which befell the county (Proposition 13, the failed gay rights ordinance, the conservative 
takeover of the Board of Supervisors, and the demise of rent control), AIDS nurtured mistrust of the state.  
 
The Contours of the Incorporation Campaign 
 As incorporation efforts began, the SDC was eclipsed by a new political force. The Southern 
California Harvey Milk Lesbian and Gay Democratic Club (SCHMC) took a leading role in West 
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Hollywood incorporation. While it was a Democratic club, the SCHMC associated more with the left. Its 
organizers established strong ties to the CES and utilized rent control to spark neighborhood activism. 
Strengthening bridges between diverse low-income communities, activists envisioned a sexually 
homogenous new city. This “gay city” spoke to elements within gay liberation, but also threatened long-
standing political relationships.   
In some ways the SCHMC was an improvement over the SDC. It was far more diverse in its 
membership. Founder Conrado Terrazas was active in the Chicano Freedom Movement and grew close to 
Cesar Chavez. He also cozied up to leftist celebrities, including Jane Fonda, who commended his ability 
“take the lead [in order] to make the impossible possible.”154 Holding a degree in Chicano Studies, he 
brought the lessons of the Farm Workers Movement to the SCHMC. The inaugural meeting was held at the 
Silver Lake El Conquistador restaurant and featured Cesar Chavez who spoke “on the topic of coalition 
building.”155 In 1982 organizers launched their first political fight over redistricting. The L.A. City Council 
was considering a new reapportionment map, and when the Thirteenth District was redrawn, organizers 
protested. Comprised of Hollywood and Silver Lake neighborhoods, the district had a high concentration 
of queers. Reapportionment threatened to split it in two and diffuse queer power. “Don’t Let Them Divide 
Us!” organizers argued. They promised to unveil their own reapportionment map which better served the 
interests of the community. In gerrymandering the district, they designed it “in order to be winnable by a 
qualified and open gay or lesbian or a candidate whose sympathies and actions are clearly in accord with 
the lesbian and gay community.”156 Here was an interesting question: what exactly did the “lesbian and gay 
community” stand for? The SCHMC did not adhere to any single political document as the SDC had. 
The challenge was a threat to Peggy Stevenson, who was not well-liked. Her steadfast resistance to 
the annual Gay Pride Parade annoyed activists. More importantly, Terrazas criticized “Stevenson’s 
lackluster support of rent control, a key issue for gays because many are renters.” This was a fair charge. A 
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moderate Democrat, she did not support Proposition M and established cozy relationships with developers. 
Yet when interviewed by the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, Terrazas played sexual, not economic, politics. 
He preferred “to see an ‘openly gay’ council member” in the seat, and hoped “keeping the city’s gay 
communities in the same district [would] make that achievable.”157 In the end, the SCHMC scored an 
impressive victory and kept the Thirteenth District together. Frontiers celebrated the “grassroots lobbying 
effort” and believed that queers would soon “elect a qualified and open member of our community.” The 
article in Frontiers was unintentionally revealing, however. Terrazas’s efforts were supported by a wide 
variety of interests and individuals. These included MECLA, the SDC, the Canyon Oaks Neighborhood 
Watch, the Los Feliz Improvement Association, the Hollywood Merchants Association, and Sheldon 
Andelson.158 What might Andelson and the Hollywood Merchants Association have in common with the 
SCHMC?159 Organizers followed up with a voter registration drive which would create “a strong grassroots 
political base” in West Hollywood. Perhaps directed at MECLA and the SDC, activists promised to do this 
“with only a fraction of the money other political organizations have.” Turning out the queer vote ensured 
that “our community participates fully in decisions that affect us.” Queers had been building coalitions 
since the 1960s, but the SCHMC signaled a less ideological strategy. Coalitions could be built around 
“issues of joint concern, including” the election of openly gay candidates.160 What if that candidate opposed 
rent control? 
Relations between Edelman and the SCHMC were tense. Aides characterized the “relatively new 
Club” as “competition with the Stonewall Democratic Club, the more old-line activist organization.”161 
When Terrazas invited the supervisor to a rent control rally in Plummer Park, he was suspicious. His orbit 
consisted of the SDC, the GCSC, and MECLA, but an aide warned that the SCHMC would “soon eclipse 
Stonewall in activity.”162 At the rally, Edelman was confronted. “We are a grass roots club,” they explained, 
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“concerned with rent control…You need to address this topic of vital concern to our community.”163 In 
response the supervisor gave a speech on affordable housing and promised to continue fighting. When 
activists asked him for his thoughts on West Hollywood incorporation, he dodged the issue.164 While they 
appreciated Edelman’s “firm support of rent control,” they pointed to his inability to save it.165 Soon after 
they sent questionnaires to local elected officials querying them on rent control and West Hollywood 
cityhood.166 They also announced partnership with the CES, which had earned a reputation for militant 
activism. While Edelman supported similar aims, he worried that CES and SCHMC lacked pragmatism. 
Before his appearance at one CES event, he was advised “be on the offensive.” “Knowing this group as we 
do,” an aide explained, “they [might] try to gain control of the discussion.”167 Indeed CES leaders often 
failed to consult with other progressives.  
In February of 1984 activists gathered again at Plummer Park. This time, Edelman was not invited.  
Attended by seniors, queers, and immigrants, it morphed from a rent control forum into an incorporation 
convention. Larry Gross proclaimed “a new campaign to save rent control and provide West Hollywood 
residents with true political representation.” He promised that by “incorporating West Hollywood as a 
separate city,” renters “would no longer have to worry about Schabarum, Dana, and Antonovich. We could 
enact our own rent control, improve services, and provide for a better community…Together, we can make 
West Hollywood a place where the needs of its people come first. We can win rent control and more.”168 
The SCHMC immediately joined the fight. This was “not terribly surprising,” since “the club [was] a more 
radical outgrowth of the older Stonewall Club.”169 After this, SCHMC leaders were persona non grata to 
Edelman. Veteran queers were suspicious of the rally. “West Hollywood has done extremely well under 
the present system,” one argued. “I don’t see widespread support for [incorporation]. I know what we’ve 
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got now is working.” Within the SDC, leaders avoided the issue. “It’s kind of like the swallows coming 
back to Capistrano,” one member mused. “It surfaces periodically, then goes away.”170 This time it would 
be different.  
Ron Stone emerged as the leading incorporation spokesman. The 36-year-old queer corporate 
efficiency consultant “long believed that the best way for his community to take control of local planning 
is to become a city.” Also a renter, he accused the Board of Supervisors of “handing out zoning ordinances 
like some people hand out after-dinner mints.” He also charged political unfairness and claimed that 
incorporation was “an issue of democracy and of taxation without representation.” This last charge was 
inane. In the first place, West Hollywood residents did have political representation. Moreover, queers 
benefited from that representation. When asked to assess incorporation, L.A. City Councilman Zev 
Yaroslavsky admitted as much. “I think these unincorporated islands,” he mused, “are anomalies these 
days. They find themselves smack in the middle of resources.” Yaroslavzky pointed to the power of the 
county that cities often lacked. When Edelman was forced to publically comment on incorporation, he 
disingenuously stated that he “had not taken a stand,” but agreed that it “would certainly diminish [his] 
influence in the area.” Despite the enthusiasm of the Plummer Park rally, Stone admitted that the 
incorporation movement was “small, [lacked] widespread support, and [had] no funding mechanism.” 
Independence would be difficult, especially since “Ed Edelman is popular with most members of the 
community.” Still, he believed it could “capture the imaginations” of the community. “All groups could 
support a move for cityhood,” he declared. “Gays, businessmen, seniors, and renters could be made to 
support it.”171 Muddled in his desire to incorporate, Stone failed to address a very important question: if 
West Hollywood became a city, who would it belong to?  
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Incorporation and Political Fragmentation  
As the incorporation campaign unfolded, two significant political developments emerged. First, 
many queers found themselves at odds with Supervisor Edelman. While he rarely voiced opposition 
publically, his resistance was a known fact. Tension with the county frayed metropolitan alliances. 
Secondly, a new form of sexual identity politics began to emerge. West Hollywood had been identifiably 
queer for decades, but incorporation stoked fantasies of a “gay city” that were new. Activists continued to 
build bridges with diverse segments of the community, including with seniors, immigrants, and low-income 
renters, but they also worked to build a cross-class sexual alliance as well. This form of sexual identity 
politics deemphasized economic imperatives which had previously been foundational. 
 Ron Stone and Larry Gross worked together to qualify incorporation on the ballot. Stone utilized a 
MECLA voter registration drive in January to tout the issue.172 Advertised as a boon for local and national 
Democrats, the effort received support from Mayor Bradley and Edelman.173 The latter rightly worried it 
would strengthen incorporators. “The gay voter registration drive,” an aide bluntly concluded, “will be 
targeted to areas where gays have a chance of maximizing their influence (i.e. West Hollywood)” and would 
be “single issue in orientation (i.e. pro-gay city government).”174 Edelman’s opposition to incorporation 
was multifaceted. Ego certainly played a role. “He was a county supervisor,” an aide explained. “He was 
used to having power and exercising it as he thought best.” Edelman believed he could “benefit the people” 
through control. On another level, “he was very proud of being the supervisor of West Hollywood. He felt 
he had done a very good job.”  Indeed he was a proactive supporter and allowed queers a place in his 
administration. There was a third reason behind his opposition that was important. Edelman believed 
incorporators were naïve and ill-prepared for city governance. He felt “he could keep West Hollywood, the 
community, from being overrun by developers. He didn’t need to be elected, he had power.” Edelman often 
flexed that power in pragmatic ways. Incorporators signaled an opposite approach. Paternalistically, 
                                                          
172 Municipal Elections Committee of Los Angeles voter registration plan, 1984. EDE, box 24, folder 2. 
173 Aide to Ed Edelman, 25 February 1984. EDE, box 24, folder 2. 
174 Aide to Ed Edelman, 8 March 1984. EDE, box 24, folder 2. 
217 
 
Edelman maintained that he was best suited to protect West Hollywood from inequitable urban 
development. An inexperienced city council, he reasoned, would be “run over by business and 
development” interests.175 He had a strong a case to make but mostly kept his views private.  
Incorporators returned again to Plummer Park to formally announce the campaign. Edelman sent 
his West Hollywood Deputy to observe. Attended by “35 persons,” most of whom “were tenants and small 
property owners,” the rally featured impassioned speeches by Stone and Art Guerrero, an energetic 
incorporator. Stone “gave a resounding attack on County Government” filled with “half-truths [and] 
erroneous information.” He was outdone by Guerrero, who proved “vicious in his remarks.” When 
Edelman’s aide approached him, Guerrero “personally attacked” her and claimed she was “not a resident 
of West Hollywood” and was thus “incompetent.” That outburst solicited apologies from “everyone except 
Stone and Guerrero.” Former WHCP committee members Joyce and Jerry Hundal “expressed extreme 
concern” about incorporation. One renter declared that he would “fight the effort to the death” and walked 
out. An elderly woman asked why residents weren’t considering “annexation [with Los Angeles]” instead. 
She also criticized Stone, Guerrero, and the CES for impoliteness. Margot and Bud Siegel, also of the 
WHCP committee, sat “grinning but silent in the back” of the crowd. Stone claimed an independent city 
could “keep tax dollars in West Hollywood,” authorize rent control, provide responsible government, 
“secure new Federal grants,” and promote “full democracy.”176 Pro-incorporators formed the West 
Hollywood Incorporation Committee (WHIC) to sway popular opinion. 
 The participation of CES in WHIC caused controversy. Its leaders had a radical reputation and did 
not always play well with others. In 1979 the group ruffled feathers when they claimed to have single-
handedly halted condominium conversions. Larry Gross indicated that he could “dictate” policy to the 
county, which earned him a rebuke from Edelman who clarified that CES was not “leading or dictating 
anything.”177 Within WHIC, Gross proved difficult to work with. One member claimed “her life had been 
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threatened by Gross” after she questioned the CES. In response, several members cited “negative CES 
influence” and resigned.178 Even passionate incorporators worried that the CES did “not adequately 
represent the best interests of the community.” Many property owners split with WHIC and worried that 
“rent control supporters were exercising too much power” on the committee.179 Guerrero accused detractors 
of voter fraud and labeled them “stooges of the [AOA],” a common but often inaccurate charge.180  
As the campaign dragged on the politics of incorporation became confusing. The SCHMC and CES 
wed cityhood to rent control.181 Stone supported this connection and promised that a progressive city would 
“enact a rent freeze,” protect renters from “arbitrary eviction,” and halt all condominium conversions.182 
When incorporators were pressed on funding and revenue programs, they offered vague promises which 
invited critique. WHCP committee members Allen Chivens and Joyce Hundal blasted the naiveté. While 
they were property owners, they were also critical of CREA and AOA. “A troubling aspect of cityhood” 
was that it was a “simple solution to complex problems.” They ridiculed Stone’s “glib promise to bring 
many of the things we already have.” When Stone promised to qualify West Hollywood for important 
housing grants, Chivens and Hundal retorted that “we already receive grant funding in greater measure than 
would be possible as a city of some 36,000 people.” They charged incorporators of being “misleading” and 
“disrespectful to Supervisor Ed Edelman, who has made sure that this area receives a large portion of 
grants.” The assertion that “a large portion of West Hollywood revenue disappeared into the County 
General Fund” was a “dangerous myth.” Instead, “the truth is that West Hollywood costs the county.” They 
were not opposed to “equitable rent control” for those “who live on fixed incomes,” but they did not trust 
Gross, Stone, or Guerrero to develop it. Along with others, they formed the West Hollywood Study 
Committee (WHSC) to oppose incorporation. Accused of supporting the AOA, members maintained they 
were “not a front” but “a group of concerned residents, business people and, yes, some small apartment 
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owners who are looking for answers about where West Hollywood is going.” Instead of a “panacea,” they 
wanted “informed community discussion.” While most fixated on the question “to be a city or not to be a 
city?” they thought “the more important question to ask is what kind of a city would West Hollywood 
be?”183 The L.A. Free Press admitted that the WHSC asked good questions.184 As the two groups battled, 
Edelman was lured into the conflict.  
Incorporation was on his radar as early as 1981. Aides encouraged him to remind queers of his 
support in hopes of stopping the movement. “You have very good relationships with the gay community,” 
they explained, “but we should be more visible because of the annexation issue in West Hollywood.” In the 
past Edelman “counted on the fact that the gays would want to remain unincorporated,” but now sensed 
opposite desires.185 He moved clandestinely to squash these efforts. In a meeting with activists, Edelman 
acknowledged that rent control was a major priority. He pointed out that “while rent control [was] 
temporary in the County,” city ordinances “were also fragile” and asked activists to give him time. He 
warned against the “division of political power” which would result from separation.186 As the campaign 
heated up, aides advised Edelman to choose a strategy. “You need to decide how ‘hard-nosed’ you want to 
be,” one advised. “Make the policy judgment of how ‘behind-the-scenes’ you want to be. If you want an 
early, public fight, a hearing makes sense. If you want to stay behind the scenes, private negotiations are 
the place to fight.”187 He opted to fight behind the scenes. This politically calculated decision was made as 
incorporation morphed into a “gay rights” issue.  
As he warmed to the idea of cityhood, Frontiers editor Bob Craig predicted that West Hollywood 
would become a “Gay Camelot.” According to incorporator Steve Martin, this promise “electrified the gay 
community.” Across racial, class, and political lines “the sense that we were somehow making history was 
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palpable.”188 Scholars have documented the myriad desires which animated queer desires for space.189 
Unlike activists in other locales, however, queer Angelenos already had access to power. The promise of 
cityhood thus offered a more imaginative kind of agency. Edelman recognized this transformation, which 
left him politically paralyzed. A memo explained that there was a “‘gay pride’ element in the incorporation 
effort” which Edelman needed to avoid criticizing. Queers were excited to see a “large number of gays and 
lesbians running for City Council” seats. If his opposition was too harsh, he “might be branded anti-gay.”190 
Identity politics now ironically worked against a powerful political supporter. Instead of publically debating 
incorporation, Edelman worked covertly which frustrated incorporators. “West Hollywood has the highest 
population density of any area in the western states,” Ron Stone fumed, “yet its residents are unable to elect 
their own city officials.” He charged residents had “suffered under county government” and faced “taxation 
without representation.” Was Edelman King George III?191 When it came to fiscal promises, incorporators 
could be dangerously deceptive.  
Stone claimed that “taxes would go down” with incorporation. This was “very misleading,” a 
county aide charged, because it avoided costs of social services. He also claimed that “West Hollywood 
would bask in revenue and would qualify for grants” which would “bring millions of dollars to the area.” 
This was “an important issue,” the aide advised Edelman. “There are grants with greater flexibility with 
the County. You should stress the amount of dollars spent…It is in the millions.”192 This was the strongest 
front on which to fight. “You have left open the question about whether or not you would still be able to 
provide grant monies,” another aide confided. “My personal opinion is that, even if you could, it is going 
to be politically difficult for you to provide much if incorporation passes.” Since “most discretionary block 
grant money is allocated to the unincorporated areas by population…the funds that you receive will be 
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adjusted to reflect the population of the areas of East Los Angeles.” West Hollywood would be expected to 
provide for itself. “If you were to take [East L.A.] funds and expend them in West Hollywood,” he 
explained, “you would leave yourself open to the charge that you were using monies that should be allocated 
to the poor people in East Los Angeles. We would be soundly criticized.” 193 A queer aide agreed. Since 
“an incorporated city will be able to raise revenue,” allotments would need to be curtailed. He warned that 
adjustments would negatively impact the GCSC, which was then receiving $82,000 for food and shelter 
programs, $50,000 for legal services, and $100,000 for job training.194 Incorporation thus threatened social 
service agencies and put activists in a tough spot.  
At a MECLA meeting Edelman agreed that “incorporation could allow for the election of openly 
gay and lesbian city council members,” but warned that the GCSC might lose funding. Sheldon Andelson 
seemed “unalarmed,” but Morris Kight seemed “frantic” about this possibility.195 Don Kilhefner also 
expressed concern. When he tried to get assurances that budgets would not be affected by incorporation, an 
aide demurred that he “could not estimate the availability of block grant funds, since the total may be 
affected by Cityhood.”196 Stone believed Edelman was bluffing. At a lunch meeting with State Senator 
David Roberti’s gay liaison, his aides criticized incorporators, who had been repeatedly “rude” and naïve. 
“It seems all political staffs are perceived to be the enemy,” they complained. Roberti’s aide was frustrated 
that some mused about “how great it would be to have a ‘gay city,’” but never “addressed the difficulties 
in starting a city or the funding aspects of doing so.”197 When Mary Thomas Beavers announced her 
candidacy for a city council seat, some were shocked. Beavers promised to have “sidewalks scrubbed,” “a 
code of decent dress established,” and “all pornographic material removed.”198 “This is for real,” an aide 
reported to Edelman, “I thought you’d get a kick out of it.”199 While humorous, she and Edelman worried 
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that incorporators were ill-prepared for the task of establishing a city. Even some incorporators lamented 
the “delightfully disconnected” stew of candidates running for city office.200 To fight back, Edelman 
released his own estimates of projected city revenues and expenses. These caused tensions to rise. 
 Stone argued that “revenues for West Hollywood” would “exceed the cost of servicing the area by 
almost $3 million.”201 Yet he failed to factor in social services, including law enforcement. Stone’s budget 
billed the county at existing formulas, which incorporation would alter. Additionally, his budget neglected 
key expenditures such as a city engineer.202 Whatever truce existed between incorporators and Edelman 
broke down. An enraged Stone accused the supervisor of “purposefully trying to mislead people for his 
own political purposes.” Edelman claimed he was “simply trying to bring out the facts so people can make 
a decision.”203 At one point, Stone demanded a public debate.204 In Frontiers, incorporators launched brutal 
attacks against the county. “Poor West Hollywood” was “worse off than the residents of Moscow” an 
incorporator charged. “At least in Moscow there is a city government (unelected as it might be). That’s 
better than nothing!” Another claimed he wanted “to live in a democracy” not “a monarchy with King 
Edelman at the throne.” One woman opined that the county had “no business running a town” since “it has 
no idea how to do it!” Guerrero engaged in histrionics: “I think the most important point regarding 
cityhood,” he crowed, “is that right now those of us who live in West Hollywood are ‘subjects,’ not real 
citizens.’”205 Considering the long relationship between Edelman and activists, these charges must have 
come as quite a shock. Ironically, they resembled the conservative antistatist arguments of Proposition 13. 
Edelman did not respond, which must have been difficult. Behind-the-scenes, even Guerrero admitted they 
were unfair. While he likened Edelman to King George III in Frontiers, privately he called to “apologize 
for the remarks” and the tone of the campaign.206 After another outburst, he promised to “try very hard not 
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to make unkind statements” and thanked Edelman for his “outstanding responsiveness in addressing the 
needs of the gay community.”207 Which was it? Tyrannical king or devoted ally?  
For GCSC and SDC organizers the political split was painful. Remarkably few veteran activists 
publically supported incorporation. Morris Kight resisted it for some time. When he began to warm to the 
idea he wrote Edelman for advice. When he professed neutrality, an unsatisfied Kight paid him a personal 
visit. After “a long meeting with the Supervisor,” he “was of two minds on” incorporation. “On the one 
hand,” he wrote, “I am supposed to advocate good government.” On the other, “I have always advocated 
self-determination (Woodrow Wilson’s Point of 1919) and it would be wonderful to have a government of 
Gay and Lesbian folks.” Kight confronted a paradox of gay liberation. He wanted to provide for his 
community, but also wanted independence. In better days the county nurtured gay liberation, but now the 
idea of a “gay city” was intoxicating. Kight supported incorporation but stressed its economic agenda. 
“Rental control,” he concluded, was “a powerful device to make [incorporation] supportable.”208 The SDC 
avoided cooperation with the SCHMC, CES, and Ron Stone. Organizers agreed that voters needed “a fair 
presentation” of incorporation, and invited opponents to make their case.209 When the SDC finally issued 
an endorsement, organizers proclaimed they were “in no way a [casting a] negative reflection on Ed 
Edelman” who had “done a superb job representing gay and lesbian people.”210  
In the final days before the election, Edelman threw an unexpected wrench in the works. Since its 
demise in 1983, he worked to find a third vote to restore countywide rent control (Hahn was the second). 
Ironically, incorporators helped him do this. Supervisor Dana expressed discomfort with the “idea of a gay 
city.” After some “softening,” he proved “amenable to rent control extension only in West Hollywood.” 
Even Schabarum seemed open.211 Aides agreed that even if he did not vote in favor of rent control, he would 
“at least agree not to oppose it.”212 When incorporators got wind of Edelman’s strategy, they accused him 
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of sabotage. “This is his last attempt at trying to kill this,” Stone charged. Edelman fired back asking why, 
if he could “protect the tenants,” was incorporation necessary?213 By this time, however, incorporation had 
moved beyond rent control. On Halloween, the Board of Supervisors extended rent control in West 
Hollywood “indefinitely.”214 There was little celebration. “Three strange bedfellows,” incorporators 
crowed, “voted to extend rent control” in order to “remove an incentive to vote for incorporation…We 
doubt many voters will be fooled. Incorporation is an issue for West Hollywood alone to decide. Edelman 
should have kept hands off!”215 What began as a rent control movement had morphed into something else. 
When the votes were cast, incorporators won a sizeable victory. They mobilized a diverse coalition of 
“gays, senior citizens, Jews, renters,” and Russian immigrants to support cityhood. These groups found 
common economic ground in the promise of rent control.216 Election returns boded well for the future. 
Incorporator Steve Martin marveled that “the CES slate swept four of five seats.” Alan Viturbi, “an intense 
21-year-old in Democratic circles,” and retired schoolteacher Helen Albert won thanks to strong CES 
backing. They represented the heterosexual minority. Valerie Terrigno, John Heilman, and Steve Schulte 
made up the queer majority. On election night, activists and observers focused on sexuality more so than 
rent control. The returns were a “seismic event,” one incorporator explained, which shook “the very 
foundation of the national conversation on gay rights.” The “political muscle of the gay community” had 
been flexed with force.217 The Los Angeles Times reverberated these assessments. “America’s first gay city” 
had been born.218  
By the end of the campaign, a clear political rift existed between queers and the county; the political 
geography of gay liberation in L.A. had changed. “The ire of pro-city folks,” the L.A. Free Press observed, 
had “been reserved for liberal supervisor Ed Edelman,” who had “done everything he could to sabotage the 
cityhood effort.” Some believed Edelman feared an “erosion of power”; others thought him opposed to rent 
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control (some went so far to claim “that Edelman was actually fronting the landlords in an attempt to stall 
cityhood”); some even speculated that his opposition was homophobic.219 Whether activists believed these 
charges or not, they caused political damage. After incorporation Edelman remained an ally, but a distant 
one. For him, the ordeal of incorporation wasn’t “wasn’t even bittersweet. It was just bitter.”220 As for the 
new city, it had high expectations to satisfy. Incorporation represented a dramatic restructuring of queer 
space and politics. In rejecting metropolitan strategies, activists reasoned that West Hollywood could better 
solve urban problems. City leaders would now be put to the test. 
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Chapter Seven: “Not a Gay City, but a Good City”: Austerity and Queer Urban 
Renewal 
 
“West Hollywood has never had a clear identity. We want 
to promote it as the leading center for design and 
entertainment, as well as home to some of the finest 
restaurants, hotels, and retail stores in Los Angeles. We 
want to put our best foot forward.’” 
-Ron Kates and Steve Schulte, 1986  
 
“We founded this city on the basis of individual rights, 
specifically those of renters, seniors, and gays. West 
Hollywood is not Anaheim, or Torrance, or Woodland 
Hills.”  
-H. Simmons, 1986 
 
“Gay City. Gay Camelot! That is how the media continues to describe the new city of West 
Hollywood,” John Rechy bemoaned in 1985. Despite the label of “America’s first gay city,” the activist 
and author insisted the city possessed a deeper purpose. “West Hollywood is not a gay city,” he explained, 
“West Hollywood is a good city.” In “one of the greatest opportunities in history,” queers could draw upon 
“their roots in oppression” in order to “show that a minority can use its first-hand knowledge of persecution 
to create a model for human dignity, respect, [and] economic justice.” Sexual and economic rights went 
hand in hand. If successful, West Hollywood would be “gay liberation’s greatest victory.”1 Rechy was not 
alone. Incorporator Steve Martin trustingly predicted the birth of a progressive “city on a hill.” As urban 
crises worsened, West Hollywood would provide a blueprint for redemption.2 To a certain degree, Rechy 
and Martin were correct. Queer pride and visibility did became synonymous with the new city, which 
assured that sexual discrimination would not be tolerated. When it came to economic rights, however, 
optimistic predictions proved dramatically off-the-mark. West Hollywood never became the paradise that 
some envisioned. Instead, it came to reflect and strengthen the austerity impulses which birthed it.  
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Historians have shown how neoliberal urban transformations, particularity gentrification, have 
emerged from unlikely places. In Brooklyn, Suleiman Osman located the impulse in diverse political 
circles. Inspired by urban thinkers such as Jane Jacobs, a “new localism” emerged in the 1970s which united 
“progressive white-collar reformers” with “angry white ethnics, black power activists, small business 
owners, and other members of the slow-growth coalition.” These neighborhood activists espoused 
antistatist attitudes which ran the political gamut. Less a tale of “white flight” and the New Right, the 
gentrification of Brooklyn resulted from “dashed idealism.”3 Beginning with Manuel Castells, scholars 
connected the gay rights with gentrification as well. As neighborhoods transitioned from working-class to 
privileged enclaves, “gay pioneers” helped to speed along the process.4 Lawrence Knopp argued that “gay 
homeowners mobilized around homeowners’ issues, not gay issues” in order to “promote upper-middle-
class gay in-migration” to the Marigny neighborhood of New Orleans.5 Both Castells and Knopp described 
queer gentrifiers in conservative terms, but it is more correct to view them alongside Osman’s Brooklyn 
activists. In both New York and San Francisco, Christina Hanhardt found that “the promotion and protection 
of gay neighborhoods” inadvertently “reinforced the race and class stratification of postwar urban space.”6 
In similar fashion, Kwame Holmes concluded that the sexual diversification of the middle class worked 
against housing affordability in Washington, D.C.7 Instead of blaming gentrification on a handful of queer 
conservatives, new scholarship suggests it lay at the heart of modern liberation movements. West 
Hollywood strengthens these narratives. Queer development interests did not so much coopt the movement 
as overstay their welcome. In an effort to achieve incorporation, activists reached out to business leaders. 
On the one hand, incorporators highlighted the sexual character of the new city: surely establishing a gay 
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city would be a point of pride for all queers. On the other, however, they carefully framed cityhood as an 
opportunity for developers. Freed from the county, West Hollywood could grow in new directions. Boosters 
marketed the city as the capital of high-end retail, dining, and housing while progressive urban policies, 
namely rent control, slowly eroded. This both reflected urban austerity politics and strengthened them. In 
West Hollywood, queer urban renewal resulted from a bipartisan attempt to make gay rights compatible 
with the marketplace. In the end, West Hollywood could not run away from larger problem. Metropolitan 
problems required metropolitan solutions.8 Thus, West Hollywood exacerbated the urban crisis. 
 
Incorporation and the Rise of Queer Business Politics 
 Adequate appreciate of West Hollywood politics requires a return to the incorporation campaign. 
Activists often spoke of a David and Goliath struggle: “gay political activists” and “pro-rent control 
advocates,” the story went, fought against “well-entrenched opponents, including landlords.”9 Cityhood 
demonstrated that “grassroots democracy” could defeat establishment interests.10 Buoying this narrative, 
scholars characterized cityhood as “an imperative to create a place where gay visibility [was] the norm 
rather than a daily struggle.”11 According to Lillian Faderman and Stuart Timmons, West Hollywood 
became “a sort of promised land” for gays.12 Yet, in an effort to secure victory, incorporators made cityhood 
amenable to both renter and business constituencies. This gay city was promised to more than one 
community. Sometimes inadvertently, progressive and business interests disassociated gay rights from 
progressive economics. This forgotten aspect of the cityhood campaign helps explain why West Hollywood 
developed the way it did. 
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 At the outset, business and development interests decried the creation of “another Santa Monica.” 
Some even circulated deceptive petitions designed to squash the effort.13 At a strategy session at the West 
Hollywood Hyatt, landlords cast incorporation as harmful to renters. “If the affluent pockets of the city 
detach themselves,” one woman asked, “what will happen to the citizens who cannot live by themselves 
because their area does not provide economical resources to make them viable?” If incorporators imposed 
“stiff rent control measures,” they would create “another New York or Santa Monica” and “stop the upward 
mobility of poorer citizens, women, and minorities.”14 The AOA warned that rent control would 
“POLARIZE CONSTITUENTS ALONG ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LINES.” If renters 
were wise, they would avoid “a situation where Renters fight against Owners, seniors fight against Tax 
Payors [sic],” and “the Haves are pitted against the Have-nots.”15 Unlike previous fights, however, 
incorporation introduced a new element. Appealing to sexual solidarity, some worked to win over queer 
business leaders. That strategy emerged mostly from Ron Stone, who crossed political lines for cityhood. 
He considered himself a progressive liberal, had recently worked on behalf of Senator Alan Cranston.16 He 
was also deeply supportive of the CES and SCHMC, but his passion for cityhood encouraged him to reach 
out to queer business interests. MECLA, long the club of choice for wealthy queers, provided him with a 
list of potential allies. Stone also hired Arthur James Advertising and utilized the pages of Frontiers to mute 
the issue of rent control in favor of “the idea of a gay city.”17 As Elizabeth Tandy Shermer argued, 
“municipal grasstops” redirected social movements and the welfare state throughout the twentieth century.18 
Likewise, queer business leaders transformed the meaning of cityhood.  
In both public and private forums, queer elites were recruited. In early 1984, Stone paid a visit to 
the West Hollywood Chamber of Commerce, which was dominated by Sheldon Andelson. Chamber 
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President Kay McGraw admitted that “the business community [was] divided on [incorporation].”19 
Specifically addressing business and landlord concerns, Stone admitted that he had “sold” incorporation 
“as a way to save rent control,” but promised balance. “Let’s look at cityhood in business terms,” he 
suggested. “Area merchants and businessmen stand to gain if the community has its own local government.” 
An independent West Hollywood would allow “money to be put to use to solve existing problems affecting 
the business community.” Swaying the conservative chamber was no easy task. Members displayed 
“degrees of skepticism” and expressed unease with “the involvement of the CES.” The “rent-control 
agenda,” one member charged, might give West Hollywood “a decidedly liberal bent” and did not reflect 
“most of the Chamber’s membership.” Stone retorted that “no government would seriously consider hurting 
its business community.” While members “took no official position on cityhood” at the meeting, some 
expressed optimism, especially Andelson.20 Around the same time, Edelman’s office reported an avalanche 
of calls from realtors and brokers anxious to “buy property in West Hollywood.”21  
Within the pages of Frontiers, cityhood was explained in pro-business terms. “Independence” was 
fundamental to “all gays,” Stone argued, since the county could not “guarantee the continued prosperity of 
gay lifestyles.” The “hostile county government,” he warned, “could destroy the flavor of the community.” 
Stone sometimes sounded like Howard Jarvis. “With a $5 million anticipated surplus,” he predicted, “taxes 
should go down…Cityhood would enable [tax] dollars to stay” and “attract many new high-quality 
businesses to area.” Through cityhood, queer businesses had “a chance to make a profit.”22 In other words, 
cityhood could be viewed as a tax revolt. In another article, Stone envisioned the future city: “Over 100 
neighborhood gay bars” were “filled with residents and tourists,” he foretold. “The peacefulness of 
residential neighborhoods” was “preserved by Cul-de-sac streets.”23 The city was “fast becoming a major 
creative center with numerous cultural events such as festivals, design competitions, and sculpture contests. 
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The annual gay parade will have a home for years to come.” Importantly, moderation ruled the day. “Amidst 
all this excitement,” he stressed, “the city will keep its financial and political balance. We will balance 
tenants’ demands with investment realities.” West Hollywood would not be “wild.” “We want to be where 
the action is,” he confessed, “but don’t want that action to be under our bedroom windows.”24 In this 
incarnation, West Hollywood looked downright suburban. 
Stone also commissioned a revenue study which directly appealed to development interests. 
Proudly announcing that “seven luxury hotels” were interested in moving to West Hollywood, he predicted 
“an even larger revenue surplus than previously expected.” In an irony that was lost, L’Ermitage mused 
about a West Hollywood expansion. Large-scale developers now gave incorporation a second look.25 
Members of MECLA seemed downright giddy as incorporation gained support. Home to the wealthiest 
queers (members paid annual dues of $1,200), it included developers and business owners such as 
Andelson, who offered an endorsement and monetary support to Stone.26 “The addition of key community 
leaders,” such as “businessowners [sic], advertising agents, attorneys, and property-owners” strengthened 
the incorporation coalition, Frontiers reported.27 Sheldon Andelson was an important booster. The Los 
Angeles Times labeled him “the most prominent gay leader in the Democratic Party,” but his politics were 
decidedly pro-business and pro-development. His Bel-Air villa hosted “senators, governors, and would-be 
presidents,” while his “trendy Westside restaurant was “used for fundraisers.” If West Hollywood 
incorporated, “some of the most desirable land on the Westside of Los Angeles” would be under new 
management, and Andelson, “better known as the ‘godfather of West Hollywood,’ would become the city’s 
best-known and most powerful” advisor.28  
When he announced his support, Andelson was honest with his expectations. “I like development,” 
he explained. “I like tall buildings. I like the power and vibrancy they bring to me.” As chairman of the 
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West Hollywood-based Bank of Los Angeles, he hoped to finance “office buildings and condominiums” in 
the new city. During the 1960s, he made a small fortune on land grabs and felt no shame in speculation. On 
the contrary, he traced this to his Jewish roots in Boyle Heights when he watched his “grandmother buy a 
little piece of property, then sell it for [greater value].” In West Hollywood, he saw the potential for queer 
urban renewal. “I hope we’ll have good architecture here,” he opined, “I hope we’ll have good awareness 
of the arts, sculpture, landscape, design. God, if we don’t have it here we shouldn’t have it anywhere.” As 
a queer man, Andelson celebrated the idea of a gay city. As a developer, he expected it to enrich his bottom 
line. By the time of the election, “about a dozen of the [West Hollywood City Council] candidates” 
maintained “some connection to Andelson.”29 Steve Schulte held the most.  
Much like Valerie Terrigno, Schulte came to prominence through the GCSC and the SDC. His 
experiences, however, taught him different political lessons. Armed with a degree in political science from 
Yale, Schulte headed to L.A. in the early 1970s and quickly gained notoriety as a model for Colt Studios. 
Indeed, among many gay men, he was “eye candy.” From the beginning he harbored political ambitions. 
“In Schulte,” one observer gushed, “the gay community had a proven leader” who was “strikingly 
handsome,” radiated a “casual masculinity,” and exuded “quiet confidence.”30 He established relationships 
with queer businessmen, including Andelson, while also working the activist circuit. In 1979, as the GCSC 
encountered post-Proposition 13 limitations, Schulte was appointed its Executive Director. He viewed the 
challenge of the Tax Revolt as an opportunity to “clean up” the GCSC and pivot towards private 
fundraising. In one memo to staff, Schulte promised to give the “ragtag” organization a “sense of structure, 
order, and credibility.” When one employee was caught working the front desk without a shirt, he was made 
an example of. “Casualness of dress,” Schulte explained, reflected “casualness of opinion [and] attitude,” 
which threatened the credibility of the organization. Schulte spent significant time at Andelson’s Trumps, 
a “fashionable West Hollywood restaurant,” where he courted wealthy donors. At the GCSC, “elite 
memberships” were established: Friends of the Center and the Silver Circle both required donations of 
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$1,000 or more. Soon the GCSC newsletter “read like the society page of a metropolitan newspaper.” Issues 
advertised to and for donors, a sweeping change from the days when it promoted classes in welfare rights.31 
For veteran activists, the changes were glaring. Don Kilhefner believed that the “political 
consciousness changed” during this period. “Prisoners and homeless people were now seen as losers,” he 
explained. “Why are we spending money on losers?” donors would ask. “Why are we developing programs 
around losers rather than winners?” He noticed that programs “with an emphasis on black gay men and 
women” were hidden or eliminated. Known for his radicalism, Kilhefner concluded that he “could no longer 
relate to the leadership” of the GCSC. “It was time to move on.”32 A similar fate befell David Glascock, 
who returned to the GCSC in 1980. Upon his arrival, he held high hopes for resuscitating languishing 
housing programs. This soon became untenable, as precious resources were steered in other directions. 
Frustrated, Glascock resigned and took a job with the SCACLU where he advocated on behalf of 
incarcerated queers with AIDS into the 1990s.33 To GCSC worker Cosmo Bua, during Schulte’s tenure, 
“money was spent on administration” while “basic services…were eliminated.”34 To a degree, these 
assessments were unfair to Schulte, who attempted to stabilize an organization in the midst of cataclysmic 
budget freefalls. At the same time, by appealing to the private marketplace, he strengthened the impulses 
which had launched the Tax Revolt in the first place. When it came to development, Schulte and Andelson 
were simpatico. In fact, their open talk of large-scale condominium development and high-end retail 
cultivation earned them a rebuke from fellow candidate Valerie Terrigno. There “is strong sentiment against 
such development,” Terrigno warned. Taking a swipe at Andelson’s residence in Beverly Hills, candidate 
John Heilman assured reporters that “people who live in the city will make development decisions.” Still, 
observers rightly noted that Andelson’s financial patronage earned him power. Gay developer, and avowed 
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Republican, Don Genhart wryly predicted that Andelson would be the largest “asset to the new City 
Council,” but noted that “whatever his role is, no one will ever detect it.”35  
As the incorporation campaign came to an end, a powerful coalition had been assembled. “For the 
vast majority of gays,” a writer for the L.A. Free Press observed, “the drive for cityhood is about one thing: 
rent control.” Why then, he wondered, had organizers “made overtures to business people and landlords, 
urging them to drop their opposition and join forces”? Ron Stone convinced many that West Hollywood 
would promote queer rights and business development. “Business people see themselves as 
disenfranchised,” one developer explained. “Now they see that [incorporation] is more than radical rent-
control…It is also for us.” On election night, Stone continued to encourage these hopes. In West 
Hollywood, queer business leaders would “continue the entrepreneurial spirit and trendsetting image that 
came with living on the frontier,” he promised. Some progressives underestimated the strength of business 
interests. Heilman, for one, thought “the hotel and business lobby crazy if they think they can control the 
City Council.”36 Despite this view, developers had been brought to the table of West Hollywood politics.  
 
“City on the Hill”? West Hollywood’s Progressive Image 
 Upon incorporation, West Hollywood leaders appeared to embrace progressive urban policies. As 
promised, the council authorized rent control, promised to halt condominium conversions, and blazed new 
trails when it came to gay rights. This progressive image was carefully cultivated and has since been widely 
celebrated. Even before the city’s inauguration, incorporators promised to push the envelope.37 The Los 
Angeles Times indicated that “America’s first gay city” might be radical, sometimes comparing it to Santa 
Monica.38 Scholars have often doubled-down on the progressive image, labeling the city “a pioneer of civic 
empowerment and responsibility.”39 These assessments only partially captured reality. Councilmembers, 
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many of whom were new to politics, often displayed a lack of planning knowledge. Solutions to urban 
problems, in hindsight, were temporary and fragile. Moreover, councilmembers always worked alongside 
business interests. 
With the exception of Schulte, the five-person council appeared unmistakably left-of-center. 
Councilmembers Helen Albert, Alan Viterbi, Valerie Terrigno, and John Heilman were all supported by 
the CES. Shortly after the election, Viterbi declared that progressives had won “a position of strength” in 
L.A. County.40 Terrigno’s election was especially exciting. The Bronx-native migrated to Los Angeles in 
1972, enrolled at UCLA, and began taking classes in sociology. Desiring “a job where [she] could help 
people,” she quickly rose within establishment circles.41 By 1984 she had worked for the GCSC, the SDC, 
and Crossroads, the employment wing of Hudson House. Attorney John Heilman supported the GCSC and 
promised to fight for rent control. At the same time, he viewed West Hollywood a “unique urban village” 
in need of preservation. This sometimes allied him with homeowners, who resisted large developments, 
and against renters who sought projects in “historic neighborhoods.”42 Adopting a council-management 
government, councilmembers selected Terrigno as Mayor. Supporters described her as a “dynamically 
charismatic lesbian who attracted endorsements from across the Democratic establishment.”43 Lillian 
Faderman and Stuart Timmons considered her a political “golden girl.” As the first openly-lesbian mayor 
in the nation, she was something of a celebrity.44 If there was one councilmember that did not quite fit, it 
was Steve Schulte, the only candidate not to receive CES support. 
Beginning with their first meeting, councilmembers moved to tackle two important issues: sexual 
discrimination and rent control, arguably the most important issues. On the first front the council proved 
effective. The failure of the countywide non-discrimination ordinance remained fresh, a letdown leaders 
promised to make right. Borrowing from models in L.A. and San Francisco, officials authorized an 
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ordinance which forbade sexual discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations. City 
administrators were instructed to “protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to be free 
from discrimination.”45 Barney’s Beanery quickly became a test case. The local bar long displayed a sign 
reading “FAGOTTS [sic] STAY OUT” since the 1960s. The misspelled banner was even reproduced on 
matchbooks and shirts. Under the new ordinance, however, the City Attorney threatened Barney’s Beanery 
with a “$500-a-day fine for as long as the violation continues.”46 The owner argued that “the sign was a 
long-standing humorous tradition,” but, facing fines and bad publicity, allowed for its removal.47 According 
to observers, “the gay community cheered on Mayor Terrigno as she invaded Barney’s Beanery with 
screwdriver in hand” to remove it.48 Beyond the non-discrimination ordinance, the council authored 
progressive domestic partner legislation. 
This extended the long quest for queer family rights in L.A. Indeed, GCSC and SDC organizers 
thought cityhood “an opportunity to take on domestic partnerships” and recognize “[queer] families.”49 
Terrigno spearheaded the effort and proposed an ordinance which emphasized pluralism. While Berkeley 
had recently allowed non-married couples to register as domestic partners, West Hollywood legislation was 
far bolder. “Our intention is to give recognition to caring relationships between two people,” Terrigno 
explained. She suggested that partnerships extended to elderly residents and other low-income renters who 
opted to live together for economic reasons. To qualify, individuals had to “share the common necessities 
of life” and be “responsible for each other’s welfare.” The broadness of the measure drew criticism from 
Schulte, who insisted that “domestic partners be required to live together for a period of time” in order to 
“show that they have some kind of commitment.” To this, Terrigno cleverly retorted that marriages were 
not subject to time limits. “Heterosexual couples have been known to get married on a whim,” she pointed 
out. “What does it matter whether people have known each other for six minutes or six months?” 
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Councilmember Viterbi acknowledged the double-standard, but insisted that residential cohabitation be a 
requirement for approval. “I would hate to see this used to provide benefits to anyone,” he maintained. The 
Mayor reasoned it would be “unwise for the City to mandate where its residents could and could not live.”50 
At a public hearing, the broadness of the measure was applauded. In fact, the only public complaint 
came from someone who felt that that the qualifications should be stretched further. It was “unfair,” he 
reasoned, “to single people who do not wish to enter into any contract with another person.”51 With this 
criticism noted, councilmembers passed the measure. Observers noted it lacked “legal effect” since private 
companies could not be coerced to comply. Terrigno admitted the provision “would not have much value 
in court,” but that did not mean it was worthless.52 Within city administration, Terrigno implemented it 
immediately, thereby extending public employee benefits to partnerships. Moreover, as AIDS ravished the 
community, the law aided hospital visitations. This was a pressing concern for queers denied time with 
dying loved ones. Indeed, Terrigno reached out to Cedars-Sinai, the largest medical facility for AIDS 
patients in L.A., to ensure that the West Hollywood law would be recognized.53 This arrangement spoke to 
the metropolitan possibilities of the measure. Since no residential requirements were established, those 
living outside West Hollywood could apply. Of the first five applications, two couples were from West 
Hollywood, two were from L.A., and one came from Culver City.54  
Domestic partnerships dovetailed with the quest for affordable housing. “Complaints about rents 
going up when a partner moves into an apartment” were common. Leaders hoped domestic partnerships 
would safeguard economic relationships and support rent stabilization.55 A representative of Alternative 
Living for the Aged explained that “when seniors move in together landlords raise their rent.” Domestic 
partner benefits “might allow them to protect themselves.”56 While landlords could raise rents if a 
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“roommate” moved into a unit, they could not do so for a “partner.” Thus the ordinance provided broad 
economic and emotional benefits. When a lesbian couple applied for a partnership license in 1985, they 
“hoped to pay less in rent.”57 Frontiers celebrated the dual use value, which “allowed non-married adults-
both gay and non-gay” to “afford some of the rights now exclusively given to heterosexually-married 
couples.”58 An SDC leader rightly connected the move to a long history of activism. “During a decade of 
political leadership,” he claimed, “gay and lesbian issues [moved] from the streets to the halls of 
government.” Now, “West Hollywood [was] continuing a tradition of progressive issues and coalition 
building.”59 Compared to rent control, securing queer rights legislation proved easy. Since the expiration 
of countywide rent control, the housing situation in West Hollywood had become “a matter of urgency.” 
The council was able to quickly authorize moratoriums on rent increases, evictions, condominium 
conversions, but it soon became clear that a rent control ordinance would become a battle.60 Low-income 
renters made up 80% of the West Hollywood population, but landlords and developers were not prepared 
to concede anything. Apartment owner and AOA representative Sol Genuth organized opposition and 
packed council meetings with protestors who threatened retaliation and disinvestment. Debates on the 
ordinance dragged on for over six months, by which point the council was in the midst of a political crisis.  
At the center of the storm was Mayor Terrigno. She had become the progressive face of the city 
government and was celebrated as a most “courageous elected official.”61 Ironically, however, her 
involvement in queer housing activism brought her down. Terrigno had worked for the GCSC, the SDC, 
and Crossroads, the employment wing of Hudson House. Unfortunately for her, she inherited the extralegal 
fiscal strategies of the organization. Indeed, Morris Kight hired Terrigno in hopes cleaning up the 
organization. Upon her appointment, she recalled “inheriting a financial mess” which she “tried desperately 
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in vain to straighten out.”62 The “financial shambles” necessitated a “juggling of funds.”63 Often, she and 
others loaned Crossroads funds to stay afloat. When grants were secured, they were used to pay off these 
loans. As with the food stamp scandal, this was a survivalist strategy, but nonetheless illegal. The first signs 
of trouble emerged during the 1984 campaign, when “political foes” began “hinting at [Terrigno’s] 
mismanagement of Crossroads funds.”64 Around the same time, she was “awakened at 3:00 A.M.” by her 
dog and witnessed “men in brown polyester three-piece suits going through her trash.”65 These were likely 
FBI agents, who had launched an investigation on Terrigno. At issue was a missing $10,000 from a 1983 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant. The investigation grew throughout 1985, thanks 
in part to personal rivalries. The council had agreed to eight-month mayoral rotations, but Terrigno 
indicated a desire for a full year’s term. “Officials from other cities,” she explained, “are always surprised 
to hear that I’m not mayor for a full year. People are always asking: ‘What are you playing? Musical 
mayors?’” Supporters gathered a petition of 3,000 signatures to extend her term, which angered John 
Heilman, who was slated to replace her.66 As the FBI investigation expanded, she suspected he was 
cooperating with investigators as a “vendetta.”67 Councilmember Alan Viterbi agreed. “The fact that [news 
reports] appeared while the council was in the middle of trying to work out the differences between Valerie 
and John seem suspicious,” he speculated. In August the Los Angeles Times reported that Terrigno would 
face a “Grand Jury probe” and the scandal became public.68   
Considering her wide popularity, supporters turned on the Mayor with surprising speed. The 
“success symbol for gay strivers” became a pariah. Council foe Heilman rewrote her tenure: “She would 
always flake out from responsibility,” he charged. “She would never attend important meetings, she would 
fail to get her work done, she would conspire behind your back.” Considering their recent spat, his 
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comments were predictable, and unreliable. Others were more surprising. Longtime friend and fellow 
activist Jeanne Córdova testified against Terrigno, claiming to have witnessed her mix Crossroads checks 
with her own. The most painful comments came from Terrigno’s former employer, Morris Kight. “The gay 
community is suffering,” he suggested, “because of her antics.” He went out of his way to exorcise Terrigno 
and urged supporters to look past the embarrassment.69 The quick abandonment was curious. Kight was 
intimately involved with Hudson House and Crossroads; he must have known of financial shenanigans. 
Blaming Terrigno may have allowed him to absolve himself from the entire mess. Others piled on and 
suggested that Terrigno was ruining the reputation of West Hollywood. The editor of Frontiers threw her 
to the sharks: “She’s pulled the wool over all our eyes,” he wrote. “You’ll forgive us if we pass on the 
Terrigno defense fund.”70 “The Trouble with Terrigno,” a Los Angeles Times Magazine writer suggested, 
was that she lived two lives: one as a “gay activist” and “rising political star,” the other as a “reckless 
embezzler.”71 Amid the chastisement, some remained true. The GCSC “quietly initiated efforts” to fund 
her defense while Sallie Fiske, the publisher of feminist newspaper, charged that Terrigno was “being 
signaled out” for punishment. “You can’t put your finger on it,” she said, “but you can feel the political 
climate…there is a quality of a witch hunt here.” Fiske believed that Terrigno’s politics were partly 
responsible. As the face of rent control and anti-discrimination, “those of us who believe in Valerie will 
have to emphasize how critical her defense is” she concluded.72  
In the early months of 1986, Terrigno went on trial for embezzlement and faced the ordeal largely 
alone. After “four hours of testimony,” she was able to account for most of the grant money, but not all of 
it. She insisted that funds were moved around haphazardly to keep Crossroads open. Under oath, she 
confessed that she “never intended to steal, convert, or embezzle” funds, although she did admit to having 
made “judgment” and “procedural” errors.73 Her defense attorney maintained she had “tried to keep 
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Crossroads open the best she could, using methods she should not have used.” This included “using her 
own money to pay expenses” which she “later reimbursed with agency funds.”74 Found guilty, she was 
sentenced to sixty days in a halfway house and fined for the missing funds. By the end of her mayoral 
tenure, she had become a ghost in West Hollywood. “Her office door was usually locked,” an observer 
recalled, “her window shades always drawn.” After her trial “she never returned to City Hall.”75 A close 
friend believed the ordeal “destroyed” her.76 The ordeal did bring one queer icon out of semi-retirement. 
Condemning the “wicked miscarriage of justice,” Mattachine founder Harry Hay marched in that year’s 
gay pride parade carrying a sign reading “anyplace I walk, Valerie walks with me.”77 
Image mattered to West Hollywood and the Terrigno scandal threatened to damage the reputation 
of “America’s first gay city.” Her identity as a lesbian and a progressive was important. In the face of 
controversy, some wondered if “the council knew what they were doing.”78 The precarious position offered 
opportunities to others, especially Steve Schulte. As Terrigno fell, pro-growth business politics ascended. 
When it came to rent control, housing development, and community investment, West Hollywood 
supported urban austerity impulses. 
 
The Erosion of Rent Control 
 In a fundamental way, rent control was the raison d’êtra of West Hollywood. It was the glue which 
bound communities together during the incorporation campaign and became a central part of the city’s 
identity. To many residents it was the political issue. According to one housing survey, 87% of the housing 
stock was comprised of rental apartments. Monthly rents ranged from $120 to $3,000, but the vast majority 
of units were inhabited by those with annual incomes of $25,000 or less. The fate of rental housing, in other 
words, affected the lives of nearly 90% of West Hollywood constituents.79 It was thus no surprise that the 
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council authorized rent control. Despite charges from opponents, however, West Hollywood never became 
a renter’s paradise. On the contrary, thanks to landlords, the city’s rent control ordinance was shaped in 
moderate ways. West Hollywood would not be another Santa Monica. Moreover, while many closed the 
book on rent control after passage of the ordinance, it remained a contested issue. By the end of the 1980s, 
in fact, it had been slowly strangled to death.   
 Developers and landlords had a long history of activism in L.A. County. In West Hollywood, some 
opposed rent control during the incorporation campaign, but many more mobilized with force after the city 
was established. When the council promised to follow through with rent control, opponents organized a 
meeting in Plummer Park (the very place of the first incorporation rally). One woman warned of a “coming 
apocalypse” if “socialists” succeeded in “creating a state of war between landlords and tenants.” It very 
well might “be the beginning of World War III,” she predicted. The energetic gathering prompted a response 
from City Hall. Councilmembers Steve Schulte and Alan Viterbi attempted to calm hysteria, promising to 
avoid radical measures. “There’s good potential for a middle ground,” Viterbi assured. Although opponents 
“always bring up Santa Monica….this is West Hollywood,” he proclaimed. “We’re going to be able to fit 
rent control to our needs.” Schulte guaranteed that “all sides” would be listened to.80 Opponents were not 
convinced and rallied behind landlord and AOA insider Grafton Tanquary, who founded West Hollywood 
Concerned Citizens (WHCC), a group made up of landlords and developers. He vowed to fight rent control 
tooth and nail, often relying on strategies of the past.  
 In the spring of 1985, as the council debated the ordinance, WHCC activists staged a dramatic 
protest. “It might seem as though ‘Red Dawn’ [has] come to Sunset Boulevard,” Los Angeles Herald writer 
Milton McGriff observed. “Landlords, frustrated with what they describe as ‘punitive’ rent control, are 
taking paint brushes and rollers to their apartment buildings [and] painting them fire engine red.” The 
protest invoked Cold War fears. Since the “socialistic tendencies” of the council were obvious, activists 
explained, the buildings of West Hollywood might as well reflect it. Interestingly, some veered off message. 
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Atop one apartment building, a large banner demanded “state or federal relief” in order to “support private 
property rights!” Another threatened to “paint hundreds of properties and signs” if owners did not receive 
assistance. City leaders chided the “visibly disturbing” protest. “If they paint their buildings,” one 
councilmember concluded, “that’s their choice, [but] it doesn’t show concern for the beautification of the 
city.”81 Indeed, many were confused by the protest, which led one organizer to pen a public letter of 
explanation. “Some wonder why I painted my building red,” he wrote. It was “not out of malice for the 
City,” which he “loved and supported.” Rather, it was a “much-needed social statement.” In West 
Hollywood, “property owners are a minority and our businesses have been singled out” for “discrimination 
by…the radical city council.” He warned renters that “investors will not build in a hostile, anti-free 
enterprise environment” and predicted that “money that could be spent on cleaning up our disgraceful 
median strip, or funding worthwhile social programs,” would be “wasted on a costly rent control 
bureaucracy.”82 He was not the only landlord to cast himself as a victim. 
In a majority-renter city, the argument went, property owners needed protection. This interesting 
strategy dovetailed with the city’s commitment against sexual discrimination, but was highly misleading. 
In fact, landlords took an active role in the shaping of the rent control ordinance. Vacancy decontrol was 
one example. This policy allowed landlords to raise rents on newly vacated units, bringing them to market 
value. It was widely unpopular among renters, who warned that a wave of evictions might result. As it did 
repeatedly, the council sought moderation. Steve Schulte proposed authorizing vacancy decontrols, but 
limiting them to 10% increases. Councilmembers Heilman and Albert thought the concession egregious, 
but Schulte argued it would demonstrate goodwill towards landlords. This promise swayed enough 
councilmembers for authorization. In the end, however, the WHCC proved ungrateful. “Vacancy decontrol 
is just not acceptable if it does not allow rents to rise to full market levels,” Tanquary announced. “The 
council may be trying to find a middle ground, but what they’re proposing doesn’t give us any leeway…In 
an inflationary environment, 10% is nothing.” Larry Gross of the CES insisted that “total decontrol” would 
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create “a tremendous pressure to evict tenants.”83 In the face of fierce lobbying efforts, he advised the 
council to punish landlords by lowering rent increases from 4.75% to 3%. This would show that the council 
“meant business” and “strengthen [the] base among renters.”84 This advice was discarded in favor of 
moderation, as the final ordinance demonstrated.  
Rents would be rolled back to the levels of May, 1984. From there, annual increases were “pegged 
to 75% of the consumer price index.” For the first time in West Hollywood, landlords were mandated to 
“provide stringent standards for apartment maintenance.” Vacancy decontrol remained set at 10% on a 
biennial basis. While the ordinance lacked the strength of its Santa Monica counterpoint, Larry Gross 
nonetheless maintained that “the long fight of renters [was] paying off.” More accurately, Steve Schulte 
celebrated the restrained temperament of the law. Councilmembers had “resisted Santa Monica-style rent 
control,” he boasted. “We listened to everyone…All sides can find something they like.” Unsurprisingly, 
the WHCC and the AOA protested. “For every concession they made,” an AOA representative moaned, 
“they zapped us in another area…The law is clearly punitive and discriminatory.” Tanquary “threatened to 
sue because an environmental impact report” had not “been prepared.” Indeed, both sides considered the 
ordinance fragile. “I think we’ll see some fine-tuning,” the Mayor confessed. “Everyone on the council sees 
parts they’d like to change.” Budd Kopps, an owner of sixteen apartment complexes in West Hollywood, 
thought it “full of loopholes.” There were “plenty of things we [could] do to make it hard on [the council],” 
he threatened. When asked to elaborate, “Kopps smiled and declined to say.”85 His smirk indicated how 
landlords would resist: legal harassment and haranguing.   
 For queers, the ordinance fulfilled a chief incentive of cityhood. “As many as 11,000 residents of 
the area are gay or lesbian tenants,” a writer in Frontiers opined. In the same article, Larry Gross noted that 
“a high proportion of the area’s gays favor strong rent control,” and credited them for the success. Rent 
control and gay rights seemed to be mutually supportive, but not to all. An interesting rebuttal came from 
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John Parks, the Treasurer of WHCC. “Not all gays and lesbians are pro-rent control,” he told Frontiers. In 
fact, he disclosed that “a third of the 800 members of [WHCC] are gay.” These members worked quietly 
against rent control. Tanquary confirmed the existence of “many concerned gay citizens” who did not 
support the “Communist councilmembers” of West Hollywood.86 Frontiers belittled these charges, 
insinuating they were lies. Perhaps, but they may have also revealed inconvenient truths. Upon the adoption 
of the ordinance, the battle over rent control continued to rage.  
Opposing forces duked it out in the pages of the Los Angeles Post, where eleven landlords decided 
to “finally speak out.” West Hollywood was “an eclectic area with great diversity and personal freedom,” 
they explained. “We like that. That’s why we live here.” The “burgeoning bureaucracy” of City Hall, 
however, threatened the city’s character. Relying on “threats and coercion,” the council worked to “wipe 
out the equity of owners and severely reduce the value of everyone’s investment.” If leaders could “decide 
that the free market is a suspect enterprise,” then residents “should not be surprised if the Council continues 
to interfere with the rest of our lives.” The “days of freedom of choice in West Hollywood” were numbered. 
This specious argument seemed designed for queers, but seniors were also targeted. Rent control, landlords 
maintained, forced “retired older seniors to subsidize the working young, which is grossly unfair.”87 At 
other times, landlords warned against ravenous outsiders. West Hollywood renters, one landlord claimed, 
paid “12 times as much as renters in Los Angeles” because there was “no vacancy decontrol.” Why should 
renters “pay to hold down rents to new people coming into the city”? The bamboozling council made them 
“pay for costly registration, computer systems, and Gestapo administrative procedures.”88 While the WHCC 
warned about the divisiveness of rent control, landlords worked to pit residents against one another. Amid 
the backdrop of the renewed Cold War, many resorted to red-baiting. This was a tried-but-true strategy. 
The participation of the CES provided ample evidence of the council’s socialist tendencies. “I.M. Wise” 
concluded that “The West Hollywood City Council (also known as ‘CES groupies) [would] dance to any 
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CES tune!” After some digging, Wise reported that council meetings never overlapped with CES 
gatherings. The reason? Councilmembers needed to “get their latest instructions from their leader, Larry 
Gross!” Enjoying his “new power trip,” Gross “maligned and scape-goated apartment owners.” Indeed, 
“the name of the tune the master puppeteer whistles while he pulls the strings” was the “The West 
Hollywood Funeral March!”89 Echoing Wise, one landlord thought it time to look “beneath the surface 
image” of the city. He had supported incorporation, believing it would “boost our exclusive shops and 
restaurants,” but now bemoaned the “CITY OF ETERNAL SOCIALISM.”90  
Supporters of rent control did not take these charges lying down. A seventy-six-year-old renter 
lambasted the relentless red-baiting. “The attacks on the CES personally offends me,” he wrote. “I know 
that without CES we would not have a city, and without a city we would not have rent control. Without rent 
control I would have been kicked out of my home.” He wanted no part in the ideological battles over 
“socialism and capitalism.” The existence of rent control meant he had a home. “When someone attacks 
CES, they attack me,” he concluded.91 One self-described “lesbian renter” thanked the Post for permitting 
critiques of landlords. “The Coalition for Economic Survival,” she argued, “is exactly what its name 
suggests: a broad spectrum of citizens trying desperately to survive rising prices, fixed incomes, and other 
economic hazards.” On the contrary, had “the West Hollywood Concerned Citizens ever said what they 
were concerned about?” Surely not renters, “whom they happily gouge and intimidate.” To those who 
whined about lost capital, she had no sympathy. “It is because of the lack of concern on the part of the 
landlords,” she explained, “that West Hollywood became a city.” Landlords reaped what they sowed.92 By 
protesting too much, WHCC activists earned the CES respect. A usually moderate editor at the Post 
surmised, “Larry Gross makes so many people angry, he must be doing something right.”93 In the realm of 
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public opinion, WHCC struggled to make the case for landlords. At the bureaucratic level, they were more 
successful.  
 To mitigate disputes between renters and landlords, the council established a rent stabilization 
committee. Ostensibly, the committee monitored rental increases, resolved disputes, and ensured fairness. 
Since it “accepted grievances from landlords and renters,” this “democratic process benefited the 
community and improved the quality of life for everyone,” one renter argued.94 Yet, the commission’s 
openness was also its greatest flaw. In an effort to be fair, it accepted unlimited requests and complaints 
from both renters and landlords. This gave opponents the ability to swamp the commission. During a one-
month period in 1985, 199 landlords filed complaints against tenants, 156 requested greater vacancy 
decontrol, and 95 sought legal protection for evictions.95 “If 500 landlords wake up one morning and realize 
they can totally cripple the system,” one opponent wryly observed, they could “bring it down.”96 The messy 
bureaucracy resulted in long waiting periods and poked legal loopholes in the rent control ordinance. Many 
landlords chose to stall, complain, and fight. Typical was one, who mocked the commission as a 
“government within a government” which had become “a zoo, a circus, a farce, [and] a mess.”97 When he 
received a notice to decrease his rents, he promised trouble. “As soon as I figure out what [the letter] 
means,” he threatened, “I will be appealing several aspects of it.” The “people of West Hollywood have 
been denied the relief they thought they voted for,” he sniped.98 Sure enough, he took his case through every 
possible appeal, and each time he lost. The experience, he wrote, “confirms everything I have always 
suspected about bureaucracies becoming self-perpetuating monsters” and ridiculed it for “bureaucratic 
buffoonery.”99 He had a point: his experience with the commission lasted for over a year. During that time, 
renters in his buildings suffered. In attempting to work with, rather than against, landlords, the commission 
struggled. 
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 Landlords sometimes skirted regulations or relied on misinformation to evade the law. When one 
woman moved to West Hollywood, she was offered an apartment for $450 a month. She later found out 
that the commission had ordered her landlord to charge no more than $374. “Even though my landlord 
knew of the rent decrease,” she explained, “he took advantage of my being new to the area.” After a “bit of 
battle,” she was refunded the overcharged amount. “My story is not unique,” she wrote. “Many landlords 
in West Hollywood have owned their properties for decades…They’re all paid for and now they’re just 
bringing in the bacon.” While her landlord compared “what’s happening in West Hollywood [to] Nazi 
Germany,” she felt it “about time that these people were put in their place.”100 Aside from complaint forms, 
moreover, the commission had few remedies for tenants who suffered retribution from bitter landlords. In 
one WHCC newsletter, organizers announced a “Voter Verification Program” aimed at “cracking down on 
false registrations.” The true aim, however, was tenant intimidation. “Owners know who live in their 
buildings,” an organizer explained, “so we will be verifying correct voter registrations.” This included 
asking tenants about their political affiliations. The proposal led one Post columnist to remark: “Landlords 
checking up on tenants may strike some as the kind of harassment that prompted the rent control movement 
in the first place.”101 The commission did not develop methods to assist those on the front lines of the rent 
control war. 
 In addition to stonewalling, opponents of rent control sought to derail the ordinance in court. In one 
WHCC newsletter, organizers were “looking for landlords…to file ‘test cases’ with the city, the idea being 
to test the willingness of the recently appointed Rent Stabilization Commission.”102 Real estate interests 
had a long history of utilizing the law to derail affordable housing, but in this instance landlords might have 
been inspired by conservative intellectual and National Review editor William F. Buckley, Jr. From his 
perch in the Bay Area, the contrarian ridiculed rent control efforts in West Hollywood, a “gay enclave with 
extra-economic and extra-sexual eccentricities.” Administered by an “Animal House government,” the 
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“kooks think rent control is a terrific idea,” Buckley cawed. “It is hard to think of any economic nostrum 
more comprehensively discredited.” He worried that “philosophical arguments” against rent control had 
“been neglected.” Instead of battling with bureaucrats, he suggested, “why doesn’t someone go to the courts 
pleading its unconstitutionality? Surely to limit the profit that can be made in one form of enterprise is to 
exercise a kind of discriminatory approach toward profit that the rule of law forbids.” Landlords could win 
a case against a “prudentially stupid [and] philosophically objectionable” law.103  
 Locating a landlord to test the matter was a strategic matter. Often, they explained their situation 
in remarkably unsympathetic ways. For instance, one woman complained of a Downey “tenant who is 
disabled and is on Section 8 rental assistance.” She continued to raise his rent, which forced him to solicit 
greater subsidies from the state. While she received payment, she bemoaned the “rip-off to the L.A. 
taxpayor.” While this angered her, encounters with rent control made her “blood boil.” At her apartment 
complex in West Hollywood, elderly tenants who “lived there for 15 years” refused to accept increases 
above “1960s levels.” She could barely make a profit thanks to rent control, and wanted to “tear this building 
down” and sell it. “Where are our rights?” she pleaded.104 Such whining did not engender popular sympathy. 
Luckily for landlords, they found a perfect test case in Mary Simonson. In her late eighties, the partially 
deaf landlord owned an apartment complex in West Hollywood for over 20 years. In 1985, she attempted 
to raise rents from $72 to $206, a whopping 280% increase. Claiming her “medical bills were spiraling out 
of control,” she insisted that the increase was necessary for her “survival.” When the commission rejected 
the request, WHCC and AOA activists rushed to her aid. “We have to look and see if the courts can provide 
Mrs. Simonson with the fair return this city has denied her,” her lawyer proclaimed.105 In Simonson, 
landlords found a sympathetic figure. Her age and frailty gave landlords a powerful spokeswoman. Indeed, 
AOA representative Craig Mordohl, who was assigned the case, made a point of introducing her to State 
Senator David Roberti in order to “show that we’re not all ogres.”106  
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Her defense team argued that Simonson had neglected to raise rents systematically for twenty years. 
As a result, rates in her building were far lower than those of comparable complexes. Rent control locked 
her into rates historically below the marketplace. In March of 1987, Judge David Rothman ruled in her 
favor. “When the commission is determining whether a landlord is making a fair return from a rental unit,” 
he explained, “it must take into account the rents of comparable units in the surrounding area.” The 
significance of the concession was not lost on landlords. Grafton Tanquary bragged that the “extraordinary 
decision could affect rent control laws throughout California…The City Council and the rent commission 
are finally learning that they are not a law unto themselves.” In West Hollywood, over 30% of the rental 
stock might be classified as “historically low,” and would now be helped by “comparisons with higher-rent 
apartments.”107 The commission awkwardly fought the ruling. In July of 1987, they approved modest 
increases for Simonson, highlighting her personal circumstances. At the same time, however, they argued 
it was wrong to compare complexes.108 In 1988, a second court ruled in Simonson’s favor, who died the 
following year. In 1990, a final ruling validated Simonson and permitted her estate to raise rents to full 
market value, nearly $550 per unit. Representatives of WHCC and AOA predicted ordinances elsewhere 
were doomed. Mayor Heilman did not mask his frustrations. “I’m very troubled,” he told reporters, “that 
the court seems to be totally oblivious to what is going to happen to the tenants of that building, many of 
whom are old and will be devastated.”109  
 Was rent control now dead in West Hollywood? Yes and no. The ordinance remained on the books, 
but the Simonson case punched a catastrophic hole in its exterior. If West Hollywood was a homogenously 
planned community, it might have avoided ruinous effects. But it wasn’t. Low-income apartments existed 
alongside condominiums and high-end rentals. The hodgepodge history of development in the area worked 
to benefit of landlords. More fatally, so did the pro-growth policies of the city council. Rent control eroded 
in West Hollywood as leaders sought an influx of private investment and high-end growth. 
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“Putting Our Best Foot Forward”: Redevelopment and the Marketing of West Hollywood   
 As it developed after 1985, pro-growth austerity policies came to dominate urban planning in West 
Hollywood. To an extent, this was inevitable. The erosion of public investment in L.A. County necessitated 
alternative solutions to urban problems. In Watts, East L.A., and Skid Row, social activists were compelled 
to seek support from corporate entities instead of the state.110 Queers in West Hollywood followed suit. At 
the same time, however, they strengthened austerity politics by tying sexuality to the marketplace. 
Dissociating queer politics and progressive economics, business boosters encouraged policies which 
gentrified neighborhoods in the name of gay rights. Through an ambitious marketing plan, boosters 
reshaped the meaning of gay space and politics.  
 Although the WHCC condemned the “socialistic” policies of the council, in fact the business lobby 
was never far from power. Developers sought to influence planning decisions, demanding “pro-growth” 
and “pro-business” policies. In an open letter, one lobbyist shared results from a “recent survey.” Asked 
“how business persons view West Hollywood,” the survey indicated that it suffered from its progressive 
reputation. “We are perceived as anti-religious socialists who think making money is for the purpose solely 
of feeding the needs of homosexuals and senior citizens,” he argued. One developer believed the city was 
“a joke to the outside world.” Another warned that, since West Hollywood “land is too valuable to remain 
unimproved,” large-scale development was inevitable. The “small urban bedroom community” would be 
wise to “embrace growth.” Despite their attempts at moderation, councilmembers were seen as hostile to 
free enterprise. If they wanted to change course, they should follow some “sage advice.” In “all decisions, 
give some thought to the business community…In other words, THINK BUSINESS along with all other 
strata of this community. DO NOT FORGET BUSINESS!” Boosters assured that queer and commercial 
identifies could be fused. “We need to stress our strengths in the fields of design, entertainment, restaurants, 
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and retail,” one explained.111 Queer developer Sheldon Adelson agreed, noting that West Hollywood was 
“naturally suited” for high-end retail and design. “My God,” he exclaimed, “if we can’t have it here we 
shouldn’t have it anywhere.”112 The development of West Hollywood, in other words, did not threaten the 
queer character of the city. Moreover, it offered security. The “primary thing businesses look for,” one man 
explained, “is stability. We don’t have a surplus of that right now in our city. What we do have is tacky-
looking streets” and “rent control. I can’t think of any single thing that could be worse, so far as harming 
investment.”113 This argument was appealing, especially considering the numerous public embarrassments 
the council had suffered since incorporation.  
Indeed, when it came to administration, councilmembers stumbled. Since the first council meeting, 
they struggled to develop a sustainable stream of revenue. The windfall that Ron Stone promised never 
developed. Instead, leaders worked nonstop to avoid catastrophic cuts to social services. The GCSC was 
often in danger. When the county reduced the organization’s funding in early 1985, a meltdown seemed 
likely. The reductions were, of course, a result of incorporation: as was the case with other cities, West 
Hollywood now needed to contribute more for its services. The council appears to have done little in way 
of preparation. In light of the precarious position, Supervisor Edelman awarded $143,000 in emergency 
funds.114 Around the same time, GCSC organizers were warned by county officials that they could “not 
undertake any new projects or programs in the incorporated limits of the City of West Hollywood.” Only 
the council could authorize those now.115 The reliance on “emergency funds” became routine. When asked 
to justify these awards, Edelman admitted bluntly that the council had “no solution to offset gaps in 
funding.” If he did not intervene, vital services would shut down.116 Still, a close aide accused his boss of 
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being “gratuitously generous.”117 With awards “in excess of $800,000 per year,” he warned that other 
constituents might feel neglected.118 With “no anticipated revenue from [the] City,” Edelman countered, he 
had no choice but to intervene.119  
In other ways, councilmembers seemed ill-equipped for governance. In March of 1985 they faced 
eviction from City Hall. Owned by the county, the building was part of a public park. Since “a temporary 
city hall is not a park purpose,” councilmembers were informed, “the county may be forced to follow 
through with an eviction.” Facing bureaucratic homelessness, they appealed to Edelman to “pull some 
strings” and forestall a decision.120 He stalled until a new location could be found. Shortly after, however, 
councilmembers waded into another embarrassment when they refused to contribute to the funding of parks. 
An indefinite request that the county “maintain all West Hollywood parks,” one aide fumed, was “unfair,” 
especially since “we have gratuitously been spending several hundreds of thousands of dollars in West 
Hollywood since incorporation.” The county had assisted with “CDBG funding of community groups,” 
“road projects,” “space for a city hall,” and the “less-than-friendly Sheriff’s office.” This “latest request for 
park revenue [was] offensive.”121 City leaders had grown accustomed to relying on the county. Like newly 
emancipated teenagers, they sometimes resisted paying their bills. When questioned, moreover, they could 
become defensive. In response to “a rumor that [Edelman] was going to cut off CDBG funds to West 
Hollywood,” Steve Schulte angrily confronted his office and accused the supervisor of “reallocating funds 
to assist East Los Angeles projects.” In this instance, the rumor was unfounded, but annoyed aides elected 
to keep Schulte guessing. “Our office’s policy is to continue funding programs in West Hollywood,” they 
responded, “while we inventory what we are providing on a case by case basis.”122 One observer admitted 
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that the council “stumbled often, sometimes badly.”123 To a prominent developer, it was clear that “the 
council [did] not know what they are doing.”124 The business lobby exploited these views. 
Unsurprisingly, Steve Schulte boosted pro-development interests. Close with Sheldon Andelson 
and MECLA, his mastery of sexual coalition-building helped to advance pro-business planning in queer 
ways. When he ran for a council seat in 1984, Schulte emphasized his identity as a gay man while muting 
his economic views (recall he was the only non-CES candidate to win a seat). In a serious blunder, Schulte 
opposed Councilwoman Peggy Stevenson in 1985. Already locked in a bitter race against Democrat 
Michael Woo, Schulte’s brief entry brought sexuality to the forefront of the race. While Stevenson reminded 
voters that she “led the fight to win adoption of the City’s gay and lesbian anti-discrimination law,” Woo 
worked to gain the endorsement of the SCHMC.125 After he decried Stevenson as a power-hungry witch, 
Schulte dropped out to focus on reelection in West Hollywood.126 In a final stab at Stevenson, however, he 
helped Woo secure endorsements from the local Log Cabin Republican Club and Don Slater.127 His queer 
contacts were decidedly more conservative. 
Back home, Schulte worked to expand his support in preparation of the 1986 elections. At a 
combined birthday party and campaign fundraiser at the Crystal Ballroom of the Beverly Hills Hotel, 
Schulte offered “gourmet cocktails” and “Birthday cakes created by West Hollywood’s finest restaurants” 
to donors in exchange for mandatory “gifts” of $175.128 His courting of developers earned him rebuke from 
Larry Gross. When Schulte had the nerve to seek CES support, Gross flatly denied, explaining that Schulte’s 
support of “political moderates, businessmen,” and “pro-development policies” was at odds with the 
organization. Recognizing his popularity in the community, however, Gross promised “not to tell people to 
vote against you,” but warned that it would be unwise to “turn back the clock to the days when special 
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interests and landlords ruled West Hollywood.”129An anonymous election flier agreed, listing several 
“reasons not to vote for Schulte.” Among these, the councilman flaunted “questionable ethics,” sought the 
“backing of landlords,” appointed “right-wing and real estate” interests to city posts, and “voted against 
residents in favor of business.”130 These charges had merit. While he sought CES backing, Schulte reached 
out to the WHCC, promising to represent “all segments of the community.”131 To queer voters, he touted 
endorsements from the West Hollywood Democratic and Republican clubs, the SDC, MECLA, the 
SCHMC, and Don Slater.132 Some were deviously achieved. For instance, in a case of “deft political 
hardball,” Schulte had “convinced more than a dozen” supporters to join the SDC days before it held a vote 
on endorsements. The influx of pro-Schulte votes pushed him over the edge, a result he was “gleefully coy” 
about.133 His chameleon politics aided development interests. 
 Upon his selection as Mayor in 1986, Schulte lobbied for, and won support of, a publically-funded 
$450,000 marketing campaign to shore up the city’s image. This became the West Hollywood 
Redevelopment Agency (WHRA). Business leaders explained that investment would promote growth and 
provide respect. Again, they ridiculed the city’s reputation. “Call it a municipal Rodney Dangerfield 
complex,” one elaborated. “It’s the little things that add up, like hearing about President Reagan dining at 
Chasen’s in Beverly Hills, when the restaurant is in West Hollywood.” The WHRA would give the city a 
second chance. Its chairman, realtor and CREA member Ron Kates, explained that “West Hollywood has 
never had a clear identity.” This effort would “establish the city as the contemporary, urban, cultural center 
that it is.” Along with “more than 20 of the community’s business leaders,” Kates would tout the city “as 
one of the West Coast’s leading centers for design and entertainment industries, as well as home to some 
of the finest restaurants, hotels and retail stores in the Los Angeles area.” The investment established a 
powerful public authority that was controlled by private development interests. For a city struggling to pay 
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its bills, the $450,000 price tag was not inconsequential, a fact Mayor Steve Schulte tried to justify. “There 
are some distinctive features of West Hollywood that we, in a positive sense, would like the world to know 
more about,” he explained. “This will allow us to put our best foot forward.”134 The argument was specious: 
West Hollywood did possess urban identities prior to 1986. Kates and Schulte were not so much creating 
as rewriting. 
In her examination of U.S. public authorities, Gail Radford concluded that such agencies were 
“guided by the logic of the market, an inevitability given that attending to their revenue flow is their only 
assured path to continued existence.”135 With the primary goals of increased property values in mind, 
WHRA designers and developers utilized public resources to promote retail growth. An early project was 
the redevelopment of Santa Monica Boulevard. Prior to incorporation, residents complained of traffic 
congestion along the corridor, ye many were opposed to a widening project, which some likened to 
“building a freeway in the heart of our city.”136 The county stonewalled widening plans with endless 
environmental hearings. The “loss of public space and parks,” Edelman argued, was too costly. Instead he 
began plans to publicly acquire land along the boulevard, where additional public parks could be built.137 
The scheme was interrupted by cityhood. In 1986, the council viewed Santa Monica Boulevard as an ideal 
stretch of the local tourist and retail economy.138 Wrangling the land from the county became a priority. At 
a meeting with county officials, city leaders went on the attack. County aides thought them “way out of 
line,” especially considering Edelman’s promise to recognize city authority. When Councilman Viterbi 
suggested Edelman put that pledge in writing, an incensed aide asked: “You really don’t trust us, do you?” 
Hoping to avoid further conflict, Edelman withdrew his acquisition scheme. The city took possession of 
the land, which was sold to commercial interests. An Edelman aide surmised that the “bungling” council 
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had erred. “Had we condemned and acquired the land,” he pointed out, “at least it would have been public 
property…Through their distrust the new Council may have outsmarted themselves.”139 But he was wrong. 
Commercial redevelopment was part of the plan. The WHRA redeveloped the boulevard with high-end 
retail shops, restaurants, and lofts.140 The fate of the boulevard began a trend.   
 Neighborhood residents noticed the new direction, and many spoke out. “Something strange is 
happening,” a man remarked in The Advocate. “You can’t get much more Democratic than West Hollywood 
[but] the City has fallen prey to some sort of wishful thinking…they call it ‘image-building.’” He lamented 
that West Hollywood was “jointly run by the city and its business community.” While leaders claimed the 
WHRA was an “image-improvement program,” a “power grab” was more apt. “If it sounds like the 
consultants and developers are trying to have their cake and eat it too,” he shrewdly pointed out, “that’s 
their job.”141 “Image seems to be a favorite topic around town recently,” one woman complained. “I’m 
concerned that many people seem to equate ‘cleaning up our image’ with downplaying our population. We 
founded this city on the basis of individual rights, specifically renters, seniors and gays. Yet, suddenly 
people are worried that families will not want to come to West Hollywood with their children. Why is this 
a concern?” The city was “not Anaheim, Torrance, or Woodland Hills. We came to West Hollywood 
because it is a safe environment for us, the seniors, the immigrants, the young singles, the gays, the poor. 
This is what makes West Hollywood unique, and that is the image we should be proud of” she insisted.142  
 Queers took special aim at Schulte. The “pompous pretty boy,” wrote one, had ceased being a 
“humble servant of the people” and had become a “ruthless opportunist.”143 “Any gay or lesbian voter who 
votes for Steve Schulte,” warned another, “will get what they deserve: more of the same worthless, 
directionless posturing and probably a lot more out-and-out vote selling. When I hear gay men say they are 
voting for Schulte because he is ‘cute’ or because he goes to their gym, I get sick to my stomach,” he 
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confessed. “If this is how gays will make their voting decisions, I pity the community…Isn’t it time we 
started using criteria like qualifications and honesty instead of who shows the biggest bulge?”144 Likewise, 
West Hollywood Democratic Club member Marshal Philips suggested that “homosexuals, like Jews, do not 
form a single power base which is monolithic in its interests.” A “majority of homosexuals in West 
Hollywood are renters. Gays, like everyone else, should vote their economic interests.”145 Despite 
complaints, business politics remained ascendant in 1980s West Hollywood. In Frontiers, an astute 
observer noted that business interests were deeply intertwined with the city’s leadership. “The voters of 
West Hollywood are liberal” and “most are renters,” he explained. Conservatives candidates “were not 
possible” unless they were queer. “In a gay constituency, being gay is a plus,” regardless of ideological 
views. Schulte “appealed heavily to gays” despite his “strong ties with the Westside vote and the business 
establishment.”146 He was but one example. In the San Fernando Valley, the Valley Business Alliance 
advocated on behalf of queer business owners and “focused on mainstream problems like taxes…not Gay 
issues.”147 In 1987, Steve Schulte told The Advocate it was time to accept that “gay Camelot [was] 
maturing.” The “idealism of the early years” had being replaced by the “realities and politics” of the 
present.148 He had a good point. Throughout L.A. County, neighborhoods were redeveloping in the shadow 
of public disinvestment. From the Westside to Downton, L.A. had entered an era of “corporate 
modernism.”149 West Hollywood reflected and strengthened this trend.  
Alongside the WHRA, the council established another public authority to deal with housing. 
Composed of development and low-income advocates, the West Hollywood Community Housing 
Corporation (WHCHC) came to reinforce the mission of the WHRA by promoting high-end residential 
development. Prior it its establishment, councilmembers joined a HUD program for small cities. Through 
                                                          
144 R. Boninger, “Making Gay Voting Decisions,” Los Angeles Post, 2 April 1986. RSC, box 9, folder 5. 
145 Marshal Philips, Los Angeles Post, 21 August 1986. RSC, box 5, folder 4. 
146 “Playing Political Hardball in West Hollywood,” Frontiers, 2 April 1986. RSC, box 5, folder 4. 
147 Aide to Edmund Edelman, 18 April 1988. EDE, box 250, folder 4. 
148 “Schulte Speaks,” The Advocate, 26 May 1987. 
149 Don Parson, Making a Better World: Public Housing, the Red Scare, and the Direction of Modern Los Angeles 
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 2005). 
259 
 
CDBG grants, it offered public resources for low-cost housing construction. A HUD representative, 
however, concluded that West Hollywood was “ineligible to become a participating city [because] it was 
incorporated after the [program] deadline.”150 After an appeal with Edelman, $600,000 in resources were 
offered to the city.151 These resources got the WHCHC off the ground. The council believed this “nine-
member, non-profit corporation” would function “like any private developer.” Ideally, “all profits [would] 
be funneled back into the corporation to help finance new projects.” The operating budget for the WHCHC 
proved significant; administrative costs alone exceeded $100,000 annually.152  
According to one WHCHC brochure, the agency aimed to be “the primary producer of subsidized, 
affordable housing” in West Hollywood. Through new construction and rehabilitations, it made “efficient 
use of scarce public and private financing by carefully controlling costs.” Indeed, the WHCHC did embark 
on affordable housing construction. Four years after its creation, it touted five housing projects in the 
neighborhood which served seniors, persons with AIDS, and other low-income renters. The combined 
number of units for these projects, however, was a paltry 106. While it celebrated low-income development, 
the WHCHC never came close to satisfying needs. It proved more successful in its second goal, promoting 
“architecturally distinguished buildings that reflect and complement the surrounding neighborhood.”153 
Attention to design was a costly priority. At one WHCHC board meeting, members were criticized by City 
Housing Manager Dan Cohen. “Not one of you has mentioned the term ‘affordable housing,’” he scolded. 
The “efforts to encourage better designed apartment buildings may lead to an unpleasant side effect: the 
construction of fewer affordable housing units,” he explained.154  
The prioritization of high-design emerged from corporate and grassroots activists. Architect and 
social activist Jim Bonar designed many projects, and considered his work progressive. A self-described 
“architect to the poor and disadvantaged,” his design philosophy was developed in contrast to the urban 
                                                          
150 Jan Pollard to Fredericj Bien, 13 February 1985. EDE, box 1061, folder 1. 
151 John F. Shirley to P. Brotzman, 14 May 1985. EDE, box 528, folder 1. 
152 “Council Oks Non-Profit Corporation,” Los Angeles Post, 2 October 1986. RSC, box 5, folder 15. 
153 West Hollywood Community Housing Corporation brochure, undated. JBP, box 1. 
154 “Planners Warned on Designs,” Los Angeles Post, 11 December 1986. RSC, box 5, folder 15. 
260 
 
renewal efforts of the 1960s. He rejected traditional public housing projects, believing them to be “just 
awful” in design. In contrast, Bonar was “fascinated with the notion of people helping themselves thorough 
a democratic approach.” Working first through the Los Angeles Community Design Center, he launched 
his own architectural firm, Cavaedium, around the time he became a primary consultant in West 
Hollywood. A metropolitan activist, he worked to design attractive housing for low-income Angelenos in 
Downtown, East L.A., and West Hollywood.155 “Non-profit housing corporations,” an officials explained, 
“can rehabilitate and build more economically and efficiently than both municipalities and county 
agencies.” Cooperation with private developers made the WHCHC “more thoughtful and detailed” in 
housing construction. In a progressive city like West Hollywood, moreover, developments were opened to 
“disadvantaged people,” especially seniors, low-income families, and persons with AIDS.156  Indeed, this 
was one area in which AIDS activists praised the council. “As citizens, we must show as great a level of 
commitment toward affordable housing and people living with AIDS,” one advocate wrote. “West 
Hollywood and WHCHC should be proud of the innovative projects being built in our city.”157 The AIDS 
Healthcare Foundation became a visible partner in the endeavor. According to one source, it “evolved from 
a small group of friends” into “a multi-million dollar agency.” Its budget was supported by some public 
grants, but mostly private donors. The “Keepers of the Flame” donor level, for instance, required a 
commitment of $5,000. Additionally, donors were encouraged to grant funds through stocks and bonds, 
IRA accounts, living trusts, and reverse mortgages.158  Partnered with WHCHC, it funded stylish housing 
for persons with AIDS, including Linn House.  
Architect Jim Bonar designed this 25-unit complex to blend in with the community. Since the 
surrounding area “consisted of single family residences and courtyard housing,” he designed Linn House 
“with the character of a two story home” which made it “compatible with neighboring 1930s and 40s 
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Spanish style homes.” When the project encountered “NIMBYism,” architects “walked door to door, spoke 
with residents, held community meetings, and sought support.” Bonar recalled going out of his way to 
distinguish Linn House with “public housing” projects.159 The results were impressive. Residents and 
observers commended the project for its “homelike atmosphere” and availability to individuals of all 
incomes. One reviewer noted that, “with its varied roof lines, Linn House resembles three houses that have 
been joined together for an extended family. At no point does it feel like a typically institutional medical-
care environment.” The “ingenuity” in design allowed AIDS to “be fought on many fronts…in the 
neighborhood.”160 In Edge, another lauded the “comfortable” and “soothing atmosphere” of the project. 
“The feel of the interior of the house,” he explained, “is extremely pleasant to the eyes…The result is a 
welcoming, warm, and homey shelter.” The walls of Linn House were decorated with still-life drawings 
donated by U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein. “A lot of these people, they’re still alive and so appreciative that 
somebody is giving them more than just a bed to sleep in,” she observed. “Emotionally comfortable: That’s 
probably the biggest key word here.” Importantly, cost was not a factor for applicants. “No one who needs 
care,” the Linn House director explained, “is turned away for inability to pay. We have people who are 
wealthy with means to pay for their own stay, as well as those with no insurance. Right now we have people 
who are homeless and are here under county [aid].” Bonar’s design was lauded by fellow architects and 
won an American Institute of Architects Council Award.161 It was this attention to detail, however, that 
abetted true weakness. With a full capacity of only 25 units, the small project did not come close to meeting 
demand and Bonar admitted it was “barely a drop in the bucket.”162 Despite good intentions, the WHCHC 
never developed large solutions to the housing problems of West Hollywood.  
Indeed, even as small projects were completed, the housing crisis worsened. The rising homeless 
population in West Hollywood became a visible indicator that the city had strayed from its promise. “The 
walking homeless,” one observer lamented, “have become missing persons: missing from our 
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consciousness and our deliberations.” Through bureaucratic creations like the WHCHC, leaders “built a 
wall between ourselves and those who have no place to lay their heads. The homeless demand shelter, not 
excuses.”163 Questioning the actions of the WHRA and WHCHC, one man was “all for helping the 
homeless” but wondered if “tearing down [buildings] caused the homeless situation for those who cannot 
afford the high-priced condominiums which replaced the apartments.”164 Not even the “rise of high design,” 
one columnist in the Post opined, could “dim our delight in the mean, mean streets of West Hollywood.” 
The existence of scores of homeless individuals discredited West Hollywood’s progressive reputation.165 
In light of these critiques, councilmembers exacerbated the problem. 
In 1986, the council gutted its homeless shelter program. “This decision will radically alter the 
City’s program,” one official warned. Ironically, although the council made decisions, she blamed the 
county. The cuts could be avoided, she thought, “pending Supervisor Edelman’s decision…to retain the 
funds.”166 Her understanding of the budget was misguided. As an independent city, West Hollywood 
decided how to allocate funds, not Edelman. But city leaders encouraged this mistaken view. At one 
meeting, Steve Schulte and John Heilman “complained that the city may be spending too much money on 
social programs.” Heilman believed the city was spending “an awful lot of money per person” and Schulte 
noted that “helping the homeless is primarily the ‘responsibility’ of the County.”167 In response, one aide 
advised Edelman to “make no commitments [to West Hollywood]. All you’ve gotten is nothing but grief 
for your assistance…in return, the County’s always made to be the ‘bad guy.’”168 By 1987, councilmembers 
introduced the “Help the Homeless” program in response to mounting criticism. It established two “drop-
in centers” at public parks which offered “information on where [the homeless] can receive clothing, food 
vouchers, employment training and a number of other services.” Even the program’s coordinator admitted 
its ineffectiveness. “The primary focus,” she admitted, “is to gather statistical information on the homeless. 
                                                          
163 T. Anderson, “Letters,” Los Angeles Post, 27 March 1986. RSC, box 5, folder 14. 
164 K.S., “Letters,” Los Angeles Post, 12 March 1987. RSC, box 5 folder 14. 
165 R.L.V., “Mean Streets,” Los Angeles Post, 7 November 1985. RSC, box 8, folder 8.  
166 Letter, 15 July 1986. RSC, box 5, folder 14. 
167 B.K. Stinshoff, “Social Services Priorities Criticized,” Los Angeles Post, 12 March 1987. RSC, box 5, folder 14. 
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It is nothing more than a Band-Aid program.”169 Here was a homeless program that housed no one. City 
leaders were not unique in their feebleness. In one speech, L.A. Deputy Mayor Grace Davis admitted that 
“current budget cuts suggested by President Reagan will limit our ability to provide any services to the 
homeless.” With no escape from austerity in sight “the problem of homelessness in Los Angeles County 
and the nation will not disappear.” Recognizing the permanent loss of public finds, she suggested 
“partnerships” with private entities would become ever more important.170 
By the late 1980s, West Hollywood had gone the way of the county. Instead of resisting the 
austerity measures which had launched its being, the city solidified them. This earned an ironic chastisement 
from Ron Stone, the leader of incorporation. Suffering from AIDS, he penned a despondent open letter 
shortly before his death. He remained committed to the promise of incorporation. Rent control and 
affordable housing were the only “methods by which the most basic level of government [could] address 
economic injustice.” While some argued that “rent control might not be the winning straw” it was “the only 
straw within reach.” Activists “ought to be damn glad that [West Hollywood] was willing to accept the 
risks and hold the line on something so basic as housing.” But The 1980s had turned out differently than 
he’d hoped. “When we see the homeless and the destitute,” he bemoaned, “we cry out that this new devil-
take-the-hindmost attitude across the land has to stop! This new philosophy of greed has got to be turned 
around! There have to be controls on our drift towards a society divided into millionaires and misery.”171 
As he put pen to paper, Stone might have second-guessed his decision to help unite queer progressives and 
business leaders. In the end, activists were naïve to think they could combat the urban crises of the 
metropolis by retreating. Rather than solve those problems, West Hollywood exacerbated them. Moreover, 
queer urban renewal strengthened conservative arguments about the city. Rather than seek a return of public 
investment, queers came to champion privatization.
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Conclusions 
In November 2014, Democratic candidate Shiela Kuehl was elected to Ed Edelman’s old seat on 
the L.A. County Board of Supervisors. It was serendipitous: Edelman’s retirement in 1994 after twenty 
years on the Board coincided with Kuehl’s political rise to fame. With the exception of Valerie Terrigno, 
she was one of the most prominent lesbian politicians in the nation. “My experiences in the gay and lesbian 
community,” she argued, “prepare me to combat discrimination for all” Angelenos.1 She served in the State 
Assembly until 2000, when she won a State Senate seat, replacing progressive CES-champion Tom Hayden. 
Still, her 2014 supervisorial race was the highlight of her career. “It’s the biggest job I’ll ever have,” she 
confessed. “Being one of five is important…especially running something the size of Ohio.” Winning the 
seat was no cakewalk. Santa Monica City Councilman Bobby Shriver proved a serious challenger. The 
older brother of Maria Shriver, he amplified his Kennedy roots in the campaign and won major 
endorsements, including that of New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg (who also contributed $100,000). 
Kuehl’s progressive record, however, won her local support. Democratic clubs enthusiastically backed her, 
as did U.S. Congressman Henry Waxman. Most importantly, in West Hollywood, she routed Shriver. 
Winning overall with just 53% of the vote, her strong margins in “America’s first gay city” put her over the 
top. The press celebrated her as the “first openly gay member of the county board.” Finally, it seemed, 
lesbians and gays had broken through at the county level.2 That assumption belied local queer history. In 
taking her seat on the County Board of Supervisors, Kuehl reentered the political home for queers in L.A.  
For a brief but productive moment in the 1970s, queers utilized the liberal welfare state to grow 
gay liberation in L.A. County. Public financing allowed activists to focus on two central aspects of the 
movement: economic justice and queer family legitimacy. By the mid-1980s, thanks largely to external 
pressures, the state ceased being the chief benefactor of gay activism. Instead, the private marketplace-
                                                          
1 Lillian Faderman & Stuart Timmons, Gay L.A.: A History of Sexual outlaws, Power Politics, and Lipstick Lesbians 
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development interests and corporate entities-were given control of the movement. When this occurred, the 
two priorities of gay liberation were separated. The quest for queer family rights, in the form of marriage 
equality and parental rights, continued, while the emphasis on economic justice was muted. In the 1970s, 
activists persuasively argued that these priorities relied upon one another. How can a family gain security 
in the face of homelessness? In hindsight, the strategy of queer privatization proved unsuccessful. In L.A. 
County, the state, not the marketplace, proved the best conduit for gay rights. The experiences of queers in 
this study urge historians to tell urban, political, and sexual stories in new ways.  
They encourage scholars to revisit the “origins of the urban crisis” and move beyond race in urban 
studies. While it is true that the roots of the urban crisis run deep and long, scholars need to pay greater 
attention to the transformation of urban policies in the 1970s and 1980s. Thanks in part to Thomas Sugrue’s 
The Origin of the Urban Crisis, historians have gravitated towards declentionist tales of the city in modern 
America. From this perspective, the Tax Revolt of the 1970s and the turn towards austerity in the 1980s 
were set in motion in the 1940s. Elsewhere, Sugrue has argued that, “if American cities ever had a golden 
age, it certainly was not the 1970s.” The decade simply lacked “a coherent urban policy” and failed to 
produce “any significant urban initiatives.”3 Yet, for the activists in this study, urban programs were 
working in the 1970s. While the shadow of the Tax Revolt has obscured them from view, CDBG and CETA 
programs enabled activists to improve their lives and communities. Much like the public housing projects 
studied by Nicholas Dagen Bloom, they worked because activists maintained community control.4 And, 
while racial minorities have remained central to stories of urban decline, this narrative shows how the urban 
crisis cut beyond race. Low-income lesbians and gays, regardless of their race, also felt the sting of 
privatization. Historians need to incorporate them into broader urban narratives. 
                                                          
3 See Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996) and Sugrue, “Carter’s Urban Policy Crisis,” in Gary M. Fink & Hugh Davis 
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University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
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 The experiences of queer Angelenos can also shape the way we write about modern American 
politics. For too long, historians have been obsessed with the “origins of the New Right” in the 1970s and 
1980s. This has obscured important liberal transformations which deserve attention. Even after the failed 
presidential bid of George McGovern in 1972 (which is usually where stories of liberalism go to die), the 
Democratic Party expanded in multicultural ways. Long before the 1990s and the recent movement for 
marriage equality, queers were active players in the reshaping of liberal politics. This has been largely 
forgotten by both queer scholars and liberal historians. This study joins other attempts to incorporate 
lesbians and gays into mainstream liberal history in order to demonstrate their shared interests.5 When 
Democrats like Ed Edelman diversified their liberal tents, when they made the party inclusive rather than 
exclusive, liberal programs worked better. Rather than treat queers as conservative or liberal political foils, 
we should incorporate them into the hearts of our political histories. 
 Lastly, the struggles of queer activists in L.A. emphasize the necessity of a strong welfare state to 
the development of gay rights in America. Queer historians have done an excellent job documenting the 
oppressive history of the state. Subject to harassment, brutality, and economic discrimination, lesbians and 
gays have rightly been suspicious of state institutions and power.6 That important history should not blind 
us from moments of state success and cooperation. In the 1970s, funding agencies were fundamental to the 
provision of social services for lesbians and gays in L.A. County. Whether or not county officials were 
homophobic, they supplied resources which provided shelter for homeless gay drifters and provided 
lesbians with job training. This deserves to be remembered by scholars and activists alike. If the gay rights 
movement is to move beyond marriage and promote an inclusive economic agenda, queers will need to 
work alongside others to strengthen the welfare state in America. 
                                                          
5 These include Jonathan Bell, California Crucible: The Forging of Modern Liberalism (Philadelphia: The 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012) and Timothy Stewart-Winter, Queer Clout: Chicago and the Rise of Gay 
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2009). 
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The recent struggles of Queers for Economic Justice (QEJ) illustrate some of these lessons. In 2002, 
QEJ set out to combat homelessness and poverty in New York City. Much like the Angelenos documented 
in these pages, they argued that queer rights and economic rights were mutually inclusive. “For many of 
us,” one activist explained, “QEJ is a statement. We wanted to try to build something that assumed a 
different set of priorities, that talked about homelessness, that talked about poverty, that talked about race 
and sexuality.” Despite innovative activism and a dedicated staff, QEJ closed its doors in 2014. While it 
“always had a loyal and committed group of donors,” it “wasn’t enough to keep [the organization] afloat.”7 
The collapse of QEJ stemmed from multiple problems, yet the lack of a viable public funding strategy was 
especially damning. In this QEJ and West Hollywood have much in common. While conservatives have 
long argued welfare be relegated to the private sphere, in actuality the private marketplace has never proven 
remarkably effective at addressing homelessness and poverty. Alone, it cannot adequately support the needs 
of the marginalized. There is still another lesson to be gleamed from QEJ. Despite the severe obstacles, the 
dedicated activists who comprised the organization’s ranks demonstrate that the spirit of gay liberation 
remains alive. And, in the words of Supervisor Ed Edelman, it remains worthy of investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 “Queers for Economic Justice Closes Doors,” Autostraddle, 24 February 2014. (Web: 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Los Angeles County, circa 1990. This map shows city boundaries within the county. The fairly 
shaded area indicates the city limits of L.A., while the darker area reveals West Hollywood, which is 
surrounded by L.A. and Beverly Hills.   
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Figure 2: Queer housing patterns in Greater Los Angeles, 1974-1980. While West Hollywood became 
associated with lesbians and gays throughout the 1970s and 1980s, queers lived in most corners of the 
metropolis. Since census data does not account for sexuality, determining where people lived is difficult. 
Nevertheless, organizational records offer clues. Utilizing records from the Gay Community Services 
Center and the Stonewall Democratic Club, this map reveals “home addresses” for queer activists from 
1974-1980. Dots represent addresses that were listed on organizational forms or meeting minutes. As the 
map reveals, queers could be found outside Greater Hollywood in great numbers. 
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Figure 3: Locations of queer housing shelters and political clubs, 1968-1984. As this map indicates, the 
Greater Hollywood area housed the majority of the queer organizations examined in this study, which 
helped associate the area with gay activism. Map key: stars: liberation house; B: Boyle Home location; F: 
L.A. Gay Liberation Front headquarters; G: Gay Community Services Center locations; H: the Hoover 
Street commune; HH: Hudson House locations; S: Stonewall Democratic Club; U: United States Mission.   
 
 
Figure 4: West Hollywood city boundaries after 1984. While queers were used to metropolitan politics, 
incorporation confined them to much smaller political boundaries. Map data © 2016 Google Maps 
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